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The purpose of the study is to contribute to our understanding of innovation 
processes. The overarching research question has been: How do innovation 
processes evolve over time, and, in particular, how are knowledge and 
technology developed and commercialised? 
 
Through an ethnographic case study of innovation in between the biomarine 
and agricultural industries, I have traced and observed an innovation process 
from idea to commercialisation. Thus, the rich descriptions of this complex 
phenomenon are a central contribution from this study. Starting out with the 
development of a couple of novel technologies for processing fish, and 
establishing a collaboration between Tine (dairy/agriculture cooperative) and 
Bremnes Seashore (fish farm), the process ended up with what is now well 
known in Norwegian supermarkets and restaurants as ‘Salma’. This 
innovation process was related to industrial change within both the aqua- and 
agriculture industries, stimulated by the research policy on ‘blue-green’ 
innovation. Thus, it is both a detailed ‘inside account’ of an innovation 
process, and an example of how various local interactions may take part in 
shaping institutional/industrial change.  
 
I have used the methodological and analytical tools of actor-network theory 
in the study, as I have ‘followed the actors’ as they strived to move the 
innovation towards realisation. An analytical scheme has been developed in 
interaction between the empirical data and my theoretical basis. This scheme 
has then been used to analyse, and theorise about, the case study, and in this 
way both challenge and complement existing theory on innovation 
processes. From this, it is suggested that innovation processes are 
characterised by uncertainty and controversy, in particular in the interaction 
between the mobilising of actors-networks and the exploration of 
knowledge. Moreover, the uncertainty and controversy are increased by the 
fact that the innovation process is situated within a network of 
interconnected processes. Some theoretical implications for the theory of 
innovation processes are suggested in relation to (1) the mobilisation of 
actors, resources and decisions towards innovation, (2) the exploration of 
knowledge to realise innovations, and (3) the interaction between 
mobilisation and exploration processes on the one hand, and between 
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This need to make, to create, to invent is, no doubt,  










1 Understanding innovation as process 
Innovation is a popular, yet problematic word within different public 
discourses today; politicians compete in proclaiming their nation or region in 
becoming more innovative than their neighbours, business associations and 
companies complain about the lack of suitable conditions for and efforts 
towards innovation in their environments, and economists, sociologists and 
technologists all claim to know something about what constitutes the keys to 
innovation. It is a rapidly growing field of research, particularly on 
aggregated levels, such as systems of innovation (Edquist, 2001; Lundvall et 
al., 2002), clusters (Porter, 1998) and various network-theories (e.g. Powell 
et al., 1996; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2001). Nevertheless, we still know 
very little about the ‘content’ of innovation processes, and we are unable to 
account for how innovation evolves in practice (Van de Ven et al., 1999; 
Garud & Karnøe, 2001; Gupta et al., 2007).  
 
1.1 Innovation in the making: A case study 
This thesis is a contribution to unpacking this black box, through its 
investigation of innovation processes and practices in one small sector of the 
business world: A Norwegian agricultural cooperative, Tine, and its 
counterparts in the agricultural and biomarine industries. It is an 
ethnographic case study of the organising of innovation processes, meaning 
the development and commercialisation of hybrid technologies and products 
between aquaculture and agriculture. What I am describing is the emergence 
of a possibility: The possibility of industrialising fish, and several (very 
early) attempts at doing so. From the scientific development of fish farming 
during the last three decades, fish has now become a controllable resource – 
the volumes, qualities and properties can now be manipulated and controlled 
at a large scale. The domestication of salmon during the past few decades 
represents a breakthrough in the large scale production of biomarine food, 
enabling the control of quality and quantity of a resource previously 
characterised by variable access (catch). Norwegian scientific communities 
together with Norwegian fish farmers have been at the forefront of this 
development, and fish is often described as the second most valuable 
resource in Norway, and hence what Norwegians are supposed to live off 
after the oil era. One of the most important and interesting questions 
emerging from the combination of these factors, is how the fish industry will 
be organised commercially. Will it continue to sell fish in bulk as a ‘raw 
material’ to processors and distributors globally, in spot-price auction-like 
markets? Or will the domestication of fish trigger a restructuration, not only 
of the sizes of fish farming actors, but also of the technical and commercial 
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practices of the industry? In other words, will there be an emergence of a 
food production industry based on fish, similar to what has existed for more 
than a hundred years within agriculture, alternatively a convergence of agro- 
and aquaculture? 
 
Within this setting, I have studied a particular attempt at developing and 
commercialising new products from fish, a set of processes that started out 
with ideas of fermentation of fish (making ‘salami’ of fish) on the one hand, 
and new technologies for processing fresh salmon on the other. In other 
words, it was an attempt at utilising knowledge and resources from one area 
within another: A creative scientist tried to use an agricultural technology, 
fermentation, to help industrialise the in Norway abundant raw material 
resource, fish. An agricultural cooperative sought new opportunities for 
business in the biomarine area, based on their established knowledge and 
technologies of industrial production and marketing of dairy products. In 
addition, a fish farm looked for ways to create more economic value from its 
new technologies for processing salmon of supreme quality.  
 
The product that during this process came to be named ‘SALMA Cured’ was 
in the most basic sense a combination of fish as raw material and 
fermentation as technology. Though it has many other uses, fermentation 
technology is normally used for making salami out of meat, and it is exactly 
this traditional salami recipe that served as the starting point for the project. 
Therefore, it has informally come to be called a salami, or sausage, among 
the project participants, and ‘fish salami’ will also be used in this thesis 
when referring to the more general idea of this invention, rather than to its 
various specific appearances and names throughout the project. However, at 
the time this thesis was being written, the product that the consumer could 
find in an increasing number of restaurants and supermarkets was very 
different: ‘SALMA Fresh’, loins of salmon of high-end quality. Still, as this 
thesis documents, the story behind this product is a lot more complex than 
the neatly designed transparent package of high-end salmon would suggest. 
It is a socio-material drama consisting of several partly overlapping 
episodes1, in which the actors struggled to cope with a set of challenging 
questions: How do you develop, realise and commercialise a food product 
that no one has heard of before? A product that falls entirely between 
established categories, both as it is perceived by consumers, and as it is 
organised in supermarkets and restaurants. Further, how do you make 
processing technologies work when they are applied to a new material? 
 
                                                     
1 For short introductions to the case, see Hoholm (2007) which emphasises cross-
professional aspects, and Hoholm & Huse (2008) which emphasises user-producer 
relationships (both in Norwegian).  
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During the initial period of farming and domesticating fish, it was not easy 
for single actors in the fish industry to develop practices outside their 
existing system of exchanging and distributing fish. This industry was raw 
material oriented, and lacked competence in processing, distribution and 
marketing. Due to the recent consolidation of the industry, a few of the 
largest actors could perhaps succeed through renegotiating deals with their 
biggest customers, and by dramatically expanding their competence on 
industrial production, product development and marketing. Yet, even then, it 
would be very demanding, since they could not ensure this would bring 
about added profitability. An alternative would be to integrate agricultural 
and aquacultural actors in a joint effort to make this new resource available 
through the agricultural industrial system. 
 
This case study demonstrates such an attempt to industrialise fish on 
agricultural premises. It is a case of making ‘meat’ of fish, an innovation 
project trying to impose agro-industrial practices on fish. In a way, this is a 
study of micro-practices: A partly ethnographic and partly historical case 
study of one project within a portfolio of several biomarine projects that 
Tine had initiated during the last decade. I closely examined these practices 
and processes of innovation, as they related to R&D, strategic management, 
production, distribution and marketing, describing the ‘heterogeneous 
engineering’ that took place across a number of professions, materials and 
collectives that made the project come alive in spite of trials, set-backs and 
shifts; processes that radically altered the project and its initial object(-ive). 
On the other hand, the ongoing micro-practices of realising this one concept 
should be viewed as a mutually constitutive part of what might become new 
industrial practices between agro- and aquaculture. It is an example of how a 
changing ‘macro-structure’ creates new opportunities, but also a bottom-up 
perspective of how new industrial and market practices are made. Scientists, 
technologists and suppliers from both sectors were enrolled in the project, 
bringing in their own knowledge and perspectives, raw materials from both 
domains were recombined in innovative and technically advanced ways, and 
the application of agricultural marketing practices to the products of 
aquacultural materials was attempted. 
 
The case study is then used to analyse and discuss the organising of 
industrial innovation processes in practice. Innovation is viewed as 
something that happens between sectors, knowledge areas, organisations and 
networks. This ‘in-between-ness’ not only opens up for new combinations, 
and hence, new business opportunities, but it also creates fundamental 
organising and marketing problems of ambiguity, de-stabilisation and 
complexity. In this respect, this case study is not unique, as arguably all 
innovation happens across many boundaries, whether they be between 
networks, sectors or organisations. Thus, this thesis presents a detailed and 
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situated study of a general phenomenon, namely industrial innovation. 
Innovation in this setting implies the development and commercialisation of 
knowledge and technology that then manifest themselves in new products 
and ingredients, and in new practices that cross, or re-organise, the 
traditional boundaries between agri- and aqua-culture. A dual dynamic came 
to the fore in my analysis of the case, between mobilising actor-networks on 
the one hand and exploring knowledge on the other. These ‘sub-processes’ 
of the larger innovation process sometimes drew on each other, other times 
they did not interact at all, and sometimes they came to confront each other – 
with potentially serious implications for the future of the innovation. In 
growing out of the empirical study, while also receiving clear inspiration 
from my methodological and theoretical frameworks, this dual dynamic 
became an ‘interpretative scheme’ from which I have structured a theorising 
discussion on innovation processes. 
 
1.2 Situating the study theoretically 
Innovation is a random phenomenon, it happens by chance. Innovation can 
be managed, organised and strategised. Through my journey of researching 
innovation, learning and organising, I have repeatedly met both these points 
of view among fellow researchers. Which is right? If innovation is random, 
then it has hardly any relevance to research, as there would be little to learn 
from each particular case, with regard to either successes or failures. Further, 
in practice, we see how actors actively and repeatedly engage in innovative 
projects. Why would they do so, if they had not had some kind of experience 
or belief that they could influence the outcome? If, on the other hand, 
innovation can be managed, controlled so to speak, then it is rather strange 
that research had not detected the laws or mechanisms of innovation long 
ago. In addition, we see how many innovation projects fail in practice, and 
furthermore end up being completely different from the initial intention/idea. 
So, if innovation is neither random, nor predictable, what is it then? What is 
this space in between, where innovation processes emerge, and sometimes 
succeed? Is it just about identifying what factors are manageable and which 
are outside our control? I think it is more difficult than that. I think we need 
to both acknowledge the (constraining) historicity and ‘pre-existence’ of 
things, and understand how this also enables action in certain, often multiple 
(but not unlimited), directions. In the literature on organisation and 
innovation processes and practices, this is called a number of useful terms; 
contingency, situatedness, relationality, heterogeneity and co-creation are 
but a few. As opposed to the more deterministic conception of path 
dependency within the organisational literature, the investigated processes of 
my study might be viewed as efforts towards ‘path creation’ (Garud & 
5 
 
Karnøe, 2001): How a small product development project possibly played a 
part in the larger quest for industrialising a new resource. Innovation 
processes that span across different settings (sectors, firms, networks, 
markets) involves complex operations of translating materials, technologies, 
knowledge, work practices, ideas and interests. This is not only related to the 
technical development of innovations, but also to the creation of markets, or 
users, of innovations. Hence, there is also interaction between technical and 
conceptual development on the one hand, and the response from (potential) 
customers/users on the other. These tensions between the random and the 
intentional, and the interaction between heterogeneous actors and resources, 
produce complexity and contingency to an extent that uncertainty – or lack 
of knowledge – to some degree will always be a challenge of innovation 
processes (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Pavitt, 2005; McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006).  
 
When studying innovation processes, one of the most basic (and, ultimately, 
philosophical) questions is whether innovation is best understood in terms of 
(1) changing something stable, or (2) stabilising something fluid. In the first 
case the world is viewed as rather stable, hence the problem (or the 
exception) is how to change. Relationships are analyzed as structures, and 
resistance to innovation and change is often explained as ‘inertia’. Systems 
of Innovation (Edquist, 2001), Rogers’ theory of diffusion (1995) and 
organisational neo-institutionalism (Scott, 1995), are examples of 
perspectives we could put under this category. This point of departure has 
been shared within mainstream organisation and innovation research during 
the past few decades of circling  the problems of change and how to loosen 
the grip of inert and solid ‘structures’, hence triggering a call for process-
based research (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; Van de Ven & Poole, 2006; Hernes, 
2007). Thus, if our interests are located within the problem of how things 
come about, the complex emergence and realisation of novelty in socio-
material interaction, the second line of reasoning is suggested as being a 
better suited approach. It seems to me, for instance, that our understanding of 
the emergence and stabilisation of inter-organisational relationships and 
networks is still quite limited. Network change is not necessarily the 
problem, stabilisation is, that is, how learning or innovation results in new 
common and stable practices (or not). In this thesis, I examine innovation 
processes in which relationships are initiated, changed and broken. In a large 
segment of the research literature on (inter-) organisational relationships, 
networks and systems, these factors are analysed as if they are given and 
stable entities. This represents a problem if our research interests include 
understanding how relationships and networks come about in the first place, 
and how they evolve over time. In the second line of reasoning, the world is 
viewed as constantly changing, the problem (and the exception) being how 
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to stabilise anything2. Relationships are analysed as recursive processes of 
interaction (Law, 1994), and the concept of ‘friction’ is suggested to explain 
resistance to – and sources for – innovation (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 
2001a,b). Actor-Network theory (ANT) and other STS approaches, the 
Industrial Network approach (IMP 3 ) and a few process approaches to 
organisation and innovation, such as Weick (1995), Van de Ven et al. (1999) 
and Tsoukas & Chia (2002), are representative of this as a basic assumption.  
 
In particular, I am positioning the study within a set of emerging fields of 
research aiming towards understanding innovation and markets from process 
and practice points of view. While science and technology studies (STS) 
have long investigated knowledge production and technology development, 
we have recently witnessed a growing interest in following technology and 
knowledge further into the economic and industrial world. On the business 
side, Van de Ven and others have contributed to developing a process view 
of innovation management and organisation, while the IMP group has done 
studies of innovation in industrial networks. While these fields of research 
are partly overlapping, they have also left some ‘blank spots’ in relation to 
industrial innovation. In relation to STS, the study shows how the pragmatics 
of business (which may be understood as a set of practices connected to 
economic theory, consumer practices, industrial networks, 
marketing/branding practices, etc) may compromise the technological 
passions and interests driving technical innovation, making science less 
‘pure’, less hegemonic and less seductive. In the encounter between 
inventions of technoscience and the tough ‘realities’ of business, what 
remains of the initial innovation is an open question, along with how it is 
combined with existing business practices in order to find use(-rs), and how 
it takes part in reconfiguring and reconstituting those practices. In relation to 
innovation management and industrial networks, the study shows how 
technoscience, and its creative chaos (of ideas and direction) and rigidity (of 
method) may serve as precondition and resource for creating new 
commercial practices.  
 
Below, I briefly introduce these theoretical perspectives, to situate my work 
within and between them, to account for my interpretative basis when 
analysing the case and to prepare the reader for the theorising discussion 
thereafter. However, I have chosen to present specific contributions that I 
both draw on and challenge in chapter 6, which is close to the theorising 
discussion. Moreover, the presentation of theoretical contributions below is 
not symmetrical. A basic assumption in this thesis is that research strategies 
                                                     
2 See Bakken & Hernes (2006) for a discussion of organising as ‘both a verb and a 
noun’, from a relational and process based perspective. 
3 The International Marketing and Purchasing Group (www.impgroup.org). 
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from the particular field of science and technology studies called Actor-
Network Theory – or ‘sociology of translation’ – are also particularly useful 
for furthering our understanding of industrial innovation. Therefore, I have 
allocated more room for presenting this perspective. 
 
Innovation management and process 
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) did groundbreaking work in pinpointing and 
researching the intertwining of technology and economy in innovation 
processes. They claimed that economists had black-boxed the process of 
technical transformation, while technologists often failed to take the 
‘external forces of the marketplace’ into consideration. Innovation, from this 
perspective, is a complex and uncertain process, and an “exercise in the 
management and reduction of uncertainty” (ibid:276). However, their 
distinction between the (technical) innovation process and its interaction 
with an external market environment did not go far enough, despite 
introducing feedback-links as central elements in their ‘chain-linked model’. 
Science and technology were ascribed interactivity, but Von Hippel (1988) a 
few years later became the major proponent for considering the market – in 
the shape of users/lead-users – as internal to the process, granting full 
interactivity also to the ‘users’, and influencing the innovation and its fate by 
using, modifying and/or rejecting it. The inclusion of heterogeneous actors 
and resources in this way has certainly produced a complex and contingent 
view of innovation processes. This is underscored by Pavitt: 
 
Innovation processes differ in many respects according to the economic 
sector, field of knowledge, type of innovation, historical period and 
country concerned. They also vary with the size of the firm, its 
corporate strategy or strategies, and its prior experience with innovation. 
In other words, innovation processes are ‘contingent’. (Pavitt, 2005:87) 
 
Contingency, in this sense, implies that innovation processes always carry a 
degree of uncertainty, and that uncertainty is reduced (although rarely 
removed completely) by learning from and building on experience and 
continuous feedback from the market. According to Pavitt, only two aspects 
of the innovation process are generic, “coordinating and integrating 
specialised knowledge, and learning under conditions of uncertainty” 
(ibid:109). In reviewing the role of uncertainty in entrepreneurship research, 
McMullen and Shepherd identified three different kinds of uncertainty, all 
related to a combination of time and novelty: ‘State uncertainty’ denotes an 
unpredictable environment, ‘effect uncertainty’ denotes the uncertain effect 
of the (future state of the) environment to the organisation, and finally 
‘response uncertainty’ denotes lack of knowledge of – and unpredictability 
of the effect of – response options (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006:135). 
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While being argued from a dualist point of view, of internal uncertainty in 
the face of external change, these kinds of uncertainty are also relevant to an 
interactive view of innovation, although with the effect that the conceived 
uncertainty would probably expand radically. 
 
McMullen & Shepherd (2006) also discuss whether entrepreneurial 
‘opportunity’ should be viewed as something being (objectively) discovered, 
or as something enacted and co-created by the actors involved in interpreting 
knowledge/information in the situation, thereby resembling the distinction 
between realist and constructivist ontologies. Both emphasise that 
opportunities are characterised by uncertainty and that this is central to 
understanding entrepreneurial action. Yet, where the realists’ uncertainty is 
mainly about availability (and sometimes interpretation of) objective 
knowledge, constructivists’ uncertainty relates to the enactment of perceived 
opportunity by the involved actors, hence multiplying the sources of 
uncertainty. According to the latter view, the ‘out there/in here’ distinction 
between actors and environments dissolves. Uncertainty, then, comes from 
the unpredictability of interaction, both between human actors (individuals 
or constellations), and between humans and material elements (both 
‘natural’, technical and textual). This is in line with Kline & Rosenberg’s 
(1986:276) emphasis on our need to improve our understanding of the 
“management and reduction of uncertainty”. The degree of uncertainty in 
innovation processes are, according to Kline and Rosenberg (1986:294), 
“strongly correlated with the amount of advance”, and, according to Pavitt 
(2005:105), the risk of failure in innovation processes will increase “with the 
number of practices and competencies that need to be changed”. Such 
‘radical’ innovation processes are equated with processes of learning, where 
‘overplanning’ may distort the process because the future cannot, by 
definition, be fully known. Furthermore, the ‘false summit effect’ – or 
repeatedly finding new mountain tops behind the one that was believed to be 
the real summit – produces a kind of uncertainty that cannot be planned for 
in detail. However, innovators tend “to underestimate the number of tasks 
that must be solved and hence also the time and costs” (Kline & Rosenberg, 
1986:298). In addition to the technical side, then, uncertainty is increased by 
rising development costs, resistance to radical innovation, financial risks and 
coupling of the technical and the economic. Hence, economic forces, 
technical knowledge and consumer demand need to be closely connected 
during innovation processes. 
 
From this, we see that innovation consists of contingent processes, stemming 
from interaction between science, technology and markets, thereby 
producing high levels of uncertainty. Hence the ‘management of uncertainty’ 
is one of the crucial tasks for participants in such processes. Pavitt (2005), 
then, found that coordination of knowledge and learning were the two 
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generic aspects of innovation processes. It also seems clear that the more 
change that is needed, the greater the uncertainty will be. However, he notes 
that more research is needed for improving our understanding of these 
dynamics. 
 
The longitudinal comparative study of innovation in the MIRP-study 
(Minnesota Innovation Research Project), as reported in Van de Ven et al. 
(1999), has become an obligatory point of passage for anyone studying 
innovation processes. Their systematic gathering of longitudinal data from a 
number of cases and sophisticated analysis of complex patterns has left a 
lasting mark on the study of innovation. Their main thesis is that the 
common pattern of all innovation processes “is a nonlinear cycle of 
divergent and convergent behaviours that may repeat itself over time and 
reflect itself at different organisational levels” (Van de Ven et al., 1999:213). 
They found this to be the case independent of the big diversity of paths and 
outcomes of the processes studied. Linear stage models as well as random 
models are disputed; instead, they argue for innovation as ‘emergent process’ 
based on nonlinear dynamics, in which sensitivity to initial conditions and 
the ability to manage complexity are viewed as being crucial for success. A 
number of important implications are drawn out of the study. Again, learning 
is viewed as being a central aspect of the process, where ‘learning by 
discovery’ is understood as “an expanding and diverging process”, and 
learning by testing as “a narrowing and converging process” (ibid:203). In 
turn, these ways of learning are explained as being dependent on each other 
in a continuous cycle. While confirming the uncertainty of outcomes and 
thus acknowledging that innovation processes cannot be controlled, Van de 
Van et al. still argue for managing innovation (in terms of navigating rather 
than controlling). In their study, they found that managers’ performance 
criteria shifted over time, both in relation to outcome, process and input, and 
in line with the changing needs of the innovation process and the unexpected 
events that occurred. Such changes “triggered innovation managers and 
entrepreneurs to search and redefine their innovation ideas and strategies” 
(ibid:42). Beunza and Stark (2004) and Grenville-Howard and Carlile (2006) 
confirm  this argument, although from a more political point of view, 
showing how the negotiation of evaluation criteria is fundamentally a 
political process through which power relations are (re-)constituted. This 
activates a need for the ‘management of paradox’, in which highly effective 
organisations are able to perform “in contradictory ways to satisfy 
contradictory expectations” and “ambiguity in goals” (Van de Ven et al., 
1999:12). Thus, in order to succeed with innovation, there is a need to 
acquire power via coalition building. This is accomplished through selling 
the project to various stakeholders in different ways during the process. 
Ambiguous and uncertain situations, like early phases of innovation 
processes, “require a pluralistic power structure of leadership” (ibid:124). 
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This increases the chances for technological foresight, while also decreasing 
the chance of oversight. Including a diversity of views and conflicts is 
viewed as constructive for divergent innovation processes, and serving as 
“checks and balances with each other”. On the other hand, unitary, single-
vision and hierarchical leadership tends to restrict creativity and (necessary) 
deviant behaviour. Coalitions, or networks, tend to grow over time, resulting 
in a complex network “engaging in a series of transactions necessary to 
move the innovation forwards” (ibid:50). This networking process is non-
linear, characterised by “numerous bargaining, commitment, and execution 
events” of the inter-organisational relationships. After some time, the 
networking may reach a point of “self-organising criticality”, “wherein the 
relevant unit of analysis becomes the web and not the dyad”. Moreover, 
interactions in the web were often more influenced “by activities occurring 
in other dyads than by the internal logic of the dyad itself”, making it 
necessary to include web-level effects in the analysis of innovation processes 
(ibid:148). Lastly, Van de Ven et al. found that “Innovation uncertainty 
decreases over time as system functions that define key technical and 
institutional parameters for the innovation emerge” (Van de Ven et al., 
1999:172). However, in my case study, the reduction of uncertainty was less 
about getting system functions, or institutional arrangements, in place, than 
about a process of radical simplification – of stripping down the innovation 
itself in order to get adaptability – and thus momentum – towards relations 
and patterns of distribution and use (see chapter 6). In the continuation of the 
MIRP-study, many questions on innovation processes still remain to be 
answered. What are the dynamics driving the divergence, convergence and 
interaction between the two? What is manageable and how? And, in the face 
of the complexity of networked interaction, how is it that such processes 
(sometimes) stabilise? How do ‘system functions’ and ‘institutional 
arrangements’ come into place? This thesis might be read as a contribution 
towards understanding the content of innovation processes.  
 
In a continuation of the MIRP-study, Garud and colleagues have contributed 
with new insights into certain aspects of innovation processes. Drawing on a 
‘socio-cognitive’ model of technology evolution, Garud and Rappa focus 
“on the relationship between the beliefs researchers hold, (...) the artifacts 
they create, and the routines they use for evaluating how well their artifacts 
meet with their prior expectations” (1994:344). A distinction is made 
between two different cyclical processes: One in which “evaluation routines 
designed to judge specific artifacts begin reinforcing researchers’ beliefs”, 
and another of institutionalisation, in which developing a “common set of 
evaluation routines that can be applied to all technological paths”. Still, these 
processes represent a shared reality. Garud and Rappa observed how beliefs 
were externalised by creating routines, which in turn were used to evaluate 
the technology in a self-reinforcing circle. However, the influence went both 
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ways, as the technical artefacts also had severe impact on what kinds of 
evaluation routines could be employed. The lack of stability in the 
relationship between the emerging innovation and evaluation 
routines/criteria thus makes new technology particularly precarious during 
its early stages of development and use. In their discussion of technology 
assessment, Garud and Ahlstrom further Garud and Rappa’s argument, in 
that the criteria of evaluation are explained as being negotiated between 
involved technologists. Sets of evaluation criteria form ‘frames of 
reference’ 4 , which create a self-fulfilling prophecy by rendering the 
researchers blind to alternative technological trajectories (1997:27). This 
also creates a need for ‘outsider’ evaluations to broaden the range of 
discussion and challenge taken-for-granted criteria. On the ‘positive’ side of 
technologists’ blinkers, Garud and Karnøe (2001) have investigated the role 
of (and space for) agency in shaping new industrial practice, or, in other 
words, shaping new technical paths. Combining thinking both from 
innovation management and STS literature, they argue that ‘mindful 
deviation’ is a central characteristic of how entrepreneurs contribute to ‘path 
creation’ and thus towards implementing new ideas in the economy. Van de 
Ven et al.’s (1999) model of innovation as ‘punctuated learning’, and Garud 
and Karnøe’s concept of path creation (2001) will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6. 
 
The Industrial Network Approach 
Throughout the 1970s, a network oriented perspective on markets and 
marketing, especially related to industrial markets, emerged out of a set of 
Swedish research projects (Mattsson & Johanson, 2006). In developing a 
relational/interactive perspective, they challenged existing views on market 
practices. Suppliers and customers were depicted as mutually dependent and 
embedded in long-term relations, which then also served to depict markets as 
consisting of interconnected relations. Firm strategy was understood to 
develop in network interaction, which thereby blurred the boundaries of the 
firm, and was viewed as more as an effect of learning than of planning. 
Moreover, product development and innovation were often integrated into 
these relationships (Mattsson & Johanson, 2006:261-265). The proponents 
of this perspective are often referred to as the IMP-group5, the ‘markets-as-
networks approach’, the ‘interaction approach’ or the ‘industrial networks 
approach’, and I will use the abbreviation ‘IMP’ below for the sake of 
simplicity. The IMP perspective involves numerous rich case studies of both 
relations and dynamics in networks, and has challenged the traditional view 
                                                     
4 The concept is borrowed from Bijker et al. (1987). 
5 The International Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP), see also 
www.impgroup.org. 
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of business markets, arguing that management of relationships in inter-
organisational networks, rather than internal allocation of resources, is the 
crucial strategic issue (Håkanson & Snehota, 1989). 
 
So, how is interaction conceived of within this ‘interaction approach’? What 
is the driving force, the rationale behind actors’ choices to interact? First, 
sometimes actors do not have a choice; due to their social and material 
embeddedness in relationships, interaction is necessary to survive or to get 
anything done at all. Still, when one has a choice, interaction might be 
sought out for different reasons, including problem solving, learning, 
innovation, efficiency or cost reductions (Ritter & Ford, 2004). Ford et al. 
(2003:7-8) have employed ‘networking’ as a synonym to interaction in 
business networks, claiming that all companies are networking, which means 
“suggesting, requesting, requiring, performing and adapting activities, 
simultaneously”. Individual and isolated action is therefore irrelevant, as 
networking involves “reaction to the actions of others and all of it will have 
to take into account the reactions of others”. In other words, interaction is 
characterised by mutual processes that are never one-sided, rather, 
interaction is always a collective achievement that is affecting all interacting 
parties. 
 
Within the framework of IMP, interaction is explicitly regarded as “the 
essential analytical concept at the heart of a relationship and network 
perspective of business markets” (Medlin 2002:1). As mentioned previously, 
this view emerged from an intense critique of traditional economic 
paradigms and their myths of individual action, independence and 
completeness. Instead, interaction is understood as being an interdependent 
process, in which “no company alone has the resources, skills or 
technologies that are necessary to satisfy the requirements or solve the 
problems of any other” (Ford et al., 2003:2). Moreover, each participant 
involved in interaction takes different “pictures” of the network with 
him/her. The main research issues within IMP are summarised by Ford et al. 
(2003:8-11) in three ‘network paradoxes: 
 
(1) A company’s relationships are the basis of its current operations and 
development. But those relationships also restrict that development. 
(2) It is equally valid to say that a company defines its relationships or 
that a company is defined by those relationships. 
(3) Companies try to control the network and want the benefits of 
control, but control has its problems and when it becomes total, it is 
destructive. 
  
This means that networks consist of relationships which then consist of 
interactions. The focus is often on the restrictions of interacting in networks, 
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that is, actors within industrial networks cannot act as they want, since they 
are embedded into complex webs of relationships (Håkansson & Ford, 
2002:135). Networks are often considered to be quite stable and difficult to 
change. The reason for this ‘heaviness’ is explained as being a result “of 
complex interactions, adaptations and investments within and between the 
companies over time” (ibid:133). However, since changes in one relationship 
are likely to affect all connected relationships, these relationships might also 
be the source of considerable change in the network, thereby making 
understanding networks crucial for understanding interaction: 
 
Thus, no one interaction, whether it is a sale, purchase, advice, delivery 
or payment can be understood without reference to the relationship of 
which it is a part. Similarly, no one relationship can be understood 
without reference to the wider network. (Håkansson & Ford, 2002:134) 
 
Such interaction in industrial relations and networks may clearly be called a 
‘process perspective’ on business practice, and a process perspective is 
dependent on including time in its analysis. Johanson and Mattson (1987) 
elaborated interaction into two categories, namely exchange and adaptation. 
In order to capture the dynamic (or interactional) side of these categories, 
time needs to be included as a factor (Medlin, 2002; Dubois & Araujo, 2004; 
Ritter & Ford, 2004), because there seems to be a difference where exchange 
happens in the present, while adaptations are being “planned in the present, 
but exist as changes to resource ties and activity links in the future” (Medlin, 
2002:7), and both concepts are closely related to both past experience, 
present interaction context and future expectations. Altogether, this 
resembles a research perspective investigating “the social creation of reality 
through interaction” over time (Medlin 2002:4). Due to the uncertainty and 
indeterminacy of the future, interacting firms need to arrive at some kind of 
shared intention in order to achieve their goals. On the other hand, a full 
sharing of future scenarios would be a utopian ideal, as each actor will bring 
different views and experiences into the relationship. From this, we see that 
even on a ‘purely’ social level, network interaction is heterogeneous, where 
“different perspectives of reality interact in a ‘relationship dynamic’” 
(ibid:9). However, heterogeneity of interaction becomes even more 
important if we include non-human elements into our analysis. Human and 
organisational actors do not interact in ‘empty space’; on the contrary, they 
interact both with and through numerous artefacts, such as technologies, 
texts and other material resources. In the IMP literature, this aspect has been 
studied under the label of ‘resource interaction’.  
 
Some authors have put resources (Waluszewski, 2004; Håkansson & 
Waluszewski, 2001), and more specifically, knowledge, (Araujo, 2003; 
Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007) at the centre of their analyses of inter-
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organisational interaction. In such interaction between resources, 
possibilities for new solutions are created, and old resource combinations are 
confronted with new alternatives, which produces variation (Waluszewski 
2004:146). Hence, if action is explained in relational terms – as interaction – 
agency is no longer necessary for action. It is no longer given a priori who 
or what will act in each specific setting under study. In their inquiry into the 
question of why and how technological systems, consisting of resource 
combinations, often hold a certain stability that makes them difficult to 
change, Håkansson & Waluszewski (2001) oppose the static notion of 
‘inertia’, instead launching the concept of ‘friction’. They observed how 
resources often seemed to be ‘cemented’ upon each other, and therefore hard 
to change or replace, and yet resource combinations with a seemingly 
unlimited stability sometimes suddenly loosened. According to Araujo, 
“friction captures the notion that movement of knowledge involves both 
transfer and transformation when different types of knowledge interact” 
(Araujo, 2003:20). Friction is a relational concept, describing a force 
directed towards two interacting bodies. It is time dependent, having 
different effects at different times. And it is transformational, in that friction 
not only leads to movement, but also to some kind of transformation of the 
interacting bodies, whether it be a change in shape, deformation or some 
other transformation. Friction also connects both historical and 
contemporary processes in being a reaction to one or more of them, and is 
thereby neither random nor deterministic. Based on these aspects, friction is 
viewed as being an ‘active force’ in resource interaction, intervening in any 
attempt to change the current embedded resource combinations,  with a 
strong tendency to favour existing values (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 
2001b:2). In this picture, human actors are described as both advocates of 
change and protectors of established practice (ibid:3). This is a challenging 
task for people in innovation processes, of coping with the new without 
destroying the current, as change often has a number of unintended (and 
unpredictable) consequences in related interfaces. Yet this is also a clear 
limitation of human agency, as the use and value of any resource is 
determined by the relationships and interaction processes in which it is 
embedded (ibid:4). Innovation is thus described as ‘walking in a rugged 
landscape’, uncertain and uncontrollable, and always exposed to numerous 
different forces.  
 
With regard to the distribution of effects, it is argued that forces directed 
towards one resource will probably also affect all of the other resources with 
which the focal resource interacts. Hence, effects are never merely local; 
they get distributed through friction with other interfaces with other 
resources, transforming them too. One reason for stabilisation effects, they 
argue, is that friction connects the present with the past, thereby defending 
earlier results and solutions. Processes of innovation, or re-combination, 
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entail examining the resources to be combined, and then trial-and-error 
investigations of the features that can be activated in the new interface. In 
other words, stability is an effect of embedding resources. This is a process 
of bringing histories together, with uncertain outcomes and no ideal 
solutions, along with the challenge of integrating the new interface with 
related existing interfaces (ibid:15). On the other hand, friction also produces 
de-stabilisation effects. Through friction, simultaneous processes are 
connected, allowing the same interface to be activated in several change 
processes. In this way, friction can also sometimes strengthen change 
(ibid:17). The more the focal resources are embedded within other 
interfaces, the more friction is produced, thereby affecting more resources, 
and requiring more power to initiate change (ibid:18).  
 
What influences the degree of friction, then? Håkansson and Waluszewski 
(2001b) found ‘economic heaviness’ to be a conservative force, including 
investments in material and immaterial resources, and the combinations of 
these into complex webs of relationships. Resources are activated in 
interfaces, giving them their substance and heaviness. In this way, power has 
a double face – increased heaviness leads to less freedom, but also to more 
influence. They further argue that attempts to change are compelled to 
become ‘economical’, from the established structure’s point of view 
(ibid:23). Another aspect influencing the degree of friction is variety, that is, 
a combined effect of the characteristics of the resource and its interfaces 
with other resources (ibid:20). This variety can sometimes be a problem (e.g. 
in large-scale industrial settings), and at other times it reveals a large 
economic potential. 
 
In the above review of the innovation management literature, knowledge (or 
the lack thereof) was posited as the most central challenge to innovation 
processes. In addressing knowledge development, friction forces knowledge 
transfer to become more about the creation of knowledge, which not only 
pertains to co-ordinating pieces of knowledge, but also moulding them 
together into new forms. Furthermore, friction often leads to the uncovering 
of ‘weak links’, where the development of new knowledge is fairly easy, 
thus both opening up new opportunities for knowledge creation, and for the 
realisation that this development often not take place at the point of initial 
change (ibid:25). It could also be noted that the ‘traditional’ view of 
knowledge creation and organisational learning has been challenged by 
Håkansson and Johanson (2001), who argue that learning in business 
networks is inclined towards differentiation, and thus complementarity, 
rather than the traditional view of learning as homogenisation (Håkansson 
and Johanson, 2001). 
 
16 
From an interaction perspective, we can outline some implications for the 
study of innovation processes within (and across) industrial networks. First, 
innovation is a highly interactive and collective issue, involving numerous 
actors, and “seldom the result of one ‘designer’” (Håkansson & Ford, 
2002:135). Hence, an innovation is never given at the outset; it is the object 
of controversial and collaborative interaction often over long periods of time. 
Second, it is hard to innovate. Within business networks, numerous 
combinations are possible, enabling a potential innovation, but only as long 
as it is “designed appropriately and seen to be positive by those who support 
its needs” (ibid). Relationships are viewed as imposing “severe limitations” 
on a single company, due to the costs of making changes, as well all the 
possible unintended/indirect effects on other relationships. Third, new 
relationships with new counterparts are viewed as being difficult because of 
the existing structure that has to be taken into account. This is called the 
‘heaviness’ of networks, and leads Håkansson & Ford (2002) and 
Waluszewski (2004) to argue that innovation has a better basis if current 
investments, technologies and resources are included in the development, 
and combined with the new solution: 
 
Interaction demands that the ‘interactors’ relate to the existing structure. 
The more the new solution can be embedded into the existing structure, 
the larger the economic advantage for both the supply and user sides. 
(Waluszewski, 2004:147) 
 
 At the same time, it is important that a place for the innovation is created, 
which often demands the ‘interactors’ to break with parts of the existing 
structure (ibid). Thus, there is a question of ‘matching’ the new with aspects 
of the old, although probably not matched with all of them.  
 
While most research on business relationships starts out with existing 
‘structures’ of relationships, less attention has been paid to the emergence of 
business networks. Although it may be argued that interaction always starts 
out with something, it still seems appropriate to focus more on the emergent 
aspects, particularly in relation to innovation. Törmanen and Möller (2003:1) 
claimed at the time of writing we have had “no more than a rather scant 
understanding of the dynamics of the emergence of business networks, and 
especially about the role of individual actors in this process”. In placing 
greater emphasis on actors than what has been common within the industrial 
networks tradition, and in aiming to study intentional construction of 
business networks, Törmanen and Möller develop the concept of ‘network 
capabilities’ to understand how networks emerge. The construction of new 
business nets is argued to depend on “the ability to combine several 
technologies and coordinate the resources and capabilities of various actors 
coming from different fields”, and that “both knowledge and learning can be 
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expected to play core roles” (ibid:4). They show how these network building 
processes are characterised by uncertainty, calling for a conscious trial and 
error approach so as to ensure learning and adjustments along the way. They 
also mention another aspect of the process, namely how the management 
team may work to sell their agenda within the organisation, through making 
and keeping promises to several parties, and in this way securing access to 
the resources needed (Törmanen & Möller, 2003:12). Moreover, Awaleh 
(2008) has shown how actors may engage in ‘purposeful networking’, e.g. 
how ‘networking ambassadors’ in the interacting organisations may work 
strategically to challenge, change and align ‘network pictures’ in industrial 
relationships.  
 
Waluszewski (2004), Håkansson & Waluszewski (2001), Leek et al. (2003), 
Medlin (2002) and Dubois & Araujo (2004), all call for developing 
theoretical ‘tools’ to better cope with the dynamic aspects of networks. 
Mattsson (2003:16) suggests that Actor-Network Theory (ANT) could 
enrich and complement the industrial networks approach by explicating how 
human and non-human actors are related, how social phenomena are 
‘performed’ in emerging and heterogeneous networks, and offering a more 
precise methodology for studying dynamics. He also suggests that ANT 
could benefit from the accumulated knowledge of the IMP approach when 
turning their eyes towards economic and market phenomena. In particular, 
the IMP approach has in my study promoted the inclusion of established 
relationships in the analysis, taking more of an outside-in perspective, 
complementing the inside-out perspective that is more common in the field 
of innovation studies. Håkansson and Snehota (1995:3) illustrate this 
difference in perspectives, and emphasises that from a network perspective 
explanation of relationship development needs to “include factors ‘external’ 
to the relationship itself”. Thus, the emergence of new relationships can not 
be viewed in isolation from the rest of the ‘network structure’. Within the 
actor-network literature (see below), although having a relational basis, there 
has been a tendency to focus more on the relationships that are sought 
established, while less attention has been paid to the established set of 
relationships into which the innovation will be embedded. This 
complementation (or expansion) is especially visible in the discussion on 
user-interaction and mutual translation in chapter 6.4, although analysing the 
case mostly from one of the parties’ points of view. I will now account for 
actor-network theory and the study of emergence. 
 
Actor-network theory and the study of emergence 
The particular strand of science and technology studies (STS) called Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) has sought to describe and understand the rise, 
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continuity and fall of social networks, in viewing them as relational and 
heterogeneous. Such networks include not only humans, but also artefacts 
like technology, texts, symbols and things as actors that can mediate 
knowledge and participate in the social. According to ANT, the social is 
unstable and unpredictable, as any actor can (and often will) resist the 
exercise of power by others. The actors that are able to enrol other actors in 
their network by selling their discourse and making the other actors 
dependent upon their knowledge and discourse/mode of ordering will 
succeed in building their network, at least for a while. Actor-Network 
Theory is not so much a theory as it is an empirical and analytical 
methodology. As emphasised by Latour (1999a) and Law (2004), it is a way 
of tracing the ‘world building activities’ making up the social and material 
relations that surround us in a way that unravels what we normally take for 
granted. It is fundamentally a relational and process perspective, viewing the 
world in constant flux and hence putting stability – and stabilisation – under 
scrutiny. This makes this perspective a good starting point for studying 
innovation, enabling the study of emergence and the problem of developing 
and stabilising novelty.  
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of ethnographic studies of 
scientific laboratories were carried out by researchers from sociology of 
science (e.g. Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Knorr Cetina, 1981; Lynch, 1985). 
Subsequently, studies of technology development were also included (e.g. 
Bijker et al., 1987; Bijker & Law, 1992; Latour, 1996). Within this stream of 
emerging perspectives on science and technology as ‘constructed’, relational 
and shaped in and by social practice, what came to be called ‘Actor-Network 
Theory’, or ‘sociology of translation’, emerged with researchers such as 
Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law as its major proponents6. It was 
influenced by a number of other traditions, such as post-structuralism, 
feminism, ethnomethodology and phenomenology (Calas and Smircich, 
1999:663). Foucault’s thinking has been influential, especially the “notion of 
power/knowledge as power relations are produced through ‘actants’ who 
perform the available discourses and practices” (Calas and Smircich 
1999:663). In applying the semiotic principles of relationality to all kinds of 
materials, ANT relates that “entities take their form and acquire their 
attributes as a result of their relations with other entities” (Law 1999:2), thus 
taking a non-essentialist standpoint. Law further emphasises the uncertainty 
and reversibility of entities resulting from this ‘material relationality’. The 
                                                     
6 For a reflexive account of ANT’s past and (potential) future, see Law & Hassard 
(eds) (1999). Latour’s (1987) introduction to ANT as methodology is still useful for 
understanding its basic principles and thinking. For a broad and somewhat eclectic 
collection of texts showcasing the state of the art within Science and Technology 
Studies, see Hackett et al. (2008), where also the ‘economic turn’ is represented. 
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dualisms of agency and structure in social theory are challenged by Latour 
(1999a), who argues that the social is not constituted by agents and structure 
at all; rather, it is a ‘circulating entity’. This means that reality is constituted 
by the circulations of transformations, being real, social and narrative at the 
same time, thus arguing that ANT entirely bypasses the question of ‘social 
construction’ and the ‘realist/relativist’ debate. To sum up ANT’s ontology, 
it views reality as relational and multiple. Different roles and identities are 
constructed within different sets of relations, which demands different 
strategies for interaction and activity. As a consequence of this relationality, 
reality is also multiple. Actors must renegotiate positions and roles, mediate 
between expectations from different networks, and relate to truths in one 
network that is irrelevant in another. For the researcher, it can be 
problematic to define the ‘object’ of inquiry, because to define it would be to 
lose the multiple character of networks. Still, to not define it is to risk 
vagueness and loss of focus. Law describes this problem during his 
organisational research in a big laboratory: 
  
What is the laboratory? Figures? Results? A site? A lot of people? A set 
of plans? To define it would be to break the principle of symmetry. It is 
many places and many orderings, a network. (Law, 1994:40) 
 
The ‘answer’ is outlined as a struggle of representation and pragmatism, to 
try representing through multiple voices according to the intention of the 
study, recognising that telling the whole story is impossible. Thus, it is also a 
political question, which story do I want to tell? And the political aspect 
becomes even stronger as representation is understood as participating in the 
making of reality. Law (1994) make use of the Goffmanian term of 
‘performativity’ to explain how reality is both real and produced at the same 
time. Performance does not mean that something is not real, but that reality 
is performed in socio-material relations, and therefore that performance 
makes reality. It is recursive. And it is not only a few ‘powerful’ actors that 
is part of these performances, it is rather the case that “[society] is performed 
through everyone’s effort to define it” (Latour, 1988:273), scientists 
included. Power, identity and performance are about practice, as there are no 
ultimate principles determining the social, no first or last instance – the 
social is performed in local specific practices, in networks of networks. 
 
Latour has in several of his studies of knowledge production and innovation 
(e.g. 1988, 1996) shown that transfer or diffusion of knowledge is never just 
that, knowledge is never just ‘flowing’ or ‘diffusing’ through the system. 
Instead, he argues that the object (e.g. knowledge or an innovation) is always 
changing on its way. Further, he argues, it is not moving (‘flowing’) by 
itself; it is always up to the individual actor to decide whether s/he should 
pass it on or not, in what way and in what form. From a slightly different 
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perspective, than Håkansson and Waluszewski’s (2001) concept of friction, 
Latour’s (1988; 1999) concept of networks in his ‘model of translation’ is 
one that emphasises ‘work’ more than ‘net’. He argues that networks should 
be understood as processes of translation, association, deformation and 
transformation. This is because: 
 
the spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, artefacts, 
goods – is in the hands of people; each of these people may act in many 
different ways, letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, 
or betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it. (Latour, 1988:267) 
 
This implies that networks are less predictable than might be believed, and 
the possibility of controlling networks becomes highly questionable, because 
power is treated not as a cause, but as “the consequence of an intense activity 
of enrolling, convincing and enlisting” (ibid). Law (1992) adds that network 
ordering is also a matter of the uncertain process of overcoming resistance. 
Hence, Latour suggests the term ‘translation’ as more appropriate for 
explaining processes of knowledge transfer and innovation. Translation, 
then, is defined by Law as “the process or the work of making two things 
that are not the same, equivalent” (1999:8), e.g., texts are often constructed 
as combinations of other texts, taking on the role of representing the other 
facts, figures, numbers, definitions, descriptions, etc. Thus, in reality, the 
ability to gather, simplify and represent an increasing number of materials in 
one, is what makes knowledge mobile and influential. This is ‘translation’, 
i.e. to speak for and represent someone else, and to simplify and delete 
complex, effortful and often controversial processes. Sometimes this is 
called a ‘black box’, where only the input and the output are visible, which 
thereby stabilises its network. The actor-network can be said to be (more or 
less) stable when (and partly because) it is taken for granted, no longer 
questioned and problematised. ANT speaks of translation of knowledge and 
technology as stories of alignment and of hard work in order to stabilise the 
social, and has developed analytical concepts and tools for structuring these 
stories. The logic of actor-networking is one of negotiation, association and 
gathering bits and pieces into a unity. 
 
In his work towards fleshing out pathways to a process perspective in 
organisation studies, Hernes (2007) sums up some of the contributions from 
Latour’s works that are considered useful for studying innovation processes. 
First, no social order can endure over time except via socio-material 
relations (Hernes, 2007:72). Second, these heterogeneous networks are kept 
together in and via recursive patterns that are repeated in time and space. 
Third, this means that entities (actors, resources, innovations, etc) are the 
outcomes of their relations, which, by the way, never become totally stable, 
as they are always in process of becoming. While Hernes (2007) portrays 
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actor-network theory, and process studies, as perspectives that emphasise 
‘choice’, ‘play’, ‘experimentation’, which allow “for choices to be made 
while remaining open to the possibility that the outcomes will not be as 
expected” (ibid:76), he does not put as much emphasis on how actors get 
themselves in the position to do the experimentation and have choices in the 
‘first place’. In a negative sense, this means that little is said about the 
resistances and limitations that actors experience when trying to order things 
into (new) patterns, whether such resistances come from materials and 
(interacting) practices (Mørk et al., 2006), politics of expertise (Mørk et al., 
forthcoming) or interaction in wider networks (Hoholm & Mørk, 2009). 
Within structural perspectives, this immediately comes to the fore, 
emphasising reified ‘barriers’ and ‘structures’, and the inertia of human 
behaviour. Still, from a process-based and relational perspective, the 
explanation is inevitably different. Below, I mention two complementary 
explanations.  
 
The first explanation goes to the core of actor-network theory and its 
materialist orientation. Law (1994) explains relative stability in terms of 
heterogeneous ordering. The hardest work of the actor-network, he claims, is 
ordering through time and space. To establish and retain performative 
patterns across distance: “Some materials last better than others. And some 
travel better than others” (Law, 1994:102). Durability is quite obvious; 
brick-walls and roads last longer than speech and text on paper. Mobility is 
perhaps less obvious. Ordering through space is one of the most important 
projects throughout history. How can managers secure loyalty to and 
maintenance of their network in distant places? Surely, they can never fully 
achieve this, but through embedding ordering strategies in mobile objects, 
such as work instructions, strategy documents, market plans, contracts and, 
increasingly, communication technologies, they increase their reach and 
influence across space. Making different things with diverse preferences 
interact and relate is not easy. Law (1992) argues that different materials and 
actors – not just humans – have ‘preferences of interaction’, and patterning 
interactions between them is not a given. Paradoxically, the more different 
materials one is able to mobilise in a network, the more it becomes resistant 
to change:  
 
[What] holds society together is mostly extrasomatic. Each performative 
definition of what society is about, is reinforced, underlined, and 
stabilised, by bringing in new and non-human resources. (Latour, 
1988:276) 
 
So, the ‘pure’ social relation, if it exists at all, is not very stable (Latour, 
1988:275). It is more difficult to hold someone accountable for a word than 
for a written contract. Consequently, then, the degree of stabilisation in time 
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and space is explained by patterned ordering of heterogeneous elements. 
Actor-networks are related and stabilised via associations, the question 
being “how some associations make something possible whereas others do 
not, how some make networks robust whereas others do not” (Hernes, 
2007:80). This means that the ordering, or stabilisation, of the social is a 
continuous process of transitions from the social to the material (Hernes, 
2007:83), which is by Latour called ‘translation’ – the work of making 
something represent an increasing amount of others (Latour, 1987; 1988; 
1999b). In such processes of ordering heterogeneous elements, the objects 
that flow, or circulate, within a network, need to be kept to a certain degree 
of openness for interpretation by the involved actors – ‘interpretative 
flexibility’ (Bijker & Law, 1992) – so that different actors may inscribe 
(Latour, 1987) different meanings or interests into them. If not, it will be 
impossible to relate the different elements of the network – often with 
hugely different preferences and interests – to each other. On the other hand, 
the degree of flexibility is limited, and it is impossible to inscribe just 
anything; we have to move from relativism to relationism as elements 
always produce some kind of resistance, often stemming from actants being 
interwoven in multiple relations. When the interests are too divergent, it 
becomes a matter of social and material negotiation, sometimes leading to 
compromise and other times to disintegration, or to one actant 
outmanoeuvring another. The highest degree of stability (although still in 
process, and not stable), according to ANT, is achieved when patterned 
orders of heterogeneous elements start appearing as one object/actor, a 
macro-actor (e.g. an organisation) or a ‘black-boxed’ technology (e.g. 
accounting procedures), which deletes all the controversies and multiple 
interests that had to be negotiated to get things together. The ordering is then 
taken for granted, or no longer questioned or challenged, and hence ordering 
becomes (perceived as) order: From contingent process to necessary entity, 
black-boxing the insight that (in principle) things could have been otherwise. 
Still, even the most (materially) stabilised (social) order may fall apart, as it 
is only a temporal stability, and it could be said that such stability only 
remains intact as long as the fragility of its construction is hidden, or as long 
as the actor-network has the means to maintain the elements ‘in place’ (in 
more or less loyal relations to each other).  
 
The second explanation, that resistances and limitations actors experience 
when trying to order things into (new) patterns, is an extension of the first; 
heterogeneous orderings (actor-networks) are not isolated in the world, but 
in fact interact and intertwine with an endless number of other orderings 
with which they may partially overlap and partially conflict. If some degree 
of stability is ever achieved, this is an unavoidable aspect, as Holm (1999) 
has convincingly shown in his study of fisheries management. The global is 
made of multiple local and interconnected orderings. This point is too often 
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simplified and misrepresented as ‘structure’, yet this would not be consistent 
with a process view. Rather, this is a case of multiple interconnected 
processes or actor-networks, and the interconnections are also processes that 
are no more or less stable than the interactive patterns making them up. This 
is also an issue that actor-network based analysis tends to lose, that is, in its 
insistence on studying only the local and situated, it unnecessarily loses sight 
of some of the connections to other networks in other realms. In this sense, 
there is a need to ‘stretch out’ the actor-networks of actor-network theory, 
without changing the principle of following the action, but ambitiously 
seeking to follow the action (Czarniawska, 1999) a bit farther in time and 
space. To change one relationship is to interfere with a number of other 
relationships, and hence, the researcher of innovation processes needs not 
only to keep track of his ‘focal actor-network’, but also trace some of the 
related networks with which it comes to interact. We can borrow some 
insights from the industrial network approach here. Araujo (1998) made an 
early argument for merging some of the insights of actor-network theory 
with aspects of the industrial network approach. He advocates a network 
view of organisation, defined as “a set of interlocking and shifting relations 
with porous and fluid boundaries7” (Araujo, 1998:317), where sociotechnical 
networks are the units of analysis. From this perspective, the existence of 
boundaries become an empirical phenomenon; boundary practices are 
collective accomplishments (Orlikowski, 2002), and boundaries are dynamic 
(Hernes, 2004). Actors, therefore, engage in efforts to (re-)organise 
boundaries according to their interests in developing, stabilising and 
maintaining certain practices rather than others (Karlsen, 2006; Mørk & 
Hoholm, 2008). To take a network view does also mean that the 
‘environment’ is understood as being “made up of the same raw material as 
the organisation”, namely “multiple interactions and relationships” (Araujo, 
1998:328), or, in other words, no solid structures, only socio-material 
interaction processes: 
 
Knowing and learning are seen as collective accomplishments residing 
in heterogeneous networks of relationships between the social and 
material world, which do not respect formal organisational boundaries. 
(Araujo, 1998:317) 
 
So, knowing and learning – and I would add innovation8 – are relational 
processes, to be found between the social and the material. They are 
                                                     
7 See Mørk & Hoholm (2008) for a review and discussion of boundary crossing and 
boundary organising practices, drawing in particular on the contributions of 
Orlikowski (2002), Hernes (2004) and Barrett et al. (2007). 
8 Similarly, Brown & Duguid (1991) argued that learning should be viewed as the 
bridge between working and innovating. 
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“implicated in everyday of collective practices” and in the “interactional 
practices that relate the organisation to other actors” (Araujo, 1998:317). 
This ordering process is about shaping recursive patterns, and when 
interconnecting multiple such orderings, a complexity emerges that seems to 
privilege incremental over radical change. As Hernes (2007:144) argues, 
“reiteration is necessary in order to uphold the system of relations, and the 
reiteration must therefore be incremental rather than radical”, because it is 
the incremental changes that may “allow for movement and the possibility of 
discovery and connecting to other elements”. This is similar to the argument 
of Håkansson and Waluszewski (2001) that, in industrial networks, 
innovation/change needs to be closely adapted to the existing features of 
implicated networks in order to be acceptable and doable, hence implying a 
‘conservative’ logic. Yet, if this the case, what about discontinuous and more 
radical changes?  
 
In reviewing the literature on (inter-) organisational innovation, Akrich et al. 
(2002a,b) locate a number of characteristics of innovation. However, the 
question of who to interact with, and how to interact remains unanswered in 
the innovation literature. They warn us against the edifying stories employed 
(in retrospect) to explain the outcome of such processes, invoking, e.g., 
absence of demand, technological difficulties or inhibitory costs as potential 
reasons. When innovation is in the making, these questions are all 
controversial (Akrich et al. 2002a:190). We need to avoid giving 
retrospective explanations, using truths created by the story, and instead go 
closer to the actors and study innovation in the making. In order to 
understand innovation processes, they argue, both the diversity and 
complexity of the decisions to be made must be reconstructed, as well as the 
time and irreversibilities they create. These decisions are difficult to 
prioritise, because it is unknown which of them will prove to be strategically 
crucial. Details often end up counting and cumulatively making significant 
differences in achieving success or failure (Akrich et al., 2002a), in projects 
that may sometimes escape the hands of its inventors. It certainly is a 
paradox that innovation is viewed to progress by means of making decisions, 
and yet the outcomes of these decisions are so uncertain. Further, since 
innovation per definition, is created from instability and unpredictability, no 
method can master innovation entirely (ibid:195). Hence, they argue that 
innovation management is about producing an environment that is 
supportive of the innovation. A process logic, like, for example, the one 
inherent in actor-network theory tells us that we can never stop doing our 
ordering work. There is not a final state of order to be achieved and where 
we can rest. When the ordering work stops, so does the order. A ‘typical’ 
ANT story tells us about how problems and solutions are established, and 
how human and non-human actors are interested, enrolled and mobilised to 
build, support, represent and hence stabilise, the actor-network and its focal 
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‘object’ (e.g. Callon, 1986; Harrison & Laberge, 2002). To ‘innovate’ is to 
commit to a continuous process of defining, enrolling and keeping all the 
involved actors loyal (Latour, 1996). Consequently, to define an ‘innovation’ 
is not possible in principle, only in practice. It is continually up for 
negotiation, and will always risk being contested. For research then, the 
interesting question is how this ordering of network learning and innovation 
is done and maintained in practice, rather than what it is (supposed to be) in 
principle. 
 
Within STS, starting out with laboratory studies, to including technology 
development and most recently, financial markets, the somewhat ‘messy’ 
mixing of technoscience and business requires more research, even though 
this impure blend of what is sacred and what is dirty has been a central 
characteristic of industrial practices from their very origin. In the case of this 
thesis, such ‘heterogeneous engineering’ (Law, 1992) entails drawing on 
relatively wide networks of various kinds, beyond locally situated practices, 
such as the globalisation of food markets, transformation of raw material 
production and scientific policy discourses on ‘blue-green’ innovation 9 . 
Moreover, the study seeks to show the intertwined mobilisation of 
technology, economy, meaning and power in order to realise industrial 
innovation, which is in line with Latour’s (1996) study of the development 
of Aramis, a public transportation system in Paris, although I am tracing the 
network building activities closer to actual commercial actors and end-users 
than became relevant in the case of Aramis. The major product of the 
research laboratories investigated by Latour and other anthropologists of 
science is texts. The major product of industrial companies, however, are 
(physical) objects – products – often mass produced and distributed for use 
by multitudes of people. Material realities and potentialities are translated to 
text, but even more so, texts (ideas, strategies, patents, recipes, etc) are 
translated to material products, and then to economic value. These are 
processes of embodying texts, and ordering assemblages of texts, materials 
and humans. In addition, most of the time, the outcome differs considerably 
from the original text (scientific text and/or business plans). Texts are not 
always circulated as relatively stable ‘immutable and combinable mobiles’ 
as they are in science (Latour, 1987). The creation of use, exchange and 
economic value is what counts (and is counted), and texts are little more than 
pragmatic tools on the way.  
 
From the original cluster of anthropological and historical studies of 
scientific practice, STS has made several turns towards other, but still related, 
fields of epistemic practice. The development of technology was the first, 
with studies of diverse fields, from aircrafts and bicycles to bio- and 
                                                     
9 See chapter 3.3 for more on ‘blue-green’ innovation. 
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nanotechnology. More recently, new directions have emerged from a number 
of studies of economic practices. Michel Callon’s The Laws of the Markets 
(1998) was the first in a series of studies of the interaction between 
economic models and economic practice, and relating their findings to 
economic sociology and the sociology of finance (e.g. Knorr Cetina & Preda, 
2005; Barry & Slater, 2005; MacKenzie, 2006). Their contributions have 
been a performative view of markets, and an investigation of the constitution 
and role of ‘calculative’ agents and devices in shaping market practice. In 
moving towards one of the most extreme versions of economic practice, in 
terms of its theory-based modeling and global flows of information, the 
techno-economic networks of finance has proven to be a fruitful object for 
investigation. 
 
However, large sections of economic practice are performed in a much more 
impure and messy mix of matters and materials. Science, technology, 
economic models and practices, industrial politics, professional practice, 
distribution and marketing practices are but a few of the elements any actor 
within most businesses and industries would have to take into account. In the 
fields of industrial sociology and anthropology, less has been done. Quite a 
few anthropological studies have been done on marketing and consumption 
practices10, for example, examining markets as cultures and brands as objects 
of cultural practice. In this thesis, I have found it particularly relevant to 
relate to the more industrially oriented works of Olsen (2000), Mattsson 
(2003), Cochoy (2005), Helgesson and Kjellberg (e.g. 2006, 2007) and 
Araujo (2007) on the performative aspects of more ‘mundane’ markets, 
resembling studies of food distribution, telecommunications, biotechnology, 
electricity, etc. In their conceptual model of “markets as constituted by 
practice”, Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007a:137) suggest that markets are 
constituted by normalising practices (“to establish normative objectives”), 
representational practices (to depict markets) and exchange practices (“to 
realise individual economic exchanges”). The links between these are 
conceived as translations (Latour, 1987). Markets are thus conceived of as 
being processes under continuous realisation in different ways, and market 
change/innovation is analysed as emerging actor-networks which realise 
their programs via complex processes of translation, often in conflict with 
the interests of other (or pre-existing) actor-networks and their practices. I 
will get back to some specific aspects of this emergent field in the discussion 
in chapter 6. 
 
In a similarly performative view of markets, Lury (2004) has specifically 
analysed brands and how they take part in shaping the global economy. In 
her view, a brand “both is an object of information and objectifies 
                                                     
10 See e.g. Garsten & de Montoya (eds), 2004 for a review and a collection of works. 
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information”, defining the brand as “a set of relations between products or 
services”, and “a platform for the patterning of activity, a mode of 
organising activities in time and space”. In this way, the brand should be 
viewed, not as a closed object, but “rather, open, extending into – or better, 
implicating – social relations” (Lury, 2004:1). The brands thereby come to 
be a tool for ordering – and stabilising – the relationships between producers, 
distributors and consumers, which has to be studied as a dynamic process 
changing over time: “The object-ivity of the brand emerges out of relations 
between its parts, or rather its products (or services), and in the organisation 
of a controlled relation to its environment” (ibid:2). In line with the works of 
Callon (1998, 1999) and Lee and LiPuma (2000, in Lury, 2004), she 
addresses the role of objects and culture in the operation of markets (Lury 
2004:4), arguing that “the brand mediates the supply and demand of 
products through the organisation, co-ordination and integration of the use of 
information” (ibid:4).  
 
Another strand of STS studies came out of a growing concern for the user of 
technology, realising that it is difficult to fully understand technology 
development without including the receiving end. Not surprisingly, the 
findings of these studies have been that users are not only receivers; they are 
also participants – in more or less direct ways – in shaping the technology 
itself. In material semiotics (Law, 1999), it is emphasised how both the 
shapes and the meaning of things are mutually constituted. Within the social 
construction of technology (SCOT) approach (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 
1987; Bijker, 1995), users have been included, although in a somewhat 
asymmetric fashion. The recent emphasis on use and users has also led to 
insightful studies by scholars such as Pinch & Oudshoorn (2003, 2008), who 
have produced more symmetrical pictures of technology development, both 
in relation to economy, industry, social practice, individual users, politics 
and the technology itself11.  
 
In their review of the literature on user-technology relationships, Oudshoorn 
and Pinch (2008) particularly emphasise the fields of innovation studies 
(lead users), sociology of technology, feminist studies, semiotic approaches 
(ANT), and media and cultural studies. Through empirical research 
identifying (some) users as innovators, von Hippel argues that many 
innovations come about from users identifying their own needs and trying to 
develop their own solutions. Thus, he came to develop the influential term 
‘lead users’, and has subsequently researched and experimented with ways 
of systematically including users in the innovation process. On the other 
hand, Oudshoorn and Pinch point to a study of Hoogma and Schot (2001, in 
                                                     
11 See also Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007 for a more economy/industry oriented 
parallel based on the IMP approach. 
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Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008:543), who found that not all users are innovative, 
and hence that one needs to think through how to find a “sensitive interactive 
environment for the adaptation of some radical new technologies”.  
 
In replacing the old view of users as passive consumers, and of innovation 
processes as linear, the social construction/shaping of technology approaches 
have positioned users as participants in technology development, in terms of 
how they interpret and therefore use the technology. The boundaries between 
users and designers, production and consumption, are thereby blurred. The 
closure of the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of objects can be reached through 
several closure mechanisms, thereby stabilising the technology in a pattern 
of predominant meaning and use. However, designers, users and 
intermediaries do interact within a ‘technological frame’, providing 
institutionalised rules on how to interact with the technology. Later, the 
approach has taken on the challenge of mutuality – of co-construction of 
both users (social groups) and technologies – via the concept of 
‘sociotechnical ensembles’. Power is studied semiotically as relations 
between social groups, but due to “the methodological priority it gives to 
social groups, [it] has not paid enough attention to the diversity of users, the 
exclusion of users, and the politics of non-use or restricted use” (ibid:544). 
 
Within the more semiotically 12  inspired strands of STS, such as actor-
network theory, Oudshoorn and Pinch mention the concepts ‘configuring the 
user’ and ‘scripts’. In Woolgar’s conceptualisation (1991), users are seen as 
readers of technology, and interpretative flexibility as constrained “because 
the design and the production of machines entail a process of configuring the 
user” (in Oudsoorn & Pinch, 2008:548), in short – the technology cannot be 
used in any way the users want due to the limitations built into the 
technology by designers. The representation of (certain kinds of) users (real 
or imagined) in designing and testing technology is crucial in the process of 
co-constructing technology and users. In other words, the process of 
configuring users is a matter of interaction between not-yet-settled users and 
not-yet-settled machines (Grint & Woolgar, 1997). Moreover, as later 
studies have emphasised, designers are also configured by both users and 
their organisations, making the process of configuration a mutual matter 
(Mackay et al., 2000, in Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008:549). In a similar fashion, 
‘script' denotes how designers anticipate user patterns and behaviours, and 
build them into the technologies, a kind of division of labour between human 
and machine, hence enabling and constraining social and sociotechnical 
                                                     
12 Semiotic approaches are concerned with the construction and structuration of 
meaning, based on a relational view on language. ANT has expanded this to include 
also socio-material relations, thus emphasising the heterogeneous character of the 
social (Law, 1992; 1999). 
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relationships. Through the notion of program/anti-program, they show how 
scripts sometimes are opposed by users refusing to submit to the anticipated 
order of things and humans. This view challenges social constructivist 
approaches by giving more agency to non-humans. Actor-network 
approaches are criticised, however, for still giving “more weight to the world 
of designers and technological objects”, and therefore “the world of users, 
particularly the cultural and social processes that facilitate or constrain the 
emergence of users’ anti-programs, remains largely unexplored within actor 
network approaches” (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008:551). 
 
However, if designing/developing/producing a product also entails 
‘configuring users’ in a real sense, not just ‘virtual’ anticipation in the design 
process, then how can we account for stories of mismatch between a 
(launched) product and (non-interested) customers/users? If the term more or 
less sticks to the dichotomy of illusion/reality, then the configured user 
would be little more than a (more or less successful) illusion, thereby losing 
the very real enabling, restraining and shaping interaction between the 
product and the user. Still, we might view configuration as the shaping of 
particular (and real) users, who may or may not (a) accept the terms of 
usage, (b) exist among the population reached and/or (c) succeed in relating 
to ‘actual users’ (Grint & Woolgar, 1997) out there. 
 
If we now go back to Garud, who was emphasised in the innovation 
management section above, we have completed a circle. In drawing both on 
innovation management perspectives and science and technology studies, he 
has together with Karnøe (Garud & Karnøe, 1997; 2001), and others (e.g. 
Garud & Rappa, 1994; Garud & Ahlstrom, 1997; Garud & Munir, 2008), 
made headway on technical and industrial entrepreneurship. In challenging 
the path dependence perspective, they describe how new paths are created, 
and the room for agency that exists within such processes. They introduce 
the concept of ‘mindful deviation’ as a key to how entrepreneurs come to 
deviate from established paths and mobilise for exploration of new paths. 
Along the same line, Pinch (Pinch, 2001; Pinch and Trocco, 2002; Pinch and 
Oudshoorn, 2003) has studied the development of the musical synthesizers, 
and convincingly demonstrated how the involvement of users and 
development of markets were crucial aspects for why and how some 
entrepreneurs succeeded with path creation while others failed. 
 
What all of these contributions share is how the entangled elements of 
meanings, theories, materials, organisations, humans and technologies are 
carefully intertwined to hold the sociotechnical network together. Things get 
their value in social and economic relations, via processes of translation and 
of framing, in which some things are included, allowed access to a system 
(e.g. of a particular economy), while other things are kept on the outside or 
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excluded. Following, changes and transformations of established systems are 
understood as being the effects of rivalry between competing sets of 
ideas/programs and frames, and their actor-networks seeking to expand and 
circulate by translating and representing an increasing number of actors and 
elements. However, as mentioned previously, the study of science and 
technology on the one hand, and the study of industry and markets on the 
other, include very different kinds of practices and actors. Therefore, we 
cannot take the idea for granted that the same analytical repertoire works in 
both kinds of settings. This is made clear in the recent studies of industry and 
markets, through how they both draw on and alter the thinking of STS/ANT. 
I will come back to a discussion of some specific uses and alterations of 
actor-network theory in the discussion in chapter 6. 
 
Having briefly presented the empirical and theoretical starting points for my 
study, I will now move on to formulating the purpose and research questions 
to be investigated throughout this thesis. 
 
1.3 Research questions: Innovation, process and controversy 
If, as argued above, innovation happens across boundaries 13 , a crucial 
question is then how to cross or overcome such boundaries. Further, because 
boundaries represent difference of various kinds, such as different 
knowledge regimes, different practices, different strategies to handle 
uncertainty and risk, and different interests, there are usually tensions 
involved in the quest for the associating/aligning, translating and stabilising 
of elements between them. Competing programmes of action, conflicts 
between new and old and paradigmatic fights between knowledge 
regimes/discourses are but a few outcomes of such boundary crossing 
efforts. Sensitivity towards conflict and controversy is strongly present in 
actor-network theory (Latour, 1987; 1996), which explicitly advises the 
researcher to trace controversies, since this is where the ‘black-boxes’ of 
relatively stable actor-networks are destabilising, hence enabling an 
observation of how ‘new’ actor-networks come about. Law (1992) describes 
the building of actor-networks as ‘overcoming resistance’ and Pickering 
(1995:22) describes the production of (scientific) practice as “a dialectic of 
                                                     
13 I use the term ‘boundary’ not as a static term referring to formal organisations, or 
anything similar.  Instead, and in line with literature both within STS (e.g.Star and 
Griesmer, 1989), practice-based studies of organisation (e.g. Gherardi & Nicolini, 
2002), and IMP (e.g. Araujo, 1998), boundaries are viewed as being empirical 
phenomena temporally unfolding in practice. Boundaries may appear in many 
forms, and are more or less stable outcomes of ‘boundary work’ (e.g. Grint and 
Woolgar, 1997); i.e. efforts to define who is on the inside and outside of a practice. 
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resistance and accommodation”. Still, conflict is also present in the other 
perspectives outlined in the previous section. ‘Friction’ in the industrial 
network approach points to the resistances and influences that necessarily 
follow from any attempt at changing resource constellations. Further, the 
political aspect of innovating is explicitly stated both by Pavitt (2005) and 
Van de Ven et al. (1999). Nevertheless, I would argue that while these latter 
perspectives seek to include conflict and politics as part of their analysis, 
actor-network theory locates controversy at its centre.  
 
There are two different viewpoints related to the actor-network 
understanding of how actors may be participating and entwined in a plurality 
of different actor-networks, performing different identities and roles in each 
of them. Michael (1996) emphasises the problem that sometimes occurs 
when an actor’s identity in one setting is confronted with the identity 
performed in another, and how this is a potential threat to the stability of 
actors’ identities. Araujo (1998), on the other hand, argues this is a potential 
trigger for learning and innovation. Both views are obviously relevant, and 
their points of departure are similar: The crossing of boundaries between 
actor-networks is likely to lead to incomprehensible performances of actors, 
hence possibly destabilising established order and inducing change. I also 
would believe that the sharper and greater number of boundaries involved, 
the larger potential for conflict; because identities are challenged, more 
interests are at stake, and it may be more difficult to stabilise (new) relations. 
 
Giving this ‘conflict oriented’ view of innovation, the purpose of the study is 
to produce a rich description and thereby gain new understanding of 
innovation processes. How do innovation processes evolve over time? I 
could also say the practice of innovation, how it is done, and, in particular, 
how knowledge and technology are being developed and commercialised. I 
seek to produce insights related to this as an empirical problem, which is 
recognised as a problem by most of the practitioners I have been talking to, 
and where the available knowledge is scarce. However, it is also a 
theoretical problem, and I seek to contribute to perspectives on innovation 
that we could call process based, relational/interactive and situated. 
 
In order identify a suitable case for the task, I relate to Van de Ven et al.’s 
(1999) definition of a ‘generic innovation journey’, emphasising innovation 
processes that are purposeful for developing a novel idea, yet constitute 
substantial uncertainty regarding the market, technology and organisation, a 
collective effort over time and require greater resources than those possessed 
by the people who undertake the efforts (Van de Ven et al., 1999:22). In 
connection with the setting where my project is based, the Centre for 
Cooperative Research at BI Norwegian School of Management, I spanned 
the partnering companies for interesting and ongoing innovation processes. 
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Tine BA, an agro-food cooperative with its core business in the dairy sector, 
turned out to have a combination of new corporate innovation strategies, a 
large R&D department and a number of interesting ongoing innovation 
projects crossing the industrial boundaries between the agricultural and 
biomarine industries. In addition, in order to enable looking into the ‘real’ 
struggles of innovation – with all its contingencies, uncertainties, 
controversies and heterogeneous elements combined – I assumed that 
‘radical’ and boundary crossing projects, i.e. the projects with the greatest 
gap between the established activities and the innovation projects, would be 
more open to investigation and display more of the innovation dynamics at 
play. Very little in these agro-marine innovation projects had reached any 
degree of ‘stability’; the final shape and destiny of the innovations were still 
undetermined. From this I propose the following formulation of the purpose 
of my study: 
 
First, I want to describe the organising of innovation processes crossing 
technological, organisational and industrial boundaries in time.  
Second, I seek to increase our understanding of efforts to realise and 
stabilise new knowledge and technology in innovative ventures, with 
particular emphasis on how controversy is overcome as part of the process 
of stabilising relations. 
 
It is impossible to explain what happens in innovation processes in 
individual, deterministic or linear ways. These are highly interactive 
processes, involving a number of both human and non-human elements, 
where the outcome – on almost any parameter – is not given at the outset. 
Hence, I have tried to pose research questions that can help me capture at 
least some of these aspects. They are founded on a perspective of 
relationality, heterogeneity and situatedness, as outlined earlier in this 
chapter (1.2). These questions also start out with the premise that ‘new’ 
knowledge never is created out of the blue, it will always be derived from 
something that already exists – hence we might say that it is the association 
that is new: Ideas of how to (re-) combine, translate or transform existing 
knowledge into something new. It is also impossible to simply transfer 
knowledge, without also transforming (or destroying) it. Hence, the research 
questions I have pursued in this study are the following: 
 
- How do innovation processes evolve over time? This is a very open 
and explorative question, corresponding with my ethnographic 
approach and my basic interest in innovation as temporally emergent 
and culturally situated. In particular, I am interested in how agency 
(programmes of action) is produced and confined, and how actors 




- How is knowledge translated, transformed and combined in 
processes of innovation? And what kinds of knowledge are 
involved? The centrality of knowledge and the lack thereof (causing 
uncertainty) in innovation is well established in the literature. 
However, the processes of translating, combining and transforming 
knowledge necessary for realising innovations is still not well 
understood in industrial settings.  
 
- What are the contrary forces of innovation processes? Beginning 
with acknowledging the presence of controversies in innovation, I 
want to understand more about what dynamics produce and fuel the 
inherent tensions of innovation processes. What are they, how do 
they influence the process, and how is the settling of conflicts 
enabled or hindered? 
 
These questions are grounded both in theory and the empirical materials, and 
have grown out of a circular process of going back and forth between the 
literature and the field. They are designed to capture both how actor-
networks are built for innovation, how knowledge and innovations are 
developed, and how the broader settings of the process influence the actual 
process under investigation. Hopefully, this may contribute to innovation 
studies by shedding some light on the question of how knowledge, which is 
developed in certain contexts and embodied in certain objects and practices, 
is rendered mobile, translated, combined and made stable in new settings, 
objects and practices underpinning innovative ventures. ‘Knowledge’ is here 
understood and studied in a particular way: Knowledge is only analyzed in 
terms of how it is materialised in technologies and work practices. Thus, the 
focus is on knowing, or the doing of knowledge – knowledge as a 
performative construct inseparable from the historical, social and 
technological setting in which it is embedded (Law, 1994; Araujo, 1998; 
Gherardi et al., 1998; 2002). Industrial innovation refers to the process of 
developing, producing and commercialising new objects through re-
combining, transforming and translating knowledge and technology. Hence, 
innovation is about the whole process, from the inception of an idea until its 
eventual implementation/commercialisation (or failure). 
 
The three above questions are from the outset empirical questions which 
seek to enable in-depth and interesting descriptions of the empirical case 
study. The study further aims to contribute with developing our analytical 
vocabulary for researching innovation processes, and particularly the 
vocabulary emerging from fields of research related to organisational, 
industrial and economic phenomena: Science and technology studies, the 
industrial network approach and innovation management (see review above). 
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But how can this be done? How is it possible to study innovation in the 
making? In chapter 2, I will turn to methodology and research design. 
 
1.4 The thesis structure 
In this introductory chapter, I have reviewed and positioned my work within 
studies of innovation processes, ending with my research questions. Next, 
the methodology chapter accounts for the use of organisational ethnography, 
and a discussion of the challenges of doing ethnography in studies of 
innovation processes.  
 
The third chapter is a presentation of the case I have been investigating, and 
the wider industrial and political setting of which it was a part. On the one 
hand, there is the emergence of ‘blue-green’ innovation policy and how 
actors in science and industry mobilise this institutional discourse to support 
their local innovation efforts. One the other hand, there is the development 
and combination of two innovation programs, both seeking to develop new 
‘value-added’ products from fish. One ‘program’ explored the innovative 
use of fermentation technology for curing fish, while the other was built on 
novel technology for processing ‘super-fresh’ salmon. In principle, these 
could be viewed as separate projects, not having too much to do with the 
other. Still, in practice, these projects became partly integrated and partly 
competing, and some of the most interesting aspects of this study are located 
in the interaction between these two projects, and their subsequent 
combination into a single brand, organised in a joint venture.  
 
The fourth chapter provides an in-depth description of the emerging 
innovation process, and the struggles to move, combine, and stabilise 
knowledge and technology across boundaries. It is a relatively detailed 
description of an innovation process, being an example of how micro-
practices both create and enact macro-practices (blue-green innovation, and 
industrialisation and market making of fish): First, because macro-practices 
are built by interconnecting micro-practices, and second, because the 
emerging macro-practice and the emerging micro-practice mutually shape 
and influence each other. The case is a particular attempt at developing and 
commercialising new technologies and products from fish, a set of processes 
that started out with ideas for the fermentation of fish (making ‘salami’ of 
fish) on the one hand, and new technologies for processing fresh salmon 
(‘pre-rigor’) on the other.  
 
In the fifth chapter, I outline an analysis scheme for studying and analysing 
(industrial) innovation processes that, in a simplified way, seem to capture 
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some core aspects of this innovation process. Based on my fieldwork and the 
methodological-analytical basis accounted for in the first chapter, I suggest 
that innovation processes may fruitfully be conceptualised as a dual process 
of mobilisation and exploration, of facilitating and attracting resources for 
innovation, and of actually formulating and testing propositions about 
reality. Thus, I arrive at a bipolar model, in which the particular dynamics 
between the two poles of a concrete innovation process become a central 
part of explaining the case. 
 
In chapter 6, I draw out some of the theoretical implications in discussing 
how my study may contribute to and complement theories of innovation 
processes, using the outlined analytic scheme to interpret the case. In 
particular, I contrast and complement the outcomes of my study with 
theories of path creation (Garud & Karnøe, 2001), innovation as punctuated 
learning process (Van de Ven et al., 1999) and relational/interactive 
perspectives of users and markets (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003; Håkansson & 
Waluszewski, 2007; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007a,b). Finally, chapter 7 
concludes the study by summing up my findings and pointing at some areas 




2 Methodology: Constructing ethnography 
In this chapter, I will discuss methodological concerns regarding the (inter-) 
organisational ethnography of innovation processes. There are two initial 
premises that have influenced my research aims, and my theoretical and 
empirical choices in this study. First, in the literature there has been a clear 
call for ‘process studies14’ of innovation and organisation (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Hernes, 2007),  which involves making 
change – or process – the point of departure, and thereby placing 
stabilisation of innovation and organisation at the centre of attention. There 
is a need to improve our understanding of the mechanisms and dynamics of 
how organisation and innovations unfold in practice, or of how they come 
into being. Therefore, I searched for interesting places to study innovation 
processes in real-time through (inter-) organisational ethnography. Second, 
when I was granted the opportunity to study innovation processes from the 
Centre for Co-operative Studies at the Norwegian School of Management 
BI, the main agricultural food cooperatives in Norway – who were sponsors 
of the centre – became the most relevant empirical field of study15, that is, if 
I could find relevant and interesting cases there.  
 
It is my privilege and challenge to study innovation in the making. It is a 
privilege because I am in the position to follow the actors and resources 
through a crucial and conclusive phase of these two innovation cases. And it 
is a challenge, because it is not easy to ‘follow the actor’ when it is unclear 
who and what will move the project towards success or failure. To study 
innovation processes is to study an emerging object or practice from the 
inception of an idea to its realisation (or failure). Further, it involves 
studying the interactional processes of the involved actors, whether they be 
scientists, engineers, managers, marketing and production staff or customers, 
governments and finance institutions, not to mention the non-human actors, 
such as technologies, texts and buildings. Studying innovation is about 
observing and accounting for an object that is also a heterogeneous network: 
To investigate how ideas, knowledge and meaning gradually get transformed 
                                                     
14 See also Olsen (forthcoming) for a constructive critique of such calls for ‘process 
studies’, which argues that ontological process metaphysics will be of limited value 
to the field, but that its epistemology will make interesting and potentially useful 
contributions at the level of analytical conceptualisation. 
15  It must be noted that I have not had any obligations or objections from the 
sponsors of the centre regarding research questions or design, other than a general 
expectation of ‘relevance’. On the contrary, this position has granted me open and 




and embodied, and thereby making the innovation more real. This is why 
studies of innovation processes lend themselves towards the situated, 
relational and narrative approach of Actor-Network Theory (ANT).  
 
There are many problems with researching innovation. First, accounting for 
outcomes of social activity demands analytic tools that are able to include 
both humans and non-humans, as the social is socio-materially constituted. 
Second, accounting for interaction processes, including how things get 
stabilised and de-stabilised is a very different task from the more common 
social science methodology of measuring input and output factors to prove 
causality and significant relationships, or to map elements of a social realm 
as if they were static, stable and generalisable. Third, if only ‘hard facts’ are 
accounted for, it would be impossible to tell stories about the ordering of the 
social: We need to include the intentions, strategies and compromises that 
are made, and how actors inscribe meaning into their materials and activities. 
While Gupta et al. (2007) with good reason calls for more complex and 
comprehensive studies of innovation processes, I do not agree with them that 
such studies should be ‘multi-level’. The argument against multi-level 
analysis is important to this study, as well as not “settling the question of 
scale in advance” (Hernes, 2007:74). When the social researcher starts 
following the action, or the “connections and associations made between 
heterogeneous actors” (Hernes, 2007:74), the term ‘context’, and the 
distinction between micro- and macro-levels are no longer relevant as 
analytical concepts. Context, if anything, becomes an empirical phenomenon 
of how the actors draw boundaries and ‘frame’ their activities. 
 
How does this inform empirical research? At best, to practice Actor-Network 
Theory is to build research on careful empirical observations, and 
acknowledge some central principles. First, it is “important not to start out 
assuming whatever we wish to explain” (Law 1992:380); instead, Law 
suggests to “start out with interaction, and assume that interaction is all there 
is”, rather than starting out with some abstract overarching concept, like 
class or structure. And from there ask questions about how some interactions 
manage to reproduce themselves into more stable orderings. How do they 
“overcome resistance and become macro-social?” (Law 1992:380). Latour 
(1987) outlines a set of methodological rules, and a set of principles for 
analysis emphasising the overarching ideas of symmetry, agnosticism and 
free association. These principles are also discussed by Callon (1986), who 
makes a rather sharp critique of sociological theorists for their asymmetric 
analyses. This becomes visible in the paradox that sociologists act as if the 
agnosticism they apply to natural science and technology, which allows for a 
plurality of descriptions, is not applicable towards society as well: Nature is 
uncertain but society is not. In this way they remove their own knowledge 
from public discussion (Callon, 1986:197), which means that society is 
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always given the last word. Callon’s argument is that both the social and the 
natural are equally uncertain and ambiguous, and hence disputable. He 
therefore generalises the principle of agnosticism, or of analytic impartiality, 
stating that one should not a priori privilege humans above non-humans. 
Thus, sociology has no solid foundations, and “is as debatable as the 
knowledge and objects which it accounts for” (ibid:199). The heritage from 
semiotics and post-structuralism become visible in Callon’s description of 
scientific and technological innovations as ‘dramatic stories’ in which both 
the identity and importance of actors are at issue (1986:199). ANT can 
fundamentally be described as a way of writing stories about the social, 
based on a set of research principles and methods. Furthermore, the choice 
of which methods and what analytical repertoire to use is up to the 
researcher according to what seems best suited to the actual task. Yet, there 
should be one single coherent repertoire to secure the symmetrical analysis 
of all actors in scope, and it is then the researcher’s task to convince 
colleagues that the right choice has been made (ibid:200). However, this 
repertoire should not include pre-established analytical grids or categories; 
rather there should be an attempt to follow the actors to understand how they 
build and explain their world (ibid:201). Hence the principle of ‘free 
association’ is introduced, emphasising idealist methods such as 
ethnomethodology, phenomenology, discourse analysis, etc. 
 
However some authors have also posed critical questions of the Actor-
Network theorists’ approach to ethnography. In summing up some of these 
critiques, Vickers and Fox (2004) mention some arguments about 
representation. ANT has tended to focus on elites, a narrow set of actors: 
Despite its claim for symmetrical analysis it still tends to represent some 
humans more than others. ANT has also been accused of refusing to engage 
in ethical debate, taking a relativist standpoint. However, Vickers and Fox 
suggests that there is nothing innately relativist in ANT as such, though this 
still might be the case in some of the ANT studies that have been done. 
Some argue that ANT is marked by ‘analytical decontextualism’, that the 
“wider social context is often let out of the analysis”, and even that ANT 
researchers only pick out the bits from their ethnographies which corroborate 
their ANT points. Vickers and Fox’ solutions to this issue are to focus more 
on non-elite people, and on processes of counter-enrolment/resistance. They 
further accept that ANT offers a kind of decontextualisation, like other 
ethnographic approaches, the context in sight is dependent on the viewpoint 
of the studied actors and those of the observer. However, in line with the 
decontextualism-argument, I find that there is good reason to seek to 
‘stretch’ actor-network ethnographies a bit beyond what has commonly been 
done in this field of research; tracing the network building activities beyond 
local sites and projects, and connecting the narrative to some of the other 
narratives with which it interacts in practice. My descriptions in chapters 3 
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and 4, and some of the subsequent discussions in chapter 6 have sought to 
deal with this.  
 
Since the late 1970s, ethnography has become a common approach to 
studying knowledge production within science and technology studies (Hess, 
1992; Law, 2004). According to Law, this is because it reveals “the relative 
messiness of practice”, helping us to “understand the often ragged ways in 
which knowledge is produced in research” (Law, 2004:18-19). 
Acknowledging the need for investigating practices of industrial innovation, 
including its situated and contingent character, makes a good case for 
ethnography. If a central issue, perhaps the central issue, in industrial 
innovation is knowledge (both when it is available and when it is lacking), 
then it is reasonable to think that similar methods could be fruitfully applied 
to understand how knowledge is produced in such settings. This is consistent 
with Hess’ (1992:14) call for de-centring the laboratory in STS studies, as 
knowledge production is distributed across a number of different settings 
and practices. The main differences from most ethnographies of science and 
technology are perhaps, first of all, the distributedness and heterogeneity of 
industrial practices, often involving more heterogeneous constellations of 
actors. This certainly includes scientists and technologists, but also 
marketing and sales personnel, business managers, logistics and distribution 
actors, politicians, bureaucrats, investors and customers. This means that 
action is found in many places, often at the same time. It also means that the 
ethnographer is challenged to engage in observing and understanding very 
different kinds of practices, though s/he does not always have the privilege 
of focusing on just one of them, and is certainly not able to capture 
‘everything’ relevant to the process. In this sense, this study has not only de-
centred the laboratory, but also business management, which has been put at 
the centre of a great deal of business research. Corporate board and 
management in the organisations studied are just a few of the many places 
and practices I had to visit; in fact, most of my time in the field was spent 
with ‘operational’ project participants, such as middle and project managers, 
scientists, technologists and marketers.  
 
My aim has been to ‘follow the actor’ (Latour, 1987), wherever the action 
happened to unfold, to understand the processes and practices of industrial 
innovation in a broader sense; to avoid the managerialist and the 
technological determinist pitfalls. Secondly, industrial innovation involves a 
set of epistemic and economic practices which have not yet been studied 
extensively within STS16. These are practices with different aims, frames and 
                                                     
16  See chapters one and six for the presentation and discussion of some recent 
contributions in an emerging field of economic and industrial sociology with roots in 
STS. 
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evaluation criteria; the stabilisation and evaluation of knowledge is 
performed less according to scientific norms of knowledge production than 
economic norms of profitability, return on investments, etc. Hence, 
transformations of scientific knowledge into industrial and economic 
practices are often uncertain processes demanding considerable time and 
resources (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007). Again, the inclusion of 
practitioners of various kinds and in various places is beneficial towards the 
understanding more of such complex processes; arguably the main source of 
uncertainty is found in the interaction between various practices and 
practitioners – especially between those that are new to each other. 
 
Advantages of this methodology are the opportunities following social (and 
socio-material) processes and practices as they evolve. Ethnography may be 
said to be about participant observation, with the ethnographer 
 
participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended 
period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking 
questions – in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light 
on the issues that are the focus of the research. (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995:1) 
 
Emphasis is put on interaction between the ethnographer and actors in the 
field, hence the argument that ethnographic fieldwork has a dialogical nature 
(Hess, 1992). Such real time studies have more power to elucidate the 
uncertainties and contingencies the actors experience in the course of 
deciding and acting. This is not a matter of constructing an objective truth of 
what happened; rather, it is an attempt at re-constructing the actors’ 
experiences, interpretations and actions in the face of the ‘opportunities’ and 
‘uncertainties’ of innovation. In other words, I wanted to re-construct some 
of the difficulties, controversies and choices that the involved actors had to 
handle, and avoid post-hoc rationalisation. Latour (1987:258) underscores 
the need for studying knowledge production in action, in order to “either 
arrive before the facts and machines are blackboxed or (...) follow the 
controversies that reopen them”, thereby looking for the transformations the 
innovation go through during the process of its realisation. In addition to the 
advantage of ‘real-time’ studies of contingent processes, and the provision of 
‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) of the empirical field, ethnography may 
produce both deep insights and increased variety of interpretations. The 
ethnographer is not granted sovereignty over interpreting and theorising the 
case. If research is viewed as being an ever-evolving discussion, this should 
be viewed as a great advantage, and if the analysis of social issues is the 
researcher’s “constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and 
their compatriots are up to” (Geertz, 1973:9), his/her discussion, re-
interpretation and comparison with other cases should be viewed as a 
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necessity. However, in my process of investigation, I found it necessary to 
include a set of events that happened before I entered the setting. In these 
cases I have had to rely solely on documentation and interviews with 
participants in these events. Even if most of these events happened during 
the reasonably recent past (from 0-3 years before), and I cross-checked 
information with different actors, I cannot rule out the possibility that I 
missed important aspects of these events. Still, the aim has not been to find 
the ultimate truth about these events, but to re-construct and re-present the 
challenges the actors were facing as much as possible. Thus, in terms of the 
process of gathering data, there are two different methodological challenges 
during the real-time and more historical parts of this study; the 
distributedness of (inter-) organisational ethnography in real-time, and the 
danger of actors’ post-hoc rationalisation of past events. I have sought to 
handle these challenges by cross-checking historical materials, and through 
keeping in regular contact with key informants in order to catch up with 
recent events when they were still ‘fresh’ and their meaning had not yet been 
collectively stabilised in the organisation. Cox and Hassard (2007) review 
and discuss retrospective methods in organisational research, and warn 
against positivist and interpretivist positions that assume the past may be 
controlled or distinguished from the present in retrospective research. 
Instead, they propose a position of re-presentation, in which the present is 
not understood as being independent of the past, but rather that the past, 
present and future are co-constituted both in the negotiation of meaning in 
organisations, and during the writing of the researcher. In this sense, the 
stabilisation of history is an interesting topic in itself – of how actors delete 
and/or re-interpret aspects of their past in their ongoing processes of 
realising their present projects and identities. The researcher also has to 
acknowledge that his story is just one of a number of potential versions, 
account transparently for how this came to be, and make an argument for its 
value. In this thesis, I have sought to be accurate in terms of dating the 
various events that I describe (see in particular chapter 3), while still putting 
more emphasis on how events unfolded in the interaction between different 
views and interests. The resulting time and shape of the processes described 
are therefore both products of the participants’ negotiations, and of the 
researcher’s purpose, questions and fieldwork (who I talked to, what 
documents I got access to, when and where I got to observe the ongoing 
processes, etc).  
 
According to Geertz, interpretive approaches to social research “tend to 
resist (...) conceptual articulation and thus to escape systematic modes of 
assessment” (1973:24). But, as “social actions are comments on more than 
themselves”, there is “no reason why the conceptual structure of a cultural 
interpretation should be any less formulable (...) than that of, say, a 
biological observation” (ibid:23-24). In this thesis, I have ended up writing 
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the empirical research in chapters 3 and 4 in a relatively descriptive way17. 
This means that, to a large extent, I have sought to provide ‘thick 
descriptions’ of the case, and suspend most of my reflections and theorising 
discussions until the subsequent chapters 5 and 6. It does not mean, however, 
that chapters 3 and 4 are ‘objective’ in the sense of ‘not analysed’. Of 
course, during the entire process of choosing case and questions, of 
observing and talking to actors in the field, and especially choosing what to 
include and how, this written account has been highly influenced both by the 
theoretical fields mentioned in chapter 1 and my own reflection and 
interpretation along the way. By displaying the case study in this way, in a 
style relatively close to what Van Maanen (1988) has called a ‘realist tale’, 
to not include my own person or much of my reflection as part of the 
empirical account, can easily be seen to produce an illusion of objective 
reality. And this illusion is possibly strengthened by the extensive use of 
quotes from interviews (and to some extent documents), at the expense of 
excerpts from my own field notes, even if much of my understanding and 
interpretation of the case has been shaped by actually being in the field. 
Much recent ethnography have embraced styles closer to ‘confessional’ or 
even ‘impressionist’ tales (Van Maanen, 1988), in various ways including 
the ethnographer with her preconceptions and influences on the empirical 
situation (as ‘participant’ both when being in the field and when re-
constructing the story in text), in particular in studies sensitive to power 
relations, such as critical management studies and feminist studies. On the 
other hand, such reflexive modes of writing ethnography have sometimes 
come to be rather ‘researcher centric’, i.e., they deal more with the 
researcher’s own process than the process under investigation. For reasons of 
clarity and focusing on the research questions, I have therefore chosen – in 
writing – to do three things separately: First, a transparent account of my 
own research process, including theoretical starting points and 
methodological process (ch. one and two). Second, a rich case description 
with an extended introduction to situate the case (ch.three and four). And 
third, I have tried to be clear and bold in fleshing out my analysis and 
arguments when theorising from the case study (chapters 5 and 6).  
 
                                                     
17 This has also been a long process of trial and error learning, as both the case 
(chapter four) and the discussion (chapter six has been rewritten in a number of 
versions. Some of these versions contained more about my process of researching 
the field, and some contained more of my reflection, interpretations and analysis 
explicitly entwined in the empirical descriptions.  
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2.1 Digging into potential cases 
Empirically, I started out early in the project with mapping innovation 
strategies and activities at Tine (the former ‘Norwegian Dairies’) and Gilde 
(‘Norwegian Meat’), both farmer-owned and highly industrialised 
cooperatives. I met up with directors and middle managers with a stake in 
these companies’ innovation strategies to identify and discuss ongoing 
innovation processes in the different settings. In particular, I was looking for 
cases and processes where the organisation would have to ‘stretch’ their 
knowledge and resources beyond what they needed in their well established 
core activities. This would mean a need for them to learn about how to 
recombine their expertise and resources with others’ knowledge and 
resources. Moreover, they would not be able to rely too strongly on their 
established routines for research, product development and marketing. In 
following such processes, it was possible to get fairly good data not 
obscuring the uncertainties and contingencies of innovation-in-practice. I 
soon came in contact with people like Mæhle (Corporate Director, Tine), 
Hovland (Managing Director, Tine Ingredients) and Skjervold (Innovation 
Manager, Tine R&D), who were all involved in shaping Tine’s biomarine 
strategies and activities, and I understood that there were a set of projects 
here in which the company’s competence and resources would be 
challenged. For Tine, several of these projects represented relatively 
‘radical’ innovations, both from a technical and a market perspective (see 
chapter 3 for an outline of Tine’s biomarine innovation strategy and the 
related projects). They started out with the assumption that their established 
expertise, technology and infrastructure would be transferrable to the fish 
and other biomarine industries, but without much knowledge of what it 
would take to get there.  
 
At the same time, I participated in a number of the meetings of a small group 
called ‘Jarl S. Berg’s experimental factories’ (JSB); an initiative for 
enhancing creativity and innovation across professions in Tine R&D at 
Kalbakken (Oslo)18. They had work meetings once a week and this became a 
valuable source of information and insight into this part of the organisation. 
Research manager Eirik Selmer-Olsen was leading the group at the time, and 
he generously opened doors for me so that I could gain access to the R&D 
milieu at Kalbakken. Moreover, several people who were or had been 
involved with the Neptun and the Umi No Kami projects were members of 
the group: Lars Petter Swensen, Elin Simonstad Valle, Svein Erik Hilsen and 
Even Manseth. This helped me understand the large and complex R&D 
organisation in Tine, getting to know some of the ‘blue-green’ thinking on 
                                                     
18 There was a similar group in Tine R&D at Voll (Rogaland) too, and I also had a 
visit there in my early phase of getting to know the Tine organisation. 
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the research side, and build relationships with people who became important 
informants to my study. In this phase, I also considered the JSB group to be 
an interesting research object in itself. However, as I inquired into some of 
the biomarine projects, I found these to be better suited; more concrete, 
higher priority in the organisation, and more urgently having to stretch far 
beyond the Tine organisation both related to industrial and market practices 
and knowledge. 
 
In particular, two projects seemed relevant for my purposes: They were 
ongoing when I arrived, they entailed significant challenges on issues both 
of organisation, technology and market, they brought hopes for synergies 
with Tine’s existing business, and they had high priority on the top 
management levels in Tine. During my first year of the study, therefore, I 
traced both the Maritex and the Umi No Kami projects. Maritex was a fish 
oil and by-products factory that Tine at the time owned together with Aarhus 
Olie (Danish producer of vegetable oils), and Umi No Kami was the project 
of fermenting fish into a salami-like product. I was granted good access to 
both projects, and started investigating the project histories, talking to 
project participants and visiting the project partners (Bremnes Seashore in 
Bømlo and the Maritex factory in Sortland), as well as talking to the 
management there. As both projects were based in Tine Ingredients, a small 
department of around 15 people, and with strong connections to Tine R&D, I 
could combine investigations of both projects at the same time. 
 
In this early phase of my fieldwork I considered including both projects in 
my thesis, but as the projects increasingly were based on very different 
business logics (omega 3 as nutritional ingredient versus Salma as high-end 
consumer brand concept), it became difficult to justify. Finally, when 
discussing the issue during my ‘pre-doctoral defence’, I agreed with the 
committee and my supervisors to focus only on the Umi No Kami/Salma 
project. This project and its set of innovation processes involved all aspects 
needed for my study:  
 
- A novel product technology based on a combination of marine and 
agricultural technologies and practices 
 
- A resulting product that was experienced as radically new and 
having an uncertain categorisation within existing food markets 
 
- A networked organisation of the project, involving actors from the 
fish industry, the agro-food industry and from academia 
 
All these aspects suggested a need for extensive learning and knowledge 
production across professions, organisations and industries. Moreover, the 
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degree of uncertainty involved, and the amount of time and resources 
invested, meant that I had the chance to follow – partly in real time – a 
fascinating innovation story with very explicit examples of  what are often 
called ‘radical innovation’.  
 
2.2 Doing organisational ethnography 
Gathering materials 
In line with ethnographic methods, the fieldwork of this study consists of 
gathering a highly heterogeneous mix of research materials, using participant 
observation, informal conversations, formal interviews and document 
analysis. During the spring and fall of 2004, I spent a lot of time at Tine 
R&D, both with the JSB-group, and talking to various people in the 
organisation. I also began conversations with Hovland, Mogård and Kiland 
at Tine Ingredients, and in June 2004, I went with Kiland and Swensen to 
Bremnes for the first large scale production of the salmon salami there. I also 
joined Swensen on a new trip to Bremnes in September 2004, and finally 
visited Bremnes in August 2006 for a second round of interviews with the 
management of Bremnes Seashore and Salmon Brands. During the fall 2004, 
I increased contact with the social milieu at Tine Ingredients, and in October 
2004 I joined Kiland and a number of other Tine representatives at the SIAL 
food fair in Paris, where Salma Cured was presented together with the 
Jarlsberg cheese and other Tine products to a large number of international 
business actors. In November 2004, I went with Bente Mogård and Roger 
Hem to Maritex in Sortland, and had the opportunity to discuss the Tine – 
Maritex relationship with the management team there. From January through 
April 2005, I borrowed a desk in the open-plan offices of Tine Ingredients. I 
spent several days a week there to observe their work practices, strengthen 
my informal dialogue with central actors in Tine’s biomarine projects, 
conduct a first round of interviews, and go systematically through available 
project documentation in project and individual archives. Several of these 
people became key informants in my fieldwork, people who I met relatively 
often; they were in various ways involved in the processes I wanted to study, 
and willing to openly share their views and experiences with me. With 
regard to my status and role during the fieldwork, as a newcomer to the 
organisations I was allowed the role of ‘acceptable incompetent’ 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:103), thereby having the opportunity to ask 
‘silly’ questions about things ‘insiders’ take for granted. Related to Junker’s 
typology of social roles in the field, I was perhaps closest to the ‘observer as 
participant’ role, meaning that I did not take part in actually doing any of the 
activities I studied, and I did not have any tasks or responsibilities within the 
organisations. At the same time, everyone knew that I was a researcher, and 
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I spent a great deal of time talking and interacting with the actors. This is 
‘participant observation’ (Hess, 1992), not to just observe behaviour, but 
also to engage in dialogue. As with many other ethnographers, the informal 
conversations at the desk, by the coffee machine and over lunch provided me 
both with valuable information and with a deepened understanding of the 
practices of the organisation. I sought to keep in regular contact with people 
at Tine R&D also during this period, although not as often as the year 
before. More of the action in the Umi No Kami/Salma project had moved to 
Tine Ingredients, Bremnes Seashore and various customer locations. I also 
experienced that my relationships to the people in R&D made it easier to 
contact them and catch up with recent events.  
 
In total, I have conducted 35 formal interviews, 21 of which were taped and 
fully transcribed. The other interviews were either done via telephone and in 
more spontaneous situations, in which it was not appropriate or practical to 
tape the session. Instead I took notes, and transcribed these interviews and 
meetings as soon as possible after the event. Right after all interviews, I also 
took notes on my own reflections and interpretations of the situation; how 
the interviewees responded to my questions, what they emphasised and their 
suggestions about where to trace the processes under investigation. A few 
key persons were interviewed twice, both to complement me on particular 
issues and to capture aspects of the process over time. I did not use a 
structured interview guide during any of the interviews; instead I brought 
lists of topics that I wanted to cover during the conversation. This is, 
according to Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:154), perhaps the clearest 
difference between the way survey interviewers and ethnographers structure 
interviews: Between ‘standardised’ and ‘reflexive’ interviewing. This is not 
a matter of unstructured versus structured; rather, the ethnographer structures 
the interview – together with the interviewee – as conversations, where the 
order and mode of questions may shift as the conversations evolve; non-
directive, directive and even confrontational.  
 
In addition to these formal interviews, my understanding of what was going 
on, including emerging innovation strategies, work practices and power 
relations, has to a large extent been shaped by the informal interaction over 
time with the various participants in the studied processes. Meeting up with 
individuals and groups during their daily work activities, sitting at a desk in 
their open plan offices, and travelling with them to partner and customer 
meetings produced a large number of interesting observations and informal 
conversations. For practical reasons, I did not have the opportunity to 
balance my time spent ‘in the field’ evenly throughout the investigated 
process or across the places where things happened. First, this was because 
parts of the processes had already taken place. The Neptun project was 
finished, as well as the first phase of the Umi No Kami project. For these 
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parts of the story, I have had to rely on a combination of interviews, informal 
conversations and document analysis. I have therefore also included 
interviews with key personnel from these early phases who were no longer 
participants in the projects. Secondly, the real-time processes under 
investigation were unpredictable and complex. Sometimes meetings and 
discussions had taken place on short notice in times and places where I was 
not present. Even if I experienced an open attitude to my presence, it did not 
always mean that I was invited to business meetings or other events of 
potential impact. Other times things happened several places at the same 
time, like when the people at Bremnes struggled to improve and stabilise 
their production routines together with people from Tine R&D, the 
marketing people worked with adapting their strategy towards potential 
customers, and the management worked on renegotiating agreements 
between the involved parties at the same time.  
 
During my fieldwork in Tine, I had open access to project archives from the 
Umi No Kami and Salma projects, and also the Maritex project, including 
project descriptions, strategy documents, meeting minutes, market research, 
board documentation and even some email-correspondence between 
involved parties. During my visits to Tine Ingredients, I spent much of the 
time I had between conversations and meetings systematically going through 
all available documentation, taking notes on information I found useful for 
my study. In spite of this openness and the access I was granted to many of 
the settings where these processes evolved, there was one aspect I could not 
satisfactorily cover on my own. I did not have access – or capacity – to 
follow the processes that took place at the top management of Tine and the 
interaction between the top management of Tine and Bremnes Seashore on 
an ongoing basis. I could partially compensate for some of this by 
maintaining a continuous dialogue on these matters with the project 
participants who would maintain a dialogue with the top management, such 
as Hovland and Kiland, and I also have had several meetings with Mæhle 
(corporate director, Tine) and Tryggestad (board member, Tine). In addition, 
I have conducted formal interviews with Refsholt (CEO) and Mæhle from 
Tine, and with Morlandstø (managing director, processing) and Svendsen jr. 
(chairman/owner) from Bremnes Seashore.  
 
Still, from a process studies perspective this only took me so far. However, 
two of my colleagues at the Centre for Cooperative Research (BI Norwegian 
School of Management), researcher Margrethe Schøning and Professor 
Morten Huse, did a study of Tine’s board meetings in 2004 based on 
participant observation and interviews. They were helpful in taking 
particular notice of the board’s discussion of the biomarine cases in the 
board meetings, as well as touching upon biomarine issues in their 
interviews with board members, and Tine accepted that I gave aggragated 
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presentations of the main aspects from these board meetings. This has been 
particularly useful in my description of Tine’s biomarine innovation strategy 
(chapter 3), and to some extent in descriptions of Tine’s decision to change 
the direction of the Umi No Kami/Salma project during the later phases 
(chapter 4). Finally, I have on a few occasions had the opportunity to present 
my (preliminary) interpretations of the innovation process back to project 
participants and well-informed groups of people: In meetings with strategic 
staff, middle managers and project participants from Tine and Salmon 
Brands, in seminars with the Tine board members present and by getting 
project participants to read and give feedback on the different papers 
describing and analysing the case study. 
 
Before moving on to my own process of writing ethnography, another issue 
needs to be accounted for. In my aim to provide an in-depth description of 
the processes going on in the case I was researching, it became natural to 
keep the account transparent with regard to the participants in the study. No 
one has been anonymised19, and all sources of direct quotes are identified in 
the text. This should not be problematic, first because all participants have 
been clearly informed of my role and intentions as researcher, and the study 
was initiated in close dialogue with top and middle management in Tine. 
Second, I sought to treat all participants with respect and have seen no 
reason to place judgement their actions. My interpretations have also been 
presented and discussed with central actors in this study on several 
occasions. Third, all sensitive topics related to strategic issues (e.g. 
competition) will have already been made public by the actors themselves at 
the time this thesis is published. Fourth, and most importantly, I take full 
responsibility for the entire re-construction of the involved processes and 
actors; a reconstruction with specific purposes and methods leading to one 
out of a multitude of potential versions. 
 
Re-organising and reconstructing materials: Writing ethnography 
To be sure, in ethnographic research, observation does not precede analysis 
as they are better depicted as constituting an intertwined process, a ‘dance’ 
between observing, talking, reading, thinking and writing. However, as 
many anthropologists have noted, perhaps the most demanding task of 
ethnography is writing (Geertz, 1973), so methodological resources are also 
needed for the textual treatment of the often massive amount of field 
materials (notes, interviews, documents, artefacts, pictures, videos, etc). 
                                                     
19 There is one exception to this: when referring to discussions in board meetings 
(based on Huse & Schøning’s (2005) study), I have been asked by Tine BA – on a 




Writing is a process of ordering these materials into a meaningful text, that 
is, a text that provides new insights into the particulars of the investigated 
setting, as well as what can be learned from this in dialogue with other 
studies of similar phenomena. Thus, how can we account for practice-based 
studies of innovation processes? An ethnographic research strategy in inter-
organisational settings tends to produce an enormous amount of detail, 
which is incomprehensible without some framework through which the story 
can be reformulated and analysed. An ‘ordering strategy’ was needed for 
handling the complex data (or ‘capta’ as suggested by Hernes, 2007). 
 
During the period from August 2005 to August 2006, remaining interviews 
were done, while simultaneously continuing transcription work and analysis 
of field materials. All interviews and field notes were analysed, using the 
NVivo7 software as a ‘cut and paste’ tool20 when identifying and sorting the 
materials in themes and events, both in looking for themes ‘growing out of’ 
the texts (including my experiences in the field), and themes related to 
research questions and theory. In this circular process of observing, 
analysing and reading theory, I had to re-analyse and re-organise the 
materials several times before I was confident that I had a set of themes and 
stories that would help me answer the research questions in a constructive 
way. This was also related to my attempts at structuring a narrative and 
theorising from the empirical materials. Many ideas about how the story 
should be told, and how theoretical discussions and contributions should be 
framed, were tested in writing and discussion with supervisors and other 
colleagues, before this thesis took shape. Should the chronology of the 
investigated events, the themes I want to emphasis, or even my own process 
of investigation be the underlying principle for presenting (re-constructing) 
the empirical stories in text? I ended up deciding on a relatively 
chronological and detailed description of the case (chapter 4) preceded by an 
introductory chapter, which situates the case study in a network of 
interconnected processes (chapter 3).  
 
In line with Geertz’ (1973) concept of ‘thick description’, and Hess’ (1992) 
suggestion to include more of the field materials in the account to avoid 
finite interpretations from a ‘superior’ ethnographer, I have used field 
                                                     
20 A great deal could be said about this powerful software for qualitative research, 
including its basis in grounded theory, its ability to incorporate different formats and 
sources, and its functions of analysing and modelling qualitative data. However, as I 
in this thesis have only used it as a tool for cutting and pasting textual materials in 
my process of analysing the materials into themes and events, the other features 
have not been used. It has, however, been very helpful to let go of the coloured 
pencils, scissor, and glue stick. Instead I could always keep track of the exact 
sources of the quotes and other text fragments found in my themes and events. 
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materials extensively. However, it has been a lot easier to be explicit about 
using interview materials and documents than using field notes of my own 
observations and experiences in the field. This has partly to do with the 
danger of ending up with a researcher-centric ‘confessionalist’ tale, and 
partly with the sense of certainty: This is really what the informants said, 
whether the reader agrees with my interpretation of it or not. Nevertheless, 
although the aim here is to make the case study both more transparent and 
convincing, I still have to carry the responsibility for the questions I asked, 
what quotes I included in this text and how I combined quotes and my own 
thinking. 
 
Having finalised a version of the case study that displayed the contingencies, 
politics and knowledge producing aspects of the story, I made another 
attempt at shaping a theoretical discussion of innovation processes. From my 
interpretation and reconstruction of the empirical story, which was clearly 
inspired by related research, a dual – and contrary – dynamic seemed 
particularly noticeable, between the activities and processes related to 
mobilising decisions and resources for innovation on the one hand, and 
activities of actually developing and testing the innovation on the other. An 
analytic scheme (chapter 5) was then developed to amplify this dynamic and 
thereby guide and focus the theorising process. Based on (a) an actor-
network theory inspired research design, (b) an in-depth empirical 
description of complex innovation processes and (c) this amplified and 
simplified analytic scheme, I framed a theorising discussion (chapter 6) 
which aimed to draw on, challenge and complement existing theory on 
innovation processes. In line with Weick (1989), the theorising in this study 
has been a process involving creative imagination, and simultaneous parallel 
processing of research materials, theory and my own interpretations. With 
regard to the outcome of the study, I have aimed at contributing to the field 
of innovation studies, first, by providing rich insights into an under-
researched phenomenon, and second, by engaging in dialogue with related 
literature on conceptualising key characteristics of innovation processes, and 
discussing the relationships between them (see e.g. Weick, 1989; Walsham, 
1995; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Law, 1994 for discussions of 
generalisations from interpretive research). The theorising of this thesis is 
therefore best understood within the category of conceptual generalisation. I 
have used my empirical account and the following analytic scheme to 
suggest the theoretical implications for innovation processes, while 
challenging and complementing previous studies. Still, the degree to which 
the insights from my study of a particular set of innovation processes within 
the food industry can be fruitfully applied to innovation processes in other 




All in all, this study has been an explorative and inductive search for more 
precise process-based understanding of the organising, or the practicing, of 
industrial innovation. Such understanding has been sought out, first in 
making an effort towards methodological rigour and continuous reflection on 
the limitations of the study in terms of the above-mentioned problems with 
time, timing and place. Second, the study has been conducted with a 
continuous cycle of intensive interaction between existing theoretical 
conceptions of innovation processes and the gathering of empirical 
materials. Third, versions of the story and their theoretical implications have 
been discussed with research colleagues on a large number of occasions, 
such as department seminars at BI, international research conferences21, and, 
especially with my supervisors. When finalising this thesis, I have put 
particular emphasis on keeping the empirical account rich and transparent; 
enabling the competent reader to find more to the story in the empirical 
descriptions than what I have exploited in the subsequent discussions. 
 
  
                                                     
21 Aspects of the study have been presented and discussed both at the European 
Group of Organization Studies, the Society for Social Studies of Science, the 
International Conference on Organizational Learning, Knowledge and Capabilities, 
and the Nordic Workshop of Interorganizational Research. 
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3 Introducing and situating the case study 
This chapter is an introduction to the case(s) that were investigated in this 
study and the setting in which they emerged22. On the one hand, I observed 
the emergence of ‘blue-green’ innovation policy23 and how actors in science 
and industry mobilised this institutional discourse to support their local 
innovation efforts. One the other hand, I observed the development and 
combination of two innovation programs, both seeking to develop new 
‘value-added’ products from fish. One program explored the innovative use 
of fermentation technology for curing fish, while the other was built on 
novel technology for processing ‘super-fresh’ salmon. In principle, these 
could be viewed as separate projects that did not have much to do with each 
other. Still, in practice these projects became partly integrated and partly 
competitive, and some of the most interesting aspects of this study are found 
in the interaction between these two projects, and their subsequent 
combination into a single brand, organised in a joint venture.  
 
The case might be seen as an early example of the industrialisation of 
aquaculture, or signs of an emerging transformation of the industry. This 
should not be disregarded, even though this particular story is situated in a 
local and historically contingent setting. The resulting products are testament 
to such a transformation. First, there is the industrial texture in the salmon 
salami, blended and cured, which presents itself as ‘pure’ – a perfect blend 
of ingredients, and representative of an industrialised food item. Second, 
there is the scientific/industrial development of processing technologies for 
fresh salmon, and the following ‘branding’ of a sophisticated version of a 
generic product: Salmon loins. Thirdly, there is the industrial economic 
logic, leading to the development and recombination of production 
technologies, packaging and design practices, logistics systems and 
marketing practices more widely. 
 
In order to come close enough to the actual innovation processes and 
practices involved in this emerging transformation of industries, this story is 
mainly conveyed as the story of an idea, a new product and an innovation, 
striving its way towards realisation and commercialisation. It is also a story 
about how the innovation interacts with another innovation, with both 
influencing each other, and ultimately seeking to translate each other into its 
own project. Emerging innovations are at the centre of the narrative. Their 
relations to other actants and actor-networks – organisations, humans, 
                                                     
22 See the appendix for a list of some of the most central participants in the case 
study. 
23  The idea that there are potential synergies between agricultural R&D and 
aquacultural/biomarine R&D, see chapter 3.3 for a more detailed description. 
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technologies, supermarkets, etc. – are traced in order to understand more 
about the contingencies inherent in the process. Controversies, ambiguities 
and coincidences say a great deal about the potential direction of the process 
along the way, and history, established technologies, competences and 
relationships, and dominant economic systems speak to stability and friction 
– or why some things are difficult to stabilise, and how these processes have 
unintended consequences. More generally, this is a story of innovation 
processes from idea to market, and how actor-networks are sought to be built 
and stabilised around new consumer products, thus contributing to filling the 
gap in the literature on in-depth and real-time studies of innovation processes 
in industrial settings.  
 
3.1 Combining fish, fermentation and proteins 
The idea of fermenting fish 
Professor Erik Slinde had the idea of testing fermentation, making ‘salami’ 
out of fish, when thinking about industrial opportunities of fish, and, in 
2000, he brought it up with some of his students. He wanted to contribute to 
developing ‘value added’ products from Norway’s rich source of seafood 
raw materials, thereby opposing the prevalent view in the fish industry that 
industrialisation of fish processing in Norway is almost impossible in 
competition with low-wage countries both in Europe and Asia. The idea of 
combining fish with fermentation technology from meat evolved in 
conjunction with a group of researchers from the Institute of Marine 
Research, Tine R&D, the Norwegian Food Research Institute (Matforsk) and 
the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Their competencies within 
biological and food sciences, and their curiosity towards exploring new ways 
of developing industrial food production, made them very interested and 
fascinated by the novel idea of applying ‘salami technology’ to fish. The 
potential of utilising milk proteins to stabilise the product strengthened its 
relevance for the Tine researchers, and helped legitimise such activities 
within the realm of a dairy company. In this initial phase, the Research 
Council of Norway found this to be a promising exploration of blue-green 
innovation, and allocated significant funding to a project that was conducted 
from 2001 to 2005, the Neptun project, in order to research the use of milk 
proteins for stabilisation of fish products.  
 
The enthusiasm for this agro-marine hybrid was mostly derived from the 
technical and biological problems it promised to overcome. On the research 
side, the constellation that came to represent two related research projects in 
Tine, Neptun and Umi No Kami, started out as informal lab experiments at 
the Norwegian Food Research Institute (Matforsk) during the fall of 2000. 
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Slinde, then working at the Norwegian Marine Research Institute, had 
previously been working at Matforsk, and, while borrowing a laboratory at 
Matforsk for testing his idea of fermenting fish, he met up with Berit Nordvi, 
a researcher of milk proteins24 at Tine R&D, in the canteen. They decided to 
cooperate on adding milk proteins to Slinde’s fish fermentation to see if this 
could help stabilise fatty acids, and together they put together the application 
for funding of a research project. With project funding from NFR, both for a 
PhD and for the project in general, the economic and professional basis for a 
three year collaboration between Slinde, Tine and Matforsk (and others) 
were in place. The Neptun project was designed to investigate the 
characteristics of milk proteins, and their applications to various settings, 
with a particular emphasis on fish. 
 
Nordvi had already been working on milk proteins for a while, and this 
opportunity to explore a brand new application and hence understand more 
about how proteins work, was indeed attractive to her research community. 
The surplus of whey from the production of cheese appealed to the ‘product 
optimisation’ logic of Tine as an industrial actor. Opportunities for utilising, 
i.e., creating economic value from, more of the raw material was 
encouraged, and the use of whey was limited. In May 2001, funding for a 
large project was granted by the Research Council of Norway. The ‘Neptun’ 
project included funding a PhD on the topic, and was a general investigation 
of the application possibilities for proteins, for which both Matforsk and 
Slinde were project participants. Fish was still not an official topic within 
Tine, yet. Due to signals from the research council, fish was still chosen as 
one of the main topics for the project. The emerging corporate biomarine 
innovation strategy at Tine, and the emerging blue-green discourse within 
national science politics, provided support for working on biomarine issues 
within an agricultural research community. I will go somewhat further into 
this phase of idea development and the Neptun project in chapter 4. Here, I 
will provide an overview of how the project evolved further into a product 
development project, Umi No Kami, and then of attempts at 





                                                     
24 Whey is a byproduct from the production of white cheese; only a small portion is 
utilised within the food industry, and the rest is unprofitably sold as animal feed. 
Hence, Tine is constantly seeking new opportunities for economising on this ‘idle 
resource’. Whey consists mainly of carbohydrates and proteins, and in this case it 




Table 1: Timeline, major project activities 
1993 - 2003 Development of pre-rigor technology (Bremnes Seashore/ 
University of Life Sciences) 
1999 - 2000 "Tine 2005" corporate strategy is developed, including 
biomarine innovation strategy 
Fall 2000 Professor Slinde tests the idea of fermenting fish with 'salami 
technology' 
Fall 2000 Slinde and Nordvi (Tine R&D) start informal cooperation on 
fermentation 
11/2000 Slinde files a patent application for 'fish salami'  
05/2001 - 02/2005 The Neptun project receives funding from the Research 
Council of Norway 
12/2001 Tine buys Slinde's patent application, establishing the Umi No 
Kami project 
Fall 2002 The lab is moved from University campus to Tine R&D; mould 
problems arise 
2002 International market exploration tour 
01/2003 First successful production of 'fish salami' without mould at 
Tine R&D's lab 
06/2003 Market surveys in Norway 
2002-2003 Tine hires researchers from University of Life Sciences 
Winter 2003 Tests are conducted with 100% pre-rigor salmon in the recipe 
12/2003 Cooperation with Bremnes Seashore 
01/2004 Tine Biomarin and Tine Ingredients merge 
Winter 2004 The Umi No Kami project moved to the line organisation 
05/2004 Partnership forms between Tine and Bremnes Seashore: 
Establishing Salmon Brands 
06/2004 The Salma concept and brand is established 
06/2004 Production at Bremnes is scaled up 
08/2004 - 10/2004 Second international marketing tour 
Winter 2005 Test sales of Salma Cured at KaDeWe in Berlin 
03/2005 Agreement for test sales of Salma Cured in German retail 
11/2004 - 08/2005 Negotiations with and adaptation to YUM (failed) 
Spring 2005 Expanding the Salma concept with 'Salma Fresh' loins 
Summer 2005 Receives design award for the Salma concept 
Fall 2005 Retail distribution of Salma Fresh in Norway is rolled out (first 
supermarket in Sept) 
05/2006 Salma Fresh out in 20 supermarkets in/around Oslo 
Summer 2006 Second attempt at selling Salma Cured in Germany (too low 
sales, withdrawn) 
Fall 2008 Salma Fresh out in 250 supermarkets and 40 restaurants in 
Norway 
Fall 2008 Salma Fresh out in 50 supermarkets in Germany 
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Buying the patent application and starting product development 
Thus, when Professor Slinde – in collaboration with Tine and others – made 
his initial experiments with fermenting fish, as well as creating a salami-like 
product of fish, he filed a patent application. In this way, the idea ‘took on 
reality’, or became an object that could be sold to the food industry. As a 
consequence, this combination of fermentation and proteins was connected 
even stronger to Tine’s biomarine strategy, thereby reinforcing and co-
creating it, when Tine’s corporate management chose to purchase Slinde’s 
patent application for fermenting fish, taking full responsibility to develop 
and commercialise products from this novel technology. 
 
The initial rationale for considering doing something on the commercial side 
of this idea was its utilisation of milk proteins for stabilising the product, not 
the biomarine innovation strategy (which was not yet finished). Further, it 
was not until this strategy was in place and implemented during 2001, that it 
became relevant enough to buy the patent application. In 
November/December 2001 a deal was negotiated between Slinde/ForInnova 
(University of Bergen’s TTO25) and Tine. Hanne Refsholt, later CEO at 
Tine, recalled the event as part of a more systematic search for projects to 
include the recently developed blue-green innovation strategy, but one in 
which they had to give up on the ‘open evaluation’ of incoming proposals: 
 
We got around 150-170 proposals, and then we had to make a system 
for handling the requests. And then we understood that sitting here, 
responding to proposals was not a very wise way to work, so we had to 
go deeper. And, like I said to you, we had decided not to do fish 
farming, right, we would rather build on our own strengths, hunt 
synergies, and this became the guiding principle. When looking for 
synergies, some things just came along, because we had been involved 
for a long time in this project on fermenting salmon and binding fatty 
acids, long before any company was established. We worked with them 
because we had dairy ingredients and knowledge about combining dairy 
ingredients with fish. (Hanne Refsholt, CEO at Tine)  
 
The approach of systematic scanning became too difficult. How could they 
know what was behind the proposals, with regard to competence and 
capacity? In part they ended up evaluating the potential of some of their 
ongoing activities, and this ‘fish salami’ idea came up as one of them. 
Hence, we can say that existing activities and competence, as well as their 
recent history, was influential with regard to what biomarine investments 
they made. Refsholt’s first meeting with this strange invention emerged from 
a phone call from one of her employees: 
                                                     
25 Technology transfer office 
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One of our researchers called me and asked ‘Hanne, do you have time to 
come down here?’, and there they presented this product, and we had a 
look at it. After this, we worked more with it, and after a while we 
bought the patent, and started looking for partners. (Hanne Refsholt, 
CEO at Tine) 
 
A product development project, Umi No Kami 26 , was started at the 
beginning of 2002, aiming for the commercialisation of the knowledge and 
technology developed in the Neptun project. In January 2003, they finally 
succeeded, at least to some extent, with developing and stabilising the 
technology. However, they did not succeed with finding and deciding on a 
final (stable) shape of the product until testing the unique raw salmon 
material from Bremnes Seashore in the recipe during the spring of 2003. On 
the market side, they had less success in choosing a particular direction, and 
with maintaining support from top management. Moreover, the rigid 
preconditions for the project by top management were increasingly 
experienced as being a barrier to progress and finding direction. It had to be 
a mixed white and red fish recipe, and it had to be launched in Norway 
before going international. 
 
Market research and technological development 
Technically and visually the product was like salami, but it had been 
previously impossible to make salami out of fresh fish. New technology that 
combined techniques and materials from the biomarine and the agricultural 
domains had made it possible to solve two major problems in stabilising fish 
for such purposes. First, fatty acids in fish are too liquid, failing to provide 
the preferred stable consistency one would expect from such a product. 
Second, fish fats normally turn harsh in just a few days. Thus, there had been 
two problems of stabilisation in solving the technological basis for this 
strange new product. Still, there was more to it, including a number of 
stabilisation issues to be handled on its shape, taste, quality and conceptual 
identity. The transformation of a patent into something that could actually be 
industrially produced and that was edible, involved agricultural bacteriology 
and chemistry, biomarine technology and biology, marketing expertise and 
management coordination.  
 
When the project was formalised, it received fresh resources for working on 
two interlinked processes. First, there was the process of continued and 
strengthened technological exploration and development, exploring the 
technological opportunities and developing the feasibility of the technology 
                                                     
26 ‘Umi No Kami’ means ’god of the seas’ in Japanese, a follow-up on ‘Neptun’ in 
the first project referring to the god of the seas in Roman mythology. 
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and recipe. Second, there was the exploring and sketching of a product 
concept by seeking knowledge of consumers and their reactions to the 
product. However, when taking ownership to the invention, further 
innovation work was moved in-house, breaking off collaboration with 
expertise on micro-biological technologies, due to lack of “trust in doing 
these experiments at Matforsk” (Per Magnus Mæhle, Tine), or a desire to 
protect their knowledge from competitors. This had consequences, both in 
increasing the development time of the product, and creating uncertainty in 
moments of determining its further direction. On the industrial side, the 
search for potential partners started early. Even so, their main conclusion 
emphasised the following: “the group considers the partner search to be less 
important than the product development. Without a physical product, 
negotiations with potential partners become shadow boxing” (from project 
meeting summary). Yet, with regard to product development, then, where do 
you start, when both the product and its market are unknown from the 
outset? It was a lot more difficult to mobilise the marketing department for 
shaping a product that was far from their existing set of food categories. 
Still, they emphasised several benefits of doing everything in-house at Tine. 
First, there was increased flexibility from being able to produce whenever 
one wanted, independent of available capacity in the Norwegian Food 
Research Institute labs. Second, economic arguments were mobilised. Third, 
it was argued that it improved the protection of new knowledge, in 
comparison to the more open environment at the Norwegian Food Research 
Institute.  
 
It was a precondition from the start to mix white and red fish in the recipe, as 
it would both be cheaper and technically easier to produce. However, due to 
too low quality on available white fish, it became difficult to stabilise the 
product technically, and the resulting greyish colour was hard to associate 
with a ’gourmet product’. Therefore, in the conceptualisation and naming 
process, they could not take into consideration things that hinted too much 
towards salmon. Several intertwined problems had to be solved before 
managing to produce the fish salami with the expected nutritional quality, 
with hygiene as the main issue. 
 
In their earliest commercial analyses, the team emphasised the inherent 
paradox of making a mixed and cured product of fine raw materials that 
would potentially not be perceived as being of ‘premium quality’ by 
consumers. Still, it was described as a product fitting within Asian and 
European food trends, to be used up-market as pre-course, snacks or 
sandwich filling. In the first marketing plan, ‘curiosity and health’ were 
mentioned as the anticipated main triggers for customers, linking the 
product’s content of omega 3 to the growing health trends within food. In the 
business plan from the same period, a success scenario was described: 
59 
 
It was a real innovation... We knew that if we could manage the idea 
right, we would be able to launch a unique product concept. Not just in 
Norway, but also internationally. (From ‘Business plan’) 
 
A mass market was projected, imagining how the ‘salami’ would become an 
everyday product ‘on all breakfast tables and in all sandwich outlets’. 
Integration of development and marketing was thus depicted as both 
necessary – for understanding and meeting the user demands, and difficult – 
for the lack of methods for involving users before having produced 
‘something concrete’ to represent the project. This dilemma led to a rather 
defensive strategy related to industrial customers (e.g. retail). Nevertheless, 
unlike other sites of research, an industrial organisation necessitates a 
business focus, and so the project group went out travelling, to Italy, 
Belgium, Japan and South Korea to learn about their ‘food cultures’, and test 
their responses to very early versions of the product. 
 
After a few years of the expensive and time consuming course of events 
named the ‘biomarine innovation strategy’, Tine’s owners, board of 
directors, and finally management started to express increasing impatience 
with the economic side of the different projects. It also represented a 
considerable push for speeding up the commercialisation of the Umi No 
Kami project. In this setting, new opportunities coming from newly hired 
researchers from the University of Life Sciences and their relations to a fish 
farm, Bremnes Seashore, was timely, both for the management of Tine 
Biomarin, and for Bremnes Seashore. 
 
3.2 Including pre-rigor salmon 
The interest in improving and developing processing technologies of salmon 
brought the fish farm, Bremnes Seashore and a group of aquacultural 
researchers at the University of Life Sciences together early in the 1990s. 
Throughout several years of collaboration, novel technologies for processing 
had been patented that enabled so-called ‘pre-rigor’ processing to be 
possible with great results documented on quality. These were new 
slaughtering and processing technology of farmed salmon, reducing stress 
levels of the fish, and enabling pre-rigor27 processing of the fish to an extent 
                                                     
27 Pre-rigor processing means processing the fish before it becomes ’death stiff’ 
(rigor mortis), thereby, getting very fresh filets of extraordinary high quality. Rigor 
occurs just a few hours after slaughter, and it is not possible to take away skin and 
bones industrially during this phase. Therefore, all fish to be processed are stored for 
around three days before processing according to the common procedure. This 
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that no competitors could achieve. In addition to the advantage of time, and 
getting fresher fish out to the customers, the raw material proved to have 
some new and very interesting characteristics regarding colour, texture and 
gaping. 
 
In the Umi No Kami project, Tine quested for high quality raw materials, 
i.e., seeking to control the practice of suppliers. Gradually, and in learning 
what specific knowledge they lacked, they supplemented the team in 2002-
2003 by hiring aqua-culture scientists and product developers from a 
research group at the University of Life Sciences. First, they hired Lars 
Petter Swensen for the Umi No Kami-project, to help them develop methods 
for sorting salmon based on their fat content (high variation on salmon), 
which again would make it easier to control the fermentation process in the 
fish salami. Swensen was gradually more involved in the project, and later, 
when UNK was moved from R&D to the line organisation, he became 
project manager on the R&D side. Shortly after Swensen was recruited, his 
supervisor at the University, Per Olav Skjervold and two other senior 
colleagues (Svein Olaf Fjæra and Odd Ivar Lekang) were brought in for 
coordinating all the biomarine research activities through a program called 
‘fiskekraft’28. Eventually, they also hired Even Manseth who was in his 
finalising stage in his PhD investigating the characteristics of some 
components in the blood of salmon. This new group of people created new 
dynamics in Tine’s biomarine activities. Having worked on improving 
processing technology for fresh salmon for many years, mainly together with 
Bremnes Seashore, this group had easy access to pre-rigor raw materials of 
superior quality. Following, Swensen and Skjervold informally started 
testing Bremnes’ pre-rigor salmon in the Umi No Kami-recipe with good 
results. In Swensen’s view, this change from using frozen fish (white and 
red) to fresh salmon was a seminal breakthrough of the project. 
 
Gunnar Hovland had recently been hired as director for Tine Biomarine. 
Further, when Hovland and others at Tine got to know and taste the superb 
quality of Bremnes Seashore’s pre-rigor salmon, they became very 
interested. By teaming up such a partner on the supply and production side, 
they managed to stabilise a number of technical issues, but still had the 
problem of moving the innovation closer to commercialisation. 
 
                                                                                                                            
storing can also be done on a trailer on its way to Denmark or France, hence there 
seems to be less advantage in post-rigor processing in Norway. 
28 Referring to the double meaning of ’fish stock’ and ’fish power’. 
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Shift from Umi No Kami to Salma 
After the research group from the University of Life Sciences were hired, 
they contributed with new resources on the fish side that had an important 
influence on the further direction of the project. More than with scientific 
knowledge, they provided an overview of the fish sector and relationships to 
several competent actors within the industry. Later, then the pressure for 
economic results gained force, the new impulses from this group and their 
relations to the fish sector took part in moving Umi No Kami towards its 
commercial identity as ‘Salma’. An alliance with Bremnes Seashore was 
established, and production facilities put up at their place, just 20 metres 
from the sea. 
 
Hovland had got the job of cleaning up and pushing the biomarine activities 
in Tine towards commercialisation, and, in January 2004, Tine Biomarine 
and Tine Ingredients were merged, with Hovland as managing director, in 
order to gain synergies from Tine Ingredients’ commercial capacities and 
network to business customers. The impatience with having a lack of 
conceptual, and hence commercial, progress in the Umi No Kami project led 
to moving the project from Tine R&D to ‘the line’, radically downsizing the 
project organisation, hiring a commercialisation manager, Øyvind Kiland, 
from Tine’s marketing department, and getting approval for totally new 
preconditions from corporate management. The unique freshness of the raw 
material was highlighted in the concept called ‘Salma’, and in the packaging 
design. This was where Tine and the Norwegian fish industry were to 
become unbeatable, as this quality level could only be produced close to the 
sea: 
 
We are depending on fresh raw material, so it can only happen in 
Norway. It is unique, and this is where the future of Norwegian fish 
industry is found, in hyper-fresh processing. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
After a while the idea of adding fresh loins of pre-rigor salmon to the Salma 
brand portfolio gained ground, and eventually pushed the salmon salami out 
in the periphery. The salmon salami, ‘Salma Cured’, lost and the fresh 
salmon loins, ‘Salma Fresh’, took over and became what was later (2008) 
considered to be a market success. The original constellation that initiated 
and organised the blue-green innovation strategy was changing; from top 
management optimism and corporate strategy planning, to middle (i.e. 
operational) and top management frustration and pressure for economic 
results. The original constellation was accused of being guilty of initiating a 
far too wide set of projects by those assigned to the task of ‘cleaning up’. 
Nevertheless, there was still great optimism with regard to the business 
potential of blue-green innovation. The markets for fish products were 
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growing, as was access to raw materials, so Tine should definitely have 
continued with their biomarine innovation strategy. The sense Kiland and his 
colleagues made of the feedback from conceptualising and marketing Salma, 
increased their scepticism to Salma Cured’s commercial potential, while 
boosting the belief in selling ‘hyper fresh’ high quality salmon, hence 
becoming a timely answer to the management’s increasing demand for 
economic success-stories. The differences between aquaculture and 
agriculture related to ‘culture’, competence and economic/market systems 
were frequently mentioned by the project participants. Moreover, the 
interests of the local family business (Bremnes Seashore) and the large 
corporation (Tine) were different. Nevertheless, they succeeded in 
negotiating an agreement of a strategic and long term alliance, and the work 
of establishing production practice at the farm could start.  
 
Scaling up production 
The new technology had to be made more robust in order to endure the 
transfer from small scale laboratory production to large scale industrial 
production. The transfer and scaling up of production from the dairy lab to 
the large scale facilities at the fish farm was done during the summer of 
2004. Yet then, a few weeks later, problems occurred. Suddenly, the whole 
batch was attacked by mould and had to be discarded, and overnight the 
harmony was gone. A white layer of mould had invaded every salami in the 
drying facility. This was also challenging for the marketing people who had 
already started presenting the product for various international customers. 
Through training and reinforcement of standards and routines, the problem 
disappeared and did not re-appear in later productions. However, this mould 
incident should not have been too surprising for the Tine people, as their 
own people had previously spent six frustrating months fighting mould in the 
their own laboratory. Unfortunately, it had all been forgotten in the black-
boxed early history of Umi No Kami.  
 
The next technical task was to improve the practice of several more aspects 
of micro-biology. In contrast to the fish industry standard of a maximum 
bacteria count of 10.000 per gram, they managed to decrease the bacterial 
concentration to below 1000 bacteria per gram after the salmon was ready 
processed and packaged. Hence, they could guarantee the quality of the 
product with a minimum shelf life of 10 days, producing economic and 
organisational advantages related to logistics and consumer experience. This 
was achieved through systematic collaboration over several months, both 
with the production personnel, the cleaning personnel and the management. 
The commercialisation manager also related how he on a couple of 
occasions had to rush out to stores and withdraw products, for instance when 
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products had started showing black spots, resulting from the slaughtering of 
too stressed fish – which led to blood shooting out to the muscles – 
something that did not appear until a few days later – when the blood had 
coagulated. In his view, no variation on quality or on the visual presentation 




Picture 1: Salma Cured produced at Bremnes (from sales presentation) 
 
Market testing: Presenting the product 
Three years after the initial idea the time had finally come for a market test. 
This meant intensive work on the naming, categorisation and designing of 
the product, which was based partly on projections of ‘ideal’ users, and 
partly on direct interaction with potential users. The change to pre-rigor 
salmon and a high-quality production strategy enabled (and required) a high-
end concept, and designers and chefs were assigned to helping with shaping 
it. Tangram Design was hired, and suggested a minimalistic logo and design. 
This included the word ‘SALMA’ in clean, white letters on black 
background, with ‘Fresh cured salmon’ as subtext, and with two symbols 
above, guaranteeing the quality and freshness of the product. The first 
package designed had a bright red colour, picking up the colour of the 
product, and containing a 250 gram Salma roll. While Tangram Design 
worked on shaping the visual representation of Salma, elite chefs worked on 
its presentation. 
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Picture 2 and 3: The first Salma package 
 
For an object like Salma, its audience would easily become uncertain about 
what this was meant to be. Thus, pictures showing Salma on display among 
some of the trendy ‘hipsters’ of food was produced, for example sushi 
(Asian cuisine), hinting at the absolute high-end quality of the product, and 
seafood pizza, a healthier alternative within the popular Italy-inspired menu. 
Later, some of these chefs would also appear at various places where Salma 






   
 
    
Pictures 4-9: Use situations for Salma Cured (presentation materials, Salmon Brands) 
 
Next, Salma started to assemble a set of associations making it presentable 
as a viable concept for conscious consumers willing to pay to try a healthy 
and tasty alternative to meat and poultry.  
 
Market testing: Selling Salma Cured 
An international marketing tour was done with Salma in the fall 2004 and 
the winter 2005. Existing business relations, food fairs and new contacts 
were visited in US, France, Singapore, Brussels, Moscow, etc. Feedback 
from and interaction with different actors in these locations came to have a 
great impact, both on the salmon salami, and on the future commercial 
strategy of Salmon Brands, with the adaptation of the sausage, both to Asian 
pizza restaurants,  German retailers and in Norway,  which involved a 
reworking  of the entire innovation for the ‘home market’. While visiting 
Hong Kong, the team met representatives for YUM, a multinational 
restaurant company. YUM was seen as the “ultimate customer” for Salma at 
this stage, representing everything they hoped for: Restaurants (easy 
logistics), world-wide distribution and association with acknowledged 
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brands29. The R&D director at YUM, suggested that it could be tested in 
their Japanese restaurants as their ‘monthly special’ campaign in Japan later 
the same year, with TV-commercials and special offers in the restaurants. 
This would have meant massive attention to Salma among some of the most 
open-minded, but also demanding, consumers in a huge market. However, 
this customer also had some labour intensive demands, and to be able to 
properly answer the question of feasibility for warm food, Salma had to be 
taken back to the laboratory. From (finally) being stable both in shape and 
production, its identity was again in question, or opened up. After altering 
some of the steps in processing, the results were positive. Unfortunately, in 
the meantime, YUM had lost interest. The customer had, for unknown 
reasons, lost interest, and the attempt to mobilise the desired customer had 
brought about both a great deal of work, and a failure.  
 
After Tine’s agent for the distribution of cheese in Germany, Detlef Martens, 
expressed interest in Salma at the food fair in Paris, plans for distribution to 
retail chains in Germany started emerging. Very early, it was tested at the 
prestigious hypermarket, KaDeWe, in Berlin (winter 2005). Although it did 
not become an immediate big-selling hit, it received positive feedback from 
consumers, especially when it was demonstrated in the store. Second, it was 
sold on the ferry between Oslo and Kiel, where it sold steadily to German 
tourists wanting to bring something Norwegian back home. In March 2005, 
an agreement was signed between Martens and Tine for test sales of Salma 
Cured in German supermarkets. However, Martens was uncertain about the 
suitable categorisation of the product, related to the shopping practices of 
consumers. While emphasising its similarity with meat products, he still 
chose to locate the product together with smoked salmon and other cured 
sea-food products. Associations with meat salami was helpful for 
communicating use, but the nutritional value and of course the raw materials 
were more similar to fish products, and hence both sides were sought to be 
maintained by calling it ‘lax salami’. A number of purchasing managers 
were convinced and willing to give it a try, and so Salma was launched test 
sales in 90 German ‘hypermarkets’. However, the sales of the ‘Lax Salami’ 
did not go particularly well, and was then put on hold. 
 
Market testing: Selling Fresh 
Salma had still not found its final shape, and no closure could be achieved 
before making some real and voluminous sales. Strategic considerations of 
brand development and positioning, and decades of experience with the food 
                                                     
29 YUM is a multinational company with R&D facilities in Singapore. They have 35 
000 restaurants across the globe, with a portfolio of recognised brands, such as Pizza 
Hut, KFC, and Taco Bell. 
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industry could not settle Salma’s identity. Its fate was fully in the hands of 
the customers (industrial actors) and their customers (consumers). Hence, it 
was easier to go back to the laboratory and the marketing department to 
develop new versions of the product, particularly products that came closer 
to already existing products in the market. At this point, a couple of ideas 
that had been considered for a while gained strength. Under pressure for 
economic results, the idea of marketing the fresh salmon loins instead of 
curing them, and the idea of working with Tine’s established market 
relations in their domestic market got full support. As opposed to the salami 
version, the marketing of ‘Salma Fresh’ launched in Norway, and starting in 
a familiar setting, where Tine already had relations, recognition, and a strong 
market position with several other brands and products (dairy and easy-meal 
products). Neatly cut loins without skin and bones, packaged in transparent 
foil and with the same minimalist design concept. 
  
   
 
Picture 10 and11: Salma Fresh 
 
The strategy to start with the best stores, and a ‘gourmet supermarket’ 
immediately caught interest, and agreed on a test campaign in September 
2005. The consumer response was very good. Because the supermarket was 
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associated with a large retail chain, Norgesgruppen30, a long-time customer 
of Tine’s dairy products, access to nation-wide distribution opened up. 
Distribution of Salma Fresh was gradually rolled out in Norwegian and 
German supermarkets, as well as a number of high quality restaurants from 
2006 onwards, making a success-story of Salma. 
 
Summing up on the case study 
These are the three ‘programmes’ related to the innovation process(es) to be 
described and analysed in the next chapters. First, there is the management 
of Tine’s biomarine innovation strategy, and subsequent investments. From 
the start, this constellation of people from corporate management and Tine 
R&D was also responsible for formalising and mobilising the Umi No Kami 
project through buying the patent application from Erik Slinde and 
ForInnova. Later, under increasing pressure from their owners for proof that 
the blue-green strategy is viable, and then being presented the raw material 
from Bremnes Seashore, the new ideas about how to make profits from the 
biomarine area gained ground. Second, I describe and analyze agricultural 
and micro-biological researchers in the research network between Tine 
R&D, Matforsk and the University of Life Sciences who sought to 
understand both more of the workings and combinations of proteins, bacteria 
cultures and fatty acids across the different kinds of raw materials (meat and 
fish), as well as realise a fermented fish sausage. And third, I describe a 
small fish farm at the west coast (Bremnes Seashore), which committed to 
technical innovation on a more than average basis, collaborated with another 
scientific community from the University of Life Sciences (aquaculture 
oriented), and struggled to create economic value from their technical 
improvements. Still, these programmes and projects did not evolve in 
isolation, and I will now outline some aspects of the settings in which this 
happened. In particular, I focus on the role of agriculture in the emergence of 
‘blue-green’ innovation, and Tine’s development of a biomarine innovation 
strategy. 
 
                                                     
30 “NorgesGruppen is Norway’s largest trading enterprise. The group’s core business 
is grocery retailing and wholesaling. Through its chains, the group holds a market 
share of 39.2 per cent of the grocery market. (…) A total of 1,919 grocery stores and 




3.3 Blue-green innovation and Tine’s innovation strategy 
A short history of agricultural R&D31 and the appeal of fish 
Tine has a long history of industrialising milk and related products. They 
have the largest R&D department in the Norwegian food industry, a national 
distribution system and one of the strongest market brands recognised by 
Norwegian consumers. Yet it is also a cooperative, owned by 18000 farmers 
in a totally dominant position, with price regulation responsibilities, and a 
role in rural politics. Organisational boundaries between Tine, the 
Norwegian Food Research Institute (Matforsk) and the Norwegian 
University of Life Sciences have been blurred, as there have been many 
collaborative projects, recruitment of people and cross-utilisation of facilities 
and other resources between them32. There are both historical and economic 
reasons for this. Historically, in 1924 the law on ‘quality control’ was 
approved, and the ‘cheese making’ regulations arrived in 1925, thus driving 
dairy practices towards the standardisation of production processes. In 
relation to this the dairy cooperative and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food developed the four-leaved clover as a quality mark for products 
approved according to this standard. Later (1972), the ‘Tine’ (a traditional 
wooden box) was chosen instead (Espeli et al., 2006:82); thus, the symbol 
for quality in terms of industrial standardisation and control became the 
identity of the cooperative. The Dairy Laboratory, established in 1934, 
became responsible for control, and the quality control of dairy products was 
increasingly based in laboratory testing. In 1940, these test results influenced 
the price of raw materials (raw milk), and the Dairies’ Producer Services got 
the role of adviser on quality improvement both in local dairies and in 
individual farms. This work was intensified during the Second World War, 
and eventually all cheese produced in Norway was controlled and priced 
according to quality (ibid:84). At the Agricultural University College (now 
University of Life Sciences), the Dairy Institute had an experimentation 
dairy ready for use in 1953. Here, they set out to understand the influence of 
cheese making technology on a more unified quality of cheese, and in 
addition a few new types of cheese were developed, e.g., the famous 
‘Jarlsberg’, an emmenthaler-like cheese based on gouda-technology. The 
bacteria culture for Jarlsberg was still produced there until 1991, when Tine 
R&D’s unit at Voll took over, and where its ‘filter fermentor’ technology 
later came to be used in supplying new production facilities in the U.S. and 
Ireland with the precious bacteria culture. The Dairy Institute handed over 
                                                     
31 I am largely relying on Espeli et al.’s (2006) history of the Norwegian Dairy 
Cooperative on these matters. All quotes are translated from Norwegian by me. 
32 See Risan (2003) for an excellent study of the mixing of technoscience, culture, 
and nature resulting in the ‘Norwegian Red Cow’ (NRF), dominating the Norwegian 
livestock. 
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the name and bacteria culture to the Dairy Cooperative without any form of 
economic compensation in case of prospective market success (ibid:88). 
However, the trademark, the Tine symbol, was not registered before 1972. 
From 1968, there was more systematic collaboration with the Dairy Institute, 
while, during the 1970s, R&D went through a phase of reorganisation and 
centralisation in the Dairy Cooperative. The division of labour between the 
Agricultural University College/the Dairy Institute and the Dairy 
Cooperative was discussed, with the cooperative at that time having 
developed “well educated staff of more than twenty dairy engineers and 
others with higher education, and in addition dairy technicians, laboratory 
assistants and secretaries” (ibid:204). Instead of co-locating R&D at the 
university (at Ås, near by Oslo), the Dairy Cooperative’s R&D facilities 
were set up at larger dairies, to secure practical relevance and low barriers 
between lab and large scale production. The basis for product development 
was quality improvements on already existing products, resulting in a quality 
of traditional dairy products of a “relatively high level”. Espeli et al. further 
reports that “in practice it is difficult to divide product development and 
quality development”, and that this focus, in combination with the Dairy 
Cooperative’s market coverage, has not led to much product development of 
new products (Espeli et al., 2006:203). A new R&D centre was built in Voll 
in 1979, with 40 employees. Nonetheless, quality was still the single most 
important issue, with product development only accounting for 10-20% of 
the activities at the centre (ibid:205). As late as the 1990s, the focus of R&D 
was still on quality, which entailed the standardisation both of quality 
parameters and the product portfolio, and local variants of the products were 
forced to adapt to the standards (ibid:209). Production was the only focus for 
R&D, and by erasing the freedom of local actors to maintain tradition and 
meet local demand, R&D was taken away from one (local) type of market 
orientation, while failing to connect to other types of market orientation 
(regional, national, international, etc). It was all about solving production-
related challenges. Still, the external, and to some extent, market-related, 
pressure during this period came from nutritional expertise and regulation 
bodies. The pressure for less fat content in the products and new products 
with health benefits was the strongest (external) driver for product 
development within the Dairy Cooperative (ibid:209). 
 
Uncertainty and preparation for potential international competition on 
agricultural food products increasingly preoccupied the industry from 1990 
onwards. In 1992, the Dairy Cooperative launched the ‘TINE’ brand, 
together with restructuration of its management. A new era of developing 
market orientation followed from the corporate management, e.g., through 
segmentation towards more specified groups of consumers (e.g. the Litago 
concept for children launched in 1993). Still, the continuous decrease in milk 
consumption throughout the 1990s assured continuous pressure for 
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production and raw material orientation in product development. The aim 
clearly was, with some success, to stem the loss in milk consumption 
(ibid:226). ‘Snøfrisk’, which was developed from 1991 to 1994 together 
with PA Consulting UK, may serve as an example of the emerging product 
development practice and strategy. Market orientation, in terms of better 
market research, imaging, specifying product characteristics, etc. was 
combined with production orientation in terms of what kind of raw materials 
needed development and improved distribution. In this example, goat 
farmers had been pushing for more product development on their raw 
material, and Tine R&D had to work on the whole product chain, that is, 
how to secure access to goat milk the entire year by changing the pattern of 
the re-production of goats, adjusting the strong taste of goat milk fatty acids 
by replacing some of them with the cream from cow milk, and finally, 
designing a package that recalled Norwegian mountains, purity, snow, etc. 
(ibid:227). 
 
Thus, a rude summary of the development of R&D resources at Tine is that 
they have evolved from dairy technicians controlling and advising about 
hygiene and product quality, through the academisation of these functions 
into a full blown R&D centre with state of the art knowledge and technology 
within niches of micro-biology, life sciences, production technology and 
sensorics. Until around 2000, however, the drivers of innovation have been 
quality control, production optimisation (exploiting more of the raw 
material, e.g., ‘kesam’ from the surplus of whey, a by-product of cheese 
production) and production capacity (utilising free capacity of facilities, e.g., 
idle milk facilities for fruit juices). Even though R&D had occasionally been 
involved in various side projects, the shift towards taking a more active role 
in researching and developing new technologies and products came with the 
‘TINE 2005’ strategy in 1999/2000, in which ‘new business areas’ were put 
forth as part of the main strategy, with fish as one of the identified new areas 
for strategic innovation. 
 
In addition to these historical/technical, economical and managerial factors, 
links to science professions have obviously influenced R&D at Tine, in 
particular micro-biology, production technology, sensorics and 
nutrition/health. Entering into a Tine lab immediately gives the impression 
of something between a natural sciences lab, a small scale production facility 
and a professional kitchen. Here, there are people with white collars and 
sterile caps and shoe protection looking into high tech scientific instruments, 
steel pipes going in all directions under the roof, and various smaller and 
larger machines everywhere: A calm and controlled atmosphere without the 
stressful tempo of a production plant. This picture was further strengthened 
by close relations to the Norwegian Food Research Institute (Matforsk) and 
the University of Life Sciences. Agricultural R&D has also been strongly 
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connected to science and rural politics, for instance when the political and 
medical debate on nutritional practices from 1963 – 83 led to the 
development and eventually introduction of fat reduced milk to consumers 
(Espeli et al., 2006).  
 
Tine saw how decades of knowledge production on agricultural food quality 
(nutrition, hygiene and marketing) could possibly become a valuable 
development of fish processing. In addition, during the last decade or so, 
Tine developed their technical and professional knowledge related to product 
development in a much broader sense, from microbiology (fermentation, 
bacteriology, fatty acids, proteins, water activity, sensorics, etc.) to 
conceptual development of products and packages together with designers 
and marketers, and their own cold-chain distribution channels. Fish had 
already been on the agenda a few times, either in relation to product 
development (e.g. ready meals for Fjordland), or to more basic research on 
the characteristics and application of various ingredients (marine omega 3 
for dairy products, milk proteins for various fish products, etc), and now they 
decided to make this a strategic priority. 
 
Blue-green innovation 
A portfolio of biomarine projects emerged within the Tine group, from a 
combination of the corporate strategy processes between 1999 and 2005, and 
existing activities, e.g., at Tine R&D related to fish. The potential scenario of 
international competition on agricultural food, led them to identify 
aquaculture as one of five strategic innovation areas to develop new and 
specialised ways of exploiting their existing competence in industrial 
production and the marketing of food. During the same time period, several 
interrelated issues gained leverage in the public debate and among business 
and R&D actors. First, there was a governmental policy debate on ‘blue-
green’ innovation, discussing how to restructure the R&D sectors related to 
agro-food and biomarine food in order to gain synergies from cross-sectoral 
developments. This resulted in a governmental white paper in 2004 called 
“The blue-green food alliance: Joint efforts and new structure”. This 
discourse was drawn upon by the different actors involved in planning and 
realising biomarine innovation in this case study. Second, from the 1970s 
onwards, a couple of research groups in Norway had taken leading roles in 
the successful domestication of salmon (and gradually a number of other 
species have been domesticated as well). One of the two leading Norwegian 
research groups on the domestication and development of the breeding of 
salmon was based at the University of Life Sciences33, a constellation of 
                                                     
33 The other research group that began systematic research on salmon was related to 
the Marine Research Institute, with Dag Møller as a leading figure. According to 
73 
 
scientists from the breeding of cattle and pigs, aquaculture and experiment 
stations by the west coast. Professor Harald Skjervold is mentioned as a 
leading figure on combining and translating the breeding system and 
knowledge from agriculture to salmon breeding in the early 1970s. His son, 
Per Olav Skjervold has later, together with a group of researchers from the 
same network, developed processing technologies for pre-rigor salmon that 
play a central role in the case study presented in this thesis. Akvaforsk 
(Institute for Aquaculture Research) in Ås is still a leading institution in its 
field. Farming fish instead of catching wild fish means a completely 
different regime in terms of control of raw materials – both regarding 
availability/volumes and qualities. Thus, the biomarine area has opened up 
for industrial production and marketing on a totally different level. The 
market system, however, had still not gone through a similar shift, thus for 
the most part refusing to reward ‘value adding’ activities, such as product 
development, branding, etc. Third, also stemming from the optimisation 
logic of industrial production, an increasing number of scientists and 
entrepreneurs were focused on the search for ‘gold’ in waste (by-products) 
from fisheries. Around 50 percent of the fish were normally considered 
waste, only 14 percent of the fish were processed and sold as filets, and no 
more than 2 percent of Norwegian fish were processed in Norway (according 
to Tine Biomarine). In other words, the potential could be huge both for 
further processing of fish, product development and for creating value from 
by-products. Products for food, as well as cosmetics and medicine have been 
developed and commercialised from various parts of waste from fisheries, 
shrimp factories, etc. These broader trends and discourses played a 
supporting role for the development of a biomarine innovation strategy and 
business development unit within Tine. The agricultural and biomarine 
sectors are more different than might be believed, in terms of knowledge and 
technical regimes, market organisation and hence in innovation power. 
These differences have historical, cultural and technical roots, from ‘catch’- 
and ‘cultivation’-based paths developed through centuries of human activity. 
At the time of writing this thesis, mainly generic products were sold in the 
Norwegian aquaculture sector, such as whole, unprocessed fish, while on the 
agricultural side, industrial processing, or ‘value adding’, of raw materials 
was more the rule than the exception.  
 
                                                                                                                            
Professor Erik Slinde, their research facilities and programs were established at 
about the same time, but there was no interaction between these two groups, partly 
due to a conflict between Harald Skjærvold and Dag Møller. Both these groups are 
still central in the research and development of salmon breeding. 
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Public funding of blue-green innovation: Evaluating early practice 
In a recent report from the Research Council of Norway on a number of 
blue-green research programs, both the science-political drive for integrating 
blue and green research and innovation, as well as ambiguity regarding the 
blue-green potential from practitioners was presented. The managing 
director of the Norwegian Seafood Federation (FHL), Geir Andreassen, 
evaluated his experiences with blue-green innovation: 
 
Even the ‘food program’ has been directly relevant for us. [But] the 
value chain perspective (fish/agriculture) has possibly been a restraint to 
the development instead of promoting it. The conditions, opportunities 
and challenges in the agricultural and marine sectors are fundamentally 
different and may result in a vague and fragmented research focus. This 
is also the case for the ‘market and society’ program. We have an 
enormous raw material base in wild species and breeding. What remains 
is creating industrial activity to increase the value creation from these 
raw material resources. At the same time, we have to develop new 
knowledge on how we can exploit the same raw material base in 
relation to bi-products and ingredients in other industries. (Geir 
Andreassen, FHL, in RCN Research Report, 2006) 
 
Although his concerns for the marine sectors were remarkably similar to 
Tine’s arguments for going into the fish industry, Andreassen had little 
belief in any synergies emerging from collaboration happening across the 
agro-marine boundaries – as they are ‘fundamentally different’. Noting that 
this was expressed in a report on the Research Council of Norway’s (RCN) 
portfolio of blue-green projects, this has to be read as a rather strong 
criticism of the idea of blue-green innovation. From this report, we can see 
that most of the Research Council’s blue-green programs during this period 
were in reality either blue or green, but the two programs mentioned by 
Andreassen sought to integrate blue and green, and were criticised for this. 
Andreassen’s scepticism might also have something to do with not wanting 
to lose ground to agricultural actors, or perhaps with lack of knowledge of 
what ‘the other’ (agriculture) represents in terms of complementary 
knowledge and resources? The coordinators of these programs in the 
research council, on the other hand, were more optimistic, and wanted to see 
more integration: 
 
We want to get even further in finding synergies between agriculture 
and fisheries/aquaculture. We succeeded with this, especially in the 
‘food program’, but we know that it is possible to accomplish more. 
(Danielsen and Horn, in RCN Research Report, 2006) 
 
Clearly, there were conflicting views on the results, and perhaps even the 
aims, of these programs. According to the program chair of the ‘market and 
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society’ program, Abraham Hallenstvedt, professional boundaries were part 
of the problem for achieving more interaction between blue and green: 
 
But what I would like to see more of, is if we increasingly could get 
researchers with experience from agriculture and forestry to work 
together with researches from the fish sector and formulate common 
research questions. (…) Researchers thrive in their own sectors, and I 
don’t think they should be allowed to continue like that without 
intervention from the outside. (Abraham Hallenstvedt, in RCN Research 
Report, 2006) 
 
While the whole report was designed and structured as if there were blue-
green synergies in the programs, thereby presenting blue and green projects 
side by side, the only concrete example in the report of something actually 
blue-green is the ‘super cooling’ project in the ‘food program’, where Sintef, 
Gilde (the Norwegian Meat Cooperative) and the Norwegian Seafood 
Federation together developed new cooling technology and then also 
transferred it  to fish, enabling the cooled storage of products at -1.1 degrees 
Celsius, increasing durability and quality to the consumer. All in all, the 
report indicates that there was still a long way to go before the blue and the 
green could be said to be integrated in any sense. To co-locate and co-
ordinate, does not automatically mean to integrate. 
 
Tine’s efforts to industrialise fish 
For Tine, there were at least two central and relatively new problems arising 
in the next years to come: First, they were likely to face more competition, 
or great competition on their core business from large multinational 
companies with a lot more experience on how to survive in an ‘open’ 
economy. As EU and WTO (World Trade Organisation) negotiations evolve, 
it is becoming clearer that their privileged national market position will not 
last forever. Following from that, they would probably need to be a lot better 
at handling innovation processes than before, often in collaboration with 
others. This might be their only viable strategy for surviving – 
differentiating, developing expertise and cooperating, instead of competing 
on price with far more effective producers of standard products. Milk 
farmers in Sweden and other European countries are more economically 
efficient in producing milk, and, given the present conditions, they would 
outcompete Norwegian farmers on price. According to the director of 
research at Tine R&D, Johanne Brendehaug, Tine was well aware of the 
potential competition challenge, enlarged by a different cost structure of 
milk farming and production than in neighbour countries: “It costs 3 NOK to 
produce one litre of milk here, while it costs around 2-2,5NOK per litre in 
Sweden. This is a threat to the food industry. Therefore, we have to 
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compensate with knowledge development” (Johanne Brendehaug, Tine 
R&D).  
 
Olsen et al. (2003) have argued that the lack of investments in infrastructure 
and production facilities in the Norwegian farming system have contributed 
significantly to these differences in cost structure. We could ask whether, 
compared to other Scandinavian actors, knowledge development could 
produce advantages in itself. This is perhaps a question of what kind of 
knowledge, e.g., perhaps a niche strategy would do the job in international 
markets. Thus far Tine has been able to compensate for the significant 
national decrease of milk consumption 34  for the last 15-20 years with 
increasing levels of product development, launching numerous new products 
(desserts, yoghurts, beverages, ready-meals, etc) to the markets each year, so 
that their turnover and profits have gradually increased during the same 
period. This suggests that Tine has managed to transform and develop its 
R&D and marketing competence towards a more ‘innovative’ profile. A 
business development advisor in corporate staff made this analysis: 
 
Tine copes well with ‘everyday innovation’. Like in our fruit juice 
production and ready meal production, etc. Incremental and sustaining 
innovation. But the other types of innovation we have to boost a bit 
more. Radical innovation, at the outside of Tine’s established systems,  
challenges the entire organisation. Initiatives for more radical things 
have often come from the top management, thus taking more shortcuts 
than initiatives from further down in the system – they have to work 
more systematically. (Asbjørn Tandberg, Tine) 
 
The notion of radical versus incremental innovation was referred to, 
indicating that innovation, through small steps within the existing product 
categories and production technologies, worked well in the company, while 
there was no established practice for working with more radical projects that 
would challenge the existing organisation. Needless to say, biomarine 
innovation was one of the most radical things they have done at Tine, 
according to how it was perceived in most parts of the organisation. The 
consequence of internationalising the Norwegian agro-food market would 
challenge the existing actors in the domestic food industry.  
 
Joint knowledge development across the sectoral borders of agri- and 
aquaculture has during the last three decades achieved considerable success 
in a few areas. The strongest example is perhaps how knowledge about 
breeding, feeding and the health of cattle and pigs have been utilised to 
                                                     
34 From 1989 to 2004, the consumption of milk was reduced by around 33 percent, 
meaning 55 litres per capita per year in average, after which it has stabilised at 
around 110 litres per capita (Hanne Refsholt, CEO at Tine, interview 2005). 
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develop the present world class quality and cost efficiency of Norwegian 
salmon farming, through joint research based at the Norwegian University of 
Life Sciences. However, this bridging of the two sectors has been limited, 
and Tine has tried to take it several steps further, into the industrialisation of 
food and ingredients production. This has resulted in several concrete 
projects related to biomarine raw materials and technologies. During the fall 
of 2001, Tine Biomarine, a daughter company of Tine, was established to 
take ownership of the development of a biomarine innovation portfolio (in 
particular related to biotech), crossing the boundaries between Tine R&D, 
commercialisation and inter-organisational partners. The biomarine area was 
already an emerging field of activity within Tine R&D. Initiatives for 
projects from Tine R&D and their alliances, and an emerging recognition in 
corporate headquarters of the opportunities within the fish and biomarine 
sectors, became increasingly entangled, as management supported new 
projects, and as researchers responded to strategy signals.  
 
Two significant changes at Tine are of importance for our understanding of 
this case study. First, the implementation of a corporate organisational 
structure was decided in 2002, representing a relatively dramatic shift in 
mindset from the long tradition of cooperative organisation. Although not 
breaking off from the original idea of cooperatives, this shift signalled a 
much stronger adjustment to the corporate world. The Norwegian Meat 
Cooperative (‘Gilde’) had taken the responsibility of moving first. After a 
few years of systematic activities in informing and dialoguing with their 
owners (farmers), the traditional group of the regional meat cooperative was 
enrolled into a single corporation in 2002, and then Tine went through with 
the same decision shortly after. Second, due to both this corporatisation 
process and the strategy process of 1999/2000 leading to the ‘TINE 2005’35 
strategy, Tine was no longer to be just a dairy company, but first and 
foremost a “food corporation”. Its new statutes were formulated in more 
general economic and food industrial terms:  
 
Objective. TINE’s objective is to run an effective, quality and market 
oriented business in the food industry on a cooperative basis. TINE shall 
on behalf of the owners strive for the best possible economic result from 
their milk production, and in addition take care of the owners’ other 
common interests. TINE may also import and export products. TINE 
may through investments or in other ways take part in other business. 
(Excerpt from TINE’s new statutes, 2002) 
 
                                                     
35 The overarching strategy work in Tine has been organised into five-year-cycles, 
where heavy analysis work has led to plans stretching five years into the future. 
’TINE 2000’ was made in 1994/1995, and ’TINE 2005’ was made in 1999/2000, 
etc. 
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These formulations clearly opened their field of activity, both within and 
beyond their current business. In commenting upon this change, Per Magnus 
Mæhle framed it as an ‘expansion’ of their knowledge: 
 
This has to do with an expansion, and it became inscribed in the statutes 
when the corporate model was implemented. Now this is not to say that 
Tine’s purpose is to produce milk, or process milk, but the primary 
thing is that Tine’s purpose is to be a central actor within food 
production in Norway and the Nordic region, I think it says, in the 
statutes. (Per Magnus Mæhle, Tine) 
 
This change is significant, from being a dairy cooperative whose only scope 
was to process, distribute and market the raw material of the owning 
farmers. The chain of arguments making this possible can be read in the 
above statement: Changing the name from ‘Norwegian dairies’ to ‘TINE’36 
and from milk to ‘food industry’, including ‘economic results’ and ‘other 
business’. Two years earlier, the ‘TINE 2005’ strategy was implemented, in 
which the biomarine sector was chosen as one out of four new strategic 
‘innovation areas’ to work on in the coming years. As we will come back to, 
the agricultural sector sees itself as having reached a much higher level of 
industrialisation and technological development than the biomarine sector; 
thus, Tine might have an advantage, but only if their knowledge and 
technology proves to be useful in, and translatable to, this new setting. Espeli 
et al. also argues that this new field of innovation became possible, partly 
due to the corporatisation of Tine:  
 
(…) an industrial product development path, away from the traditional 
dairy, towards more processed products. Establishing the corporation in 
2002 implied an opportunity for the integration of businesses that 
formerly had been managed without national coordination from the 
central administration. The corporation also provided opportunities for 
engagements in totally new areas, like seafood. (Espeli et al., 2006:312) 
 
However, there had been biomarine projects going on long before 2002, both 
as more or less formal R&D collaborative projects, and through the 
initiatives of particular business units, such as Tine R&D and Fjordland. In 
addition, there had been a few acquisitions on the fish-side, mostly initiated 
by the top management. In the ‘TINE 2005’ strategy, “TINE should go after 
growth and development in fully or partly new food areas that could (...) 
yield a ‘favourable economic and market development’” (Espeli et al., 
2006:288). In having worked on various non-dairy projects over the years, 
this definition of ‘side activities’ as part of the overall strategy was new. The 
new identity as ‘food corporation’, instead of dairy, opened up for a number 
                                                     
36 The brand ‘TINE’ was first introduced in 1992 (Espeli et al., 2006:213). 
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of potential business areas, such as fish, ready meals, bread products, sauces, 
desserts, soups, spreads and cold cuts, snacks, chocolate/sweets, pizza, baby 
food, brand extension, co-branding and new drinking products. Moreover, 
animal feed, patents, commercialisation of brands and licenses, and 
capital/property investments were considered (ibid:290).  The assumption 
was that, in the coming years, core business would not make it on its own, 
hence, that the current financial, technological and intellectual capital needed 
to be utilised in new areas. Potential synergies were outlined, related to 
competence, distribution system, supplier and customer networks, 
production facilities and branding. Seafood got a particular role (ibid:289). 
Even if not very clearly articulated, this was implicitly framed as a necessary 
strategy for survival. With a mandate from the corporate management, a 
group for developing the ‘new business areas’ strategy was established37, 
and the work of this group would come to set out many of the premises for 
discussing the traditional dairy path versus the new food path (ibid:292).  
 
It is reasonable to say that Tine’s product and technology competence over 
the last 70 years or so had mainly been based on quality development (i.e. 
hygiene, animal breeding, cold chain supply and distribution), while from 
the turn of the millennium, product development received a more strategic 
focus. Yet, what knowledge did Tine have for doing more product 
development? What kind of in-house knowledge could be used? While 
working on all aspects of product development, from biotechnology to 
concept design, the utilisation of exactly this ‘quality competence’ (hygiene, 
micro-biology, fermentation, etc) has arguably turned out to be valuable. In 
order to develop the quality of processing of, for example, fish, and hence 
enabling the production and branding of high-end products has been a 
powerful way to do product development. 
 
Similar to the global restructuring of the food retail sector, the 
restructuration of the Norwegian food retail sector during the 80s and early 
90s resulted in 1995, in four big actors totally dominating the market, and 
building their own integrated systems of business and distribution. There has 
thereafter been a continuous fight over distribution between these retail 
chains and the agro-cooperatives. Yet, on their cold and fresh products the 
agro-cooperatives did not yield an inch. Their cold chain technology and 
distribution system was said to be an important strategic means for keeping 
control over the market (Espeli et al., 2006:327). Moreover, while in the 
                                                     
37 Hanne Refsholt (director Tine R&D, later CEO at Tine), Per Magnus Mæhle 
(corporate director, business development at Tine), Jan Ove Tryggestad (board of 
directors at Tine and in several of the biomarine companies) and Kåre Markussen 
(managing director of Tine Region North) were among the central participants in 
outlining the biomarine strategy on the corporate level at Tine from 1999 onwards. 
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1970s and 80s every new product from Tine would be warmly welcomed by 
retailers, the new powerful constellations of retailers saw things differently. 
Central coordination in the retail chains of product assortments increasingly 
put constraints on the potential for product development, especially after 
2000, forcing Tine to involve their (industrial) customers much earlier in the 
product development process (ibid:329).  
According to Jan Ove Tryggestad (board member at Tine and several of its 
biomarine companies), these changes have created friction in the 
organisation. As an early example, the idea of utilising available 
technological capacity for producing fruit juices met resistance in the 
organisation, as people were afraid that it would take focus away from 
dairy/milk activities, and potentially cannibalise the milk market. He further 
emphasised the importance of redefining Tine’s purpose, in terms of 
allowing more risk taking and going from short-term profits to the present 
long-term horizon.  
 
This understanding of Tine as a politicised organisation was strengthened by 
the findings of Huse and Schøning’s (2005) study38 of the Tine board of 
directors in the same time period; a collectively owned organisation, with 
board members representing different positions regarding both Tine’s 
strategy and the politics of farming and food production. This political 
aspect of the organisation holds important relations to the larger networks in 
which Tine is embedded – to more than 18000 Norwegian farmers, to the 
national and regional politics of food production, to the rural population, and 
to national protection of the agricultural food market. Further, some of these 
relationships came to play a role in relation to the issue of ‘blue-green’ 
innovation. 
 
The following summarises and elaborates on the reasons for why blue-green 
innovation became part of Tine’s corporate strategy: Around 2000, Tine had 
financial capital, competence on food production and logistics, control over 
distribution channels, a broad network and significant R&D resources. 
Facing the threat of increasing national and international competition on 
their core business, they identified fish as one of five interesting areas for 
innovation, and opted for the marine field on a broad basis. This was also 
related to the general optimism of the late 1990s on behalf of the fish 
industry, as fish farming and biotechnology brought about great promises on 
new business opportunities, and the science political discourse of blue-green 
innovation, mainly in the research sectors, but also on the industry side. 
                                                     
38 Huse and Schøning (2005) observed Tine’s board meetings and interviewed the 
board members during 2004. The restructuration of Tine Biomarin and its portfolio 
of projects, including the partnering with Bremnes Seashore, was discussed and 
decided in the board during this time period. 
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As mentioned previously, there are significant historical, technological, 
economic and cultural differences between the agricultural (green) and 
biomarine (blue) sectors. The more interesting question, however, seems to 
be whether these differences mean that the sectors should be kept separate 
(no potential for synergies) or if a stronger relation would pay off both 
technologically and economically. Professor Erik Slinde (Norwegian 
Institute for Marine Research), inventor of the ‘fish salami’ in this case 
study, explicated the differences between the sectors in this way: 
 
Yes, it is a significant difference between farmers and fishermen. 
Farmers know that the cow needs a calf in order to produce milk, and 
that the calf must become a heifer. Farmers think long-term. And they 
have another characteristic that people in general are not aware of. Most 
people complain about farmers, because they get a hell of a lot of 
subsidies, and why do they? They are incredibly clever negotiators. The 
truth is that they negotiate unbelievable deals every year. Fishermen, 
they live from the principle ‘this year our God is kind, giving us lots of 
fish’, and ‘this year there are few fish, so we have to starve’. They think 
extremely short-term. And there is no hope for the traditional fish 
industry. (Erik Slinde, Institute of Marine Research) 
 
In spite of its exaggeration, this statement represents some of the basic 
differences between fishery and dairy. A catch-based business, like 
traditional fisheries, has not allowed for long-term industrialised 
development of knowledge, technology or markets in the same manner as 
the agricultural sector. Further, while the fish sector is transforming towards 
cultivation instead of catch, industrialisation of processing, product 
development and marketing has not yet been followed. This is what the 
corporate management at Tine identified as an opportunity. Hanne Refsholt 
connected Tine’s threats of blue-green innovation to the following: 
 
We started talking about entering business development in the fish 
sector. And then, when we worked on the new strategy around the year 
2000, having been through a decade of decrease in milk consumption, 
and to be a company that still risked a fall in turnover, because milk 
consumption fell from 170 litres to 110 litres per capita, and in addition 
it was politically decided to have competition in milk in Norway, how 
could we maintain our turnover, how could we grow, and how could we 
stay an attractive company? And then we analyzed, where do we have 
something to build upon? Do we have resources that can be of 
importance in new areas? And we have a rather unique situation, as the 
only food company in Norway with a large R&D department with a 
considerable and broad competence, not only on basic processes, but in 
fact on the whole chain of industrialisation from idea to market-ready 
product. (Hanne Refsholt, Tine) 
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A very rational and strategic process was depicted, from the realisation of 
the external threat of international competition, to a systematic search and 
evaluation of opportunities, before making choices based on synergies with 
their own R&D capabilities and their unique value chain. Another one of the 
key figures who introduced the biomarine innovation strategy, Per Magnus 
Mæhle, described their rationale for going for fish in similar terms: 
 
Well, we started when we had the strategy process in 1999 called ‘TINE 
2005’, where we ended with a conclusion about the importance of 
entering into fully or partly new areas, because the opportunities for 
growth in dairy products in the Norwegian market was limited. There 
were two things we started looking into – first, the question ‘why have 
there been so little activities on fresh seafood in Norway’? And because 
we have knowledge of fresh products – we know fresh products with a 
high turnover rate, it was natural to identify this as a potential. Second, 
there were numerous financial positions, many at that point expecting a 
fish farming adventure, and the aquaculture industry became more 
central in the Norwegian fish sector, which meant a greater degree of 
industrialisation compared to the catch industry. (Per Magnus Mæhle, 
Tine) 
 
Here, too, the blue-green strategy is connected to the overarching strategy 
processes, and the ‘TINE 2005’ strategy in particular. Such processes were 
heavy analytic exercises every fifth year in the company, with thorough 
discussions that took place over time before implementing the resulting 
strategies. Further, the emergence of industrial practices within the fish 
sector, such as fish farming and increasing interests in financial investments, 
strengthened Tine’s interests. Refsholt elaborated on their analysis of 
potential synergies with fish: 
 
So, the first thing we decided was that for us, financially based business 
development not was very interesting, even if we had free capital. We 
wanted to prioritise industrial business development. And then we 
started sorting the potential areas, and search for areas with potential for 
synergies, and of course, for growth and development. And then the fish 
area was identified at an early stage, and we started learning that fish 
can mean lots of different things, you know, and our activities have 
been marked by this, having been involved in everything from trying to 
control the fish farming to develop high tech products. (Hanne Refsholt, 
Tine) 
 
Again, the rational and systematic aspects of the process of opportunity 
identification were highlighted. On the other hand, when actually 
implementing the strategy, it is immediately described as a learning process 
of trial and error, testing out activities within a diverse set of projects. It 
must be noted that the choice of not getting involved in financially oriented 
83 
 
ventures also had aspects of trial and error. Tine invested in INAQ Invest 
early on, together with former consultants from KPMG, Gilde (the 
Norwegian Meat Cooperative) and others. This became an expensive 
learning experience for them, when the ‘bubble’ broke in the fish sector with 
a number of bankruptcies as the consequence. Moreover, Tine has later had 
to revise and reverse these considerations of not covering the whole value 
chain, realising that issues related to farming perhaps represent some of the 
strongest potentials for synergy between the blue and the green:  
 
And then we said, in opposition to the milk area, we will only be where 
we think we can get added value, and where we think we are able to 
contribute as close as possible to the market. But we have 
acknowledged that this is impossible and wrong, because, similar to 
milk, it is as vulnerably related to quality control in the whole value 
chain. This means that we have to go in and take control, even in raw 
material supply and processing. (Per Magnus Mæhle, Tine) 
 
Integrating backwards in the value chain has, especially in the case of this 
thesis, become a success factor. Although they have not yet gone all the way 
back to breeding fish (with the exception of some research projects on fish 
feed), they now seek to influence everything from when the fish is taken out 
of the water to its presentation in supermarket shelves and restaurant menus. 
This is not just a simple operation, as it demands both general and specific 
knowledge: 
 
You can’t just know something about organic components in food 
products, you must also know the specificities of fish as raw material 
which are different from what we know from before. And you need to 
know about the market, sourcing-wise, how it is different from ours, and 
such issues. (Per Magnus Mæhle, Tine) 
 
In other words, Tine had learned from their biomarine ventures that they 
need to know more about the specificities of the new sector in order to 
succeed with using/applying their own expertise to that sector’s raw 
materials, products and markets. When challenged to specify the 
transferability of their knowledge, Johanne Brendehaug, director of research, 
modified this picture somewhat: 
 
Our machines can with minor adjustments be used both in dairy 
products and fish; some are even used for analysis in the petroleum 
industry. But the raw material characteristics are different. We draw on 
others’ expertise about this, and we are challenged to learn about this, 
but we have a lot of transferable competence and technology to pick the 
raw material apart and put it together again. We have a long history of 
experience with this. (Johanne Brendehaug, Tine R&D) 
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The technologies and methodological practices of research and development 
could be transferred with some adjustments, but the specific ways that the 
new raw materials would behave, their ‘characteristics’, were different, and 
here Tine sought external expertise. While the simplification, or 
generalisation, of breaking materials down to their more fundamental (and 
thus similar) pieces broadened the scope of their knowledge and enabled the 
transition, this did not mean that they automatically would succeed. It could 
well be the case that their generalisable knowledge would not handle the 
particularities of the new area. As an example, early attempts at combining 
dairy products and fish oil (omega 3) had been constrained by technical 
problems: 
 
In 1990, we had a look at the opportunities for mixing fish oils and fatty 
acids from milk, to produce margarine. We collaborated with a research 
institute on herring oil in Bergen. But the problem was that the oil was 
too unstable, due to oxidation or lipolysis39. It got harsh, tasted fishy, 
and that’s not what the consumers want, at least not in margarine. So the 
oil was simply not good enough at that point. (Willy Finkelsen, project 
manager, omega 3 application projects at Tine) 
 
The available materials and technologies in this early attempt opposed the 
story of blue-green synergies, at least in that particular area. And when Tine 
more than a decade later started working with Maritex (see below) on 
developing a high quality omega 3 refinery, it took another seven years, 
large investments and huge efforts before they in 2008 could launch the first 
dairy and bakery products with added marine omega 3.  
 
The director of product development at Tine R&D, Ove Johansen, combined 
the new strategic inclusion of ‘side activities’ like the biomarine projects, 
with their generalised R&D competence, and their ultimate goals of 
maximising economic returns to Tine’s owners (agricultural farmers):  
 
We are supposed to maintain the income of our owners; they should be 
able to make a living from the raw material they provide. But now this 
means first and foremost that they make money, no matter if the income 
stems from milk or fish or other things. Milk instead of shares, 
dividends in the form of increased prices per litre of milk. Our owners 
are supportive of the new business areas, but with a relatively low risk 
tolerance. For us working in this system, income is the basic issue. 
 
The dairy cooperative organisational model was interpreted quite freely here, 
suggesting that the main issue was not only about processing, distributing 
and selling their owners’ milk, but rather about providing them with 
                                                     
39 Decomposing fat. 
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economic income. ‘Income from milk’ was translated to ‘income from food’. 
Again, a generalisation of Tine’s activities, competences and mandate took 
part in enabling the move to blue-green innovation. In addition, ‘the other’, 
or the fish industry, was projected as being less competent and hence in need 
of Tine’s expertise: 
 
The production processes of Maritex and Tine are quite similar, and we 
can make them better. The fish industry has no tradition for good 
hygiene, it is pretty rough. We can use omega 3 in Tine’s innovation. 
There is a problem with fish oil becoming harsh and with durability, but 
our knowledge can be used for handling these challenges. Omega 3 can 
be used in margarine, yoghurts, bread, etc. We develop our own 
products, hence acquiring knowledge about how it works and the proof 
of its effects, which then means they become easier to sell to other 
actors internationally, either as knowledge and ingredient, or as finished 
product. There are many producers of omega 3 in the world, but we can 
give it a good nutritional standard of quality. (Ove Johansen, Tine 
R&D) 
 
This view, of the fish industry as being ‘pretty rough’, with less emphasis 
and looser regulations on hygiene and other ‘nutritional standards’, is 
representative of most of the agricultural actors (both in business and 
science) I have been talking to. On the one hand, this is based on some 
evidence, or at least experience, while on the other, this serves as the basis 
for supporting and enforcing Tine’s strategy of taking on a position in what 
they believed would become an industry more similar to the agro-industry 
than it was previously. Within an integrated food producer like Tine, the 
strategy could then become the first to develop and market combined 
products in their own product portfolio, thereby enabling  the marketing of a 
whole ‘package’ of application knowledge, technology and actual 
ingredients to other industrial actors internationally.  
 
In having described the differences between fish and milk, as perceived 
mainly by the agriculture side, and thus the main reasons why Tine’s 
management viewed fish as an innovation opportunity, I can move on to a 
more reflexive account of Tine’s biomarine projects so far: 
 
One of the important discussions has been about whether we have had 
the right strategy, and if there are synergies in this. These issues have 
been discussed by the board and by corporate management, but at the 
same time, it is a part of the strategy discussions in the different 
[biomarine] companies. Whether they are satisfied or not with Tine as 
owner, related to the intention of building synergies and that these 
companies are too small to supply all resources themselves. Then they 
come to us, arguing for more money, or for the recruitment of more 
people, or for more competence, and so forth, what can we at Tine 
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offer? And then it becomes a board discussion: Do we have more 
money to provide? Do we have the competence needed? Where can we 
find it? What are the weaknesses and strengths in these companies? And 
evaluate where something needs to be added, to make something that 
has potential, because the aim here must be to obtain profitable results 
at some point, and we have said 3-7 years, making clear that we think 
long-term, and that it is not easy money. (Hanne Refsholt, Tine) 
 
At the outset, the blue-green investments were meant to be long-term, 
meaning they allotted 3-7 years before the projects needed to produce 
economic value. At the same time, there was a continuous discussion of how 
patient one should be, what kind of resources should be made available, and 
what intermediate goals to push forward. There were certainly not unified 
discussions in the board and management of Tine, nor in the daughter 
companies. 
 
The biomarine projects 
In going further into the development of a blue-green innovation strategy at 
Tine, the implementation of the strategy can be viewed as a broad trial and 
error exploration of a new field for the involved participants. Two main 
routes were tested, the financial and the industrial, of which the former had a 
short career. The financial position of the investment venturing company 
INAQ, formed by former consultants in KPMG, together with Tine, Gilde 
and some shipping actors, became a failure: 
 
INAQ was an early case we took on, and it was more for financial 
reasons, plus to build a network in the sector and seek out a way, and it 
was not very successful, therefore it got closed down. (Hanne Refsholt, 
Tine) 
 
The initiative came up in established relations within business consulting, 
and was boosted by the optimism of the emerging aquaculture ‘revolution’, 
and, according to corporate director Per Magnus Mæhle, later was 
undermined by the subsequent downturn in the industry: 
 
Mæhle: INAQ is to date the absolute most unsuccessful venture we have 
done. (…) It was started by a group coming out of KPMG, and their sea 
farming group, and we were among those joining in on investing in the 
company when it was established, together with some others. Gilde 
joined in, as well as a couple of ship-owners, and some other investors. 
Researcher: What didn’t work out in the project? 
Mæhle: Well, it was stopped by the downturn in the breeding sector. 
Failed investments and over-investments plus a conflict where one of 
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the owners on both sides of the table, when buying a company with no 
value. 
 
Hence, instead of learning about the fish industry, or building alliances for 
further investments in the sector, what they learned was to stick with their 
core competence, and directly involve industrial production and marketing 
of food. Accordingly, the other main route was one of industrialisation. A set 
of very different projects was established, with the shared idea to build and 
exploit industrial synergies with Tine’s existing business; knowledge, 
technology, distribution and marketing. The common coordinating 
organisation, Tine Biomarin, was established: 
 
Yes, the start was when we chose to establish Tine Biomarin [in the fall 
of 2001], which was supposed to administer and have responsibility for 
the new marine projects. Someone who knows Tine well enough to be 
able to draw on relevant resources, directly related to the individual 
ventures. Later, we chose to close down Tine Biomarin, because we 
questioned the value creation in Tine Biomarin. We saw that it didn’t 
manage to become anything more than a hub; it didn’t reach a critical 
mass in terms of the marketing and sales organisation. We merged it 
with Tine Ingredients instead, because the competence in Tine Biomarin 
was mainly in marketing and sales, and instead of drawing those 
working with biomarine activities out in an isolated group, it was 
important to, when it comes to natural sciences and development, you 
need critical mass, be in a community, or else you lose much of the 
synergy. (Hanne Refsholt, Tine) 
 
In order to ensure access to the relevant in-house resources at Tine, and to 
facilitate interaction between the different projects, they were organised 
under a common organisation. However, later they saw that this organisation 
served this ‘hub’ function only, and lacked the ability for ‘value creation’ 
(commercially). Thus, when they chose to merge it with the supplier of 
ingredients to industrial customers, Tine Ingredients, it was important to 
maintain this ‘networked practice’. Isolating the projects could easily mean 
loss of energy and access to crucial resources of various kinds. Still, not all 
biomarine projects were located within Tine Biomarin, as some projects 
related to the distribution of fresh fish was organised closer to the daughter 
company, Fjordland, a producer of ready meals, margarines, etc. One 
example is the case of ‘Marian Seafoods’, a concept of fresh fish distribution 
to Norwegian retail: 
 
Then we developed this concept for fresh seafood, which we analyzed 
in different forms. We first established it as a project together with 
Gilde, and worked a couple of months together with them, before we 
found out that we needed a partner from the fish side, and got Domstein 
and Fjord Seafoods partly involved on the ownership side. But it turned 
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out that we didn’t have similar enough strategic goals, we simply could 
not agree. (Per Magnus Mæhle, Tine) 
 
Sectoral boundaries, here in the form of different interests and goals, made it 
difficult to collaborate in a strategic alliance with actors from the fish sector. 
After this breakdown, Tine and Gilde together established the company 
Marian Seafoods, with the concept of packaging fresh filets of fish with 
packaging technology from the meat industry, and aiming for the large 
Norwegian retail chains. Later, the company was merged with Fjordland. 
However, long-term problems in getting a stable supply, both in volumes 
and quality, especially on white fish dependent on catch, created a great deal 
of trouble.  
 
We have had to recognise that we need to go further down in the value 
chain to ensure quality control, like our ownership of Sunnmørsfisk. 
One thing is to secure access to white fish and establish packaging 
facilities at Fosnavågen. But when you can’t get good enough quality 
from a critical factor, because they were not used to handling things 
according to the quality requirements we are accustomed to in our 
industry, and, we can reduce the degree of innovation, but we can’t 
compromise on process quality. They did not have the quality in their 
production that is called ‘nutritional standard’, and we have had to 
improve this, and it has cost money and a change in attitude. (Per 
Magnus Mæhle, Tine) 
 
Quality, in the sense of hygiene and ‘nutritional standards’, seems to be like 
a ‘sacred cow’ within the Tine system, a matter that has no compromise. 
Either they manage to get the quality they look for, or they cannot do 
anything at all. After changing suppliers a couple of times, a partnership 
with Norway Seafoods was established, one of the largest fishery companies 
in the country, presumably with the resources to develop their supply 
according to Tine’s standards. However, the market side had problems, too. 
After some new attempts at launching Marian products during 2005-2006, 
together with a large campaign using expensive TV-commercials without 
success, the concept was taken out of the Fjordland portfolio and closed 
down.   
 
The next large projects were within marine ingredients, with Tine Biomarin 
investing in the two biotechnical bi-product companies Maritex and 
NutriMarine Life Sciences40: 
 
                                                     
40 The list is not complete. Tine did also invest in some other companies, e.g., the 
biotech company Aminotech AS (later pulled out), and the fish product company 
Lofotprodukt (still associated).  
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Mæhle: We had identified, in addition to fresh sea food, marine 
ingredients as an interesting area, and we did some research on this 
throughout the winter of 2001. It resulted in contacts with several 
companies as potential partners, and in the end we prioritised Maritex, 
at the time owned by Aarhus Olie, and this entrepreneurial project 
NutriMarine Life Sciences, that we helped establish. We had a vision 
that we could coordinate NutriMarine and Maritex in one way or 
another. 
Researcher: What was the challenge with this? 
Mæhle: There were two types of challenges: first, to get these 
companies focused enough, as they have been focused on seeing many 
different opportunities, and following too many paths, and, because 
none of them had any cash flow to build upon, something had to be 
found that we thought we could realise, to get a sound development. But 
there has been too much back and forth in both companies, and too little 
market oriented development, such that in the Maritex case they have 
been occupied with raw material as the starting point, and technological 
process control in the NutriMarine case, and too little focused on 
whether any customers existed out there who were not only interested, 
but also willing to buy it, and then establish these as drivers of the 
process. 
 
A new kind of industry, different from the fresh fish in Marian, but with 
some similarities with other activities, in particular as found in Tine 
Ingredients: First, there are product optimising activities involving utilising 
as much of the raw material as possible, including the idea of creating 
economic value from by-products (or ‘waste’), as ingredients in various 
industries, both related to food, health and cosmetics. Secondly, it involved 
doing business with industrial customers, collaborating closely to meet each 
customer’s needs. However, the coordination effect between these 
companies failed, and interaction with Tine’s resources proved to be difficult 
in these ventures. Altogether, it has been a hard and bumpy ride, learning 
both about the biomarine sector and especially about what Tine’s resources 
can be used for in this setting. Still, Mæhle was hesitant to judge any part of 
the process as failure: 
 
Both in the media and internally there are people saying ‘some things 
have been failures’, or ‘we have wasted some money’, and then, like I 
said to the board of directors the other day, everything except from 
INAQ should still be seen as invested. We are in a process, and we said 
from the beginning that we would not get anything in return from this in 
two or three years, we talked about 5-10 years, and in my opinion there 
are reasons to still stick with this. (Per Magnus Mæhle, Tine) 
 
Admitting the bad luck of investing in INAQ just prior to the 2000-2003 
downturn in the aquaculture industry, causing big economic losses before 
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pulling out, Mæhle still argued that all the other ‘should still be seen as 
invested’, meaning that the outcomes of these ventures were yet to be seen. 
However, NutriMarine Life Sciences was sold after collaboration problems 
with the entrepreneurs/scientists who had started the company, and who held 
all the knowledge in the firm, and Maritex had huge initial problems both 
with choosing a direction, starting out with almost 50 different products 
(from cod stomachs to collagen peptides), and with delivering on 
technological and quality premises. It is always hard to argue for innovation 
projects during their development, like when Dagens Næringsliv wrote a 
critical article41 about Tine’s ‘failed’ biomarine projects. When innovations 
meet such resistance from internal and external actors, they depend on 
convincing representatives to maintain support. Mæhle was one of these 
advocates of the biomarine strategy, as he did not give up from having to 
face a few obstacles.  
 
Restructuring Tine Biomarine 
Obviously, different opinions of a blue-green innovation strategy were 
represented in the management and board of directors at Tine. As time went 
on, these differences became clearer as there was an impatience for results, 
and different attitudes towards the uncertainty of these projects: 
 
Yes, at Tine’s board, there are different attitudes on whether it was 
smart to enter into these marine projects. But so far, the board has been 
unified about the decision that has been made, but there are different 
attitudes about the degree of patience, and on whether we have chosen 
the right level, and if we have chosen the right projects. (Hanne 
Refsholt, Tine) 
 
According to Jan Ove Tryggestad (board of directors at Tine), NutriMarine 
Life Sciences became too vague to continue working with them, Maritex had 
to take on big economic losses due to a costly and time consuming 
upgrading of technology, and the Marian project failed to build on realities, 
i.e., they had problems with suppliers and lack of market access. Then they 
had turbulent times, with changing management in the companies. Finally, a 
former dairy manager was hired as managing director, and the focus was 
radically narrowed to only omega 3 and no other products. When Gunnar 
Hovland took over as managing director of Tine Biomarine in November 
2002, and later continued as director after the merger with Tine Ingredients, 
he sought to clarify the principles for doing marine business at Tine: 
                                                     
41 According to the February 24, 2005 issue of the business newspaper Dagens 
Næringsliv, Tine had, in total, at that point in time spent more than 100 million 
NOK on their blue-green projects without any returns so far. 
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We have three principles that must be in place before Tine will work on 
marine activities: First, unique freshness. If we do not talk about really 
fresh products, actors from any country will be able to deliver good 
results. Second, the connection between dairy and marine. Drawing on 
the best from both areas and creating something new. And third, 
commercial potential, both economically and on volume. (Gunnar 
Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Freshness as the main advantage in relation to international competitors, 
synergies with their core competence, and a certain scale of business were, 
in his view, necessary conditions for succeeding with biomarine activities at 
Tine. His conception of the biomarine strategy was clearly based on the 
responsibility of moving these projects closer to commercialisation, feeling 
the pressure for results from a heterogeneous portfolio of biomarine projects: 
 
Job number one for me, in all the companies, was really to clean up. 
Because it was an incredible chaos, both in the strategic platform for 
why Tine was in it at all, it was anchored to an illusion and not in 
realities. And there was chaos in the companies as well, they were all 
entrepreneurial ventures, with entrepreneurial culture and 
entrepreneurial mess all over, with neither focus nor progress in the 
important areas for business. NutriMarine was sold relatively fast, or in 
practice given away. And then, in Maritex, the managing director was 
fired, we cut away almost 50% of the employees, and from 12-14 
production lines we cut down to 3. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Hovland here gave a more bottom-up picture of the biomarine activities than 
the corporate directors (above), relating them to the corporate strategy 
process, a need to coordinate and evaluate already existing activities leading 
to the establishment of Tine Biomarine. In his view, the resulting ‘chaos’ 
had to be brought to order, he had to ‘clean up’ – both regarding the strategic 
platform for doing biomarine projects, and regarding the actual ongoing 
projects.  
 
When it was decided by the Tine board of directors to sell NutriMarine Life 
Sciences (NMLS), we can read the argumentation used for suggesting a 
decision in an excerpt from the board meeting case papers: 
Orientation about NutriMarine Life Science: Tine chose NMLS as 
partner based on expected synergies with our product development and 
sales of special nutritients. After two years of work, the company has 
become more oriented towards pharmaceutical industry, and it is 
difficult to achieve synergies with Tine. (…) heavier process in the 
marketing work (…) provision of both financial capital and competence. 
(Tine board meeting case papers, 2004-04-07) 
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The change of strategic orientation within NMLS was here used as the 
reason for why they had not achieved the expected synergies with Tine. 
Furthermore, the need for more resources – on financing and marketing the 
venture – served as arguments for selling their shares in NMLS. In the board 
meeting 42 , the management argued that the process related to clinical 
documentation (in pharmacy) was expensive and uncertain, that it would 
take at least another year before anything would be ready for the market, and 
that the venture was far behind the business plan schedule. In addition, by 
defining the project as ‘outside’ Tine’s business areas, an argument was 
made for taking a loss from selling the shares rather than losing even more 
on continuing with this venture. Several of the board members expressed 
that some of the owners were increasingly sceptic and impatient regarding 
the economic outcome of the blue-green projects. Some other board 
members expressed support for the management’s analysis and suggestions, 
emphasising also the collaboration challenges between NMLS and Tine. The 
board decided in unison to sell the shares in NMLS. It is clear that it had 
reached a point in which top management asked fundamental questions 
about the blue-green strategy, producing high pressure for Tine Biomarin. 
The process had taken more time and money, and been more difficult to 
handle than was expected, leading to a call for evaluating efforts, and for 
improving economic results. Afterwards, some board members told that they 
found the blue-green strategy and activities somewhat diffuse, both 
regarding the products and their markets. They found it increasingly difficult 
to defend these priorities towards the owners – farmers supplying milk43. On 
the other hand, they also mentioned that this had been a valuable learning 
process. In their view, Tine both needed more specific knowledge on the fish 
sector and a closer relation to Tine’s core business. Lack of competence, 
both in the board, and in managing the projects, was seen as the main 
problem. Discovering the gap between initial pictures and the reality, and 
‘tidying up’ the resulting mess had been a learning process that hopefully 
would improve their ability to succeed in the future. Reviewing the 
biomarine strategy, Hovland emphasised marketing, internal capacity and 
competence, partner interests and process control as the main challenges. 
Many would agree upon the importance of these issues. Yet, in the case of 
                                                     
42 Based on Huse and Schøning’s observations and interviews in their study of the 
Tine board of directors during 2004, in addition to my own conversations and 
interviews with participants. 
43  In a dairy cooperative like Tine, instead of sharing dividends, profits of the 
business is shared between the owners/members (at the time 18000 milk farmers) by 
adding to the price paid for the supplied milk. In this way, the link between ’core 
business’ (milk) and economic results is strongly associated as perceived by the 
owners. Their main goal with Tine is simple: get as a high price as possible for the 
milk they produce at their farms. The creation of relevance of ’side activities’ might 
therefore be harder than in other industrial corporations. 
93 
 
implementing Tine’s biomarine innovation strategy, did they not do any 
market research before investing in new ventures? This contrast with 
Refsholt’s and Mæhle’s accounts of systematic search and evaluation of 
potential projects (see above). How rational/top-down was this process, and 
how much was it based on an attempt at coordinating already existing 
bottom-up initiatives? And how can proper market research be done within 
not-yet-existing market segments? In these projects, a clear message to Tine 
has been that they need to invest a lot more in internal competence to match 
and achieve synergies from external investments. In being left with only two 
projects after the process of ‘tidying up’ in Tine Biomarin, Umi No Kami 
and Maritex, the quest for commercial results in these ventures had to be 
intensified. In particular, Maritex’ business model of producing and 
marketing ingredients to industrial customers became an argument for 
merging Tine Biomarine and Tine Ingredients. By this, Tine Biomarine’s 
position as a hub between R&D and commerce was moved into a clearer 
commercial position, though still dealing with advanced technical issues:  
 
After the first phase of tidying up, we saw that there were synergies 
especially between the fish oil at Maritex, or the business logic of 
getting the oil into dairy applications, and sell it both nationally as a 
demo and internationally as application, that business logic was pretty 
similar to what we do with dairy ingredients. In a way, you have to do 
relatively heavy work on the research part, the application part, and the 
knowledge part to get an ingredient to be stable in a product. And then 
we sell not the oil, but the solution. Since this is related, it was natural to 
merge Tine Biomarine with Tine Ingredients. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
According to this argument, it is less clear how well the fish sausage of Umi 
No Kami fitted within Tine Ingredients. In this case, it was more a case of 
maintaining control of the project by those who had interests and ideas about 
Umi No Kami’s further development. The process of getting the 
collaboration between Maritex and professional groups at Tine took time:  
 
Maritex has had a culture of fixing everything themselves, such as a 
home-fixing culture on everything, and R&D has been there and helped 
them on several critical issues, but the cultural difference seems so 
different that we have struggled to make our R&D a natural part of 
Maritex. It is a problem for us, quite simply. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
Thus, not only geographic differences, but also ‘cultural distance’, meaning 
differences in professional and industrial practices, made it difficult to get 
the collaboration on track. In the communication of both parties I noticed a 
total agreement to draw on Tine’s resources with regard to technology, 
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marketing and economy, in order to develop and commercialise Maritex’ 
business. Yet, in practice, I could not see much of this;44 there were some 
attempts related to technology development and to production routines on 
hygiene, but without much success. Not until Maritex’ management was 
changed with people from the dairy industry (2005/2006). Again, the issue 
of ‘quality’, or nutritional standards, as defined by Tine, was highlighted as 
the main technological – and thereby also a commercial – problem: 
 
Maritex has had terrible results, and nearly went broke. They have not 
succeeded in the market. This is partly because the ingredients industry 
must have nutritional standards in their production, and the marine 
sector has not come as far as in agriculture. Tine R&D goes in and 
works directly in the company with things like hygiene, production, 
product development, etc. This is also partly because they have not 
succeeded with their marketing. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Obviously, this has to do with having challenges on the marketing side, in 
being an entrepreneurial company without many initial relations to their 
markets (industrial customers), and with more than 50 products to sell with 
almost no resources in sales and marketing. The fact that it was unfocused is 
perhaps an understatement. Another issue is that it took Tine, as owner, 
several years to realise this as a problem, and then radically restructure the 
company. Hovland saw this as a general problem in the early phase of blue-
green activities in Tine:  
 
The problem with the innovation projects in Tine has been that one has 
gone too wide, bought companies, invested and so forth, and at the same 
time has not been conscious of our internal capacity. If you buy a 
company, it demands enormous management resources. (Gunnar 
Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
In other words, it had been a demanding challenge for the dairy cooperative 
to develop a blue-green innovation practice out of the new strategy, both 
with regard to the technological aspects (that is, quality standards) and on 
marketing (focus on customer demand). This led to more spending of 
financial and human resources than expected and hence created frustration 
and pressure for results in the mother company. In the case of Maritex, Tine 
Biomarin ended up buying out the other owners of the fish oil company to 
ensure economic and managerial control of the company. After lengthy and 
expensive upgrading of the refinery, and brutal restructuration shifting out 
                                                     
44  I went to Maritex for a few days together with project managers from Tine 
Ingredients, followed a set of meetings, and got to speak with the management 
group there. I also discussed Maritex with several people at Tine’s management and 
at Tine R&D during my fieldwork.  
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management in two rounds, their omega 3 is now out as an ingredient in 
Tine’s yoghurt and in Goman’s ‘Coast Bread’. It is also out in the 
international industrial market for functional foods ingredients, but its 
success is too early to tell. 
 
As most of the biomarine projects in Tine has been of international 
dimensions and ambitions, the question of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
has come to the fore. The idea of producing ‘value added’ products from 
biomarine resources is clearly based on two strategic factors: First, the 
access to fresh and superb raw materials, and second, the competence of the 
Norwegian food sector. Without taking advantage of the freshness and 
developing unique fields of expertise, labour will be cheaper in other 
countries and regions, and consequently it will be more profitable to do 
processing there.  
 
And I am fully convinced that the only thing that is cheap in Norway is 
competence, well educated competence. Everything else is very 
expensive. And then, to put that competence into our products and 
solutions, get it up, get patents, protect our IPR, this is the way forwards 
for us. Our products, our milk, are without value. In an international 
setting, we won’t have a chance. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
This is a strong, but probably qualified statement about how many of Tine’s 
present products will come under pressure from international competitors. 
Their complex logistics and distribution system, quality control and market 
relations will not produce the same advantages when trying to compete with 
international competitors buying milk from far more efficient milk farms. 
Without a serious restructuration of the Norwegian milk farms, Tine might 
be outcompeted on price (Olsen and Espelien, 2003), since consumer milk is 
a commodity, without much potential for building and protecting 
knowledge-based advantages. Knowledge based strategies have their 
potential in more processed food products and ingredients, such as cheese, 
fermented milk products, ready-made foods, etc. The situation in aquaculture 
is similar. With regard to the production of raw materials Norway still is 
very competitive; hence, product development from fresh fish might become 
a profitable area. The processing of frozen fish, on the other hand, can be 
done anywhere in the world, as the costs of labour weighs more than the 
costs of transport, and, in the EU, customs tariffs are lower for unprocessed 
fish. Strategically, two questions are then of importance for Tine. What kind 
of knowledge is useful in their biomarine activities, and how can they take 




It is about competence on nutritional standards, which does not exist at 
all on the marine side. They will never manage to industrialise food 
production on their own. It is about picking the raw material apart and 
putting it back together in an appropriate way for consumers and 
industrial production. It seems to me that a shift has come in Tine, 
including more of their own nutritional competence on the marine side. 
They have understood that when the marine side not has managed this 
before, it is because they don’t have this competence. Tine has to use 
their own competence, add it to the marine side. (Per Olav Skjervold, 
Tine R&D) 
 
At this point in time, Skjervold had left Tine for a position as director of 
innovation in one of the major fish feed producers (EWOS Innovation). 
Where Brendehaug (Director of Research, Tine R&D) and others said early 
on that they would attain competence on fish in collaboration with fish 
actors, Skjervold saw a shift within Tine towards valuing their own 
competence higher. This was one of the reasons why Skjervold and his fish 
research colleagues from the University of Life Sciences were hired by Tine 
– to strengthen their internal competence on aquaculture.  
 
In spite of his critical attitude to the early organising of Tine’s biomarine 
activities, Hovland (managing director, Tine Ingredients) admitted that it is a 
learning process marked by uncertainty, with new and commercialisable 
knowledge as the aim: 
 
Researcher: So, you say that this is an attempt at trial and error 
learning? 
Hovland: Yes, in practice it is. And the theory is then to look for unique 
advantages, and add our competence to these unique advantages, and try 
to protect them in some way. Whether via branding and trademarks, or 
patents, or whatever, and then test it in the [international] market. And 
then we have to know that it is good enough that we would have 
internally used it first, in our dairy company. After all, it is sent to our 
daughter companies out there. 
 
Going down that road of finding ‘unique advantages’ in the blue-green 
cross-section had not been done before by industrial actors, hence, the 
identification of opportunities, whether based on market demand or 
technological possibility, had to be exploratory, and not as rational as  
corporate management accounts suggested (see above). Still, the challenge 
was to get beyond this – into protecting and then testing the 
knowledge/products in domestic and international markets. Commercialising 
knowledge has increasingly become a question of protection, or formalising 
ownership of the knowledge developed; intellectual property rights (IPR). 
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First, the following illustrates one of the instruments of safeguarding against 
copies: 
 
We know nothing [about IPR]. Yes, if we are honest with ourselves, we 
don’t know much. But we have to know, when we sell concepts, when 
we get this Maritex oil going, we will try and protect it as part of food 
products, create complete protection regimes around them. That will be 
the test case, in trying to get those products going in Norway, and then 
in a couple of other countries within a year. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
When confronted with the status of Tine’s competence on IPR, Hovland was 
very clear about their shortcomings. Having met the demands for IPR in 
meetings with potential international industrial customers in some of the 
biomarine projects, they realised the importance of developing knowledge 
and routines about this in Tine Ingredients. Activities for upgrading Tine’s 
competence on the issue were started. Yet from starting to work more 
seriously with IPR to having included it as an integrated perspective via 
strategies, routines and competence in the entire organisation takes time. 
Second, IPR can be viewed as a way of making knowledge exchangeable, 
and providing negotiation power in relation to large international business 
customers: 
 
The drive for increased focus on IPR at Tine is not mainly related to the 
fish ventures, even though they are a part of it, because they are 
international, and the patenting process and the contract dispute on the 
fish salami were a bit deterrent. But most importantly, this is about 
internationalisation. It is understandable that Tine has not worked 
systematically or at all, with this in Norway. It has worked very well 
without it. There is a ‘before’ and ‘after’ the point in which 
internationalisation became a topic at Tine. Potential customers and 
partners expect this to be in place; it is a necessity. We have clear 
signals from the US, related to omega 3, that patents will increase the 
market value and the interest considerably. Moreover, approvals with 
FDA and GRAS 45  have to be in place. (Bente Mogård, Tine 
Ingredients/Tine R&D) 
 
Even if the fish industry has been international for ages, their lack of 
systematic knowledge development when it comes to processing and product 
development has led to little use of patenting. According to patent lawyers, 
Stene and Langan, in Zacco, (an intellectual property consultancy), there 
were almost no use of patents in the fish industry. They further compared it 
                                                     
45 FDA is the US Food and Drug Administration, and it has a crucial position in 
approving new food and medicine products. GRAS is the US approval of food 
safety, ’Generally Recognized As Safe’. 
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with the oil industry and the poultry industry, where patents are not only 
used for “outcompeting rivals, but also to control the value chain” 46 . 
Patenting will certainly be of value when going international with products 
and concepts based on omega 3 from Maritex in the coming years. In the 
main case of this thesis – Umi No Kami/Salma – the whole project started 
with buying a patent application on the fermentation of fish. Later, with 
establishing relations to Bremnes Seashore, their high-quality raw materials 
were also based on patented processing technology. However, the economic 
value patenting provided in this case, is more questionable. I would suggest 
that other protection and marketing strategies, particularly related to 
branding, design and continuous innovation have been of greater importance. 
 
  
                                                     
46  Interview in FISK Industri & Marked, 2006-08-15. Downloaded from 
http://www.netfisk.no/default.asp?page=3&article=292 on 2006-10-18 11:05AM 
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4 Fermenting fish: Innovation in practice 
In the previous chapter, I sought to provide an introduction and overview of 
the case that I investigated, so that the following more detailed descriptions 
would be easier to comprehend. I also in the previous chapter situated the 
case study within a larger set of interconnected networks that together form 
what are often referred to as industries, structures, infrastructures, political 
discourses and institutions and markets. I would not agree that this is the 
‘context’ of the case study as it is often described. Rather, it should be 
understood as an attempt at ‘stretching’ the networks beyond what is 
common within actor-network theory, in order to describe how local 
practices interact and become intertwined with other practices, sometimes 
due to their need for simple coordination or for close collaboration across 
domains, and sometimes in their collaboration towards forming and 
distributing new practices to the extent that Practice (with a capital P), or 
what we might call ‘macro-practice’, emerges. Examples of the latter could 
be the emergence of a new profession, a new category of products or new 
constellations of users creating a new ‘market’. Here, I am arguing, along 
with a number of process and practice theorists (e.g. Latour, 1999b; Law, 
2004; Pickering, 1995; Araujo, 1998; Hernes, 2007), that what is global is 
built from interconnecting local practices and processes. My ethnographic 
case study is, therefore, just a small slice of what was going on in the 
network of interconnected practices during the time period in which I 
followed some of them. The development of a ‘blue-green’ innovation 
program within Norwegian science policy was another instance of such 
‘innovation-process’. It was no less local than the fish salami, but it was 
brought forth by other actors with other obligations and interests, such as 
managers and bureaucrats of universities, research institutes, the Ministry of 
Education and Research and the ministries of fisheries and of agriculture. 
The tracing of these specific and local processes in detail would have been 
an entirely different study, but it would have nevertheless interacted with 
Tine’s development of a biomarine innovation strategy, and with the barriers 
to commercial innovation within the fish industry. As mentioned previously, 
I could also have started out with the relationship between Bremnes 
Seashore and the University of Life Sciences, and traced the processes of 
technological innovation happening there for years, as well as the subsequent 
processes of creating economic value from them, while failing to find users 
willing to pay extra for high quality products before incidentally coming into 
contact with Tine. That would have also been an interesting study. Yet that 
was not the starting point of this project. My starting point was studying 
innovation processes within agricultural cooperatives. Then I came across 
the biomarine activities at Tine, and found this to be an excellent object of 
study for understanding innovation processes that cross boundaries; the 
uncertainty of the processes was high, and the need to learn and create new 
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knowledge was also high. Thus, the following detailed description47 of an 
innovation process is an example of how micro-practices (developing a fish 
salami) both create and enact macro-practices (industrialisation and market 
making of fish). This is because macro-practices are built by interconnecting 
micro-practices, and because the emerging macro-practice and micro-
practice mutually shape and influence each other. 
 
4.1 Idea and invention: Recombining elements across settings 
Where did the idea of fermenting fish and making ‘salami’ of fish come 
from? We can not exclude the possibility that people have tested this before. 
Yet in this case, Slinde came up with the idea to combine fish and 
fermentation technology when he started exploring new ways of processing 
fish. He had research experience within both agriculture (The Food Research 
Institute) and aquaculture (Institute of Marine Research), and, based on this, 
he wanted to explore opportunities for industrialising Norwegian fish. 
 
Inventing the object: Fermenting fish 
There are certainly several story lines leading to this product development 
process. One story line began with Tine’s surplus of whey, a byproduct from 
cheese production consisting partly of proteins. The desire to make 
economic use of this idle resource led to various R&D programs, and one 
had to with experimenting with milk proteins as additives to various food 
products. Another story line comes from Tine’s long history of industrial 
production and distribution of dairy products and, in connection with this, 
their knowledge development on fatty acids, fermentation and hygiene. More 
recently, a story line from a totally different setting, that is, Bremnes 
Seashore and their development of new processing technologies for salmon 
in collaboration with researchers from the Norwegian University of Life 
Sciences, is of crucial importance to the present product concept. Yet 
another story line related to both the agricultural and the aquacultural 
sectors, and which at various points interacted with these other story lines, is 
the development of national ‘blue-green’ research policies and programs, 
which tried to stimulate collaborative efforts across the agro- and 
aquacultural sectors. Nevertheless, in emphasising Tine’s role in the process, 
my account of the case needs to start with a professor in aqua- and 
agriculture, Erik Slinde. In addition, even if it were to be a story about what 
products came to constitute the concept of Salma, including fresh filets and 
                                                     




other potential products, the story line from Slinde’s idea of fermented fish is 
still difficult to overlook. 
 
Slinde is what I would call an ‘entrepreneurial scientist’, in communicating 
self-conscious creativity and energy, and being always ready to throw out 
opinions about society, research and business. With previous experience 
from ‘both sides’, having worked as a scientist and director of research both 
at the Food Research Institute and at the Institute of Marine Research, he 
wanted to encourage the product development of fish: 
 
I suggested that we could start teaching a subject called ‘seafood and 
product development’ here at the University of Bergen, and then things 
worked out so that I did that for three years. Then I had students and 
courses, and taught them a few things about seafood and product 
development. Let’s take some food technologies, and then apply them to 
fish, using fish as raw material, and using food processes, and one of the 
processes that I know really well is production of salami. I thought to 
myself, ok, we can make a salami out of fish. (Erik Slinde, Institute for 
Marine Research) 
 
From this experimental recombination of technologies and materials, based 
on Slinde’s expertise, the idea of making salami out of fish, preferably from 
salmon, was tested. It soon became clear that the fat content in salmon would 
be a main technical challenge, and therefore a mix of red and white fish was 
seen as necessary: 
 
The fat content varies a lot in salmon, it varies from 10 to 30%, a very 
large variation, thus we have to balance this with a white fish, and the 
most available white fish in Norway is saithe, filet of saithe. And 
moreover, it is extraordinary cheap. Then we thought that this should be 
a good product. So, I thought, I go to the ‘Renew-program’48, and tell 
them that I have an idea to make salami out of fish, ordinary Norwegian 
salami. And they said ‘yes that was ok’. (Erik Slinde, Institute for 
Marine Research) 
 
Here, we have an early version of the fish salami. On the one hand, applying 
technology from ordinary and mundane Norwegian salami, and on the other 
hand, it was thought of as a competitor and substitute for exclusive products 
like smoked salmon and ‘speke-lax’. These sources of the idea, which 
simultaneously associate with the mundane and the exclusive, came to 
follow the innovation process for years, producing both conceptual 
ambiguity and flexibility. This ‘double identity’ was also present in the 
                                                     
48  The ‘Renew-program’ is an industrial research program constituted by a 
collaboration between the Research Council of Norway and Innovation Norway. 
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object’s technical and economic challenges. First, there was a challenge in 
stabilising fatty acids, which in the beginning was attempted to be solved by 
blending white and red fish. Second, there was a challenge of market 
segmentation, whether aiming towards the exclusive ‘gourmet’ segments or 
a larger market of ‘everyday products’. And third, it was a matter of cutting 
costs, for example by blending salmon with saithe, which is a much cheaper 
raw material. 
 
Slinde was not the first person to think of the potential combinatory 
opportunities between agri- and aquaculture. Between policy makers and 
research institutions, I have described some of the debate on the potential 
synergies between ‘blue’ and ‘green’ innovation in chapter 3. But a fish 
sausage; a salami of fish? “What a bad idea”, a lot of people said throughout 
this process. “I only work on bad ideas”, Slinde responded stubbornly, 
“because, if something is considered a ‘good’ idea, it has certainly been tried 
before. In reality, if ideas become good or bad, it is the result of the project, 
not its cause” (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research). Thus, the idea 
was born, some initial funding acquired and shortly a laboratory at the Food 
Research Institute was hired to test it out in practice: 
 
It costs 60.000 NOK to do an experiment at Matforsk, including 
analyses and whatever else has to be done, people and so forth. And 
then I went over to Matforsk, and got hold of salmon and saithe, and 
then we made mixes downwards, with 100% salmon, 50% salmon, 25% 
salmon, etc, and I think we did 4 productions. And then we saw that in 
the products that contained much salmon, the fat just flowed right out. 
Then I thought that, ‘well, it was a pity’, and then it was back again [to 
Bergen], in way going back and saying that this was really a failure, we 
can’t make it. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
The first experiments did not go very well. Yet, even though he thought of 
the experiment as a failure, Slinde still brought the results back to his fellows 
at ForInnova (the University of Bergen’s Technology Transfer Office) and in 
the Renew-program: 
 
And then I went back home, and came with these nice packages, right, a 
little like ‘dress up the bride’. And then, the economists at ForInnova 
went down to the store and bought a few beers, and these guys ate it, 
and said it tasted delicious. So, I thought that, if three economists are 
sitting here telling that this is good stuff, then I am sure I can make it 
better” (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Slinde’s interpretation of the situation, even in hindsight, was ambiguous. 
On the one hand, the first experiments failed, and he was really heading 
home without positive results. Still, just to be able to show something, he 
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‘dressed up’ the fish salami and let the businessmen have a taste. Surprised 
then by the fact that they got excited about it as well as its potential as a 
commercial product, Slinde realised that if a group of businessmen liked it, it 
could become something more that just a researcher’s fascination about a 
new technological combination. I was later told by one of the Renew-
program representatives, that he thought the product tasted “awful”, but that 
they thought it was a fascinating project, and some of them had a good 
relationship to Slinde. Thus, it was decided to continue with further 
experiments, and start developing a business plan for the project. A bit later, 
the emerging product was presented at an aquacultural fair, and the visitors 
were asked what they thought about it. Slinde recalled particularly one 
episode that, according to him, strengthened his belief in a market for such a 
product:  
 
We went to AquaNor, of course with the sausage, and we gave out 
samples, getting responses and conducting market research. Some said 
that they would absolutely not eat it, but, then it happened. A mother 
came with a little boy. The boy saw that we had sausage, and he wanted 
a bite, then he ate it, and asked ‘can I have some more?’ And you know, 
then these guys in ForInnova understood that getting kids to eat salmon 
as sausage, giving them omega 3, then you have the mothers, so then 
there was a market. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Selling ‘easy omega 3’ for children, which is both a new way to approach 
eating fish, and possibly a market for ‘family friendly fish’, this event seems 
to have provided some reassurance for going further with the project. The 
next step was to patent the invention, and in this case study, patenting was 
judged as a crucial point of the decision: 
 
This part is very important, and when, if you patent something, you start 
a commercial race, you have to sell, get someone interested in taking 
over, like Tine did with this salmon sausage. It was sold at a very early 
stage, because either you have to build a business yourself, which we 
considered, or else you have to get someone interested. (Erik Slinde, 
Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Saying A was easy – exploring the idea in a laboratory and then having 
public funding was a green line to move forwards. Yet, when, saying B, or 
starting the patenting process, they would also have to say C, in seeking to 
industrialise the project. The great risk, as well as the costs and commitment 
needed were considerable, and Slinde and his partners in the TTO could not 
take on the costs of patenting without thinking commercialisation right 
away. Slinde and ForInnova decided to take the next step and write the 
patent application, thus also going for commercialisation – preferably by 
selling the patent to a capable industrial actor.  
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4.2 The Neptun project: Research and technology development 
Initial cooperation: The Neptun project 
Still, how did Tine come into the picture? Tine was one of a very small set of 
domestic actors having the capacity to conduct heavy product development 
and commercialisation processes in the food industry. Yet the emergent 
cooperation between Slinde and Tine R&D came about through incidental 
events, and shaped a relationship that might have made it a lot easier for 
Slinde to get the attention of Tine’s management at a later stage, when it was 
time to sell the idea to an industrial actor. The relationship started with an 
incidental meeting, and was developed in a common research project with 
public funding. 
 
Slinde’s ‘fish salami’ recipe was from the start based on a mix of red and 
white fish. During this early period, the participants focused mainly on 
technical problems related to texture (stabilising fluid fish fats), durability 
(stabilising fish fats from oxidation/getting harsh) and colour (white/red 
combinations often becoming to colourless/grey). They also worked on other 
problems related to the microbiological quality of available raw materials. In 
particular, fish coming from the catch side, or white fish such as cod and 
saithe, did not have the standards perceived necessary to make the 
technology work. This was explained by the participants as resulting from 
different practices and regulations regarding hygiene and nutritional 
standards between the fish and the dairy industries, and they found it hard to 
change the suppliers’ practices according to their demands. This was a 
dilemma for the innovators: Change the practice of fishermen and fisheries 
to fit their need for ‘high-quality’-raw materials of white fish, or face the 
technical and economic challenge of using only salmon in the recipe. With 
the emergence of salmon farming, it had become considerably easier to 
control such aspects, but it was at the time considered to be too 
technologically difficult and too expensive to develop a pure salmon 
product. This image of the innovation as based on a mix of red and white 
fish became also anchored to, and later reinforced by, corporate management 
at Tine.  
 
Collaboration in the laboratory 
The fatty acids in the fish sausage would not stabilise thoroughly, as fish fats 
are more liquid and oxidises (get harsh) faster than fatty acids in meat. 
Hence, Slinde needed something that could deal with the texture of the 
product. His quantitative analysis indicated that adding some kind of protein 
could possibly help stabilise the product. This did not have to be from milk, 
though he had met a dairy researcher that day at the lab, and, further, the 
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feeling of contributing to Norwegian industry was appealing to him. While 
eating lunch in the cantina, during a day he was working in the laboratory at 
the Food Research Institute, Slinde came to talk with Berit Nordvi, a 
researcher from Tine R&D:  
 
We found that the most important variable was the content of proteins. 
And then we made such a mix and added milk proteins, because Berit 
Nordvi was working on milk proteins, among other things, from whey. 
When we needed a source for proteins, I, being somewhat idealistic, 
thought that if we can use a Norwegian source of proteins it would be 
better than soy from the US, so I thought, ok, milk proteins are ok, let’s 
test it. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Nordvi told Slinde about her project on exploring various applications of 
whey proteins and other milk proteins. According to an industrial logic of 
‘product optimisation’, the firm is impelled to exploit as much of their raw 
materials as possible for economic gains, in this case study, a large surplus 
of whey, a by-product from cheese production. At any rate, Slinde and 
Nordvi started talking about their projects, and Slinde asked if Nordvi could 
supply him with some proteins, an invitation to test out milk proteins as a 
stabiliser of the fish sausage:  
 
It was a coincidence, my job had been to lead the research activities on 
whey proteins at Tine during that phase, and the whole project actually 
started in the canteen at Matforsk. It was incidental, because the first 
experiments he had done on the fermented sausage, they had reviewed 
the results in a project meeting, and it was not as good as they hoped. 
And I sat beside them, and Erik just went like, ‘yes, here is a person 
with some proteins that could help us’, he approached me, and like, said 
something about whey proteins and stuff, and then he contacted me 
relatively quickly afterwards. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
Tine R&D joined Slinde’s project without any rights to the invention, as 
their interest in participating in the project was partly about the prospect of 
selling whey proteins if Slinde succeeded, and partly about learning more 
about the use of this dairy ingredient. Slinde, as a result, got access not just 
to proteins, but to both material and knowledge resources on a wide range of 
aspects of food production. It was partly accidental that Nordvi was present 
at Matforsk that day, and her project fit nicely with Slinde’s present needs 
for a protein supplier. Professor Slinde further emphasised his view on the 
future development of the Norwegian food industry: “I knew at the time that 
Tine was on its way into fish, and Norwegian agriculture. In 10-20 years 
time, a large part of Norwegian food industry will be using fish as raw 
material”. This was one of several starting points for what came to be a 
much larger program at Tine than they knew at the time, a scientific and 
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economic exploration of a number of issues that they hoped would 
eventually lead to commercially beneficial knowledge, technology and 
products. Still some time would pass on this particular project before Tine 
started thinking about buying the patent application and starting a product 
development project. During this first phase, the most pressing issue was 
understood to be to stabilising the rather fluid fatty acids in fish, a rather 
unexplored issue within food science: 
 
The fat slipped out. One couldn’t stabilise the fat, and so his focus was 
that they needed to add more proteins. We then did some experiments 
together, and I was surprised when the taste of the product became that 
good. And later I was very surprised that its taste kept so well over time, 
from my viewpoint having worked with oxidation of fish oils and things 
like that, this was not possible. And then, suddenly, I was caught by the 
project, it was terribly interesting. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
The effects of interaction between fish fat and milk proteins surprised 
Nordvi, and triggered interest, as she was immediately “caught by the 
project”. From here, there was a short way from the triggered curiosity to 
organising a common project. Thus, after having found this interesting 
epistemic object, how did the researchers mobilise the considerable 
resources necessary to work with it? It seems that a combination of good 
relations with the Research Council and effective argumentation towards 
Tine management did the job. 
 
Funding the Neptun project 
Despite being driven by a fascination and passion for the unknown, 
industrial research is often a practical, almost mundane set of practices, with 
projects often growing out of concrete problems or challenges. Researchers 
seeing opportunities in expressed problems related to the organisation of its 
resources, production and marketing. At Tine, surplus of whey had, as 
mentioned previously, been considered to be a problem for quite a while, in 
not finding products that could, either for reasons of production or those of 
markets, utilise more than only a small amount of this byproduct of cheese 
production, except as animal feed: 
 
Whey is a byproduct from production of white cheeses. In 1999, almost 
80% of the whey volume of a total of 840 million litres was used as 
animal feed. This has not been a very economic utilisation of valuable 
components of the raw milk material. TINE has therefore during the last 
decade prioritised building core competence on whey, through research 
activities on the development of tailored whey protein concentrates for 
use in the food industry. It is highly important for TINE Norwegian 
Dairies to maintain research activities on whey protein concentrates in 
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areas with potential for significant volumes. TINE has a strong belief 
that R&D activities on fish are on the right areas. (Attachment no.3 in 
the RCN application for the Neptun project, March 2001) 
 
In January 2001, Nordvi and Tine, in collaboration with Slinde and 
Matforsk, agreed to apply for funding from the Research Council of Norway 
(RCN) for three research projects on protein applications. Dialogue with 
actors in the RCN helped them to write the applications in line with strategic 
priorities for research funding. Since one of them was accepted by RCN, 
what came to be known as the Neptun project was established. Getting 
approval for a research project like this was a matter of satisfying several 
stakeholders. After having received support from the Tine R&D 
management, via argumentation for learning about the application of whey 
proteins, the next gatekeepers were corporate management at Tine and the 
Research Council, both of which had somewhat diverging interests, hence 
making this an exercise in political sensitivity when formulating the project 
proposal: 
 
At the time, Tine was in a very early phase on their fish strategies, and 
so they were not implemented within any plans yet. We sent the 
application, and it was framed in a rather unusual way, in dialogue with 
the Research Council, we had a meeting with them on the matter. 
Because it was out of the question for Tine to front fish in that period 
and so we quite simply fronted the ingredients side.  (Berit Nordvi, Tine 
R&D) 
 
From the point of view of Tine’s corporate management, the timing was not 
right to become an industrial representative for the public ‘blue-green’ 
innovation program. Their biomarine innovation strategy was not yet ready, 
and also awaited approval in the board of directors. Nevertheless, in having 
developed some kind of basic competence on protein applications both on 
products from meat and fish in earlier projects, the concept of fermenting 
fish revealed new and unexpected functions of milk proteins which opened 
up for a new angle of research. In the project description of Neptun, this was 
connected to an even longer tradition forming the background for curing and 
fermenting salmon: 
 
In Norway today, we produce smoked and graved49 salmon. Smoked 
salmon has a relatively high content of water, while gravlax is 
                                                     
49 ‘Gravlax’: During the Middle Ages, gravlax was made by fishermen by salting the 
salmon and lightly fermenting it by burying it in the sand above the high-tide line. 
The word gravlax comes from the Scandinavian words grav, which means literally 
"grave" or "hole in the ground" (in Swedish, Norwegian and Danish), and lax (or 
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characterised by a strong fermented flavour. (Project description, 
‘Salmoni’, March 2001) 
 
For a company having a strong identity in traditional rural culture, and for a 
domestic research council with responsibilities for stimulating national and 
regional industry, associations to tradition and popular products in the 
Norwegian cuisine might have contributed to making this project relevant. 
Following are some further descriptions about the technology of using 
bacteria cultures for fermentation: 
 
Lactic acid bacteria have been used for centuries for production of 
nutritients. About a fourth of our food consumption comes from such 
food products, and there exists several thousand recipes on vegetable, 
animal and seafood products that are fermented (Campbell-Platt 1987). 
These nutritients have extended durability, new aromatic and textural 
characteristics in comparison with the raw materials of their origin. 
Often, taste and nutritional value are improved. (Project description, 
‘Salmoni’, March 2001) 
 
Here, we see more strongly how the project group seems to have tried to 
give value to their research object by associating it with history and tradition, 
and also technical ‘quality’ features like durability, taste, texture and 
nutritional value. Moreover, ‘Neptun’ was no doubt a word having marine 
connotations, associating the project with the initial spark from Slinde and 
his sausage. Still, Nordvi explained the title and the project intentions in 
somewhat ambiguous terms: 
 
This is really not a project just about marine applications of milk 
proteins; rather, it is a project of the general applicability of milk 
proteins, of whey in particular. But since aquaculture was a hot topic for 
research funding at the time, we designed the project application with 
that in mind. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
The important aspect of the project from Tine R&D’s point of view could 
not have been fish at the time, nor was fish Nordvi’s personal and 
professional interest. It was the opportunity to exploit whey in new 
applications, hence both producing an interesting research problem, and 
making business out of an existing and problematic by-product, an attempt at 
reframing whey from waste to valuable resource. The connection to fish, was 
                                                                                                                            
laks), which means "salmon", thus gravlax is "salmon dug into the ground". Today 
fermentation is no longer used in the production process. Instead, the salmon is 
"buried" in a dry marinade of salt, sugar, and dill, and cured for a few days. (Source: 
Wikipedia, retrieved 28 July 2007 13:56 UTC) 
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here argued to be a pragmatic matter, of positioning the project where 
funding was available. At the same time, Slinde’s fish salami played an 
important role both in initiating the Neptun project in the first place, and in 
serving as an example within the project application of the implications of 
the study. These efforts at strategic navigation indicated tensions and a need 
for political caution, and care in avoiding politicising the project. From the 
project application to the RCN, the fermented fish nevertheless received a 
privileged position as part of both the main and subsidiary objectives of the 
project: 
 
Main objectives of the project: 
Produce at least one tailored whey protein concentrate (WPC) in pilot 
scale that is characterised as very well suited for use in fermented and 
dried seafood products. 
 
Subsidiary goals: 
1. Produce and characterise tailored whey protein variants (around 15-
20 in small scale, and at least 3 in pilot scale) that are assumed to 
be well suited for use in seafood products, and which have a low 
pH and water activity. 
2. Acquire a quantitative and reproducible method for evaluating 
different WPC variants in a dried, smoked and fermented seafood 
product model. 
3. Test new tailored whey protein concentrates (alone and in 
combination with other milk based ingredients) in this fermented 
seafood product model. 
4. Ensure the completion of a PhD within the area ‘characterisation of 
whey proteins’ properties related to emulsion and binding of 
unsaturated fatty acids from fish in concentrates and in fermented 
seafood products. 
 
(The RCN application for the Neptun project, March 2001) 
 
Thus, in practice, this project was designed as experimentation with, testing 
and designing – specifically – protein concentrates suited for the fish salami. 
Yet, the research problems to be dealt with were framed in more general 
terms, specifying the micro-biological research questions rather than their 
possible practical applications, though with a strong association to fish: 
 
To hinder unsaturated fatty acids from fish flowing out of these 
fermented seafood products, it is necessary to add proteins. In terms of 
research, this implies that it is important to understand what 
mechanisms are important for binding the unsaturated fat in fish 
products, i.e. if this mainly happen by emulsion, gelling or by less 
specific hydrophobic bindings. (The RCN application for the Neptun 
project, March 2001) 
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Here is the focal problem of making Slinde’s fish salami technology work, 
illustrating the ‘importance’ of this research. Finding new mechanisms for 
binding fat from fish, and thus learning how to strengthen and control them 
was the task at hand, as formulated in scientific terms. Further, this was 
innovative, indeed, the problems of fluid and oxidising fatty acids in oily 
fish, related to fermentation, was an unresolved – and probably rather 
unexplored – issue at the time. Thus, while Tine had a great deal of 
knowledge about their milk proteins, or how to make concentrates of them, 
for use in milk-, meat- and fish-based applications, the challenge of 
mastering these difficult problems – of controlling and curing fresh and oily 
fish – was new and exciting, and opened up for new ideas of industrial food 
production. In this scientific setup, an initial model on which to test and 
measure the research results was made, a ‘quantitative seafood model’, that 
would make statistical analysis possible. Later in the project, another model 
was made, a physical prototype. Unsurprisingly, it was not made from 
scratch; it was a standardised prototype of the fish salami – a conceptually 
and materially ‘locked’ version.  
 
With funding from RCN, the project gained some size in terms of the 
potential actors involved. Some of the monetary support was intended for a 
PhD stipend, and after thinking it over, Nordvi decided to take the 
opportunity herself: 
 
A PhD project was included as part of the project, that I was captured 
by after a while, though it was actually not the intention. We wanted to 
do specific things with whey proteins, and I had responsibility for that 
part, so, in my view this was just a way of funding more activities on 
whey proteins. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
As part of the early documentation, a market report on fermented sausages 
was written, seeking to back up the claim in the project proposal for the 
commercial potential of a project on whey proteins: 
 
Total turnover for fermented sausage in Norway is equal to about 1.83 
billion NOK a year.  
1% of total turnover:  18 million NOK a year 
5% of total turnover:   91.5 million NOK a year 
10% of total turnover:  183 million NOK a year 
 
Total sales value of fermented sausages in Europe is equal to around 
194 billion NOK a year. 
1% of total turnover:  1.9 billion NOK a year 
5% of total turnover:  9.7 billion NOK a year 




(Market estimate for the Neptun project, on fermented sausages, 2001, 
Tine R&D) 
 
This has to be called a very early evaluation of market potential. Notice how 
the argumentation, built for a project investigating “the applicability of milk 
proteins”, pointed towards the effort of commercialising the sausage (which 
was still Slinde’s property, not Tine’s), and not the proteins per se. Further, 
the market was described in terms of ‘total turnover’, not of cured fish 
products, but of salami – fermented meat; hence the outlined market 
potential became enormous, and if anyone in addition had ambitions to take 
on/purchase considerable shares (1, 5 or 10%) of this, then this would of 
course become hugely profitable. This is very similar to a large number of 
‘market reports’ in most business organisations, almost like a ritual. What is 
their function? What do such ‘market reports’ with estimated ‘market shares’ 
do, when the product is not finished, and its use and its end-users are not, 
and cannot be, known? Are they necessary to produce convincing 
argumentation? Or is it just an obligatory and meaningless part of the 
business plan-ritual? And would anyone believe such a story? Later, several 
times during the start-up of the UNK project (after buying the patent 
application from Slinde), when Salma went on its first marketing tour, 
leading figures in both the project, and corporate management at Tine, told 
the story of making the fish salami “the next Jarlsberg”, i.e. a big 
international success: 
 
Tine finds participating in the further development of the Norwegian 
food industry to be an important role, especially in the areas where 
Norway has a natural advantage and with products that may be of 
commercial significance for our milk based ingredients. (Attachment to 
the RCN application for the Neptun project, 2001) 
 
The research was in this way connected to the Norwegian food industry 
more generally, and to Tine as an actor with certain responsibilities in 
developing this industry. In one and the same paragraph, ideas about sectoral 
unity, food markets, Norwegian industrial identity and Tine’s future income 
are reinforced in relation to each other. Note also that when “commercial 
significance” is used in this setting, it has to be viewed in relation to Tine’s 
total turnover of more than 11 billion NOK (2001), thus strengthening the 
impression of high ambitions in the project. 
 
The aim of building up competence on protein applications was present in 
the project throughout this phase. In practice, as a genuine interest of the 
involved project participants, and in discourse, perhaps, as a back-up in case 
the commercialisation of fish (the fish salami) did not work out. By breaking 
down the composition of the object to a micro-biological level, not as a chef 
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with ingredients of essentially natural origins, but as a biologist, they 
performed the role of the scientist who, with microscopic precision, 
separates and recombines material components to arrive at new properties: 
 
The properties of a fermented salmon product are the result of proteins, 
fat and water. In addition, antioxidants need to be added to avoid 
oxidation of the fatty acids. When salmon is used as raw material, the 
colour in the final product is a result of the amount of astaxanthin in the 
fish. The growth of bacteria is steered by the amount of added sugar. 
(Attachment to the RCN application for the Neptun project, 2001) 
 
In this résumé of the process and recipe of the fermented sausage, the 
proteins were claimed to be the intermediary between fish and meat, 
between fermented fish sausage and salami from meat: 
 
With today’s knowledge, it is possible to develop new fermented 
seafood products with satisfying taste and texture that may be optimised 
to the market demands that exist (Slinde et al. 2001). These will be 
seafood products that may become a real alternative to fermented 
sausages of meat. One has succeeded with this by, among other things, 
adding whey proteins and other milk protein fractions. (Attachment to 
the RCN application for the Neptun project, 2001) 
 
Thus, it was argued that it was possible to make fish a ‘real alternative’ to 
meat, a science based simulation. Yet something was missing:  
 
However, experience from developing this patent has shown that there 
is need for more basic knowledge of how proteins bind the fluid 
unsaturated fatty acids from fish at low temperatures and low pH. 
(Attachment to the RCN application for the Neptun project, 2001) 
 
The relation between proteins and fat needed to be developed, as the 
potential effect of combining them was not yet fully exploited, nor fully 
known. Hence, Tine’s research capacity and competence was needed, and 
not only on proteins: 
 
Tine Norwegian Dairies have their core competence within the 
production of fermented dairy products. With today’s increasing 
knowledge of the positive effects of lactic acid bacteria and pro-biotic 
bacteria (Marshand J & Vandenplas Y, 2000), it is not unexpected that 
fermentation of fish is considered to be a strategic business area. 
(Attachment to the RCN application for the Neptun project, 2001) 
 
Bacteria cultures were also an area where Tine R&D could contribute with 
their experience and expertise. Proteins and fat stabilisation were given a 
more central position in the application than the ‘core technology’ of fish 
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salami; fermentation. Thus, though almost absent from the formal research 
agenda of the project, fermentation was here mentioned only briefly, in order 
to strengthen the argument for Tine’s involvement in this biomarine project, 
drawing connections between generic (representations of) biotechnical 
knowledge and specific research problems in a totally new area for the 
organisation. Thus, we see how the project team made connections between 
the tiny micro-biological components of scientists’ materials, an innovative 
seafood product, Tine’s core competence and conceptions of potential 
markets. Let us now move a little closer to their practice of biotechnical 
science. 
 
Testing different types of fish, colour variants and ways to stabilise fat 
The focal problem in research practice during this phase was how to make a 
tailored protein concentrate for fat stabilisation: 
 
After this initial work, we chose to use a standardised and dried seafood 
product model in our further testing. This so-called ‘Neptun-model’ is 
based on a combination of salmon and saithe, and can be viewed as the 
prototype 1 of a specific fish product. To build knowledge on how 
different protein-containing ingredients influence different texture 
properties and fat binding in this product, a wide selection of 
commercial protein-based ingredients was first tested. Afterwards, eight 
different tailored whey protein variants were tested in the model. (Final 
report on the Neptun project, 2005) 
 
The quantitative model (here, referred to as model 1), mentioned above, had 
subsequently become a material prototype (referred to as model 2). In order 
to run practical experiments with various proteins and ingredients, and then 
measure and evaluate the results, it was necessary from a scientific point of 
view to decide on a specific version of the fish salami recipe. This was an act 
of ‘locking the object’, or temporarily stabilising it. In this way, models 1 
(theoretical/statistical) and 2 (physical prototype) could be maintained in a 
relatively stable relation, representing both each other, and the idea of a ‘fish 
salami’. The results of experimenting with the physical prototype (via a 
controlled variation of certain ingredients) could be fed into the quantitative 
model to produce scientific knowledge on the effects of different proteins on 
fermented fish. Thereafter, one could decide on the most suitable version, 
and then jump back to the prototype using the better technology. The 
original idea, maintained in the patent application, the Research Council of 
Norway project application and in ‘prototype 1’, was to combine white (e.g. 




The variation in fat content was too great, therefore we had to balance 
[the salmon] with a white fish species, and the most accessible white 
fish in Norway is saithe. And in addition it is extremely cheap. (Erik 
Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
In the Neptun project, a large number of different recipes were tested. Cod, 
saithe, various Asian species, haddock, mackerel and other white fish species 
were blended with salmon in varying degrees, along with a few attempts at a 
pure salmon product. Several of the white and red fish blends produced good 
results, both on taste and texture, and they found it easier to control the 
stabilisation of fat in such blends than in pure salmon variants, which tended 
to have considerable problems of fat flowing out in spite of the added 
proteins. In addition, some white fish species, like saithe, were a lot cheaper 
as raw material. A mix of red and white fish was thus regarded as being both 
technologically and economically ideal. On the other hand, the mixed 
recipes brought about some problems. First, the colour was not considered 
delicate enough; it lost intensity from the inclusion of white fish, and saithe 
in particular made the product almost grey. This problem was sought to be 
solved by adding artificial colours. A few alternatives of colour were tested, 
which again represented new challenges in food production, including food 
regulations allowing some ingredients and restricting others. In addition, 
there were challenges of image, e.g. added ingredients made the product 
seem less ‘pure’ and ‘natural’. After a while, the adding of colour was 
dropped completely. Here, salmon provided the ‘model colour’50  for the 
other recipes, a delicate and clear red/pink, both signalling its salmon content 
and its salami identity. Second, it turned out to be difficult to get deliveries 
of white fish that were treated with the necessary hygienic standards, i.e., 
with a low enough content of bacteria. This was regarded by some as a 
problem that was almost impossible to overcome, due to the general 
standards of the fish industry, and especially on the catch side. Yet, by 
others, it was regarded as something that could be overcome through 
working with suppliers, in a combination of making clear demands and 
teaching, based on the Dairy’s own expertise on the issue. According to 
Slinde, fishermen are “trampling on the fish”51: 
 
                                                     
50 However, even the colour of salmon as raw material varies, and is within salmon 
farming a matter of scientific and practical experimentation related to content of 
astaxanthin in the fish feed.  
51 Slinde commented in the newspapers about the hygiene conditions in the fishing 
industry a few years ago, accusing them of bad hygiene (Aftenposten, 2002-02-10; 
Fiskaren, 2004-02-11). Although claiming to argue from his own observations and 
research, the industry and his employer (The Norwegian Marine Research Institute) 
were annoyed about the statement, and defended practices that had long historical 
roots and that were accepted by regulation authorities. 
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And then there is the problem, and this is why I was so cross with 
Norwegian fish industry too, that when we bought so-called saithe, it 
always had a bacteriological quality that was unacceptable. (Erik Slinde, 
Institute for Marine Research) 
 
In commenting on the techno-scientific competence of Tine, professor 
Slinde argued, based on his experience with research and evaluation/control 
tasks in the fish industry, that it wise for the dairy cooperative to opt for 
biomarine activities: 
 
It is appropriate for Tine to go for fish, because of their competence, 
they have special competence on fragile foods, and we want to sell sushi 
and sashimi, which are to have less than 10,000, preferably 100,000 
bacteria per gram. The Norwegian regulations on nutrition accept 
1,000,000 bacteria per gram in fish. We don’t accept more than 100,000 
in poultry and other food products, but in fish we have an extra high 
limit, because it is so damned poor. I usually say that ‘you should 
normally not tread where you keep food’, but if you look at a trawler 
deck and look at the guys walking around there, because a trawler deck 
is not disinfected, right, so when the boys just went to the loo, and then 
went out again. A fish that fell on the floor is actually spoiled. And if a 
piece of meat fell on the floor in a meat facility, it would not get back 
on the table, but in the fish industry this could happen. (Erik Slinde, 
Institute for Marine Research) 
 
This diverging practice between fish and agricultural industry was seen as a 
source of problems by the innovators at different moments throughout the 
process.  For several reasons, this problem – or controversy between fishery 
and agricultural practices – of microbiological quality would not be solved 
before much later in the life of the fish salami. Nonetheless, the Neptun 
project went on, and gradually, Slinde and the Neptun team started thinking 
about the commercialisation of this new technology. A patent application 
had been filed by Slinde, and gradually he started working towards selling 
the idea to an industrial actor. 
 
4.3 Umi No Kami: From science to product development 
It is one thing to collaborate on researching a technological problem; another 
is to buy the entire idea, taking all the responsibility and risk for 
industrialising and commercialising the new technology. In this section, I 
will describe how Tine came to buy the idea of fermented fish from Slinde 
and the subsequent process. After buying the patent application on the fish 
salami from Slinde and ForInnova (University of Bergen’s technology 
transfer office/TTO), Tine set up a new R&D project, in addition to Neptun, 
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on the fermentation/protein technology. This time a product development 
project, Umi No Kami (‘the god of the sea’ in Japanese) aiming at 
developing recipes and a commercial concept for the innovation. Below, I 
describe some of the work on technological challenges, how the project 
group sought to market information about such a product, and their efforts at 
conceptualising it, through testing bacteria cultures, proteins, additional 
flavours and colour. Asking experts (marketers, chefs, etc) and consumers in 
different geographical areas about a product that was not finished and no one 
had heard of before. In this phase, they worked almost exclusively with 
mixed recipes (red and white fish). In addition to the directions of the initial 
idea and the patent, this was also a management-imposed boundary that 
hindered the exploration of other directions. In spite of aiming for 
commercialisation, the multiplicity of choice in this research-based setting 
did not seem to narrow, instead the objects under investigation seemed to 
have steadily expanded during this period. The Umi No Kami project went 
on for more than two years from its start in 2002, and it seemed that the 
number of possible routes, providing different sets of opportunities and 
problems, continually increased. Lab work was able to explore and develop 
the object into a product that was stable in production in a number of various 
ways, but less able to choose among alternatives. 
 
Filing and marketing a patent application 
After having proved to himself that the technology would be feasible, Slinde 
filed a patent application. His aim was to sell the idea to a large industrial 
food producer, which in his view the most realistic way for such a product to 
make it into business. At Tine, they did not necessarily think of this as a 
product for them at the time, this was more a way of developing business 
from selling whey as an ingredient to other industrial actors, in addition to 
expanding their knowledge on their own technologies and surplus 
ingredients. Along with a technology transfer office, ForInnova, Slinde 
started presenting his invention at national and international food fairs. It 
should be noted however, that neither the shape, taste, nor the concept of this 
object were very developed at the time. Thus, they presented a set of 
different versions, or combinations of fish types resulting in different colours 
and tastes. No naming, packaging, segmentation, categorisation or other 
market/user oriented exercises had been done. Hence, the presented object 
was in reality an emerging technology with a few potential product versions. 
After the previously mentioned responses at the Aquanor fair, the effort in 
selling the idea to an industrial actor increased. Presentations and offers were 
made to various international actors, and to Tine. Slinde and ForInnova 




And then I had another problem, as ForInnova wanted money, they 
wanted economic profits, this was important to them, while I was 
interested in making this a Norwegian product. (Erik Slinde, Institute 
for Marine Research) 
 
Was the aim to get as high of price as possible for the product, or did it 
matter to whom it was sold? One of the first things Slinde did was to present 
the patent to Gilde, the major Norwegian producer of meat – both cured and 
fresh – and perhaps the Norwegian agro-food actor that would have the best 
qualifications for industrialising and commercialising the product. Yet they 
were clear on their refusal of the offer, they were not interested. Tine was 
then left as one of very few capable actors in the country to both develop the 
product further (R&D) and to commercialise a product falling between 
established product categories and marketing channels. Due to the ongoing 
collaboration on the Neptun project, a reason for contacting the corporate 
management at Tine was already in place, and a first meeting was arranged: 
 
The people at ForInnova, who were responsible for selling the patent, 
were rather persistent too. Then, first Ove52 and I and Per Magnus53 and 
a secretary had a meeting about it, and after a while they were invited to 
ForInnova. I participated in that meeting, where their idea was sold in. 
(Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
In the beginning, even though they were somewhat interested, Tine did not 
make any decisions. Slinde’s other option was to sell the patent 
internationally, for instance to a Japanese actor visiting Bergen at the time. 
He expressed interest, and considered the price, a price significantly higher 
than what TINE had been offered, to be rather low: 
 
Anyway, it so happened that a Japanese man came, and he wanted to 
take the product back to Japan, sell it and make some profits. Then he 
asked what we wanted for it, and we answered ‘20 million Norwegian 
kroner’, and then he responded, ‘ah, very cheap!’ Right, it was no 
problem for him to get returns on this investment. (Erik Slinde, Institute 
for Marine Research) 
 
In being experienced with fish products, the Japanese man took away both 
the bread and the salad that accompanied the fish salami, when tasting the 
product: 
 
And he, right, we always served the sausage with bread and some salad, 
because it is a problem, that all food made from fish will become harsh. 
                                                     
52 Ove Johansen, head of product development at Tine R&D. 
53 Per Magnus Mæhle, corporate director, strategy and business development. 
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And preferably there should be cucumber, to take away, you don’t taste 
the harshness. That’s why you always get cucumber with mackerel. 
There is some aldehyde in it. Right, and then he picked up the piece of 
fish, and he ate only the sausage, of course, he was Japanese. (Erik 
Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
In hinting at the knowledge about fish embedded in the Japanese culture, 
Slinde demonstrated the potential of the product, was able to create interest 
in spite of being at a premature stage of development. With the man still 
interested in the patent, after tasting a fermented, and slightly oxidised, piece 
of fish, Slinde went back to Tine for another try to convince them about 
investing in the project. 
 
I said to them ‘please, can you please buy this product, so that it stays in 
Norway? I think this is important’, I said. ‘And unfortunately, you have 
to face that the guys selling it, they understand now that it is worth 
more’, since they have gotten signals that the Japanese want it’. And 
then Tine decided, and an agreement was made, and finally signed. 
(Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Thus, the foreign potential buyer proved to be an efficient argument for 
getting Tine to take action, and within a few days after being confronted 
with this competitor, Tine had decided to buy the technology. Yet if he could 
get several times more money for the patent application from the Japanese 
actor, then why did he sell it to Tine? Slinde had done business from his own 
research in various ventures several times before, and had some experience 
with the business aspect. He gave two different explanations for selling it to 
Tine. First, he considered the offer from Tine to be a safer bet: “Values are 
only values when they have reached my bank account” he said; thus, in his 
view it was better to accept a secure and quick offer, than engage in long 
negotiations with an experienced international actor, and take the risk of 
ending up with no deal: 
 
Yes, well, not just twice as much, but I understood then that we possibly 
could get five times the price from Japan. I have worked with those 
huge ‘golden bird’ projects and I never run after them anymore. I am 
not interested in them. I am not particularly intelligent, and I am not 
particularly hard-working or clever, so if I find a small bird with a 
broken wing in a corner, I know that I may be able to catch it. And this 
is the issue, Japan was an opportunity, but Tine was a reality. (Erik 
Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Second, as mentioned above, he expressed a wish to contribute to Norwegian 
food industry, as “fish is what we are supposed to live on in the future”. 
Obviously, he wanted to give the product the best possible conditions for 
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development and commercialisation, hence preferring to deal with the most 
capable actors:  
 
Some in the fish sector are furious because this was sold to Tine. It 
should have been the fish industry. The problem is that there is no one 
in the fish industry that is capable of producing sausages. Not even fish 
sausages. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
In Slinde’s view, those who were most capable of industrialising seafood 
were not found in the fish industry. Agriculture was seen as superior to 
aquaculture, both in scientific, industrial and marketing knowledge. When 
Tine finally bought the patent, they too were concerned with the knowledge 
aspect: 
 
Anyway, it happened that Tine bought the patent, and they were really 
eager to get a confidentiality agreement with me, for a certain cost, and 
I approved it, so that I then was to work further with it. (Erik Slinde, 
Institute for Marine Research) 
 
In order to ensure that not only the piece of paper resembling a patent 
application, but also the practices, ideas and experiences of which the fish 
salami was part, i.e., its history, were represented in the project’s further 
process, they hired Slinde as a part time consultant. Still, despite this 
intention, his availability as a resource for the project organisation remained 
untapped for large parts of the project. Only in relation to the already 
established collaboration with Nordvi and her whey protein research was 
Slinde included and used.  
 
The decision to buy the patent application at Tine was strongly related to the 
selection of the biomarine sector as a new strategic business area at Tine. 
Corporate management at Tine became convinced of the image of a fish 
salami, a ‘meat product’ based on fish. It fitted nicely into their ongoing 
revision of strategy, in which, as mentioned in chapter 3, a new ‘blue-green’ 
business development area was under articulation. Further, even if the fish 
salami idea had eager representatives at Tine R&D, it seems unlikely that 
corporate management at Tine would have supported the internalisation of 
this into a product development project without its articulation of an 
ambitious biomarine innovation strategy: A strategy between the company’s 
development of new business areas in the face of increasing competition and 
its consciousness of ‘responsibility’ in the development of Norwegian food 
politics. Corporate director Mæhle, central both developing the biomarine 
strategy and in establishing the Umi No Kami project, emphasised Tine’s 
relation to the department of agriculture: 
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Even if Tine has an important role within the agricultural food industry, 
as an extension of the state’s agriculture politics, it still is very 
important in relation to the future legitimacy of Tine exactly that we go 
this broad, for example doing things in the biomarine area. (Per Magnus 
Mæhle, Tine) 
 
The fact that a business cooperative would have a designated role to play in 
present-day national politics, performing certain tasks54 in the dairy and milk 
farming sector on behalf of the state, is perhaps counter-intuitive in most 
western economies, but here we see how a corporate director expressed 
concerns about Tine’s future legitimacy (maintaining their position), and 
how crossing the boundary between the blue and the green domains possibly 
could benefit their future relations to the state. Despite occasionally referring 
to the blue-green discourse, I still had the impression from management at 
Tine, that the main reasons for choosing the blue-green path were their own 
analyses and strategic considerations of business. However, Jan Ove 
Tryggestad (board member representing the farmer-owners) could balance 
this picture, arguing that the “public discourse on blue-green innovation is 
the strongest driver for these activities”, and that Tine had received “praise 
from government ministers” for this. He further emphasised how the quest 
for political legitimacy and goodwill, together with the allocation of research 
funding (Research Council of Norway), and the development of aquaculture 
– i.e. fish farming, had provided incentives for going into biomarine 
activities, thus strengthening a long-term commitment to blue-green 
industrialisation. 
 
After negotiating and making a deal on Slinde’s patent application, Tine’s 
management dropped the patent application back down the hierarchy to the 
R&D department, where Slinde had already been collaborating with 
researchers on this idea for a while. The project carried a promise of a 
profitable utilisation of Tine’s surplus of whey: “R&D had seen that it could 
be very interesting to go into this technology because it was a whey 
application, and we have some challenges in finding interesting whey 
applications” (Bente Mogård, Tine Ingredients).  Yet what else was in the 
patent application? According to Slinde, only imagination set the limits: 
 
And I realised that the technology that Tine received, fermentation 
technology on fish, which in practice means that if they want to develop 
this area, it is almost like making cheese of milk. And when you know 
how many cheeses there are, you can imagine how many products you 
can make of fish. Tine received a big gift in their hands, in my opinion, 
that they paid a low price for. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine 
Research) 
                                                     
54 See chapter 3.3 for more on Tine’s political role. 
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In other words, he argued that Tine attained knowledge of a generic 
technology, with the potential for a wide variety of product variants, or 
competence in a whole new way of making food products from fish. Still 
there are many ways of framing the question, including what was in the 
patent, what Tine actually bought from Slinde and ForInnova, depending on 
who you ask, and, not unimportantly, when. The viable path, according to 
Slinde, for commercialising such a product would be to go international, as 
the Norwegian market would be too small. Few customers would be willing 
to test out a strange new food item of fish: 
 
To put it another way, I think that to patent in Norway is of little 
interest. Four million lunatics, that’s not a market, and certainly not for 
food products. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Normally he would have used a patent office in London, but out of a 
sentiment of idealism in wanting to strengthen the patent competence in 
Bergen, he used a local patent office. The result was ‘not optimal’, but still 
Slinde was ‘satisfied’ with their job. A couple of opposing claims arose, 
which created work in getting the patent application approved: 
 
And so, when Tine had bought the patent, they struggled a bit with it, as 
they received two opposing claims – fantastic! – one from USA, which, 
in my opinion, had nothing to do with the patent at all, and then some 
young people in Ålesund, that claimed that this is their invention. This 
is also something that I have learned, that if you succeed with 
something, there will always be someone arguing that s/he had come up 
with it before. Fair enough, but we can disregard this, it is a digression. 
(Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
However, in the Tine system, these opposing claims became more than just a 
digression, both in terms of challenging their knowledge of patent processes 
and in terms of increased doubt about whether the technology was novel and 
specific enough for approval at all. For some time, they maintained their 
efforts towards getting an approval, and from a status report on the Umi No 
Kami project, we can read the following: 
 
On APP 2.0 [application 2.0]. Norway: Preliminary approval is 
withdrawn due to the received objection. TINE answers by maintaining 
our claims as to its novelty and innovativeness. Internationally (PCT-
application): International Preliminary Examination Authority 
concludes that the level of innovativeness is not accepted on any of the 
aspects, nor on novelty. Still, there is a positive opportunity for approval 
in some countries: EU, Japan, South-Korea, USA and more. (Status 
report, Umi No Kami, 2003) 
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Commenting on the patenting process, with the application still not 
approved, Bente Mogård in the Umi No Kami team described some of the 
problems: 
 
[The salmon salami] was based on that patent application, together with 
the connection to the surplus of whey at Tine. It has been my task to 
manage the patenting process, the application was almost ready, but it 
was not good enough to protect us against objections on novelty, 
innovativeness and industrialisation, thus we have spent a lot of time 
trying to defend ourselves. But at the same time we have changed the 
production process, and it is now less related to the patent, hence not as 
important anymore. (Bente Mogård, Tine Ingredients) 
 
It seems to have been a double process at Tine’s patenting efforts of this 
innovation. On the one side, it was hard to produce argumentation for the 
patent to convince patent authorities of its novelty and innovativeness. On 
the other hand, the Umi No Kami project moved on, changing the 
technology and recipe so that the patent perhaps would not be as relevant 
anymore. Then, some of the participants asked whether the technology was 
too generic in reality to deserve any patent protection at all, hence producing 
more doubt in the organisation. What were the patent application and the 
Umi No Kami project about: A fermented fish sausage with similarities to 
salami; a generic technology having great potential for multiple products; or 
a failing application unworthy to be judged by patent authorities as novel 
and innovative enough? Unsurprisingly the development of different 
understandings of this, contributed to escalate conflict, as Slinde recalled 
from Tine Ingredients’ attempt at renegotiating the contract with ForInnova: 
 
There is a distance, related to understanding. And when Gunnar 
Hovland tells me that he will never do business with ForInnova again, 
well, that matter has two sides. So, the question is, how clever has he 
been? Yes, that is one side, and then the question is, what do they think 
they are buying? And what do they actually buy? And then, I have 
learned this now, every contract containing payments over time where 
people don’t do anything, in other words, when you licence something, 
or royalties, or some kind of success fee, these things almost always end 
up with disputes. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
In addition, the inclusion of a success fee in terms of additional payments 
from Tine to ForInnova for each new market, i.e., geographical region, in 
which the fish salami would be introduced was increasingly felt as a burden 
to the Umi No Kami team, and hence they sought other ways to deal with the 
issue, such as negotiating changes in the contract, documenting how 
different the final product was from the original recipe in the patent 
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application, and so forth. The development of fish salami demanded a lot 
more resources than they first thought: 
 
I thought that we had bought a more finished product than we had. And 
I do think that Tine thought they bought a sausage that was more or less 
ready developed, but then it turns out that it is not finished, and that it 
would take a lot of work. We bought a patent, or, in my way of seeing 
this, is that we bought a, no, I suppose we didn’t buy a sausage, we 
bought a technology, about how to bind fatty acids in fish to enable 
making of sausage. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Despite being less developed, and more generic as a technology, they 
nevertheless kept on developing the innovation and its potential application. 
I will now attempt to give a closer look at the initiation and organising of the 
product development project, Umi No Kami. 
 
Starting the Umi No Kami project 
The patent agreement became the formal starting point for technical 
development, conceptualisation and market research that together were 
supposed to shape what Umi No Kami would become. The act of buying the 
patent represented a shift in focus and organisation of work related to whey 
proteins and product development, by forming this new project aimed 
specifically at the technical and conceptual product development of this ‘sea 
salami’ into a commercial product. While the Neptun project had been 
working on fundamental processing technologies (various applications of 
milk proteins), exploring and improving them  in relation to nutritional 
standards, Umi No Kami was defined as a product development project, 
taking the initial idea, knowledge and technology, into developing recipes, 
marketing concepts and testing and adjusting the technology to make it 
stable and under control: 
 
Neptun has continued as a project, and is almost finished these days, 
and has been purely research related. Umi No Kami was more of a 
combination of research and product development, although with more 
of an early emphasis on research than on product development, both due 
to being in a starting phase, and because of a somewhat different type of 
leadership. And so, my role has been to integrate the research into the 
product, and then take it to an implementation phase. (Lars Petter 
Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
To a large extent, Neptun had for almost a year been preparing the ground 
for Umi No Kami, by exploring and producing knowledge on the basic 
technologies used in the sausage. The connection between these projects was 
maintained during the two first years of Umi No Kami, pooling the resource 
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base for both projects, and supporting each other with technological research 
questions and possible solutions. To some extent it seems that the activities 
of Neptun were turned towards serving Umi No Kami: 
 
There is a close and good collaboration between the research project 
Neptun and UNK. Neptun this spring has been focused on the doctoral 
work, methods development for measuring oxidation in salmon, and 
development of NIR-methods55 for analysis of fat content in salmon. 
(Status report, Umi No Kami, 2003) 
 
The Neptun team, although based within Tine R&D, worked together with 
university researchers as well as people from marketing and consultants with 
expertise on related products, and with suppliers of fish and technical 
equipment56. Umi No Kami, on the other hand, was organised as an internal 
project with few relations to outside actors. In commenting on the early 
motivation for the Umi No Kami project, Nordvi expressed a wish for 
continuing working on the invention, beyond the scope of Neptun: 
 
We started the Neptun project in May 2001, and we did so because I felt 
that there were great opportunities, and I was eager to get Tine to buy 
the patent. Erik Slinde wanted to sell to Tine, he had also tried 
elsewhere. And I wrote a report together with my leader, who was Ove 
Johansen, which I sent to Per Magnus Mæhle57. He had tasted the 
product earlier, when we tried to argue why we should get involved in 
this, and consider buying the patent. So, I tried to give as good of a 
background as I could about the product, and I got some numbers 
saying that the international market on fermented sausage from meat are 
pretty big. Of course, I didn’t argue for a specific sales volume for Tine, 
but I said that if one could get 1%, or 5%, of the sales from meat in 
Europe, then it would make several billion Norwegian Kroner. (Berit 
Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
This indicates that the mobilisation for buying the patent went through 
alliance building with central actors in Tine’s business development 
activities, and through producing arguments according to corporate rituals 
(e.g. market share). The motive for initiating these projects seems 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the reason for doing Neptun, and relating it to 
Slinde’s patent application, was the opportunity to exploit more of Tine’s 
surplus of whey in an industrialised fish product probably produced by 
                                                     
55 Near-infrared scanning 
56 According to Berit Nordvi, around 100 persons from several organisations were 
counted as having made some kind of contribution in the Neptun project when the 
final report on the project was written in 2005. 
57 Corporate director for strategy and business development in Tine (at the time of 
the case study). 
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someone else. In this sense, the project looked similar to other projects 
related to Tine Ingredients’ business area – selling various ingredients from 
milk, and thus often participating in R&D activities to enhance 
understanding of how to use these raw materials in different settings. But on 
the other hand, Nordvi revealed also an early hope for taking over the whole 
thing. Hence, the process of convincing the organisation to get involved with 
the fish sausage, and to buy the patent, began already with the establishment 
of Neptun. In part, they started an intentional process of presenting and 
arguing for this as a golden opportunity. In addition, it seems as if the object 
itself had some kind of ability to gather interest and enthusiasm at Tine on its 
own. As soon as people in both R&D, management and marketing started to 
become familiar with the product, various narratives of commercialisation 
started emerging between the product and its ‘interpreter’, so to speak. Few 
were left ignorant of the fish salami; its strangeness and technological 
wonder ensured curiosity and fascination, as well as scepticism and laughter, 
in the organisation. In summing up the initiation of Umi No Kami, it is 
noteworthy how Neptun was organised as an open and science-based project 
involving a number of different people from different organisations, while 
Umi No Kami, on the other hand, was organised as an internal project at 
Tine. The resources and activities in Neptun seemed to turn towards 
supporting this new product development process, when it became clear that 
Tine would take over the patent application.  
 
Organising the project 
To a larger extent, the Umi No Kami project was based on a cross-
professional task: To develop and stabilise both the technology and a 
marketable product-concept. Whereas Neptun involved mostly researchers 
and technologists, Umi No Kami had to involve scientists, technologists and 
people with expertise on marketing and design. In addition, it was more 
strictly tied in with the corporate innovation strategy, hence also involving 
the management when setting or changing the direction of the project. All 
this made the project more exposed to potential conflicts and tensions. For 
managing the project, Karl Inge Rekdal was appointed. As a result of Tine’s 
recent change into a corporation and the following reorganisation of 
management, Rekdal became redundant in his position as managing director 
of one of the dairy cooperative’s regions, and he was then offered Tine 
Biomarin’s Umi No Kami project instead. Even if it had been a long time 
since he had worked on the shop-floor, his training as sausage maker gave 
him some professional credibility for leading this innovative hybrid 
fish/meat/dairy project. From the start, the project participants were Bente 
Mogård (internationalisation), Hilde Torvanger (market), Berit Nordvi 
(research), Frode Fimreite (market) and Janne Haugdal (product 
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development), in addition to project manager Karl Inge Rekdal. Then a 
number of additional people were associated, e.g., Kjersti Østbø (NTNU, 
packaging), Erik Slinde (inventor and researcher), Elin S. Valle, Line 
Torsvik (Tine R&D) and Lars Edal (Gilde, sausage maker). All in all a group 
with a broad set of competences was represented. However, again the fish 
industry was not represented, except Slinde and Nordvi with their scientific 
approach. The level of competence in the fish industry was not particularly 
highly regarded. Coming from a top management position to a chaotic and 
open-ended innovation project, however, was a mixed experience to Rekdal: 
 
I had been managing director, and suddenly I became responsible for a 
project group. They were motivated and independent, and concerned 
with demonstrating their excellence. Hence, I didn’t have the same kind 
of leader position as in a line organisation. And in the organisation 
outside the project we lacked support. It should probably have been 
organised independently of Tine. (Karl Inge Rekdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Rekdal was thrown into a group in which several participants had been 
working on the invention for a while. He found himself lacking the formal 
authority of a line organisation, and in addition feeling lack of support from 
the rest of the organisation. Communication problems soon appeared in the 
team, as one product developer described: 
 
You really had to be responsible for your part, no one else would take 
care of it, and you had to be demanding, as there were many strong 
people, with Karl Inge and Bente, among others. And you could say that 
we talked on different wave-lengths in this group. I think we talked 
about the same things, but we couldn’t understand each other. The 
problem was really, Karl Inge is a clever man, and probably a good 
leader, but he didn’t fit the role of project manager. He was used to 
having his secretary around, writing all the letters and facilitating 
everything for him, and none of us wanted to be project secretary. And 
we were three stubborn women that not allowed ourselves to be picked 
on. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
The project participants had been recruited to the project on the basis of their 
professional experience and expertise, and were not very keen on taking on 
administrative tasks. Moreover, the project manager was not a representative 
for the project on a superior level within the hierarchy, with Bente Mogård 
instead participating on the Tine Biomarin board and then serving as a 
messenger between the board and project team. The reason for this was 
related to history, with Mogård being an established board member of Tine 
Biomarin and active participant with an internationalisation responsibility in 
the Umi No Kami project, while Rekdal was totally new to the organisation 
of Tine Biomarin. This indicated lack of common understanding, and 
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problems of communication, involving much of the project team in a number 
of issues, especially when technological and marketing decisions were to be 
made. In addition, the grounding of the project within the greater 
organisation of Tine seems to have been weak, not in terms of expectations 
and attention, but rather in terms of top management commitment and 
capacity for following up. The team felt a lack of support: 
 
Business development and fish became just one of many projects. In my 
experience, there was no one in the corporate management who had real 
ownership to the fish ventures, and I think that is a weakness. There has 
to be someone committed to it, carrying it forwards. (Hilde Torvanger, 
Tine R&D/Marketing) 
 
In being the one from corporate management negotiating the patent deal with 
Slinde, and with a great deal of responsibility for the development of 
innovation strategies at Tine, the project team expected more support from 
Mæhle; a person representing the project within the management team and in 
the board, defending it if necessary and securing more resources when 
needed. The project got resources, and they got a long-term perspective, but 
still they felt a bit isolated and left to themselves in the project, except when 
Rekdal or the CEO of Tine, Jan Ove Holmen, performed in media and other 
public venues, bringing with them the Umi No Kami project as their 
ambitious and promising new venture58. After around one and half years, 
Rekdal took on the consequence of these problems, and accepted a CEO 
position in a company in the metal industry. A turbulent phase followed, 
with at least two other persons testing the project manager chair, before Lars 
Petter Swensen was appointed to the job: 
 
I came into the project with the concrete task of developing methods for 
documenting raw material variations in the [fish salami] production. 
And then they needed a new project manager, and I knew the process so 
well, thus I went in as project manager. I had been working on the 
project for almost a year when this happened. (Lars Petter Swensen, 
Tine R&D) 
 
As I will come back to later, at the time Swensen was promoted, strong 
forces had started moving the project in a new direction, and Swensen’s new 
role played a crucial part in the change. It turned out to be more difficult 
                                                     
58 E.g., Rekdal in Aftenposten 8th February 2002 (the fish salami compared with the 
international success of the Jarlsberg cheese), and Holmen in Adresseavisen 16th 
October 2004 (the international potential of the fish salami ‘Salma’ emphasised in 
the presentation of Tine’s new strategy, ‘TINE 2010’). 
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than anticipated for the early team to draw synergies between the existing 
competences in the Tine system and new seafood ventures: 
 
And when we went into fish, we talked very nicely about these 
synergies, right, branding, our competence, our distribution channels, 
and even exports. But what we experienced along the way was that we 
didn’t really manage to utilise, get full synergy out of it, because we 
placed the projects as satellites, outside the system. (Hilde Torvanger, 
Tine R&D/Marketing) 
 
The problem was described as a lack in ability to mobilise internal 
professional groups, whether marketing, management or technology, for 
helping out when needed in the project:  
 
I felt that we perhaps got too little pacing from relevant groups, or, on 
the one hand that we got too little pacing, and on the other that we 
perhaps used the people around us too little, that we could have done 
that much more. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/Marketing) 
 
Or as described by Haugdal as a more general problem at Tine:  
 
It is difficult, you know, at Tine, that when you work on a project, at 
least in such an innovation project, then it is difficult to get other people 
to help you, who have the competence. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D)  
 
This was experienced as a problem, not only between agricultural and 
biomarine activities, but even within the portfolio of fish projects: 
 
We had many different fish projects, and none of them were 
coordinated, we sat separately, and worked as best as we could. And, 
clearly, when I participated in the Umi No Kami project, we quickly 
discovered that we needed more competence on fish, we know too little 
about it, even if we at R&D had some competence. (Hilde Torvanger, 
Tine R&D/Marketing) 
 
Another option was to team up with external actors with knowledge of 
fermentation technology, fish processing and so forth. In lacking a proper 
sausage maker, the product developers wanted to hire someone external, but 
the answer was negative: 
 
And, in fact, we lacked the sausage maker competence that I mentioned 
earlier. When they spend so much money on other things, they should 
have hired a sausage maker too, but I got the clear message that I 
exaggerated the value of that professional competence, that we didn’t 




Haugdal and Torvanger described how this had consequences, possibly both 
for the technology development time of the product, and uncertainty in 
moments of deciding on the further direction of technical issues. How ironic 
was it, then, to try and protect the patent application and other knowledge 
developed in the project by moving the experiments from Matforsk’s lab at 
the university campus to Tine’s own R&D premises, hence cutting off 
expertise on these micro-biological technologies of fermenting sausage: 
 
It was invested in a drying facility; we needed to be able to produce it 
ourselves. This indicates that we didn’t trust doing these experiments at 
Matforsk, because when we now had gotten the rights to the product, we 
also had to guard the knowledge that came from the product 
experiments. (Per Magnus Mæhle, Tine) 
 
To protect some kinds of knowledge, they dissociated other important 
knowledge from the project, even though this lack of trust concerned one of 
Tine’s closest knowledge development partners for decades. On the 
industrial side, the search for potential partners had been going on since 
early in the project. Thus, they were left with a company-internal 
organisation of a relatively ‘radical’ innovation project, while the question 
remained about how to go ahead, when both the product and its market are 
unknown from the outset. Slinde described the sausage’s entry as a conflict 
between the marketing and R&D departments: 
 
This sausage came into Tine the wrong way. How do you manage to get 
a knowledge product into the marketing department? How do you get 
the marketing department to become excited by such a product? (Erik 
Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Slinde was ambiguous about what constituted ‘the right way’ of taking in 
and running an innovation project. To get such a technologically advanced 
and open-ended idea into the company, he felt that it would be easier to 
interest and convince researchers and technologists. Yet, from there, how 
should one get people in marketing and management interested? On many 
occasions, I heard people from Tine R&D talk about their frustration about a 
lack of influence towards product development and marketing processes, 
resembling a ‘technology push’ paradigm (if my invention is good enough, it 
will find its way to the market by itself). According to the director of Tine 
Ingredients (Gunnar Hovland), technologists needed to learn to follow their 
ideas more aggressively through the system, not giving away the role of 
representing an idea before it has gained sufficient strength and 
understanding in the system. What the technologists had showed 
considerable commitment to, however, was the process of solving and 
stabilising the technological challenges of the innovation. 
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Re-combining materials and stabilising fatty acids 
Taking a highly uncertain and controversial innovation through numerous 
professional, social and organisational trials, from R&D through marketing 
to end consumers, is an exhaustive effort in itself. It is easy to forget about 
the actual object under development. What was the status of the object, the 
fermented fish sausage during this early and explorative phase of the 
project? If we go to the 2003 status report, three important points were 
reported on the status of the object. First, successful test production at Tine 
R&D’s own laboratory had finally been achieved, and subsequent 
productions had shown good results. Second, this had enabled going further 
into searching for partners, preparing for large scale production and market 
testing, aiming to finish these activities by the end of 2003. Third, plans 
were made for further product development: Finish the recipe, choose 
bacteria culture and make an agreement with the Food Research Institute on 
the commercialisation of the bacteria culture, develop near-infrared 
measurements of fat content and colour, get approval from authorities, and 
establish procedures for analysis (Status report, Umi No Kami, 2003). After 
struggling with the technology for some time, succeeding with test 
production had been a stage gate for moving on to interaction with potential 
partners and customers. Here, I will go into a bit more detail about the 
technological challenges that the status report referred to, including 
stabilising the production and the product in a technical sense. Making fish 
salami is a relatively complex process of combining and stabilising a set of 
biological substances. Biologist Even Manseth explained the main process in 
broad terms: 
 
The fish meat is ground and blended, mixing in the various milk 
extracts, or whey proteins, and the bacteria culture. Then the right 
temperature is secured, and then it is put into sausage skins. When it is 
put into the skins, you put it into the oven that both smokes and dries it, 
and then the process, the bacteria starts producing lactic acid, right, and 
then the acidity increases, and then you conserve the product, and at the 
same time you dry the product, take out water, getting less water 
activity, and then smoke it. (Even Manseth, Tine R&D) 
 
A process of three main parts: Supplying and preparing the right raw 
materials, before mixing the recipe together, and at last creating the best 
conditions possible for the microbiological process within the product. Three 
microbiological substances have to work well together: Water, fat and 
proteins. And three biological processes that had to be managed to make a 
fish salami: Stabilisation of fatty acids (by adding proteins), fermentation (by 
adding bacteria cultures) and keeping away disturbing micro-organisms (by 
strict hygiene routines). I will below describe some of the challenges related 
to these three bio-technical processes. 
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There are two intertwined problems with fish fat when curing fish: It is fluid 
and it oxidises easily. It is a matter of stabilising materials on a number of 
factors; texture, keeping them in place physically, maintaining 
nutritional/aesthetical value and helping them avoid becoming harsh. During 
the first attempts at making a fermented fish sausage, the fat did not stabilise 
and tended to slip out of the product. As mentioned previously, this was the 
reason why Erik Slinde asked Berit Nordvi and Tine R&D for help; he 
thought that adding proteins, e.g. from milk, could help solve the problem. 
After Tine bought the patent application and started the Umi No Kami 
product development project, the primary task was to get in control of the 
technology. This quest for getting the technology to work led the technical 
project participants through a number of issues. In the research-based project 
prior to Umi No Kami, Neptun, they produced knowledge on the use of milk 
proteins to stabilise fatty acids: 
 
To put it simply, if you take proteins over fat, in my PhD I have found a 
ratio of 2.4. Protein binds the fat. Encapsulating the fat with proteins, 
that is really what it is about. We did not know that at the time, but there 
was a limit, that made it difficult. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
So, Slinde’s hypothesis was right, proteins could be added in the processing 
of fish salami to stabilise the fatty acids. Still, there was a limit to how much 
fat could be stabilised in such a product, a limit that made it difficult to use 
only salmon (with its high and variable content of fat, 10-30%) in the recipe. 
A number of different material and technological issues were investigated to 
enhance this stabilisation process. Different combinations of fat content and 
blends of saithe and salmon were tested, together with tests of other white 
fish species than saithe:  
 
I have tried, in the Neptun project, with different fish species, and 
without doubt it was the alternatives with as much salmon as possible 
that were the best, giving the best colour, and everything. However, 
from what we knew about the patent technology and from the 
experience we gained in Neptun, we knew that a pure salmon product, 
with the percentage of fat in salmon, is not an easy thing to manage. It is 
right on the limit of what can be added of proteins. (Berit Nordvi, Tine 
R&D) 
 
Transferring the technology and procedures from the practice of making 
salami of meat, they used frozen raw materials to enhance the drying 
process. 
 
And from technology on fermenting sausage, they work with frozen raw 
materials, the thought behind being that frozen meat more easily lets go 
of water, hence one can take out the water faster. With regard to fish, 
132 
the thought was, to work with frozen fish was simply related to the 
problem of anisakid nematodes59. Janne Haugdal wrote a letter to our 
Food Safety Authorities, to get approval, or permission to produce our 
product. They responded that farmed salmon was ok, as they have not 
found any anisakid nematodes on farmed salmon. (Berit Nordvi, Tine 
R&D) 
 
In beginning with an unquestioned replication of the original procedure, 
using frozen raw materials, for reasons of drying, this practice was then 
reinforced by a problem of the new raw material, namely its common 
contamination of anisakid nematode larvae – which also demanded freezing 
before use. A lot of different species were tested in this version of the 
technology and recipe, without satisfying results: 
 
Yes, we have tested a lot of fish species. We have tested so many that I 
do not think I remember all of them. In the beginning, we started with 
saithe and salmon. And we did not get as fine of a colour. And therefore 
we tried to find other fish species that perhaps could bind the fat 
somewhat better, and get it stabilised so that we could get away from 
the big variance of fat in salmon, and at the same time it should be 
possible to use a white fish that gave a better colour and better 
durability after freezing. Thus, we tested all those different fish species. 
(Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Even though the food regulation authorities would accept the use of fresh 
farmed salmon, white fish still had to be supplied from wild fish catch, and 
so the procedure of using frozen fish remained obligatory, if not going for 
the more difficult technological challenge of making a pure salmon product. 
At the time, the use of fresh fish was nothing but an interesting idea, 
something that in the spirit of science should be tested. Anyway, though 
whey protein proved its ability to stabilise some fatty acids, this process had 
to be improved quite a lot before having a satisfactory firm product. Thus, 
the testing of various white fish species continued, to see whether some 
combinations were more capable of binding fat than others, but the colour 
                                                     
59 Larvae of anisakid nematodes, a kind of roundworm (sometimes called whale 
worms), are often found in many different species of wild fish. The two most 
common are ’anisakis simplex’ (herring worm) and ’pseudoterranova decipience’ 
(cod worm). Humans may be infected when eating raw or undercooked fish, causing 
anisakiasis, i.e., infections and allergic reactions. The parasite will not survive 
freezing down to -20 degrees Celsius for 24 hours, or warm treatment above 70 
degrees Celsius. Thus, according to food regulations, fish has to be frozen before 
use. However, no anisakid nematodes have been found in farmed salmon, which 
could therefore be excepted from the regulations (Laboratory of Identification of 




was not delicate enough. Then, there was the problem of getting good 
enough quality on the white fish. The competing idea, of using only salmon 
– or at least as much salmon as possible, remained an option, and the food 
regulation authorities were asked for permission to use fresh (not frozen) 
farmed salmon. To enable management of the problem of fat content in a 
pure salmon product, near-infrared spectroscopy (NIR) was launched as a 
possible tool for helping sort out the fish with least content of fat: 
 
The challenge was to get a product that held together. We were allowed 
to start using this NIR-equipment, so that we could start sorting the 
salmon in different groups, so that we could use salmon with 10% fat, 
so that we got away from the large variance related to fat percentage, 
because you can’t bind all the fat if the percentage reaches 20%. (Janne 
Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Hence, Lars Petter Swensen, who had been working with this technology at 
the University of Life Sciences, was hired as consultant, and later became 
project manager for R&D in the project. In this way, they could maximise 
the use of salmon in the recipe. Yet while possibly moving towards technical 
success, it did not help the economic aspect. The initial idea had been to use 
trimmings instead of premium filets to keep down costs: 
 
And then we have found out that the best raw material is suited. 
Because of the fat percentage, that you get a so high percentage of fat 
that you get problems with the product becoming harsh. It would of 
course be possible, but then you couldn’t make a sausage only from 
salmon, you would have to blend it with some white fish too. (Janne 
Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Control of fat percentage in the fish improved from the near-infrared-method 
(although this technology needed significant development before it could be 
used industrially), but still only the best parts of the fish could be used. This 
was also different from making salami out of meat, where trimmings are a 
common resource in the recipe. Haugdal summed up some of the similarities 
and differences between fish and meat related to fermentation: 
 
And this is the opposite of making salami out of meat, because, when 
you make cured sausage of meat, it is recommended that you freeze the 
meat, since you are supposed to destroy the proteins, you are not to bind 
that much water, as the water needs to get out of the sausage, since it is 
going to be dry. We froze the fish, in the same way as with meat, but the 
product became too dry, it did not become optimal. But then we found 
that when we used fresh fish, it bound up more, and when we used pre-
rigor fish, which is of the best quality with regard to proteins and 
binding capacity, then you got great sausage. The meat and the fish 
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behave very differently. The bacteria work in the same way, as well as 
the pH-process, and the drying process. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
After two to three years of research, Haugdal could be quite specific about 
the transfer of meat technologies to fish. While the bacteria culture worked 
in the same way with fish, and the following pH and drying processes too, 
the process of binding fat was a lot more complex on fish. They had to 
strictly control the fat content, add proteins to encapsulate and stabilise the 
fatty acids, and use fresh premium raw materials instead of frozen 
trimmings. In total, these were significant changes for adapting the original 
technology to the new raw material, making the product both more 
expensive and more challenging to produce.  
 
Still, if the use of frozen meat was such a taken for granted part of salami 
practices, and this matched well with the demand of freezing fish to avoid 
parasites, how did they come up with the idea of using fresh fish instead? 
This came from the growing group of aquacultural researchers at Tine, who 
were all recruited from a particular research group at the Norwegian 
University of Life Sciences (UMB). In addition to Swensen, Per Olav 
Skjervold had also been hired to a key position for the biomarine activities at 
Tine R&D, and when he called one of his junior researchers at the 
university, new ideas came up: 
 
When I did my PhD at Ås [UMB], Per Olav called me and asked, well, 
they were in the process of developing Salma, and they had problems 
with some things. It was to get a good texture on the sausage, well, to 
get it to hold together in a way, and then they used, at the time, frozen 
raw material. I had read in the literature in relation to such, fresh 
products, that you have properties that you won’t find in less fresh 
materials, so, I suggested more or less to try out fresher raw materials, 
closer to the farm, you could say. (Even Manseth, Tine R&D) 
 
Manseth’s research was not about fermentation technology at all, but his 
PhD project of investigating and developing the binding agents of fish, led 
him to recommend the testing of fresh materials. The rationale here was very 
different; instead of starting out with the particulars of meat and 
fermentation technology, his perspective came from what he knew about 
fish, and how this perhaps could compensate for problems with the original 
technology. Hence, Lars Petter Swensen and Per Olav Skjervold started 
doing experiments with fresh salmon in addition to the ‘official’ experiments 
still using frozen materials. In Swensen’s view, this change from using 





The first quantum leap, as I see it, was related to getting control of the 
raw material. And then there has been much incremental development, 
and the next quantum leap was the use of fresh fish, which became very 
interesting when we went from using 30-day-old fish, to using 24- hour-
old fish and then to using 4-hour-old fish. We did a test, where I went 
over to Bremnes and got fish that was only six hours old, and we got a 
very compact sausage that did not fall apart, and that we could slice, in 
using such fresh raw materials, and then we did not need to use that 
supporting ingredient. We needed fresh raw material, and we needed to 
have control on fat and colour. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
Here, he was referring to using near-infrared technology to get control of the 
raw material, and then using the pre-rigor processed salmon from Bremnes 
Seashore, as two technical breakthroughs in the project. Since he was hired 
to get control of the raw material by using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIR) 
to sort the raw material according to colour and fat content, this became the 
first ‘quantum leap’ in the project, according to Swensen. It enabled 
maximising the use of salmon in the recipe without including too much fat, 
and furthermore strengthening the visual presentation of the product with a 
stronger red colour. However, as Nordvi remarked, the NIR technology was 
at the time in a very early phase, with only a manual handheld instrument, 
not efficient, robust or reliable enough for putting it to large scale industrial 
use. A few years later (2006), this technology had become available for 
automated industrial production, but still had not gained the argumentative 
strength – from an economic and use perspective – to support a purchase 
decision from the venture’s owners. The second ‘quantum leap’ according to 
Swensen, was the breakthrough on what raw material produced the best 
results. Through the close relations formed through earlier projects to 
Bremnes Seashore and their pre-rigor processing technology (probably in 
having great interests in finding use for this technology which they had 
helped Bremnes with developing), they began informal testing of fresher fish 
on the side of the formal experiments with frozen raw materials. They went 
through a process of testing increasingly fresher fish. From these 
experiments, they ended up with dramatically improved texture of the 
product. Later, when scaling up production, moving the production from 
Tine’s lab in Oslo to Bremnes Seashore’s facilities by the sea, they were able 
to improve the freshness of the fish using another 2 hours – producing a 
product that is ready processed within 4-6 hours from slaughter. The new 
procedures and raw material enabled leaving out the problematic ingredient 
‘transglutaminase’ (restricted use in food products), and still resulted in a 
“very compact sausage that did not fall apart, and that we could slice”. To 
Swensen, this represented “paradigm shifts”, moving the project to a “totally 
new platform”, from which they could start working in a more “linear” 
product development fashion. No more need to “mess about with other types 
of raw materials and other types of processes”, thus leaving behind the 
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original idea of using both white and red fish, and the practice from the meat 
industry of using frozen materials. Yet it also meant producing a product that 
was dependent on expensive and exclusive raw materials. 
 
The technological basis started taking shape, not only for going into a more 
incremental product development phase, but also for moving the product 
from R&D to production. At the same time, the project also started its 
transition from the original project group to the hands of an emerging 
constellation between some University researchers, Tine management and 
Bremnes Seashore. This again stimulated the move from being a 
fermentation technology/fish salami project to becoming a fresh and cured 
pre-rigor salmon project. The project got both a “rigid research design” and 
some very explorative aspects. It was a matter of simplification, keeping 
some variables stable while playing with others:  
 
Before we had great variation in the product, and because of these 
variations, it has been difficult to conclude on what results being the 
right, then, what development that has been right. (Lars Petter Swensen, 
Tine R&D) 
 
The outcome, the “quantum leaps”, could be used for another set of powerful 
simplifications, including choosing to use only one type of raw material, 
from a supplier with close relations to the members of the project group, and, 
in the long run for simplifying the project intentions by choosing direction 
and developing a more unitary product and concept, what came to be called 
‘Salma’. There were intentions of developing new seafood products with 
associations to salami and smoked salmon. In addition, there were material 
interactions in which a number of combinations proved difficult, impossible 
or ambiguous. In this situation, finding a combination that worked had great 
consequences for the concept development. Swensen told about “rigid 
design” and plans, but at the same time the project allowed, or required, lots 
of adaptation – or even transformation – of the technology and the concept.  
 
Recruiting and controlling micro-organisms 
Berit Nordvi, the project manager of Neptun, spoke about how they had 
worked on the fermentation technology, how the taste and texture of the fish 
salami were explored and successfully stabilised, and then forgotten and 
regarded as being unimportant by its later representatives. The more 
commonly told stories of the Umi No Kami project centered on the 
application of whey proteins for the stabilisation of fatty acids, and the 
choice of types of fish. Nordvi, however, emphasised the exploration of the 
original idea, and perhaps the most central technology in salami, namely 
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fermentation – adding bacteria cultures in order to ‘cure’ the product60 . 
Historically, the fermentation of foods, e.g., meats, has been a technique for 
enabling the product to be stored over periods of time (Ferrières, 2006), and 
Tore Teigen, consulting sausage maker in the Umi No Kami project, could 
tell that at local pre-industrial farm dairies, bacteria cultures were hardly 
conceived of, or even known about, as they were stored and brought 
forwards through the un-/intentional storing of elements from previous 
productions:   
 
Before the 1970s, bacteria cultures were residing ‘in the house’, or in 
the liquid solution from the previous production, it was not something 
they ‘made’. (Tore Teigen, sausage maker) 
 
Like in ‘magic’, the transfer and maintenance of tribes of bacteria cultures 
happened through ritual-like procedures and practices, e.g., adding some of 
the liquid solution from previous productions to the new ones, or sometimes 
the production room and facilities ‘by themselves’ served as a place of 
maintaining and transferring bacteria cultures to every new production. 
When industrialising production, however, the sterility of production 
facilities made this cultural element, the ‘magic’ effect, disappear. In 
addition subsequent scientific research within microbiology has made it 
possible to work on cultivating some tribes of bacteria, while fighting others 
in enabling and controlling fermentation in industrial scale.  
 
                                                     
60 A definition of fermentation is “the process of deriving energy from the oxidation 
of organic compounds” or “the process of energy production in a cell under 
anaerobic conditions (without oxygene) (Prescott, Harley & Klein (2005) 
Microbiology, McGrawHill, NY). Basic of fermentation in food is the work of lactic 
acid bacteria cultures or other microbiological elements, such as yeast in bread and 
wine, and mould in blue cheese. In a salami, these active ‘cultures’ produce acid, 
increase the pH level in the product, thus conserving and curing the product. 
Together with this process, it is necessary to reduce the ‘water activity’, in order to 
reduce and get in control of the micro-organisms in the product. Smoking has also 
proved to limit microbiological activity. The drying process of salami is done in a 
drying facility; by changing the air, and using condensers to take the moisture out of 
the air, water is ‘pulled out’ of the product. Thus, (meat) salami is cured in just a few 
days. With fish, however, the process has to be done slower to get a nice product. 
Thus, reducing water activity, adding acid culture, and smoking all together 
constitute storage friendly products, with some distinctly different material and 
aesthetic characteristics from the original raw material. Fermentation, microbiology 
and the curing of raw materials are some of Tine’s core competences, though 
normally using milk as raw material (e.g. yoghurt, cheese, etc). Thus, in this case, a 
well known (bio-)technology gets used with a new raw material, fish, which is more 
similar to meat than to milk. 
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Making fish more like a meat product, or employing a meat curing 
technology in processing fish in an industrial company, demanded scientific 
exploration and testing, in this case study starting out with the core 
technology – fermentation. So, what about bacteria cultures? What role did 
they play in this project, and who had the task of taming them and making 
them work? This time the bacteria did not work on their usual material, 
meat. Berit Nordvi related that relatively early in the project, they had done a 
thorough laboratory testing of around fifteen different bacteria cultures, 
mostly lactic acid cultures, based on the hypothesis that choice of bacteria 
culture could make a significant difference in quality, both with regard to the 
taste and stability of the fish product: 
 
We tested many cultures during the process, and we have tested many 
cultures in the research project [Neptun], and this is without doubt the 
best bacteria. From a selection of 15 cultures, it was in any case the best 
one. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
According to her, they found one culture that made clearly better results in 
both taste and texture than the others, an old culture that had been used with 
good results even in meat production. The later improvements of the recipe 
had some effect, but, in Nordvi’s view, nothing close to the effect from 
choosing the right strain of bacteria: 
 
It was not as good as the products they have today, but it was still fairly 
good. And we did consumer research, a bit later, on salmon and saithe 
in combination, compared to salmon, showing that the difference was 
not that big. But in my own view, I also think that the salmon product 
tastes better, it is a bit more delicate. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
While the choice of fish species was not easily solved before meeting the 
Bremnes pre-rigor salmon, lab work here provided a clear positive answer. 
The chosen bacteria culture was immediately implemented in further work 
on the fish salami. This evoked the question of IPR, of seeking to secure 
ownership to the chosen bacteria culture, as this would make it more difficult 
to copy the product. In originally being an old Gilde-bacteria (the Norwegian 
Meat Cooperative), and now being found in the collection of bacteria strains 
at Matforsk, Slinde chose this bacteria for testing based on his previous 
research on fermenting meat. As also previously mentioned by Rekdal in a 
project report, the project group initially wanted to see if they could 
negotiate exclusive rights or ownership to this bacteria culture, to make it 
more difficult to copy the production process – and hence the product: 
 
In fact, we do not have total ownership to the culture, it is Matforsk’s 
property. We did not succeed in this. If one had taken the action in an 
earlier phase that I in fact recommended, perhaps on management level, 
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then we could perhaps have got the ownership to it, but it was decided 
not to do anything. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
Later, with the deletion of this part of the story, or of how it was told, this 
task was not prioritised, instead just ensuring the rights to use Matforsk’s 
property: 
 
Later an agreement was negotiated, so we have all the rights to use it, 
but we don’t have ownership, which means that others also can use it. 
So, we could perhaps have secured ownership, if it had been discussed 
at a high enough level, and early enough, but this was not done. (Berit 
Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
Still, after having cut off relations to research associates, among them 
Matforsk, to protect the knowledge developed at the Umi No Kami project 
from being copied, why did they not care more about securing exclusive 
rights to the bacteria culture? Was it just a case of fragmented 
responsibilities or a partially strategic focus on IPR that made this issue 
dissolve? Or had problems arisen in the relationship between Tine and 
Matforsk? It does seem a bit odd to isolate a project from its collaborators to 
protect knowledge and technology on the one hand, and letting go of an 
opportunity to take ownership of a crucial part of the technology on the 
other. 
 
When the culture was chosen, the industrial logic of ‘economies of scale’ 
was activated, and testing was initiated to find whether the bacteria could be 
(re-)produced by Tine themselves, or if it would be better to outsource to 
large and specialised companies: 
 
We had people who worked with bacteria cultures elsewhere at Tine 
and who participated in this discussion, and tried to stipulate the costs. It 
was calculated by the Stavanger-group, having some fermentors, if they 
were able to do it, but they could not do it sterile, well, you need 
specific equipment to do it this way. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
Just a few months earlier, Tine R&D had done a project to enable the 
production of bacteria culture for the Jarlsberg cheese in-house. The need to 
maintain the exclusive ownership to this culture had been challenged by 
Tine’s expansion of production to new plants in US and in UK, and they 
needed to develop their ability to supply these factories with ready-made 
bacteria cultures. It turned out that a machine, a ‘filter fermentor’, developed 
in yet another project, together with SINTEF, a technology institute, proved 
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useful to the task61. After some considerations of the cost and quality, they 
decided to try and do the production in-house, particularly to keep the 
ownership and knowledge of the culture. By using existing knowledge and 
technology at Tine, developed for covering the rapidly increasing demand 
for Jarlsberg-cheese around the world, Tine R&D managed in a relatively 
short time to also produce the culture for the fish salami at a large scale at 
their R&D facilities at Voll in Rogaland. But still there were other, and a lot 
more problematic, microbiological processes they had to get in control of. 
 
In the minutes from a Umi No Kami project meeting (2003), it says that 
“experiment no.5 is soon ready, no mould problems, awaiting results on 
visual, taste, quality”. Further, it said that personnel from the marketing 
department, Frode Fimreite, would help in organising market testing, 
something that had not been possible before because they had not managed 
to produce any successful products. In the previously mentioned status 
report, the project manager could tell that “product development [has been] 
delayed because of technical problems (mould problems, 6 months during 
fall 2002)” (Status report, Umi No Kami, 2003). Behind this written 
information, we can find one of the most traumatic time periods in the 
project’s lifetime. Six months of hard and frustrating work of trying to avoid 
mould in the production; identifying and removing sources of unwanted 
microbiological activity. Six months’ delay in the project, not managing one 
single successful production, thus not being able to test the product in the 
market. The Umi No Kami project group had early been sceptical to the 
limited time frame for the project. Within one year, they were to both gain 
control of the technology, and develop the product towards 
commercialisation: 
  
It was the first thing we discussed in the first meeting we had, that the 
time schedule was much too short. We would not be able to launch 
anything at the given point of time. We got approval for a six month 
                                                     
61 The fermentor, a ‘filter fermentor’ was a 4 x 4  x 3 metres cubed of a machine, 
with a lot of tubes and valves and tanks, a big closed box (the process management 
is automated), and a small control room with two seats, instruments, PCs, etc. A 
piece of technological complexity, enabling continuous processing (not ‘batches’) of 
lactic acid bacteria cultures for large scale production. This is the only machine of 
this kind, the prototype. Here, the culture for production of Jarlsberg cheese in the 
US and in Ireland is produced, and only small portions are needed for large 
productions. As a consequence, it was decided to implement this technology in the 
production department. The bacteria get food from a set of containers, through an 
automated control of the valves. It is a fascinating machine, but even more a 
fascinating story of innovation; combinations of incidents and qualified targeted 
work. This actant significantly supports Tine’s successful growth with Jarlsberg in 
the US and in EU, and then, also the fermentation of fish. 
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delay. Every batch takes a month to produce, which means that you can 
produce ten batches in a year, and then you have worked continuously 
all the time, and that is a lot, right. You probably won’t manage ten 
batches either, because you then would have to work on the project all 
the time. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Given the long period of production of each batch, the limited capacity for 
running parallel batches, and the general organisation of R&D activities, 
with personnel often assigned to several projects at the same time, the team 
saw that this was a very tight deadline, and managed to negotiate another six 
months.  On the other hand, they were also conscious of the significant 
economic investments that had been made to establish the project, so they 
felt pressure to produce results as fast as possible.  
  
As mentioned previously, when establishing the Umi No Kami project, the 
lab experiments were moved from Matforsk to Tine’s own lab at Kalbakken 
in Oslo. Nordvi emphasised the practical benefits instead of the aims to 
protect knowledge: 
 
We had a strong focus on our wish to do the Umi No Kami project 
internally. There were both economic reasons, because we expected a 
lot to happen in the project, and so we wanted to do it internally to 
protect knowledge, and also to be able to run production whenever we 
wanted. This is because there are often waiting lists at Matforsk, and we 
can’t do both fish and meat at the same time there. (Berit Nordvi, Tine 
R&D) 
 
Thus, there were several benefits of doing everything in-house: First, there 
was increased flexibility from being able to produce whenever one wanted, 
independent of available capacity at the Matforsk labs. Second, economic 
arguments were mobilised, suggesting that in the long run, it would be 
cheaper and more efficient to be able to do the testing in-house. And, third, it 
was argued that it was improving the protection of new knowledge from the 
supposedly more open environment at the academic research institution 
Matforsk. To enable this transfer, new drying facilities had to be bought and 
installed.  
 
Still, the benefits of transferring lab experiments from Matforsk to Tine’s 
facilities at Kalbakken in Oslo soon were overshadowed by technical 
problems. The supposedly rational act of changing labs, turned out to bring 
with it severe problems with mould. Suddenly, they could not produce a 




We had a very difficult first phase. We had big problems with mould, 
and so we had to work a lot on procedures, both to keep the product 
clean, and to change things, in order to manage the product. And then it 
was not exactly an advantage having a bakery next door. It was a very 
tough start for those women, extremely frustrating for the project 
manager, and for all of us, there were frustrations and more frustrations. 
(Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
Those responsible for product development in that phase spoke of the fall of 
2002 as extremely frustrating, in repeatedly experiencing set-backs, and not 
managing to identify the reasons and fix the problem. A set of different 
explanations for the problems were launched by some of the participants. 
Erik Slinde pointed to the climate (drying) facility as the source of the 
problem: 
 
They did not know very much about climate facilities, because it was 
not the meat industry standing there, but the dairy industry, so the 
hygiene and everything like that was surely ok, but, there was fish 
hanging inside, and not milk. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine 
Research) 
 
The project manager for the Neptun project, Berit Nordvi, agreed with 
Slinde about the significance of adjusting the drying facility, in addition to 
the issues of hygiene: 
 
So, really, that whole fall was about knocking their heads on the wall 
over those problems, and not getting any further, and the first 
production that was ok, was in January 2003. There were different 
reasons, and in fact, some of the reason were hygiene, and then some of 
the reason had to do with the drying facility, it was not adjusted 
optimally, even though it was the same kind we had used at Matforsk. 
And so all the products that I made at Matforsk are much better than 
what they could make at Kalbakken afterwards. (Berit Nordvi, Tine 
R&D) 
 
Nordvi was here connecting the mould to the accumulation of water in the 
machine, which was something that had to be solved by adjustments. Janne 
Haugdal, product developer and one of the central participants in this phase, 
admitted having some problems with adjusting the drying facility, but 
nevertheless dismissed this as an explanation for the mould problems: 
 
No, it was the air and everything around it, and the equipment, we 
produce it cold, right, and then the sausage machine and the grinder 
have to be totally clean, everything has to be covered by foam, and you 
have to, for you kill nothing just by warming up the product like you do 
with normal sausage. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
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In addition to pointing out these hygienic issues, being the product developer 
responsible for solving the mould problem, Haugdal wanted a professional 
sausage maker on the team: 
 
I am not a sausage maker or anything, but still I’ve got the responsibility 
for the product development part in Umi No Kami. There were many 
challenges, to put it that way, we were a quite versatile project group, 
but we lacked perhaps the particular professional competence, or the 
sausage maker. If you try to do all the things yourself, you will easily 
fall into some pitfalls. And it is important to have someone who can 
stand and feel the mince, and that knows cured sausage making in his 
hands. I know a lot about how ingredients are working, and I can even 
run a meat grinder, but I don’t have it in my fingers. (Janne Haugdal, 
Tine R&D) 
 
As mentioned above, Haugdal’s management thought this was an 
exaggerated demand. Haugdal, on the other hand, suggested that the 
experienced professional, knowing how a good salami mince should feel 
between his fingers, and how to put it through the various processing 
machines, could have expediated them to success. The embodied knowledge 
of an experienced craftsman was lacking. On the other hand, to what extent 
would such knowledge be relevant on a totally different raw material? 
Further, in her account of the mould problem, Haugdal emphasised air 
pollution (mould and yeast spores from the bakery next to the lab), hygiene, 
and to an extent lack of experience with operating the machines as the main 
reasons for the problem:  
 
We had many frustrations, from the outset we had one year or 
something until we were to have a finished product, and when we 
struggled half a year with the mould, and could not manage a single test, 
then the frustrations grew bigger and bigger. And we disinfected all the 
equipment, and we bought a lamp to put into the drying facility, 
disinfecting inside the climate facility, and we made a whole lot of 
preconditions to enable a good product, then, and at last we made it, but 
it took us several months. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Together, these factors formed a complex problem, and Haugdal strongly 
opposed the buying of large scale production facilities – former meat 
facilities – before succeeding with production in the lab. Those who were in 
the middle of the demanding and frustrating process, did not find it wise to 
decide on industrialisation issues, like how to scale up production, before 
having full control of the basic technology. It took them seven months to get 
there – from installing the drying facility to producing the first batch without 
any mould on, seven months delay before at all being able to continue the 
product development and the market testing work.  
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To sum up, the mould was in different versions explained by the early 
project participants by hygiene and air pollution. Technological adjustments 
were admitted to represent a challenge, although deemed irrelevant by some 
of the ‘insiders’. In addition, the quality of the fish was an issue, perhaps not 
for the development of mould, but definitely for making a sausage of a 
quality that could be eaten.  
 
The fish sector was often described as a ‘cowboy’ industry, with little 
competence on the most basic industrial issues, such as quality management, 
nutritional standards, knowledge based product development and branding. 
One of the big problems was described as the microbiological quality of 
fresh fish supply: 
 
We measured too high levels. We had to give them feedback that we 
couldn’t use their fish, and nor could we buy at Inger Sørensen at the 
quay [in Oslo]. So the way we solved it, we controlled every single fish 
they sent us, and they were not good enough before we got fish from 
Bremnes, that was the first time we got proper fish quality on and did 
not have to throw out a whole batch after production. (Janne Haugdal, 
Tine R&D) 
 
Some of the participants in the Umi No Kami/Salma projects did not have 
much belief that it would have been possible to solve this problem together 
with the fish industry. Haugdal, on the other hand, did not agree with this: 
 
By making strict demands on the suppliers of raw materials, and then 
there are other suppliers, so, there are many that would be interested in 
selling fish to these kinds of projects. So I think that we would have 
been able to solve it anyway. Just have to be tougher, can’t just press on 
the quota, and you can’t go via a wholesaler, you have to go straight to 
the supplier. (Janne Haugdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Entering into a close and demanding relation with the supplier would 
possibly enable the quality Tine wanted, she argued. However, in practice, 
the desired quality was not achieved before switching to, and training, 
Bremnes Seashore as supplier. 
 
Summing up: Organising micro-actors 
The wish to internalise test production at Tine, to protect and produce 
knowledge within the organisation, seems to have led to delays and 
problems (there were no mould problems when running test production at 
the Matforsk laboratory). They also faced a loss of knowledge, when 
145 
 
discontinuing the cooperative relations with the Matforsk/University of 
Biosciences communities.  
 
To sum up the main aspects of technology development, four intertwined 
technical and biological problems had to be solved before managing to 
produce the fish salami at Tine R&D’s own facilities, with the expected 
biological and nutritional quality and avoiding mould attacks. Hygiene was 
the main and overarching issue at play. Routines had to be sharpened, 
cleaning had to be done with extra care, and all of the other issues were more 
or less related to these two. Second, there was a bakery laboratory next door, 
hence there were more spores from yeast and mould in the air that caused 
trouble for the curing of fish. Third, the new technology – the drying facility 
– had to be adjusted to work optimally in relation to moisture. It was 
contested among the participants whether this had anything to do with the 
mould problems, but all agreed nevertheless that it was something that 
needed to be done. Last, the supply of – especially white – fish was a big 
problem. Several suppliers were tested, and they worked with some of them 
over time to make them improve their microbiological quality, without 
success. Until testing the pre-rigor salmon from Bremnes Seashore. This 
issue was also contested, as the Umi No Kami product developer clearly 
argued that more work with, and stricter demands of the white fish suppliers 
could have produced good results, while others – particularly those who had 
worked with Bremnes Seashore – were less optimistic with regard to the 
competence and capabilities within the traditional fish industry.  
 
In hindsight, three plain and simple things could have been done differently, 
according to various participants, in order to simplify and speed up problem 
solving during this frustrating stage. First, they could have continued hiring a 
laboratory at Matforsk where they started, and where the technological and 
situated problems at Tine’s own facilities did not exist. Still the supply 
problem would have continued. A drawback would have been less 
flexibility, thus possibly creating the need for more time than planned, 
though perhaps not as much extra time as the mould problem demanded. 
Another potential problem was the protection of intellectual property, as the 
environment of an academic research institute was viewed by some as a 
potential threat for an expensive and prestigious project at Tine. Second, it 
was suggested that they could have prioritised the recruitment of a sausage 
maker to the project team when they lost the one they had in the beginning. 
A professional in the practice of handling minced meat, sausage machines, 
and fermentation processes, could possibly have learned quicker about this 
new combination of fermentation and fish than the more general product 
developers in the project. And third, if Tine had been aware of the divergent 
nutritional standards and microbiological competence in the fish industry, 
they might have evaluated the need for integration backwards with the 
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suppliers differently: Either by going to the actors with stricter demands and 
consultancy, or by formalising relations through acquisitions or strategic 
alliances, to get in control of the whole value chain from slaughter to final 
product. Or by not doing fresh fish activities at all. In any case, Tine did buy 
the patent application, and they did have serious ambitions of 
commercialising the technology via a branded product concept. It is time to 
inquire into the customer side of the project. 
 
4.4 Early market research and conceptualisation  
Original intentions 
From the early documents of the Umi No Kami project, we can learn some 
things about the original purposes of the project, and how the innovation was 
perceived by the main participants. Already in March 2001, almost a year 
before formalising the product development project (Umi No Kami), we can 
read from the Neptun project description how connotations to meat and 
markets for meat were made from the very beginning: 
 
A new kind of product, development of a new market. With the 
knowledge one has today, it is possible to develop a range of new 
fermented seafood sausages. These are fish based fermented sausages 
that can be real alternative to meat-based fermented sausages. The 
products may be optimised to satisfy different market demands (e.g. 
different product variants and consumer segments). Use of the products: 
Similar to fermented products from meat. Perfect as snack together with 
beer, etc. (Project description, Neptun, 2001) 
 
However, when – in the same document – starting to develop arguments for 
the consumer value of such a product (as opposed to the value for the 
researchers, which is more related to fascination and interests in managing a 
new technological combination), associations to the fish side were 
emphasised: 
 
Food with positive health effects: 
-High content of omega 3 (e.g. consumption of 40-50 gram fish sausage 
(contains 20% fish fat) covers recommended daily portion. 
- High content of A and D vitamins. 
- High level of positive lactic acid bacteria cultures. 
- Fish (and not disease-infected meat). 
 (Project description, Neptun, 2001) 
 
Associations were made to health trends, the recent scientific research on the 
benefits of marine omega 3, and the quest for clean, uncontaminated foods. 
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The market of fermented meat, combined with the nutritional value of fish. 
In getting their feet on the ground, the project team started developing a 
business plan for the product right after buying the patent application and 
formalising the project. Formally, the object at the time was little more than 
a patent application, but in practice, Berit Nordvi and others had been able 
show it to people, taste it and experiment with various ingredients. Thus, at 
the time, there was a relatively close association between the patent 
application’s prescriptions for fermenting fish, and the temporary status of 
the object, experimenting with materials and technologies in practice: 
 
The product was then not a pure salmon product, because the whole 
patent idea was based on getting enough proteins, and so it was a mix of 
saithe and salmon. What was presented was one to one of this, and it 
was used milk proteins, whey proteins. It was coloured, and looked 
nice. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
Although they made a few adjustments, like adding colour, they followed the 
recipe of the patent application closely when making the material prototype. 
The first ‘strategy document’ sought ways to associate this emergent object 
with the industrial reality of food, i.e., established categorisations of food 
items, potential consumer ‘needs’, and the international structure of food 
distribution: 
 
We can develop a fish product that is somewhat similar to fermented 
sausage in its texture, taste, and shelf-life. This type of product does not 
exist in the market today. Thus, nor does any natural category exist in 
the food trade where this product belongs. Our challenge is threefold: 
Develop a concept that is sustainable over time. Develop a product and 
a product series based on needs in the market. Find those markets with 
the highest potential for this type of product. The concept will be the 
start of an international brand within fish products (‘Strategy document 
1’, Umi No Kami, 2002). 
 
Here, we see that the identity of the original invention was a “fermented fish 
product”, “similar to fermented sausage”, in other words, a salami of fish. 
Yet the market category for such a product was at best ambiguous62, as there 
                                                     
62  In retrospect, we can se how these ambiguities came to follow the project 
throughout most of its lifetime: An early establishment of certain dichotomies, to 
which the project participants stuck, although having problems choosing a side. 
Moreover, these dichotomies were later reinforced by their socio-material relations: 
some connotations of ’salami’ (e.g. in Norway) leaned towards low price everyday 
food segments, while the emerging choices on technology and raw materials (pure 
salmon) leaned towards gourmet (excellent quality of materials, and hence high 
costs in production). The positive version of this is that multiplicity maintains 
alternative solutions, in efforts to postpone choice as long as possible. 
148 
was no “natural category” to which this product belonged. It could be a fish 
product, or a fermented meat product. A little later, the ambiguity expanded 
to include consumers and their potential use of such a product: Gourmet 
‘upper class’, or mundane everyday product? The identified challenge was, 
however, as clear as it was difficult: Develop concept, product and market at 
the same time. A SWOT analysis followed in the document; emphasising on 
the ‘strengths’ side the patent, the healthy aspects, the long shelf-life and the 
need for cold chain technology, which is considered to be a core competence 
at Tine. On the ‘weaknesses’ side, the uncertainty of what consumers 
wanted, its potential for use in warm dishes, the lack of a product category 
and the problem of identity – the fact that a ‘mixed’ product processed into a 
sausage did not communicate freshness or highest quality - were mentioned. 
The opportunities that were mentioned were the possibility of establishing a 
new category, and fitting the concept within various food trends (Thai, 
Italian, etc). The most threatening issue was viewed as being the problem of 
categorisation, as the product would either drown in the amount of new 
products, or the customers would not understand what it was or how it could 
be used. Whether a new category was established or not, the Umi No Kami 
team came to think that people with high education and income in high cost 
markets would be the best customer group targeted for the product, making 
them use fish salami in their dinner, snacks and pre-courses. Due to 
considerations of risk, it was suggested that ‘Tine’ was not used as main 
brand, but rather either a “supported or pluralistic (independent) strategy” 
was chosen. In the project contract, it simply stated that Umi No Kami set 
out to develop the patent “to a commercial product, and market and sell it 
nationally and internationally” (Project contract, 2002).  
 
With the formalisation of the Umi No Kami project, it got fresh resources for 
exploring and sketching a product concept by seeking knowledge of 
consumers and their reactions to this product. The first sketch of a marketing 
plan reflected on why people would purchase and re-purchase the product. 
“Curiosity and health” was mentioned as the main triggers for customers, 
again linking Umi No Kami’s content of omega 3 to the growing health 
trends within food (‘Strategy document 2’, UNK, 2002-06-04). However, at 
this point the marketing plan contained no references to concrete market 
analyses, and looked more like an expression of the project group’s own 
speculations and reflections. Two months after the first strategy note, a 
business plan was ready, outlining in its introduction a future scenario for the 
use and diffusion of utopian dimensions: 
 
It is strange to think back on the starting point for Umi No Kami. We 
had purchased a patent application. That was all. But it was not any 
patent application; it was a real innovation, and not just an idea for 
product development. We knew that if we could manage the idea right, 
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we would be able to launch a unique product concept. Not just in 
Norway, but also internationally. And today, 18 years later, we all know 
what success this has become. It is a well-known product to be found on 
all breakfast tables and in all sandwich outlets. When we look back, it is 
almost like the product has always been there. It has grown into our diet 
as a missed element, and has been adopted and accepted as part of our 
food tradition. (KIR and HT 2020). (From ‘Business plan’, Umi No 
Kami, 2002-07) 
 
We can almost feel the optimism and fascination the project team must have 
felt for the innovation. In this document, a mass market is projected, 
imagining how Umi No Kami would become an everyday product “on all 
breakfast tables and in all sandwich outlets”, and the rest of the business plan 
is made to support this future scenario, from market estimations and 
considerations in budgeting. No associations were made to appetisers in 
restaurants, or for special occasions in homes with a high level of education, 
like the first strategy document written two months earlier. Further, there 
were no traces of the ambiguity of market segments, product identity and 
technology evident in the earlier notes, and that followed the project 
throughout its lifetime. A year later, in a status report given by the project 
manager, the potential use of the product was downplayed, instead focusing 
on the geographical aspect: 
 
We will launch a profitable and sustainable concept and product series, 
during the winter 2004. It will be an international concept of fermented 
and dried fish products in Norway, Europe and Asia. We think we have 
to go for a core product, and then adapt some products and variants to 
local conditions. 
 
The purpose is to develop a series of fish products that take part in 
creating a whole new category of fermented and dried fish products in 
the food trade, that are profitable, and that the consumer wants. The 
product is to be sold both in Norway and internationally.  
(Status report, Umi No Kami 2003-06-20, by Karl Inge Rekdal, Tine 
R&D) 
 
This is clearly intended to be an international project, as this report does not 
show anything other than associations to fish, and maintains awareness about 
the challenge of establishing a new product category. In the first quote, a 
tension was identified between a ‘core product’, i.e., the need for 
simplification of the product development and production processes 
(economy of scale), and the need for local adaptations to different 
geographical markets and market segments. There was an awareness arising 
about this strategic question, which was later transformed into a set of socio-
material strategies of product design, production facilities and sales 
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activities. The second quote shows how the project group had been working, 
not just on the problem of categorisation, but also on the discursive 
associations to the emerging object. They started creating its context, so to 
speak, by outlining a portfolio of product variants that together were meant 
to produce a “whole new category of fermented and dried fish products in 
the food trade”. Moreover, it would become profitable, as something “the 
consumer wants”. This statement points both towards the need for creating 
customer value in order to succeed, and towards Tine’s (and Tine R&D in 
particular) parallel work on reconstructing their conception of their own 
general knowledge/competence, i.e., not to “process milk”, but to “pick the 
raw material apart, and then put it back together in the way that the customer 
wants it” (Per Olav Skjervold, Tine R&D). In other words, they were 
creating meaning in the project by connecting it to the corporate strategic 
work on Tine’s competence and business development strategies, thereby 
also reinforcing these corporate strategies. 
 
A strong line of thought in the early argumentation for the project was how 
to secure internal support and resource access. This ‘internal marketing’ 
work can be traced as being implicit in various sources (some of which have 
been alluded to above), but there are also quite explicit accounts of this 
aspect of the innovation process. This is not to say, however, that the 
participants did not believe in their own argumentation: 
 
And when I look back on this now, I am almost embarrassed about what 
economic expectations we had to this. But I was very excited, and had 
incredible belief in it, and I still do, I am certain that even the 
Norwegian market has potential. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine 
R&D/marketing) 
 
Although acknowledging a few years later, after having left the project 
group, that they had been too optimistic, Torvanger was still excited about 
the innovation and had hopes for its success. Yet when confronted with the 
abovementioned ‘hairy’ goals in the early strategy notes, she could explain 
more about the dilemma of early phase innovation: 
 
Clearly, the dilemma when it comes to big investments, right, is costs, 
then you have to show expectations of great profit. But the question is, 
when you go for/pursue a radical innovation, like this, what kind of 
expectations should you have? Should you think from a seven-year 
perspective, or from a three-year perspective, as the management at the 
time demanded? And in my opinion, it is totally unrealistic to think 
from a three-year perspective, as it would be too little time for getting 
profits after 3 years. Right, you can’t make it, but that was the 
requirement. It wasn’t any problem for me, because I believed in it. 
(Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
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They knew the project would take time and money, and to legitimate this use 
of resources, expectations of great profit had to be demonstrated. Prosperous 
stories of the future had to be made, which were partially grounded in the 
product and their limited knowledge of its potential markets, but mainly 
based on the expected level of ambition within the company. If three years 
are what a company is allotted, then three years are what it starts out with, in 
the hope that it will be sufficient, or at least that management would gain 
enough commitment to the project by then to continue supporting its. Berit 
Nordvi could confirm how they worked to sell in things to Tine: 
 
The main aim with that pre-project group, which I participated in, was 
to sell in things to Tine. This was a project that was discussed back and 
forth, and there was a lot of uncertainty, so one of the ways we handled 
it – at Tine’s national meeting – was to serve the product to them, and 
they ate. In addition, we ran a consumer test, typically with focus 
groups, and got an evaluation of what people in Norway thought about 
it, according to three or four focus groups. The second step was to do a 
market survey by sending out the product around in Norway, early 
spring, to get feedback on the product. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D)  
 
In order to convince both the top management, and representatives for the 
owners, and make the product known to a wide group of people in the 
organisation, they arranged to serve tasters of Umi No Kami to participants 
at a national meeting. They acknowledged that a fish salami would have 
difficulties finding much enthusiasm, or even interest, without a 
demonstration of it – letting people taste, smell and feel it, use their senses to 
evaluate what their sceptical brains otherwise would have rejected as 
nonsense. Second, they sought to back up the physical experience of the 
product with argumentation based on consumer data. Thus, focus groups and 
market surveys (i.e. home testing of the product) were run to produce 
evidence of market potential.  
 
Types of customers and quality/price 
Who would want to buy salami of fish? The great interest and enthusiasm in 
the dairy for this hybrid object was derived for the most part from the 
technical and biological problems it promised to overcome: 
 
And to bind the fatty acids in fish, right, was very exiting, but this is 
technology driven, right, because to get hold of, or to master something 
new in this way I think triggered a lot, but at the same time we saw that 
there had to be some opportunities in the market for this. (Hilde 
Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
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“Mastering something new” triggered motivation, which again triggered a 
search for arguments in favour of the project, as “there has to some 
opportunities in the market”. Yet despite having been bought by a 
commercially oriented corporation, this project represented nothing but 
uncertainty when it came to potential customers: 
 
But it was a recipe for something we didn’t know what would become. 
It was called fish salami, but what on earth could it be used for? We 
didn’t know, but we just saw that it could mean many opportunities, a 
great potential. And we worked a lot with explorations of what markets 
it could be relevant for. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
When they could find ways of solving these biological problems63, then – 
surely – someone would be interested in buying the resulting products? 
 
Researcher: What kind of vision was it, then? What was the driving 
force for the project? 
Torvanger: I think that the sandwich filling was the first priority, that 
we at last could get a sandwich filling of fish to the people, in a way, 
because that is almost non-existent today, you have pâtés and smoked 
salmon, but smoked salmon is not an everyday product, right. So, I 
think that these thoughts were important in the beginning. 
 
“Sandwich filling of fish to the people” fits well within Tine’s portfolio of 
dairy products which have been on every Norwegian breakfast table for 
decades, an ‘everyday product’. Yet, did it fit in with these users’ 
perceptions and use-practices? Two of the main supporters of Umi No Kami 
(throughout the project) within the corporate management were confronted 
with the issue of involving users: 
 
That has been some of the critique in this field too, that it has been too 
little customer driven. But the problem is that where you have genuinely 
new products, and these are products that the customers have substitutes 
for today, then the customer finds the product interesting, but will the 
consumers be interested? Is this something that will sell? So, we have 
tried, to a large extent, to get customers in, and have them take a role. 
                                                     
63 In reality, we could also say that the problem as such were a result of the creative 
practice of scientists. Hence, both the problem and its solution are socio-materially 
constructed. The only thing missing, then, was to construct its use(rs) – a demanding 
process of negotiating distributors’ distribution portfolios and consumers’ daily 
eating habits and food making practices. 
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But it is pretty hard on these kinds of products. (Per Magnus Mæhle64, 
Tine) 
 
The way of conducting user-involvement in this more radical project was not 
routine, for a company with a 100 years of experience with incremental 
development of dairy products65. Thus, they both lacked established methods 
and practices for involving customers in radical innovation, and knowledge 
about how to handle the ambiguity of customers related to the initial interest 
and final purchase of new products. Note also the distinction made here 
between customers and consumers. While business customers (retail, 
restaurant, etc) showed some initial interest, they were still not easily 
involved in the project. Further, while business customers expressed some 
interest, it did not mean that the end users – the consumers – would be 
convinced to buy anything. Refsholt further problematised the issue of when 
and how to involve customers in the development process: 
 
What is interesting is: How much R&D work needs to be done before 
you have something to show the customers? So that you can establish 
customer involvement, and how significant is the development work 
during customer involvement? I think we have an increasing awareness 
of the importance of doing this early. But it is very difficult to do before 
you have something. You need to have something concrete. (Hanne 
Refsholt66, Tine) 
 
While acknowledging the need for early involvement and customers, 
Refsholt nevertheless questioned the timing of this. It was seen as difficult to 
involve external actors before having something concrete to show them; a 
prototype, or a demonstration of possible versions. An abstract idea was not 
enough. For the project group, this dilemma ended in a rather defensive 
strategy related to industrial customers (e.g. retail):  
 
                                                     
64 At the time of starting the Neptun and UNK projects, Mæhle had the position as 
director of Tine R&D, before moving to the position of corporate director with 
responsibilities in strategy and business development. 
65 According to my informants, Tine launched around 60 new products during 2004, 
most of them small variations on and developments of existing dairy products. 
While the market for traditional dairy products (milk in particular) decreased 
throughout the 1980s and 90s, and stabilized during the last years (in volume), TINE 
has been able to compensate by launching new and ’value added’ products 
(flavouring milk, branding fermented milk, developing concepts for specific 
consumer groups, etc), and steadily increased their revenues and profits. 
66 Refsholt was corporate director during the early phase of the UNK project, before 
substituting Jan Ove Holmen as CEO a few years later. 
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We had not come far enough to dare to contact the retail chains, and this 
had something to do with confidentiality too, right. (Hilde Torvanger, 
Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
“To dare to contact” retail chains both had to do with how to present 
something so unfinished without making fools of themselves, and with 
confidentiality. The fact that this was brought into Tine via a patent 
application, made them conscious of IPR issues that sought to keep the 
knowledge developed a secret until approaching the time for launching it in 
the market. Instead of exploiting their business relationships, they opted for 
the routine techniques of focus groups and market surveys, bypassing 
distributors and going directly to consumers to see how they would perceive 
and use the product: 
 
But we worked with market analysts, and we worked with focus groups, 
and we really tried to go in and understand how the consumers would 
use it. We simply served various dishes, and had them tasting and using 
it in various ways, in order to see whether it could be used as tapas, as 
sandwich filling, as an ingredient in hot dishes, as a pizza topping, and 
so we tried many things. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing)  
 
The results were relatively positive. Many of the consumers in the tests 
approved the product, and suggested how they preferred using it, while 
others found it too strange to integrate it in their cooking and eating 
practices. Yet there was one group of users who had been greatly involved 
during most of the project, namely chefs: 
 
And we worked with chefs, we had several sessions with the Culinary 
Institute, and with the chef at Neptun, he is experimental, very good at 
experimenting with new things, making dishes with brown snails and 
other ingredients in Bergen. So we obviously gathered a great deal of 
food competence, and in relation to how you can use the product, and 
what it is suitable for. But the main reason was to get knowledge of the 
consumer. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
A chef with experience from the Culinary Institute and various restaurants, 
Svein Erik Hilsen, working at Tine R&D, was participating on and off on the 
project. He was both an important advisor to the project group, and a bridge 
to other experienced chefs, both at the Culinary Institute, and at well-
regarded restaurants, like for instance the chef at the Neptun restaurant in 
Bergen. This was instrumental, both for evaluating recipes and for producing 





Management preconditions and initial intentions 
The management commitment to the project, or deciding to buy the patent 
and establish a product development project, did not mean that everything 
was then settled with corporate management. What were important for the 
direction of the project were its initial intentions, forming what we could call 
‘framework conditions’, stemming partly from management discussions and 
decisions on buying and formalising the project, and partly from the patent 
application itself – its recipe and prescriptions for making this ‘fermented 
fish product’. Both the technical side (raw material, processing technology) 
and the market side (mixed product, domestic and international) seems to 
some extent to have been conditioned by these initial intentions, limiting and 
shaping the potential pathways (’opportunities’) explored by the project 
team: 
 
When we started this, one of the premises that was very important, was 
that we had to use white fish, in a mix with red fish. The white fish had 
to be included. It was a technological challenge, and a visual challenge, 
as it had a grey colour. And the product was difficult to make, right. 
This was decided as a premise, and then we had to stick to it. So, when 
we started developing a communication platform and name, we talked a 
lot about ‘Sea Salami’, and all such ‘Salmon’-things, right, but this was 
out of the question, as we would then be limited exclusively to salmon, 
and we could not do that. And in addition, this product was supposed to 
be international, and a gourmet product, right, we wanted it to be 
upscale, so we ended with a product name called ‘Deli-Fjord’, 
delicacies from the Norwegian fjords, right. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine 
R&D/marketing) 
 
Although he had expressed sympathy with these framework conditions when 
discussing the marketing strategy, Torvanger described how this also limited 
their work. The obligation to include white fish led to technical difficulties in 
stabilising the product technically due to low quality in raw white fish 
materials, and its greyish colour was a challenge to associate with a ’gourmet 
product’. Finally, in the conceptualisation and naming process, they could 
not take into consideration things that hinted too much towards salmon. 
When questioned for more detail on these original preconditions and how 
they changed, Torvanger brought together several of the issues mentioned in 
this chapter: 
 
Clearly it created a lot of frustration along the way. When the changes 
were settled, things were in a way ok, but there were enormous 
challenges prior, because they demanded [the mixed version], and this 
was very difficult. We were obliged to launch in Norway first, before 
going international. So, we worked hard to understand how this product, 
which originally was to be an upper-class gourmet product and which 
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we don’t have large segments for in Norway, how could we manage to 
create a success story in the Norwegian market that would be the basis 
for going abroad? We worked a lot with the sandwich filling market, to 
see how we could get it in there. And, what is very difficult, then, is 
firstly that the sandwich filling market is very competitive, with many 
different actors, and a huge amount of different products, and secondly 
that consumer loyalty to sandwich fillings is very high. You know, how 
can you change those two or three products that you always have in 
your fridge? You will probably have many other things once in a while, 
but you have just a few permanent ones. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine 
R&D/marketing) 
 
In addition to the technical and conceptual challenges of mixing white and 
red fish, the obligation to launch in Norway first was here seen as 
problematic, in particular because an ‘upper class gourmet product’ would 
not find enough customers in this small and price- sensitive country, hence 
the production of a ‘success story’ legitimising going abroad would be 
challenging. Torvanger described the typical Norwegian consumer as 
extremely loyal to a small set of sandwich fillings, in a very competitive 
retail market. These associations to the mundane everyday eating habits of 
Norwegian households were not easy to combine with an ‘upper-class 
gourmet product’, which was mentioned in that same passage. What for a 
period of time seemed rigidly stable, however, was later radically changed in 
the shift from Umi No Kami to Salma: 
 
And then we had a challenge that we really did not understand along the 
way, but that we have seen very clearly afterwards, that the framework 
conditions from the corporate management changed a lot during the 
process. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
So, at the time, these preconditions were experienced as being very stable 
and restrictive, while later in the process, for some specific reasons, they 
could suddenly be changed. Yet how can you investigate the market, when 
being stuck with this obligatory framework condition at this stage, but still 
no finished product.  
 
International study tour 
Before reaching ‘closure’ regarding the product, i.e. really having something 
to present, how can you research its market opportunities? 
 
We sought consumer knowledge and market knowledge, to see what 
opportunities that were really there. And we worked a lot with studying 
what markets that could be relevant, related to the taste, right, it was a 
dried, fermented, and smoked fish taste, where would that be accepted? 
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And where do they eat much fish, in other words, where could we get it 
out to many different segments? (Hilde Torvanger, Tine 
R&D/marketing) 
 
The Umi No Kami project group chose to map the international cultural 
geography of food – identifying areas with significant “fish cultures” and 
“cured meat and salami cultures”, and then exploring these areas both by 
learning about their habits, preferences and distribution practices, and by 
giving out tasters of a few potential versions of their fish salami. 
Domestically, they used established market research methods to investigate 
the market, letting consumer representatives taste, use and evaluate versions 
of the product. The transformation of research interests into commercial 
products was in this case study obviously not a straightforward and simple 
exercise. This was therefore given some priority, in addition to the central 
task of getting the technology to work industrially. Responsibilities were 
given to project participants Hilde Torvanger for marketing, and Bente 
Mogård for internationalisation, and they organised a few study tours, to 
learn about local markets and get feedback on the fish salami from local 
‘experts’: 
 
And so we went out, we were allowed several study tours, and studied 
both, well, Italy related to the Mediterranean countries, and we went to 
Japan and South Korea, which are also important fish markets. Clearly, 
I have been able to explain better afterwards, we were given a lot of 
time, and we had lots of resources, though not unlimited, but we had 
lots of resources when we received both time and money to go on these 
study tours, and had room for playing around with things. (Hilde 
Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
Geographically and culturally, potential users and their contexts were 
investigated, with facilitation and help from Innovation Norway (the 
Norwegian Export Council). Under the commercial uncertainty of the 
project at the time, both the project team themselves, and their fellows in 
Innovation Norway, really felt that “going to the market first”,  was “a right 
way of doing things”. This view was further confirmed by the market actors 
visited:  
 
We got to talk to very different people, we talked to chefs in several 
different hotels, we talked to purchasing managers in big food stores, 
and we talked to food journalists, to analysis agencies, so there were a 
wide range of different inputs. And this was the main feedback; firstly 
that everyone found it to be very exiting that we went out at such an 
early stage of the project to really check out the opportunities, and 
secondly we brought in all of these tasters. There and then, the response 
on the product was very positive. But we got comments that there could 
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be changes on this and that, that there are opportunities here and there, 
etc. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
Both in relation to the new marketing dogma of ‘customer driven’ 
innovation, and to the experienced need for learning more about potential 
product/market interfaces, this act of asking actors closer to potential 
markets was experienced as being useful. Various ‘opportunities’ and 
‘opportunity gaps’ were found, enabling Torvanger to ‘explain better 
afterwards’ what the project was about, but on the other hand also 
maintaining the multiplicity, ambiguity and lack of focus by finding “too 
many fields of opportunity”. Most project participants supported the idea of 
going to ‘the market’ before finishing the product:  
 
We travelled to Italy and Asia to check out the markets, get response, 
signals on the market. The taste at the time was not as it is now, so in a 
way we presented something we did not yet have, thus we kept the 
presentation low profile, and talked more about the concept. We got 
positive responses during these early market encounters. But, we 
understood that we should absolutely not call it a ‘sausage’, it would 
then be associated with a cheap mixed product. (Karl Inge Rekdal, Tine 
R&D) 
 
To present something that one does “not yet have” is not an easy thing to do, 
and hence Rekdal preferred keeping a low profile on the product. He 
nevertheless found the tours useful, helping him in making sense of what to 
(not) call the product, and how to present it. Different versions of the product 
were brought on the tours, to get broader input for choosing direction in the 
project: 
 
We brought two, three or four different recipes. I don’t remember if we 
brought a product purely of salmon too, but I don’t think so. But we had 
one with a very high content of salmon. It looked much better, right, but 
the others had good taste too, the tastes were not very different, but 
what looked good, you know, the others had a too grey colour. And at 
the same time we got insight into distribution systems, retail chain 
structures, shopping patterns, in a way, we got plenty of input, 
knowledge, so that if we had chosen to go for, e.g., Japan, then, we had 
gotten a picture so that the next time we could ask more concrete 
questions, and go deeper into the issues that needed more depth. (Hilde 
Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
Thus, the visual performance of the product made a difference to these 
market representatives. The greyish colour of the versions with more white 
fish did not make as good of an impression as the light red colour of those 
containing more salmon – even though ‘the tastes were not very different’. 
The other learning output from these tours, was insight into the different 
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‘distribution systems’, i.e., how the fish/food industries were organised in 
the different regions, making it easier to be more goal oriented in further 
marketing work. However, when the time came to employ more common 
market research tools, they chose to focus on the domestic markets. 
 
Domestic market research 
While knowing the food retail structure in Norway through and through, the 
Umi No Kami project group knew less about how the domestic end-
users/consumers would judge their innovation, thus mobilising Tine’s 
apparatus for market research, though not before having stabilised the 
technology properly. After some frustrating months of work in the lab (see 
above), versions of the product were ready for testing by a number of 
Norwegian test users for exploring how a fish salami went together with 
Norwegian practices of cooking and eating, and how it fitted in refrigerators, 
in different meals, and among consumer preferences. However, as 
mentioned previously, first they chose to get the technology/recipe to work 
properly before doing anything more with potential markets and market 
representatives: 
 
Well, what happened in practice, to begin with there were a lot of 
fragmented market tests, and intense work in R&D, right, and one could 
not get the product to be stable and good. We worked with many other 
things at the same time, and then we said that ‘let’s cut all the other 
things, now we just have to work on making a good product, and when 
that is in place, then we can start looking at what to do. So, then we cut 
marketing, and customer surveys, and such things, and worked on the 
taste, then, on how to get a good and stable taste. And after around six 
months only focusing on the taste, then we had a good product, right, 
and we asked ‘what can we do with this?’, it surely could be used for 
something. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
At that point in time, the director for Tine Biomarin, Hovland, had become 
impatient with progress in the Umi No Kami project, and suggested focusing 
on one thing at a time. First, they had to make the technology work, which 
meant another six months of lab work before finally being able to control the 
crucial aspects of the production process, hence having something – a stable 
product – to present to the market. Then they could start doing more 
systematic market research, such as focus groups:  
 
And we worked with focus groups, and we really tried to go in and see 
how consumers would use it, tested it, simply served various dishes, and 
got them to taste and use it in different ways, and see what was suitable 
for tapas, on sandwich, as ingredient in hot dishes, on pizza, so we tried 
many different ways. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
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And then, home testing in 300 Norwegian households: 
 
When certain improvements had been made, so that we had a product, it 
was sent to the market, to members of the Norwegian population. This 
was to test the potential for re-purchase, and they looked at the 
Norwegian and the Scandinavian market. They made some reports on 
the potential size of the Norwegian market, where they said that it 
would be somewhere between ‘brown cheese’ and mackerel in tomato 
sauce, which is very large, but it is very difficult to make estimates on 
the potential volumes of a product. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
Together with some responses on preferences and suggestions for 
adjustments of the product, the market survey company made some 
estimates on the potential market size in Norway and Scandinavia, 
positioning the product among brown cheese and mackerel in tomato sauce. 
This would have made the fish salami one of the most sold sandwich fillings 
in the Norwegian market (which has, by the way, one of the large bread-
eating populations in Europe), which would thereby make the project 
profitable before even trying to access international markets. However, again 
with the curse of hindsight, such measures for this kind of product cannot in 
any sense be viewed as being very realistic, even though getting good 
feedback from the test users: 
 
They gave a pretty good re-purchase response, in the Norwegian 
market. So, this is the only, concrete, market analysis that has been 
made. But we know that, especially on new products, such market 
analyses do not have very high value. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
As Swensen indicated, market research during this phase of the project had 
limited value. It did provide some responses that the participants found to be 
useful; they also found it useful to learn about different regional food 
traditions in order to adapt the product to different markets. Further, perhaps 
most importantly, it did some work in producing ‘evidence’ for market 
potential in the internal marketing of the project, to Tine’s management, 
owners, and other involved actors. 
  
Summing up market opportunities 
Inspired and informed by these events, the team identified some marketing 
opportunities they considered to have potential:  
 
Firstly, we were able to identify these different segments that I 
mentioned, right, the sandwich area in Europe, the snack and gift market 
in the East, and so on, and then we could narrow down, right, and then 
we could start putting numbers on it, how big is this really? We could 
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buy numbers related to what we were talking about. (Hilde Torvanger, 
Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
So, according to Torvanger, the research enabled them to start narrowing 
down and choosing direction. In summing up the project, Bente Mogård, 
who was responsible for internationalisation, displayed some of the 
reasoning during the process. The early market studies identified “the areas 
in which such a product could work”, particularly the fermentation traditions 
in Spain, Italy, Germany and the fish traditions in Asia, especially Japan and 
Korea. These were also identified as markets with buying power. However, 
then “South-Europe was early put aside, as Norwegian fermented sausages 
not are comparable to the Spanish”. In realising how the success of new 
fermented products in this region would probably be closely connected to 
very local and culturally significant actors, they chose to go for Nordic 
markets on the European continent instead, in addition to Asian markets. As 
the participant with direct responsibilities for representing the international 
perspective, Mogård not only saw the project as a single project on fish, 
emphasising how they also “used the project to do something with the 
internationalisation at Tine”. The Umi No Kami project was described as a 
learning arena for Tine’s international activities in general.  
 
In summing up the most interesting alternative market regions and segments 
from the UNK market research, Torvanger made some clear distinctions, 
mainly related to cultural/geographical variations:  
 
We had a focus on the east. A sandwich filling in Norway, snack in 
Japan, perhaps even the gift market in the east, you know, the gift 
market is enormous, both in Korea and Japan. And in the Mediterranean 
and European area we had other opportunities, the fast growing 
sandwich culture, with lack of fish based fillings, a lot of tuna, but not 
anything else, and this was a clean and dry fish product. You know, 
ordinary smoked salmon is used, but is more greasy, right, while this 
product was easier to handle, on the move. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine 
R&D/marketing) 
 
The ‘salami culture’ of the Mediterranean had been ruled out, and so they 
were left with Umi No Kami as a sandwich filling for the Norwegian and 
European markets, as well as a snack and  gift for the Japanese and Asian 
markets. The practical characteristics of being ‘clean and dry’ instead of the 
more ‘greasy’ smoked salmon and tuna had become a selling point for 
Europe. In Asia, Umi No Kami sought to be associated with the practices of 
eating more fish, and of giving red coloured gifts. Some choices were made, 
but Umi No Kami was still a multiple – and hence ambiguous – object, both 
in relation to market segments and to product features. This ambiguity 
cannot only be explained by these sets of ‘market opportunities’, as each of 
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them would need strong representation by participants within the project to 
survive. It was, in other words, a negotiated aspect of the identity of the 
innovation. 
 
Summing up identity negotiations 
There were three different, although interrelated, negotiations about the 
identity of Umi No Kami. One was related to the various interests of the 
involved participants working on this fish salami invention: 
 
You had Neptun, which was a very research based interest, not product 
focused at all, but more on research. And this was a very strong driver, 
because if there is one person who knows what she wants, then 
everyone goes there. Thus, there were many persons with different 
opinions, both related to what kind of fish to use, what kind of raw 
material, and what kind of process. So, the leading focus was related to 
research, because the researchers knew where they wanted, and had 
parallel activities aiming towards a PhD, and the other [product 
development] was a direction that did not know what it wanted. And 
then you had marketing, which neither had the understanding of which 
way to go. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
In the Umi No Kami project, the people coming from the Neptun project had 
clear interests in science and technology development, seeing Umi No Kami 
as a natural evolution of their research interests, even if they were aiming for 
commercialisation. Then there were the product development people 
working in a middle position between research and commerce, seeking to 
put together and stabilise a product that would work in industrial production 
and would hopefully find commercial use. The third group was those 
working with marketing, which had responsibility for researching potential 
markets, and beginning to develop a market concept for the innovation. 
According to Swensen, only the Neptun people at the time had a clear 
conception of what the Umi No Kami project should be about, and therefore 
more influence than the groups which ,had to struggle with the huge 
uncertainties regarding how and where to commercialise the innovation. It 
was brought into Tine in the first place by scientists interested in the 
technological matters of fermentation, proteins and fat stabilisation, and so 
these research-based interests retained strong representation in the project 
throughout much of the Umi No Kami project.  
 
A second negotiation was related to the preconditions and directives from 
top management, shaping the perceptions of what the project group could 
and could not do with the project. I have earlier described the initial 
intentions of the Neptun and Umi No Kami projects, and how the patent 
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application and top management decisions became a quite rigid frame for 
Umi No Kami. The project team reported having problems getting approval 
for changes in this framework, and also struggled to get extra resources. 
Then, after two years of technical and conceptual exploration of fermenting 
fish, a chain of events occurred that totally changed the situation. Suddenly, 
these preconditions could be renegotiated and changed. One version of the 
story was that it was triggered by changes in Tine’s corporate management: 
 
But what happened in the corporate management was that the strongest 
advocates for preconditions such as doing this in Norway, that it had to 
be a sandwich filling, and those things, quit and went out. And then the 
preconditions fell too. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
The corporate director for Tine’s Northern region, Kåre Magnussen, had 
together with Per Magnus Mæhle (director for R&D, and later corporate 
director for strategy/business development) and Ingrid Svensen 
(international director), had responsibility for the biomarine activities at 
Tine. When Magnussen quit his job, supposedly the strongest proponent for 
the initial preconditions of the project, suddenly the whole project could be 
re-evaluated: 
 
But when [Magnussen] went out, they did a re-evaluation of it, and it 
was decided not to launch it in Norway first, but rather internationally, 
and this was at the same time as the project was moved into the line 
organisation. (Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
The initial preconditions, which were at times experienced as rigid and 
frustrating to the project group, were opened to renegotiation, and significant 
changes were done in the project strategy. From working hard both for the 
domestic and the international markets, Norway was now removed as 
‘obligatory passage point’ for Umi No Kami’s marketing strategy. 
Furthermore, the transfer of the project from being a Tine R&D project to 
becoming a commercial venture within Tine Biomarin (which slightly later 
merged with Tine Ingredients), was a strong signal of change of focus – 
from product development to commercialisation. This transition became the 
start of a radical transformation of the project. Or perhaps these 
renegotiations were first initiated not by the top management so much as by 
a new constellation taking shape between Tine Biomarin/Ingredients with 
Gunnar Hovland as new director and a new group of researchers within Tine 
R&D with Per Olav Skjervold as a leading figure.  In any case, this led to a 
major shift, both in the organisation of, and the idea about the innovation 
process, which is something I will come back to below. 
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The third negotiation was between humans and non-human elements; 
between researchers and product developers and their raw materials – 
biological substances of various kinds, in the battle for making the resulting 
product materially and technologically stable. The various fish species had 
different characteristics, or we could say preferences, which to various 
degrees were combinable with the other raw materials or with conceptions of 
how the product should look, smell and taste. The various micro-organisms 
at work also had their own interests; mould found the product extremely 
attractive and was hard to keep away, while the best tribe of lactic acid 
bacteria needed to be identified and recruited. As was described about 
technology development earlier in this chapter, some things were rendered 
impossible – technologically not feasible – while other things worked out 
through adaptation work. This clearly influenced the conceptualisation work. 
Going for an everyday, low-price, version of the product became 
increasingly difficult in the face of the increasing costs of high quality 
materials and production technologies. On the other hand, the use of only 
salmon, and the qualities of the pre-rigor raw material opened up new 
opportunities on the high-end side of the scale. 
 
4.5 Reorganising the project and scaling up production 
Along with the work on technical and conceptual development, work was 
also done on identifying and evaluating alternative ways of taking the Umi 
No Kami from the lab to large scale production and distribution. Doing 
everything themselves at Tine was considered to be an alternative, but their 
lack of knowledge, both on the meat and fish side, was viewed as being a 
reason for also considering partnering opportunities. During this process of 
partner search, a number of alternative solutions had been considered. Early 
on, the Norwegian Meat Cooperative, Gilde, had been consulted to check on 
their interests in collaboration. Gilde both had expertise on process 
technology of fermenting meat, and a dominant market position on cured 
meat products in Norway, but Gilde rejected the proposal:  
 
Tine has no experience with climatising. And we had a feeling that 
Gilde did not want competition, or perhaps we were not good enough in 
marketing the project to them. Gunnar [Hovland] and I could not reach 
them. (Karl Inge Rekdal, Tine R&D) 
 
Gilde did not seem very interested in backing up commercialisation of the 
‘fish salami’, a potential challenger of their core business. Another 
alternative for Tine was to buy a meat facility in Levanger that was closing 




We knew that a facility in Levanger was to be closed down. So, parts of 
the project team, together with some quality control people from us, 
went to have a look. Karl Inge Rekdal wanted to start scaling up the 
production relatively early. This was not done, and we had many 
discussions about this, which had a lot to do with the insecurity we felt 
in relation to the microbiology. The product developers did not want to 
start scaling up production in such a facility at the time. (Berit Nordvi, 
Tine R&D) 
 
This became a serious conflict in priorities and timing of how to scale up 
production within the team. The product developers, still struggling hard to 
stabilise the technology (mainly due to the mould problem), strongly 
opposed the project manager, and wrote a separate evaluation on the matter 
and sent it directly to the top management: 
 
This thing about buying that facility, it was a very tricky thing, that I 
used a lot of my time on to. We were to buy a facility in Levanger, a 
meat facility. And I feel that it is my fault that we did not do this, but 
that is fair enough. It was a fine facility, and everything was ok, and 
they were supposed to close down their production. But it was all too 
early, because at that time we had all the trouble with the mould, and we 
had not yet managed to produce anything in the lab. I made a note on 
the pros and cons, and then it was decided to not buy it. (Janne Haugdal, 
Tine R&D) 
 
These concerns about the unstable state of the technology in the lab, and the 
following uncertainty about requirements for scaling up the production, 
made the management decide to wait with further investments until the 
object was stable in small scale production in the lab, in spite of the project 
manager’s suggestion. Two other companies that were considered were 
Sunnfisk and Lofotprodukter. While Sunnfisk was disregarded relatively 
early, Lofotprodukter, partly owned by Tine, and already producing a 
number of different mince based fish products, came to be seen as the most 
relevant partner, until the pre-rigor salmon from Bremnes Seashore was 
tested in the recipe: 
 
When we started to get control of the raw material, and we started with 
fresh fish, it was Bremnes that clearly stood out as an obvious partner. 
(Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
This “control of the raw material” referred to the use of fresh pre-rigor 
salmon from Bremnes Seashore. From then on, access to high-quality raw 
materials quickly became the most important criteria, not only for making 
and explaining the product, but also for evaluating potential partners: 
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We evaluated two or three other companies too, amongst these were 
Lofotprodukter, and we had arguments on things like equipment, 
localities and facilities. Had they been supreme, then we would have 
collaborated with them. But when the raw material became the pivotal 
element for collaboration, then we made an objective evaluation of the 
other partners. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
With raw material quality as pivotal criteria, and with Bremnes’ pre-rigor 
salmon as the benchmark, the matter became increasingly clear to the 
organisation: 
 
Well, the reason that it became Bremnes was that they had the pre-rigor 
salmon, it was very special, it had added value, which was very 
important, and which I still regard as very important. We, therefore, 
became very fascinated, again, by the technology. (Hilde Torvanger, 
Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
Thus, Lofotprodukter and other alternatives were turned down in favour of 
the provider of the best raw materials, and the project participants were – 
again – thrilled by access to novel technology. This choice and the process 
that preceded it also had some relational components. The newly hired 
university researchers had already a long-standing research relationship with 
Bremnes Seashore, and Nordvi felt that this influenced the choice: 
 
But, obviously, it was based on close relationships. It was also an 
evaluation of Lofotprodukter, in which Tine is part-owner, and 
evaluation of the facility outside Bergen which Fjordland is associated 
with. And in that final evaluation before choosing Bremnes, we in fact 
sent our quality control people to evaluate those facilities, but in a way, 
they felt that they were overruled, and that Bremnes should be chosen. 
(Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
This view was confirmed by a member of the new group of researchers: 
 
[We] have had a research relationship with [Bremnes Seashore]. This is 
probably the lever that has made Salma fresh loin, and all that, come 
about. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
Although being framed by the ‘winning group’ as an objective and open 
search for the best alternative, we also see how various interests and 
relationships were part in shaping the process. Whether being about 
frustrated product developers wanting to put further investments on hold, or 
new team members with established relationships to a supplier, the process 
of the partner search involved technical, economic and social rationalities. 
The introduction of a new relationship (between Tine and Bremnes Seashore 
via the new researchers) and a new raw material (pre-rigor salmon) to the 
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process changed the ‘rules of the game’, making raw material supply the 
pivotal criteria for partner evaluation. This happened parallel to the 
abovementioned shift in the organisation and framework conditions of the 
project. They could have considered other partner opportunities, such as 
aligning with actors closer to the market (e.g. distributors), but this was not 
seen as a significant pathway: 
 
Not when we considered alliances. Because then we had to go into the 
product, as we had big challenges in making the product work, 
stabilising it, and so we had a strong focus on this, and not least, that the 
raw material had high enough quality, and that we had good access to it. 
(Hilde Torvanger, Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
Stabilising production was considered a more pressing issue, and more 
strategic to the immediate progress of the project. Yet if, for example, access 
to distribution and customers had received the same emphasis in the 
argumentation as the access to raw materials, would then the process become 
very different? Anyway, Bremnes Seashore was in the end chosen as partner 
for industrialising Umi No Kami. In a note to corporate management at Tine, 
three potential partners were considered, ending with a clear 
recommendation: 
 
Choice of Bremnes Seashore is recommended for the following reasons: 
They have economic and financial strength, and a wish for 
collaboration. Lofotprodukter only wants production-for-hire, and has 
an overextended economy. Sunnfisk has an uncertain economic 
platform. Bremnes Seashore has ‘super-fresh’ pre-rigor raw materials, 
which is crucial to Umi No Kami. The others must get pre-rigor from 
other production units, and cannot do the processing industrially. All of 
the companies are dependent on heavy assistance from Tine R&D. 
Lofotprodukter comes best out of this, because they already produce 
food articles. (Note to the Tine management from the Umi No Kami 
project group, 2003) 
 
Further in this note a plan for “gradual industrialisation in collaboration with 
Bremnes Seashore” was suggested, with a capacity for 200 tonnes in the 
production facility in the first phase. Economic strength, unique raw 
materials and “a wish for collaboration” were mobilised as arguments in 
favour of Bremnes Seashore, while the limited interest in partnership of 
Lofotprodukter, and the weak economy of Sunnfisk underscored this 
recommendation. Behind this decision was, as mentioned previously, also a 
process of re-organising the biomarine portfolio of Tine, including Umi No 
Kami. I will now go on to describe the process of changing direction in the 
project in more detail. I will also describe more of Bremnes Seashore’s 
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relationships to actors in this group, and their reasons for being interested in 
collaborating with Tine.  
 
The ‘coup’ of Umi No Kami 
The process of re-organising the Umi No Kami project came out of the 
abovementioned changes both in the corporate management at Tine, and in 
the management and merger of Tine Biomarin and Tine Ingredients. 
Swensen called this a ‘coup’ of the Umi No Kami project, to create more 
momentum towards commercialisation. A ‘coup’ is perhaps not an 
appropriate term, as the shift was largely initiated and implemented by 
Tine’s management (the business unit director, Hovland, aligned with the 
new researchers and with the corporate management). Nevertheless, the shift 
represents a radical break with Umi No Kami as it had been originally 
organised and conceived of, and therefore the term helps describe the 
political drama inherent in the process. The result was a project changing 
from being clearly R&D based on a commercial venture with ambitions to 
commercialise a brand concept. I had met up with the new constellation 
several times before I got to hear about this shift. In my field notes from the 
time period, we can read the following: 
 
During lunch at Tine R&D, the people around the table started talking 
about a person with strong opinions about the development of the fish 
salami, about some communication or collaboration problems, and 
about the fact that this person no longer had much direct involvement in 
the product development project. The contours of a conflict in interests 
came to the fore. It appeared that it was the identity of the fish salami 
(or of the Umi No Kami project), both in terms of technical 
specification and commercial presentation that were at stake. I learned 
that this person (Nordvi) had been central in the early phases of 
developing the fish salami, being project leader of the Neptun project 
and writing her PhD on the role of proteins in this process. I also 
learned that the project had changed so that it was not viewed as 
relevant to involve her anymore, but that she still had relatively strong 
opinions on the matter. 
 
The fact that I had not heard anything about this during several weeks of my 
fieldwork triggered my curiosity, and I sought to retrace some of the events 
of this coup in subsequent meetings and interviews. The change started with 
the initiation of a reorganising process. Gunnar Hovland was hired as 
director for Tine Biomarin at a point when Tine had invested a great deal in 
blue-green activities but without getting anything back. Although having a 
long-term perspective on these investments, it was time to start 
demonstrating some commercial potential. Around the same time, Swensen, 
Skjervold and the other researchers from the University of Life Sciences 
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were hired by Tine R&D, and Skjervold and Hovland soon found some 
common interests. Hovland interpreted his mission as being one of “cleaning 
up the mess”, i.e., structuring and organising the activities more efficiently, 
and evaluating what to do next. During this period, the initial Umi No Kami 
team gradually understood that something happened, although not getting 
the full picture:  
 
Bente Mogård was part of the team, and Hilde Torvanger, who had 
worked in marketing for many years, and they represented the market. 
But in particular Hilde was in a way duped out in that phase, and she did 
not know what happened at all, clearly she was forced into a tight spot. 
(Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
In not knowing exactly what would happen, they feared Hovland’s 
scepticism to the whole project; that he would chose to close it down as part 
of his task to restructure Tine’s biomarine activities.  
 
In the beginning, they were pretty sceptical to the product, which is 
perhaps not so strange, when they had a project that had not managed to 
produce anything during the entire fall of 2002. I don’t know if they 
were uncertain about whether they should close down the project or not, 
but that’s how I experienced it. After awhile, they prioritised the project, 
and they made the decision to only use salmon. From my point of view, 
there were not very clear indications that pre-rigor was so much better, 
it may have some product advantages, in terms of texture. But it was 
promoted as if it had very big advantages. (Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
Pre-rigor salmon triggered enthusiasm and new hopes for the Umi No Kami 
project in the new management of Tine Biomarin/Ingredients, and it was 
decided to remove white fish from the recipe, something the earlier project 
group had not been allowed to do by corporate management. The framework 
conditions had changed: 
 
It was from the top management, yes, the framework conditions were 
changed so that when they took over the projects, they did not start from 
scratch, but they suddenly had a totally different set of conditions. Thus, 
they went for a new conceptualisation process, right, as they then only 
had salmon, they looked towards different markets. (Hilde Torvanger, 
Tine R&D/marketing) 
 
How come the corporate management and board of Tine accepted these 
rather radical changes in an already expensive and so-far unprofitable 
project? How could they accept changing the framework conditions for the 
project? They went from a blended white and red fish recipe to pure salmon, 
from doing domestic marketing prior to international marketing to then 
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launching internationally first, and eventually from organising everything 
internally at Tine (R&D) to spinning the project out in a joint venture with 
Bremnes Seashore. In addition to changes in the top management and the 
business unit management, a part of the explanation came from the emerging 
impatience from the owners and the top management towards the biomarine 
projects. This was not said very explicitly in public, but there were some 
signs of increasing pressure for commercial results, for producing some 
success stories  to support the biomarine strategy, and for damming up for all 
above-the-line expenditures, e.g., in Hovland’s approach to his new job at 
Tine Biomarin/Ingredients: 
 
[We have] a lot of ideas about what we could do further. But Tine has 
until now not profited at all on such projects, even after having invested 
large sums of money. Therefore, these two projects 67  have to start 
generating profits before we can do anything more. (Gunnar Hovland, 
Tine Ingredients) 
 
To Hovland, the way of generating profits meant to create order within 
chaos, and restructure the project portfolio: 
 
A lot of my energy has gone towards cleaning up in those companies 
and acquisitions that were done a few years ago. And now we need to 
show results on these ventures. We are in the process of checking for 
synergies between these ventures and Tine’s core business. If we cannot 
find synergies, we will sell the companies68, since then financial actors 
may do it better than us. Now all my capacity is directed at these two 
projects, to get them through. For example on the Bremnes-project, the 
risk of failure is perhaps 95%, but the potential for profits is billions. 
We are dependent on the corporate management to succeed, but both the 
CEO and the head of the board are supporting and working hard to back 
up these activities. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
With backing from the top management, Hovland now needed to prove the 
commercial value of the biomarine strategy before being able to expand. In a 
later meeting, Jan Ove Tryggestad could confirm my impression of ‘the 
                                                     
67 Hovland was here talking about the Umi No Kami project and the fish oil/by-
product factory Maritex in Vesterålen producing purified omega 3 to be added in 
’functional foods’. 
68 Hovland elaborated on this process: “That is why we sold Nutri Marine Life 
Sciences. And now we are checking this in Maritex, for example if there is a basis 
for producing omega 3 milk. If we succeed, Tine will not be the main customer of 
Maritex, it will be sold internationally, but we have to sell competence together with 
the ingredients, and packaging alternatives, etc. And then Tine may produce it for 




coup’, and of impatience with the management regarding the Umi No Kami 
project. Tryggestad had been a long time owners’ representative on the 
board of directors at Tine. He had also been on the board of Tine Biomarin 
from the start, which, he argued, had not worked according to how it was 
intended. It became too research based, and it was difficult to bring the 
projects towards the market. The impatience and uncertainty about the 
continuation of Umi No Kami had certainly become an issue in the top 
management at Tine. They felt that things had taken a lot of time, without 
showing enough progress and results. They were uncertain about whether 
and how the project should be pursued further. Hence, the shift was seen as a 
‘necessary change’. The board was impatient and frustrated over lack of 
progress. Tryggestad, as the owners’ representative, fronted the project 
towards the owners, and as he said, there had been a “long downturn” in 
representing these projects to the farmer-owners. The focus from 
management had changed from explorative learning through investing in a 
set of very different biomarine ventures, towards control and milestones of a 
narrow set of activities. Thus, this setting of a changed corporate 
management group, and Hovland and Skjervold’s linking of Umi No Kami 
to pre-rigor salmon, as well as their renewed vision of commercialisation, 
convinced the corporate board and management that they should change 
their initial framework conditions to enhance their opportunities for getting 
something back on their investments on fish salami. The initial project 
manager for Umi No Kami, Rekdal, left the project for a job as managing 
director in another company, and the rest of his crew were more or less 
pushed to the side in this process, in the beginning serving as two competing 
groups, and after a while with the new group taking over:  
 
Gunnar [Hovland] had been hired then, and Per Olav [Skjervold] was 
hired too, and they started running their own course. Hence, it became a 
project with two groups that did not collaborate. (Berit Nordvi, Tine 
R&D) 
 
According to several informants, the Umi No Kami project had lacked 
direction for a while before this, and the form, taste and quality of the 
product were contested issues among the different professional groups in the 
team. Nevertheless, during this period the technology and the recipe had 
been made to work, and developed into something more presentable. The 
groups involved were identified by Swensen as those working on (1) 
fermentation, (2) whey proteins, (3) process optimisation and (4) raw 
material quality/variation. There was a struggle for influence, partly by 
doing ‘successful’ experiments, partly via mobilising arguments and vision, 
and partly by shaping evaluation criteria. On the technical (experiment) side, 
the process of getting in control of the project evolved through technical and 
argumentative trials: 
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An example is in a project meeting where we started seeing good results 
on the effects of raw material variation, and where we – who worked 
with this – did a coup of the project, and then the other group took the 
project back to their professional domain, and it has been different 
interests, where we have made coups of each others experiments. (Lars 
Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
At any given point in time, the group in control of the experiments had 
power to influence the further direction of the project, as long as their 
experiments showed progress in producing ‘evidence’, i.e., an improved 
product according to evaluation criteria that were also parts of the 
negotiations. In this case study, the battle was between representatives of 
pre-rigor salmon (‘raw material variation’) and representatives of bacteria 
cultures and whey proteins. Further, to strengthen their chances, supporting 
technologies were mobilised by the pre-rigor group. The efforts to measure 
(and therefore control) fat content in salmon intensified with Swensen’s 
participation, even though being a premature technology for this purpose: 
 
Now we are back to the handling of raw materials, right, the product has 
to have a certain percentage of fat, proteins and water, and water 
activity. The product parameters have to be defined. The reason I used 
saithe was that I knew the fat percentage in Norwegian salmon was very 
broad. And so I would rather have done it in the mincer, by adding 
saithe, rather than sorting only salmon. Tine chose to sort the salmon 
with a technology they did not have, which won’t make it easier to 
finish the project. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Slinde, in delivering central premises for the ‘bacteria and protein’-group, 
preferred to control the fat percentage by mixing white and red fish in the 
mincer. Still, with Swensen and Skjervold, near-infrared technology was 
introduced to the project, first manually, and later it was sought to be 
automated. When the experiments with pre-rigor salmon in the Umi No 
Kami recipe showed good results, it was not difficult to take control of the 
project and put one of the new researchers (Swensen) in charge on the R&D 
side. 
 
It has been the case that the person having the vision also was the 
person in charge, as when we saw the significance of raw material 
variation, and then we also got a very good argument for leading and 
steering the other processes. It further laid the foundation for identifying 
the effects of the various types of fermentation cultures, and the effect 
of the whey proteins. So, to get control over the raw material was the 
tool that made it possible to evaluate the effects of the other input 




By winning the battle for vision and leading the process, one also had the 
privilege, based on their ‘model’, of evaluating the effects of the other input 
factors. When the emerging new constellation gained strength, the story was 
effectively shaped on behalf of pre-rigor salmon as crucial for the quality 
and concept of the fish salami. The former lack of knowledge about the 
effects of input factors was seen as part of the problem: 
 
And then, in that phase which I call ‘chaotic’, where no one knew the 
direction, did not have a product that held together, nothing, one just 
had a few research results showing a tendency, and so it was very 
chaotic because no one knew fully the effect of their input factors. 
Later, when we started getting a product that worked, it was a lot easier 
to gather the professional groups. You get something you can 
acknowledge, and then it is a lot easier to gather around it. (Lars Petter 
Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
It seems that the various input factors, such as knowledge and technologies 
from different professional groups, were assigned value post-hoc. The 
effects were, in other words, negotiated among the participants, both 
according to the actual results of experimentation, and according to the story 
the leading group wanted to tell – in this case study a story of a novel raw 
material with great opportunity. In this quest for position in the project, the 
new researchers had worked ‘on the side’ of the formal experiment design to 
test their pre-rigor raw material in the Umi No Kami recipe and gain 
argumentative strength:  
 
The professional group dealing with whey proteins was very strong 
then, and in particular Berit Nordvi, there was in a way very few who 
managed to oppose her, while Per Olav and I, we managed in a way to 
run over it. I would not say that we influenced decisions on it, but we 
did somewhat what we wanted. We did things on the side, like those 
things to do with fresh fish, supplementary experiments we did, that 
were not planned, but that we did after the others had gone home. (Lars 
Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
In this way, Swensen and Skjervold could use informal activities to gain 
strength to formalise their position to realise their interests, interests that 
became aligned with the new management of Tine Biomarin/Tine 
Ingredients. But, what other groups had been involved in the development of 
Umi No Kami? After buying the patent application from Slinde, Tine had cut 
off some of its relations to science, and after this ‘coup’ even more science 
relations were removed from the project, while adding others. Swensen’s 
account of academic input emphasised hygiene and chemometrics: 
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There have been something we call ‘stress tests’, how will the product 
stand a stress of, if you add a little listeria, and then this with NIR [near-
infrared measurement], sorting on fat content. One group working on 
hygiene and one group working on chemometrics, or NIR, those two 
groups have been important. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
Research groups on these issues from the Food Research Institute and the 
University of Life Sciences had been consulted at various points. However, 
again the knowledge fields of fermentation and proteins were left out of the 
story. According to the early Umi No Kami project team, valuable input had 
been made from such research groups at the same academic institutions. The 
post-hoc negotiation on the meaning and value of input factors also pertained 
to external relations.  
 
In the revision of the biomarine portfolio, and the inherent evaluation of 
what to do with the Umi No Kami project, those who had been driving the 
project were thus far not included. In a conflict on the direction, both on 
technology development and on conceptualising the product, the new 
management of Tine Biomarin/Ingredients did not open up their processes 
and emerging plans to everyone involved. Hence, some felt sidetracked and 
chose to withdraw from further engagements with the project, and turbulence 
in the team increased. Several people visited the R&D project manager 
position before Swensen eventually got the job: 
 
Janne Haugdal quit as project manager during the spring of 2004, and 
then Line Torsvik took over for a short period, and then a new project 
manager from Tine was hired, Astri Ruud, who was relatively new in 
the organisation. Lars Petter came after her again, so there have been a 
lot of project managers, then. You may say that there was a lot of mess 
in the organisation, because this was a typical R&D driven project, 
regarding who to involve, where it should be organised, in the 
international department, or at Tine Ingredients, or simply in R&D? 
(Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
The original project group consisted of dairy researchers (micro-biology; 
bacteria cultures and proteins), aqua-cultural researchers (mainly on 
technology and product development), a chef, in addition to representatives 
from marketing and internationalisation. After participating in a meeting 
with the group, Kiland found it “very easy” to downsize the staffing of the 
project. Swensen became project manager on the R&D side, as the only 
remaining permanent resource on the project. It was believed to be easier to 
achieve agreement between two than between ten, and even more so when 
from the outset these two belonged to the same ‘side’ of interests – 
representing the commercialisation and pre-rigor constellation after the 
reorganisation of Tine Ingredients: 
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All others were just cut off. And we agreed to cut away most of the 
hours assigned to the project, and we reduced the R&D costs by two 
thirds. And it was easy to get approval for this, R&D and we were in the 
same boat, we had to succeed on fish. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
For Kiland, lack of market interaction, at the expense of technical issues, 
represented a bigger problem in the project: 
 
It is always the case that R&D, well, it is always marketing that decides, 
right. And I think that [Berit Nordvi] had influence on the group, and I 
know that there were internal disagreements. And I think she couldn’t 
get [her suggestions] approved in marketing, thereby losing progress. I 
participated in one of these R&D/marketing meetings, and it was useful 
just to sit there listening. It took long time, everybody wanted to say 
something, and there were around 10 people there, and there was 
perhaps just two that needed to be there at any given point in time. It 
was about the product, micro-biology, stabilise a sensitive product, bind 
water, freshness, and all this. It was a little like an endless wander in the 
professions, then. You could see people were tired, you could see 
signals between people, etc. But within that group, there were many 
dynamic and clever people. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
‘Endless’ exploration of possible solutions to technological challenges 
resulting in loss of touch with marketing issues, that was how the early Umi 
No Kami process was represented by those taking over, therefore taking 
quite radical steps in reorganising the whole thing. However, in a reflexive 
moment, Kiland acknowledged the importance of timing in relation to 
distribution of roles and agency in this and similar projects: 
 
I think that if I had come into the project earlier, when the project had 
its thinking cap on, the patent application was there, and they were 
supposed to make a product, then we would probably go through the 
very same idle development process, and I would have become 
synonymous with stagnation. This is not line extension, where you start 
out with some knowledge about what the customer needs. It does not 
exist previously. I think that no matter what, you have to burn some 
people on that road, it is only timing that matters. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
There were real (material) and challenging problems to be solved, problems 
of raw material characteristics, of technology development, combined with 
blindfolded explorations of market potential and appropriate 
conceptualisations of a product not seen in a market before. Such a complex 
process was perceived by Kiland as being so demanding and uncertain that it 
was necessary “burn some people” in the process. Clearly, in this new phase, 
they needed different knowledge than in the earlier phases, but some of the 
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earlier participants questioned whether the new organisation would have 
benefited from keeping closer relations to some of the previous work in the 
projects. Together with the sidetracking of people concerned with the 
marketing of Umi No Kami, a lot of the early knowledge and analysis of 
potential markets was also forgotten. Skjervold’s expertise of salmon 
processing and his relations to Bremnes Seashore triggered Hovland and his 
organisation, and they started exploring opportunities for connecting 
Bremnes with the Umi No Kami project: 
 
Gunnar Hovland was hired as the one responsible for the whole fish 
strategy. Per Olav has the role as professional on the research side, he 
had worked with the pre-rigor challenge at Bremnes, and of course he 
had a personal wish to cooperate, and that Tine should go for that 
company, then. Without a doubt, he was the one who came up with that 
question of pre-rigor salmon in the project. And the attempt at 
developing measuring technology to sort fish, such a NIR-instrument. 
(Berit Nordvi, Tine R&D) 
 
A constellation formed of commercially focused management and pre-rigor 
salmon-oriented researchers. In the process of restructuring the portfolio of 
biomarine activities, Hovland was sceptical to the Umi No Kami project, but 
eventually chose to give it a try – get the fermentation technology working 
and start the commercialisation process. Hence, the people involved were 
encouraged to explore possible ways of connecting the two. In this way the 
technological interests of Swensen and Skjervold came together with 
Hovland’s efforts to bring the Umi No Kami project towards the market and 
thereby showing some economic results to Tine’s board and corporate 
management.  
 
Skjervold and his university colleagues got influence on the biomarine 
activities at Tine in general, as well as on the Umi No Kami project in 
particular. The relations and expertise they brought with them on processing 
of salmon seems to have been very important for their impact in Tine: 
 
It was epoch-making to us to have a person with enough competence to 
build bridges between Tine’s milieu and another milieu. In that project, 
I think it was vital that he had the network, and that he managed to be 
methodical in the approach, and managed to communicate with both 
camps. (Hanne Refsholt, Tine) 
 
In the situation where Tine’s initial crew were frustrated with raw material 
quality, disagreeing on how to go about the further process, and where 
management started getting impatient for results, both middle and top 
management were pleased with someone coming in with clear suggestions 
and an established network for solving the problem. Another area of 
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ambiguity was the market side. What was the ‘need’ in ‘the market’ for a 
fish salami? Or how should this project be shaped or changed in order to be 
accepted by distributors and convince potential users? While not having any 
clear answers available, the new constellation around Umi No Kami sensed 
that selling a product based on pre-rigor salmon would be easier and more 
valuable than staying closer to the initial idea of a mixed white and red fish 
recipe of fish salami. Hence, the argumentation for teaming up with Bremnes 
Seashore was strengthened. When arguing for the new project organisation, 
with Bremnes Seashore as partner, Hovland put a lot more emphasis on the 
opportunities that would open up by starting collaboration with Bremnes 
Seashore on pre-rigor salmon than on the challenges and costs of 
establishing a joint venture with this company. Crucially, they had a letter of 
intent from a big French catering actor, which was used for everything it was 
worth in selling in the new plan and mobilising resources: 
 
What in fact was the lever for industrialising the product was that Tine 
Biomarin had got a quite big and solid customer in France that wanted 
to use the product. Later, they have not been involved at all, but this was 
the lever that gave us accept for those investments both in Tine and in 
Bremnes. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
After having received the necessary mandate from corporate management, 
Hovland, Kiland and Swensen never mentioned the French actor again to me 
again. The French had lost interest, but had been useful for the time being. I 
will now go on to explore some of reasons for connecting blue and green 
food-industries, and what role this played in the emerging interaction 
between Bremnes Seashore and Tine. 
 
The market system for fish as barrier to innovation 
The idea of blue-green innovation seems to be based on the recognition of 
certain specificities within each of the industries that were seen as limitations 
to further development, and a hypothesis that the connection of the two 
might help in overcoming the barriers and stimulate new industrial growth. 
As shown above, in the Norwegian public discourse on the topic, the fish 
industry was seen as representing a potential for growth through innovation 
and industrialisation, with its international market system and the recent and 
ongoing domestications of a number of biomarine species. However, the 
market system was based almost exclusively on the exchange of raw 
materials, and the lack of industrialisation was seen as main problems for 
innovation. Agriculture, on the other hand, was perceived as having little 
potential for growth, with its domestic orientation and the long term decline 
in consumption of milk in the population. Still, the long term development of 
academic and industrial knowledge within agriculture, and favourable 
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economic and market conditions, had put the agricultural industry in a 
position of abundance. These differences, it was suggested, were 
complimentary and a basis for synergies. 
 
Tine’s depiction both of itself and of the fish industry reproduced these 
narratives, supported also by the views of their academic partners, like 
Slinde and Skjervold. Hovland highlighted the lack of industrialisation in 
terms of innovation, product development, distribution and marketing in 
aquaculture: 
  
The problem in the fish industry is that they are poor at product 
development, innovation, marketing and branding. They might make 
some attempts, which almost always end up in the commodity shelves, 
the prices go down to the common level, and provides little returns. 
(Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Thus, there was little product development and little focus on marketing 
practices like ‘branding’ in the fish industry. Still, was this a matter of 
lacking competence? Or was it a matter of a market system that not rewarded 
product development? While producing ‘opportunities’ for Tine to use their 
competence in a new setting, this was also seen as a challenge for Tine when 
seeking cooperation and resources. The only actor in the fish industry that 
was found to be sufficiently ‘serious’ about innovation was Bremnes 
Seashore: 
 
Bremnes Seashore turned out to be the only actor in the fish farming 
industry that has pursued innovation; they have invested 40 million 
kroner on R&D since 1997, without really succeeding with it yet. All 
the others have no clue when it comes to innovation and research. 
(Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Although they had not succeeded yet, Bremnes Seashore was still seen as 
showing the right attitude towards innovation and industrial development. 
This picture might fit the reality at the time among fish farmers and fisheries 
pretty well. As mentioned previously, there had been lots of research and 
innovation, but mostly with focus on the farming process, with academic 
institutions and feed producers in leading roles. Less had been done on the 
production and commercialisation side. Bremnes Seashore, on the other 
hand, had for years been investing in new processing technology within the 
blue domain. This had led to improvements on their raw material quality. 
Their competitors still had to wait through the ‘rigor-phase’ (‘death-
stiffness’) after slaughtering the fish before being able to process it further: 
 
When all the energy in the muscle has been used up, decomposition 
begins, which makes the collagen break down, so that you can take 
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away bones. This is what most processing actors are waiting for, and 
that is why it is as simple to transport the fish to France during the three 
or four days needed. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, MD, Salmon Brands) 
 
This waiting time could be used to transport the fish both closer to 
international markets and to countries with lower labour costs. The 
hypothesis of the Bremnes Seashore people was that pre-rigor processing, 
eliminating the delay in processing and hence the advantage of sending the 
product abroad for processing, and in addition improving the quality of the 
product, would provide them with competitive advantage and better prices 
on their salmon. Succeeding with mobilising funding from the Research 
Council and collaborating with university scientists for more than a decade, 
had led to groundbreaking methods for slaughtering and processing salmon. 
Yet thus far it had not led to any success in creating the expected added 
economic value. In this setting, one could easily think that there was little 
hope for industrialising fish, forgetting that, in fact, aquaculture, or 
cultivating fish, had been a great success story. It has been said to be the first 
animal domesticated since the turkey was domesticated some 400 years ago: 
 
Norwegian fish farming has never performed badly; in fact it has been 
going incredibly well, it is almost unbelievable. But that is if you look at 
the building of an industry. It is fantastic. The last animal we 
domesticated was the turkey in the 1600s. To domesticate a new 
species, like salmon, is amazing. (Erik Slinde, Institute for Marine 
Research) 
 
The first steps towards industrial production – or controlling the supply of 
raw materials – had been put in place. Still, the industrialisation of farmed 
fish had a long way to go yet, if comparing with industrial production and 
marketing of agriculture. Very few fish farming actors had thus far made 
systematic attempts to develop industrial processing activities, and even 
fewer had gained any rewards for such investments.  
 
In my opinion, in general, we must do more product development on 
seafood in Norway. Just to bale fish from the sea, like Norwegian 
fishermen do, and then treat it worse than…, it is, if you compare with 
food industry, and watch how fishermen treat food, then you see that it 
is pretty bad. If you compare the meat shelves with the fish shelves in a 
supermarket, you will see that fish is least developed in Norway. (Erik 
Slinde, Institute for Marine Research) 
 
Bremnes Seashore, a relatively small fish farm and filet producer, was one of 
the few that had tried. Together with the research group from the University 
of Life Sciences, Bremnes had between 1993 and 2004 invested around 40 
million NOK in developing technologies for slaughtering and processing of 
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salmon, however, without any economic rewards within their established 
market system. In Bremnes’ own brochure “From roe to 
delicacy…Innovation and quality all the way” (2004) we can read:  
 
In 1993, Bremnes Seashore AS started a research-collaboration with 
The Agricultural University of Norway. The aim of the first research 
and development project was to develop new manufacturing 
technology, which would be able to maintain the quality of our 
products. The project was successful and, with the new technology, 
Bremnes Seashore produces products with regular and higher levels of 
quality than other producers. This method, described as “Cold Fish - 
natural cooling of slaughtered fish” is today patented, and recognised 
throughout the fish farming industry. 
 
In other words, this was unique in the industry. These projects had led to 
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Table 2: Selection of scientific articles from the University of Life Sciences research group 
cooperating with Bremnes Seashore 
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They had also led to scientific documentation of the beneficial effects of this 
processing technology on the raw material (see table 2). However, the 
patent, the scientific documentation of improved colour and texture, and the 
industrial advantages on logistics (fresher fish, improved durability) had still 
not paid off on better prices for their products: 
 
We have worked with [the ULS researchers] for some years to improve 
the quality of salmon. But we have struggled to realise those values 
when it comes to product development. We have had contact with many 
actors on the traditional side, but we can’t get more out of it than the 
general price. (Olav Svendsen Jr., Bremnes Seashore) 
 
Scientific documentation of superior quality obviously did not in itself 
qualify for higher prices in this industry. There seemed to be other issues at 
stake, in particular related to the way the market system was set up: 
 
We have a traditional marketing apparatus to traditional actors, like 
Halvard Lerøy and Coast, and they are really not very interested in these 
kinds of sales, because they only think of volumes, right, get out large 
volumes of filets to producers of smoked salmon. And therefore we 
have gone for Tine, because we thought that they had better 
opportunities. (Olav Svendsen Jr., Bremnes Seashore) 
 
Their distributors (e.g. Lerøy Seafood, one of the three largest farming and 
distribution actors at the time) showed little interest in marketing pre-rigor 
salmon for added value, as there were no market segments developed, and 
the fear of undermining their market for standard (non-pre-rigor) salmon was 
said to play a role. In such a market system, it was difficult to economise on 
quality improvements. High-quality and product development strategies 
were hard to implement. Both the distribution system and the marketing 
system were experienced as encouraging mass production of generic goods, 
therefore they had reached a point where return on their investments was 
required before making more investments of that kind: 
 
We may research and develop a lot, but you do that just for a while, 
until you actually get something back, get something commercialised, 
and that is the next step now, to prove something, and then further 
projects might come afterwards. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes 
Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
The Norwegian fish industry has ‘always’ been international, thus having far 
more experience with international business than agriculture. The trading of 
fresh and frozen fish with actors from the EU, Asia, Russia, etc. is the daily 
practice of Norwegian fish distributors, dealing with culture and language 
differences, and negotiating deals with various actors according to 
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fluctuating market prices and demand, while often involving the Norwegian 
Ministries of Trade and of Foreign Affairs to get and maintain market 
access. However, the industrialisation of fish has only come so far in 
Norway. Little product development is done, and most processing is done in 
other countries, e.g., Denmark and China. Two of the most common reasons 
for this, according to my informants, were the high labour costs in Norway, 
and the added taxes for processed goods in the EU market. However, what 
about other potential reasons, like lack of R&D focus, lack of competence on 
industrial food production and marketing, and lack of technologies and 
marketing systems for more differentiated products? From the agricultural 
side, these aspects were almost absent in the fish industry. The marketing of 
fish was mostly done through ‘idealised’ market mechanisms, of more or 
less auction-based exchange, but with a rather poor ability to coordinate 
supply with demand, often explained by two conditions: Firstly, the trade 
had been dominated by many small actors, thinking mainly short term gains. 
This had started changing, as recently there has been a considerable 
concentration of actors in both in fisheries and fish farming. Secondly, the 
long production (breeding) time of salmon, around two years, created 
problems in unstable markets. Despite having some flexibility on when to 
slaughter the fish and further flexibility via freezing, there had been 
examples on how the whole industry had been led to crisis due to the 
combination of these two factors; small and vulnerable uncoordinated actors 
trying to breed and market as much fish as possible. Moreover, marketing 
was organised as an institutionalised and uniform process of ‘Norwegian’ 
fish, by the Norwegian Seafood Export Council, with obligatory 
participation by the industry actors. This is ‘generic marketing’ through an 
image of ’Norwegian’ fish. Having marketing responsibility for exports of 
fish, and not being allowed to discriminate between actors/products by the 
marketing the goods of particular companies, they have to market the 
’Norwegian’ only, as if this is always a sign of the highest quality. The 
implications of this model is threefold: less incentive for developing product 
variety/differentiation, potentially undermining trust in fish from Norway – 
because there are, in reality, quality differences, and less incentive for 
farmers/companies to improve on quality – due to competition largely based 
on price. It is not very strange then, that Bremnes Seashore had a hard time 
getting added value from their innovations. Yet, as previously mentioned, 
this sectoral problem seemed to be changing, and the people at Bremnes saw 
themselves as participants in driving change. Technical demands and 
developments were especially seen as speeding up this process: 
 
The problem is that the consumer doesn’t know where it comes from, he 
is seeing a fish, and only about 10% of dissatisfactions get back to the 
store. But when the big actors start putting their names on the product, 
the consumer requirements will rise, and the supermarkets focus a lot 
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more on quality these days. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes 
Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
When tracing systems would become available to the users, and large 
producers started branding their products, the current practices of 
exchanging fish were likely to change, perhaps converging with other food 
industries based on fresh and fragile raw materials. 
 
In sum, in this long-standing relationship between scientists and fish farm, a 
number of different projects, like investigating various factors potentially 
influencing the quality of farmed salmon was done, such as shape of filets, 
impact of water quality, cooling of fish before slaughter, de-freezing 
velocity, micro-biological growth and more. As mentioned, this had led to 
patented technology for ‘live cooling’ and ‘pre-rigor processing’ of salmon 
owned by Bremnes Seashore. The emerging program of industrial product 
development of salmon connected Bremnes Seashore, university researchers 
and eventually Tine. A constellation of marine researchers based at the 
agricultural university and a family owned fish farm had done something 
unusual in the fish industry: Invested more than 10 years and 40 million 
NOK in R&D. However, acknowledgement from scientific communities and 
public bodies is not enough in an industrial setting. Unless they led to added 
economic value for the industrial company, the projects were not considered 
successful. Hence, the search for partners that could help them 
commercialise and economise on the new knowledge led them through 
meetings with a number of actors in the established economic system for 
marketing fish, none of them showing interest or capacity for exploiting this 
potential. Then Tine arrived at the scene, representing an opportunity to 
escape the limitations of the fish industry, and to obtain a share of 
agricultural competence and infrastructure for product development. 
 
The ‘cold fish technology’ and pre-rigor processing of salmon 
Increasingly, Bremnes Seashore came to be seen as the preferred supplier, 
and potentially also production partner for the fish salami. Bremnes was seen 
as ‘the best in its class’ regarding quality and innovation, able to deliver the 
‘best salmon available’. But, what was this exceptional technology doing? 
By cooling down the fish in waiting-cages, the fish is less stressed during 
slaughter, hence slowing down the process of going into rigor mortis, and 
the fish may therefore be processed right away. If not cooled down, this 
process happens during just a couple of hours, making it impossible to split 
the fish and take away skin and bones in time. Thus, in normal processing 
plants the fish have to be stored for 3-5 days before processing69. Following 
                                                     
69 According to Even Manseth, Tine R&D. 
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the excerpts from a sales presentation by Kiland in 2004, this ‘cold fish’ 









Giving several more hours for processing before reaching a rigor score in 




Through this technology, the UMB researchers have documented 














Pictures 12-18 Presentation materials, Salmon Brands 
 
As thoroughly documented in scientific journals, there was no doubt in 
Bremnes’ presentation of its superior raw material. For Tine Ingredients, this 
became interesting for two reasons: First, the informal testing of this raw 
material as ingredient in Umi No Kami by Swensen and Skjervold had 
shown what they saw as very good and interesting results. Second, it was 
experiencing these qualities – seeing and tasting – that convinced 
management at Tine Ingredients that they not only wanted Bremnes as an 
ordinary supplier, but rather as some kind of partner in the project; it was a 
raw material and a technology with potential.  
 
Partnering with Tine: Bremnes Seashore’s point of view 
Why would a traditional family owned fish farm, profitable and deeply 
embedded in the ordinary market system for fish, be interested in partnering 
with an industrial actor from the agricultural sector? The simple answer is 
that they wanted returns on their innovation investments. A more nuanced 
answer is found in the evolving relationship between the two parties: 
 
Broadly speaking, we started with fermented salmon, and we were 
perhaps a bit flattered, because Tine had tried to make this fermented 
salmon product by mixing red and white fish, in the beginning. And 
then they had tried different kinds of raw materials, but it did not work 
out. That they came here and tested the raw material that we had worked 
hard to develop, and had some success with, were in a way important, 
we had a good starting point. So that it was a certain degree of 
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enthusiasm when we went into the project, we found it very exciting. 
(Jan Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
The answer seems related to hope (for better prices on their fish) and flattery 
(acknowledgement of their technological developments), moreover, to their 
long-standing relationship to the researchers that had now been employed by 
Tine. Morlandstø emphasised the price issue: 
 
Yes, clearly, when you make a product like this, it isn’t that easily 
linked to the raw material prices by the customer, or the purchaser. They 
will not be that concerned with the current salmon prices at any point in 
time, on such a product, as if one were to buy a filet or a portion sized 
piece. And in addition, this product will not have any competition. (Jan 
Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
The hope for producing added economic value from their high quality raw 
materials was a clear rationale for starting the collaboration with Tine. An 
opportunity for Bremnes Seashore to get out of the ’fish industry trap’ of raw 
material markets with fluctuating prices and little reward for product 
development. It was also interpreted as being a mutual need for help among 
the two parties, in creating value out of their respective innovations: 
 
We established a connection to Tine via Per Olav Skjervold, who had 
worked with us on various projects the last 10 years, and then he was 
hired by Tine. Then we learned that Tine had bought the rights to a 
fermented fish product, which had been previously based on a mix of 
white fish and salmon. They did not manage to get the shelf life they 
wanted, and then Per Olav saw that fresh fish, pre-rigor, which we had 
been collaborating on, could be the solution to some of those problems. 
And, as we see it, Tine holds a huge competence, both on product 
development, and also on marketing and sales, so that the relation 
between us as a raw material producer, and the work of bringing the 
product over to another dimension, in a way, is a success factor. (Jan 
Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
Thus, at Bremnes they saw this new relation to the big food corporation as 
an opportunity to get their product – pre-rigor salmon – out to customers in 
new ways that would provide better prices. Yet even with the advantage of 
building on established personal relationships, there were some challenges in 
establishing collaboration between the agro-food cooperative and the fish 
farm. When planning the production facilities, differences between the 
owner companies soon appeared: 
 
When we made a budget on machinery and equipment and facilities, 
they cut it down with a razorblade, and did it as cheap as possible. This 
is not exactly in Tine’s spirit, right, we do things as expensive as 
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possible, while they have cut costs, bought machines of too low quality, 
and some of them were second-hand and a bit worn. (Lars Petter 
Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
Different standards and attitudes towards equipment and costs created some 
frustration, as when second-hand machines had to be fixed and adjusted 
instead of investing in new ones. Different processing practices (standards, 
knowledge) also became visible, both in supplying raw materials of the right 
quality, and in processing routines in the production plant: 
 
Another thing is the fresh fish, where we also had problems with 
integration, to get them to follow the standards and hygienic guidelines 
we gave them. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
The change from a mixed white and red fish recipe to a pure salmon recipe 
also had implications for the cost of production, as this estimate over the 
mixed recipe shows: 
 
The raw material prices will vary according to type of fish, but e.g. 50% 
salmon and 50% saithe give nice products. The fish prices are at present 
around 25 NOK per kilo for salmon, and around 5-6 kroner for saithe 
and fish cuttings. Of other ingredients, whey proteins cost around 5-10 
kroner per kilo finished product. The water loss during drying will 
probably be around 35-40%. These costs in addition to the process costs 
will possibly lead to a total production cost on ready seafood sausage of 
around 40-60 kroner. (Project report) 
 
From this example, we can see that production costs would approximately 
double by going for 100% salmon, and this was before considering pre-rigor 
salmon. Moreover, this was not all; Morlandstø (MD of Salmon 
Brands/production at Bremnes) opposed machines for automating the near-
infrared scanning. From his cost/use estimations, the machine could not be 
justified, unless the supplier took their part of the investment: 
 
I try to say that we are not in a position to buy an instrument for almost 
a million kroner, if we can’t get more out of it than we do today. We try 
to control the fat content via the type of raw material we use, the size of 
raw materials. To some extent we get control, but clearly, if we had that 
instrument, we would have used it, and we could perhaps have used 
more types of raw materials. We can use it back on farming; provide 
information to the farmer on, for example pigmentation, thus they may 
use less [astaxanthin] in the feed, it is a very expensive part of the feed. 
(Jan Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
Thus, on the one hand, Morlandstø did not feel they really needed an 
automatic near-infrared instrument, as the cost could not be justified. On the 
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other hand, it would have been very useful if they had one, and he suggested 
that partnering with the fish farm on the investment could possibly justify 
the investment as its use would have served several different interests and 
purposes at the same time. In total, the cost of partnering with Bremnes 
Seashore and using pre-rigor salmon instead of a mixed recipe were 
considerable: Investments in a new production plant, development of new 
technology to control fat levels, work on production routines and especially 
the double raw material costs. These were investments and costs that the new 
constellation at Tine were prepared to take, but that – paradoxically – the 
new partner, Bremnes Seashore, tried to get as low as possible, at least on 
the equipment side. 
 
Partnering: Negotiating contracts and practice 
The differences between aquaculture and agriculture related to ‘culture’, 
competence and market systems were frequently mentioned by various 
participants in this case study. However, when coming to collaboration 
between researchers from Tine R&D and the processing staff at Bremnes, 
communication seems to have been working without much frustration. This 
did not mean that differences had disappeared, but rather that some 
communicative features seem to have been in place between these groups: 
 
[Bremnes Seashore] have collaborated with UMB since the early 1990s, 
right, related to developing pre-rigor processing, and slaughtering 
methods and everything. Both improving effectiveness and getting that 
quality level they have today. These are results of heavy R&D 
investments, so in that respect it is much easier for R&D people to be 
accepted over there. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
The (partly) common history of collaboration between Bremnes Seashore 
and the University of Life Sciences had produced personal relationships, 
new knowledge and technology, and probably a common language about the 
new practice. In addition, the division of labour between the Tine people was 
claimed to be important for providing a good collaborative climate. 
Technologically, Swensen (Tine R&D) worked with the Bremnes processing 
unit as usual, in close dialogue with Kiland (commercialisation manager, 
Tine Ingredients), while Hovland took care of the partnership negotiations. 
A year into the joint venture, but still negotiating issues of organising the 
joint venture, Kiland described their roles: 
 
And it has been very important for progress that Gunnar has been 
working on this, and then I am only working on my things. If I had 
started arguing with them over money, this would have been ruined, 
because I can’t argue with them over a million or ten on Monday, and 
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then ask the production to provide a test production for me in Tuesday. 
And Gunnar is consistently competent, and very good at selling. And, as 
I interpret it, he had the [Tine] corporate management in the palm of his 
hand. And I think, now that he has become part of it70 then he decides 
anyway, and this has been very important. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
Thus, with Hovland to take care of overarching negotiations with Bremnes, 
and also provide support and resources from top management at Tine, gave 
freedom for the ‘operational’ project participants (particularly Swensen and 
Kiland) to focus on their particular tasks, furthermore making it easier to 
collaborate with Bremnes Seashore on operational tasks. These pre-rigor 
technologies represented high-end knowledge on processing fish: Scientific 
knowledge, already implemented in practices, technologies and routines. 
Thus, when people at Tine talked about the lack of knowledge in the fish 
industry, they were perhaps talking mostly about their own fields of 
expertise, such as microbiology (fermentation, hygiene, etc) and marketing 
(distribution, branding, etc). In the case of pre-rigor salmon, Tine bought 
access to ready developed technology. Accordingly, Bremnes’ interest in this 
joint project was the prospect of transforming their own technology into 
economic value – which they thus far had not been able to do on their own. 
 
The project management and Tine Biomarin/Ingredients sought continued 
support for the project from the Tine corporate board and management. In a 
project report (December 2003), we can see how the various arguments were 
combined to strengthen a clear proposal for taking the project over to a 
commercialisation phase. With regard to the organising of the project and 
relevant resources, it was suggested that the project was transferred to Tine 
Ingredients to “ensure continuity”. Further, they suggested “that Bremnes 
Seashore is chosen as production partner”, after having evaluated three 
different “relevant partners”. Six man labour years should be assigned to the 
project. After investments of 16.5 million kroner in the UNK project, they 
were ‘now ready for industrialising and commercialising this knowledge’, 
hence asking for another 12.2 million kroner the next year (2004). With 
regard to conceptualisation and market, Umi No Kami was argued to be a 
global concept, partly because of its global novelty – “a real innovation”, 
and partly because of their international scope regarding marketing. It was 
supposed to be a “gourmet product for restaurants and delicatessen. 
Ingredient for food industry (salads, sandwiches, etc). Weekend sandwich 
filling for supermarkets, hotels and cafés. Snack for supermarkets, bars and 
                                                     
70 Gunnar Hovland was appointed corporate director for sales after the turbulence in 
management related to TINE’s controversial deal with the retail chain REMA 1000. 
Jan Ove Holmen quit his job as CEO, and Hanne Refsholt took his place. 
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restaurants”. The sales estimate was set to 1200 tonnes a year in 2010, and 
perhaps 5000 tonnes as the peak (long term), “providing both national and 
international work in parallel” (Project report, Umi No Kami, December 
2003. 
 
Presentation materials from a meeting between Tine Ingredients and the 
management at Bremnes, from the initial dialogue on opportunities for 
formalising collaboration, displayed how this was communicated to their 
future partner on the project. The UNK salmon salami was to become the 
new ‘Jarlsberg salmon’, in other words, the aim was to repeat Tine’s 
international success of Jarlsberg cheese – the largest imported cheese in the 
US, and with an increasing demand in a number of countries worldwide. 
UNK was said to be presenting a ‘new and delicious way to eat salmon’, 
with high quality, developed in ‘collaboration with top class chefs’. Market 
research was in process, awaiting results regarding market potential in the 
US, Asia and EU, and the planned ‘entry strategy’ would focus on ‘selected 
segments offering high quality and high value positioning’. Collaborators 
would be ‘high profile’, and the first feedback from Nutrimer, a large 
catering actor in France, was that the product gave ‘a good mouth feel, in 
line with luxury delicacies, not making the sandwich wet or greasy. It was 
viewed as natural with positive micro-bacteriological properties, and suitable 
for salads, pasta dishes and sandwiches. Their requirements were no 
additives, stable quality and six month self-life, positioning the product in 
the luxury segment with estimated volumes of 30 tonnes for sandwich and 2-
400 tonnes for salads for testing during 2005. If an agreement could be 
reached, production would start in June 2004, with the “Tine board and 
management fully behind the project”. Three phases of scaling this up were 
outlined: First pilot production, then common development project, before 
industrial production. During the pilot, Bremnes needed to invest 4 million 
NOK in facilities, while TINE would put 12 million NOK into marketing. 
Preferably, TINE wanted a joint venture, with Bremnes having 34% of 
shares (Presentation, 2004-01-30)71.  
 
In a Tine corporate board meeting in April 2004, a draft for a shareholder 
agreement between Tine and Bremnes Seashore was presented. Bremnes 
was presented as producing 14,000 tonnes of fish per year, and as the owner 
of two patents: “Process and plant for handling of fish from its delivery to 
the quitting thereof”, and “Method for the manufacture of a high quality fish 
product” - in other words the mentioned patents for live cooling and pre-
rigor processing of salmon. Tine had the rights to the recipe and the patent 
application for the fermentation of fish, a product that had “particular 
                                                     
71  “Commercialization of marine innovation (Umi No Kami)”, presentation to 
owners and management of Bremnes Seashore, 2004-01-30 
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requirements to production process, based on Bremnes’ slaughtering 
technology, covered by the above mentioned patents and patent application”. 
In addition, they also had a patent developed by Manseth, another member 
of the group of university researchers who had been hired by Tine, on 
binding agents in fish blood. This technology did also play a role, although 
minor at the time, in the emerging ideas around Salma as a portfolio brand. 
The investment in the joint venture was said to be up to 30 million NOK 
during 2004-2007. In the statutes, the purpose of the joint venture, called 
Salmon Brands, was formulated as “increased value creation on fresh salmon 
through marine innovation, processing and branding”. The company’s 
activities were to be “R&D, production, brand development, marketing and 
sales of products based on fresh salmon” (Board meeting case papers).   
 
In the Tine board meeting (2004-04-27) 72 , the management presented 
Bremnes Seashore as motivated and competent, emphasising Bremnes’ 
considerable investments in innovation the last decade, hence recommending 
the partnership. Some board members expressed exhaustion in dealing with 
costly blue-green projects, but perhaps more as a preliminary warning than 
as an attempt to stop the project at the moment. The optimism of the project 
management was taken a step down, but the opportunity to utilise more of 
the surplus of whey was seen as an important factor. The corporate 
management representatives got support from some board members for the 
suggested way forwards for Umi No Kami. In the end, the management 
finished the discussion by signalling both modesty (adjusting sales curve, 
and admitting tough aspects) and strong optimism (would have invested). 
The case ended with full agreement to the suggestion of carrying on with 
establishing collaboration with Bremnes Seashore, and Refsholt, Tryggestad 
and Hovland were appointed to the interim board of the Salmon Brands 
project. 
 
In order to build the argumentation for a final decision at the next corporate 
board meeting, a report was written by Tine Biomarin/Ingredients about Umi 
No Kami, and distributed as attachment to the board documents. The report 
is dated 2004-05-18, and consists of a summary of the Umi No Kami project 
so far, its present status, and an operationalisation of the next phases of 




                                                     
72 Based on Huse and Schøning’s observations and interviews in their study of the 
Tine board of directors during 2004, in addition to my own conversations and 
interviews with participants. 
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- The best protection against imitation is to develop a strong brand 
based on a good concept and then continuously developing the product 
so that we are always one step ahead of those wanting to copy it. This 
philosophy is valid both with and without a patent. 
 
Product development 
- R&D is doing a great job and makes progress according to plans 
- The product can be sliced down to 0.8 mm 
- We have produced stable versions of the 12mm, 50 mm, and 80mm 
diameters 
- Taste is under control 
 
Industrialisation 
- Pilot facilities are being established at Bremnes. Project plan implies 
test production in June 2004 
- Technology investments are minimised by the purchase of used 




- Expecting test sales and test on repurchase during 2004 
- Norway: TINE Ingredients has started testing at a customer. TINE 
Storhusholdning [catering supply] is awaiting test production and can 
thereafter target selected customers for test sales.  
- France/Nutrimer: They have received the product, and communicated 
back that the quality is within the target area, but that it is too expensive. 
Further, they claim that substitutes exist. We interpret this as a 
negotiation move. The presumed substitutes are ordered. 
 
Production costs 
The company’s production calculations were presented at the board 
meeting, at 110 NOK/kilogram. The elements of risk of this calculation 
are tied to: 
- Raw material prices (based on 30 NOK/kilogram, has varied from 14 
to 37 during the last 5 years). In the production contract with Bremnes, 
the pricing will be market based, but locked in a certain interval.  
- Loss (50% of the salmon is not used in the product – hence double raw 
material price). This can be improved by further product development 
of relevant minced products (hamburger and similar). 
- Test production. Minimal sizes on test batches down to 
100kilgram/batch, equals 11.000 NOK per batch. 
- Water content/activity. The product is based on drying salmon from 
water activities at 90% down to 40%. It turns out that the product 
provides a better taste experience with a somewhat higher content of 






Background for choosing Bremnes Seashore as a partner 
- Raw material. Bremnes has patented pre-rigor raw material. This is a 
requirement for the production of our product. 
- Competence 
- Capital 
- Business culture. Bremnes is recognised as a serious and long-term 
fish farmer, and the management has a business culture that we find 
easy to collaborate with (straightforward, honest, modest, reliable) 
- Will. The chairman of the board at Bremnes, managing director, and 
owner show strong motivation to succeed with the partnership, and 
prioritise it highly in their business. 
 
(Report for the corporate board, from Tine Biomarin, dated 2004-05-18, 
attachment to board meeting documents) 
 
Product development was said to be progressing, and then the product would 
be technically feasible. The resistance from Bremnes towards buying new 
and expensive equipment had been integrated as an advantage in minimising 
investments. In hindsight, it seems that the French actor, Nutrimer, was 
ready to discontinue the relationship, but was still used as a representative 
for the market potential of the product. Further, they showed concern for 
reducing the costs of production, both in the test and up-scaling phases, and 
in regular production. Based on this report, the final decision on the new 
business strategy and partnership of Umi No Kami were discussed in the 
next board meeting on 2004-05-26. When introducing the case to the board 
this time, the management stressed how they had taken suggestion from the 
previous meeting into account. Further, they told about the rejection of the 
patent application, the fact that production facilities were not yet in place, 
and the challenge of high production costs. Then a three-staged future 
process was described, each with exit-opportunities if the project did not 
demonstrate satisfactory progress and results, before ending by 
recommending the plan. In this way, the project was presented as vulnerable 
and with some risk involved (although some of the risk had been reduced).  
 
The response from the board members was immediately supportive, and 
after some discussion, the recommendation was approved by the board with 
some small adjustments in delegating conditions. While some board 
members still expressed some scepticism, the majority had now become 
clearly positive to the plan. It was also argued that Tine had now learned 
from their mistakes, and was thus more competent to do biomarine projects 
than before. Finally, the taste was mentioned as now being ‘good’, meaning 
that they had now gained control of the recipe and technology, enabling 
stable production of a good tasting product. In sum, Tine, their partner and 
the object itself were ready for commercialisation. The discussion was 
closed by the management again modifying their ambitions and reassuring 
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the board by referring to their ongoing market research and by making clear 
that this task would be taken seriously. 
 
In having acquired the necessary support from Tine’s corporate 
management, negotiations with Bremnes Seashore could be formalised and 
intensified. Although having expressed clear interests in cooperating, the two 
parties still had to negotiate the terms of the agreement. The people at 
Bremnes were sceptical to the initial proposals from Tine, and Hovland 
explained how they worked both with direct negotiations and informal 
dialogue: 
 
There was a lot of arm-wrestling about how things should be.  They had 
to integrate many other interests in the agreement, on both raw material 
prices, on growth – capital for growth, and other things, where of course 
Tine held the opposite point of view. And we used the chairman of the 
board and the CEO of Tine, to, you could say; simply make them 
familiar with Tine’s basic values. This is Tine, this is what Tine wants 
to be related to fish, and things like that. And gradually as they trust us, 
they are willing to go further with us as an actor, instead of others, as 
they have had buyers for the business we are going into now, both 
Lerøy and others have wanted to buy this business into which we are 
now entering and making a joint venture. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
Having different interests and being unfamiliar with each other was 
gradually overcome by exploring and getting to know each other, and 
concurrently negotiating how the different aims could go together. Not only 
sectoral differences, but also organisational and historical matters had 
implications for the negotiations. Representing Bremnes, Morlandstø spoke 
about the need for them to achieve a larger change of the agreement: 
 
We had some discussions about our motivations for making the 
agreement in this or that way, and in the beginning the agreements 
looked more like a rented production deal, but we were absolutely not 
interested in that. We have turned these agreements upside down these, 
and now we have a sensible basis for both parties. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, 
Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
It was important for Bremnes Seashore to be an equal partner, more in terms 
of status than owner share. In addition, aspects of size, or capacity, were 
mentioned, with Bremnes securing itself against being forced into 
expansions larger than their ability, and at the same time insisting on co-
ownership and a common motivation for succeeding with the project. After 
six months of exploring each other and negotiating the terms for a joint 
venture, the first formal steps towards commercialising Umi No Kami as a 
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pre-rigor based salmon salami were settled, and the joint venture Salmon 
Brands AS was established. Risk and commitment for the project had been 
shared with another company, which was rich with technology and raw 
materials, but without industrial experience beyond the ordinary market 
system of selling salmon as generic non- or half-processed raw material.  
 
Increasingly, through the process of scaling up production, the Salmon 
Brands organisation felt a need for having more control of the raw material 
side of the production process. This strengthened their argument for 
including all the pre-rigor activities from Bremnes. Jan Ove Morlandstø, 
having become managing director for Salmon Brands, was concerned about 
his influence on the raw material quality as rationale for this expansion: 
 
I don’t think there was any other way to do it, because I had the 
responsibility as managing director of Salmon Brands from day one. If I 
am going to buy these products and this quality without having the 
power and authority to change it, it will fail. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, 
Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
These negotiations resulted in moving all processing, pre- and post-rigor to 
Salmon Brands. Suddenly, the joint venture had considerable volumes going 
through their system, without having closed a single commercial deal on the 
innovations of Umi No Kami. The question was about how to draw 
boundaries in a joint venture; in this case, as with the original agreement, 
between further processing and marketing, or between raw material supply 
and processing/marketing. The actors ended up sharing more in the joint 
venture than initially planned; solving potential controversies by sharing 
both costs and income within the whole industrialisation process, hoping it 
would mobilise mutual motivation and commitment to the joint venture: 
 
The salmon product [the fish salami] in itself, tasted good, and that is 
exciting, and I am myself interested in doing more product 
development. To get better prices for the salmon than just the raw 
material price, you have to do something with it. Usually we make 
salmon filets, right, but its price is related to the raw material price 
anyway. And so, they had this idea, and they had a very good sales 
apparatus, and plans to sell very large volumes of the sausage then. 
(Olav Svendsen Jr., Bremnes Seashore) 
 
In having settled an agreement for doing product development, production 
and marketing together in a joint venture, what remained were largely two 
issues: Scaling up production at Bremnes, and marketing the product. Even 
if these two processes partly evolved parallel to each other, I will start with 
the up-scaling of production, before I move on to the marketing process in 
the next sub-chapter (4.6). 
198 
Scaling up production 
When moving production from the laboratory at Tine R&D to large scale 
facilities at Bremnes, problems arose in the relations that existed between 
micro-biology, production facilities and knowledge/routines. In addition, the 
high-quality demands of the product became even stricter in interaction with 
market representatives. 
 
On June 28, 2004, it was time to start scaling up production at Bremnes, and 
I joined the Tine team on the trip to the west coast to observe the event. For 
two days, people from Bremnes and Tine worked together on preparing and 
starting the first large scale production in the new production facilities, with 
training personnel, adjustments of technology and intervention from micro-
organisms at stake. I met up with the Tine team at the airport early Monday 
morning. It consisted of Lars Petter Swensen (R&D project manager), Svein 
Erik Hilsen (chef), Tore Teigen (consulting sausage maker) and Dorotha 
Dynda (micro-biologist). New production facilities were supposed to be 
ready, composed of partly new and used equipment from various Tine 
dairies. At the airport, Teigen, an experienced sausage maker hired for the 
event, told Swensen about his scepticism towards the status at Bremnes, 
stating, “I am ready, but they are not ready over there”.  Here, he was 
commenting on what he saw as lack of planning and overview, particularly 
some technical issues that had not been solved yet. Swensen responded in a 
relaxed mode, “well, but the most important thing is just to get things 
through this period of time; training”. After the flight from Oslo to 
Haugesund, we drove a rented car for two hours before arriving in the small 
coastal village on the south-west coast of Norway, where we soon found out 
that not everything was ready. In fact, it was quite chaotic. Some technicians 
were still working on the drying and smoking facilities, while a supplier of a 
production machine was installing software and trying to get the thing ready 
for its task. 
 
From a presentation of the status of the Umi No Kami project by Swensen, 
we can make a summary of the (technological) achievements and remaining 
challenges of the project by the end of 2003, right before the processes of 
conceptualisation (chapter 4.6) and production were speeded up during the 
spring 2004. The presentation, made to the management at Tine, was called 
“Product development for UNK 2003 – a journey in quantums with comfort 
shoes73”. The goals for 2003 had been to make two different recipes ready 
for production, one ‘gourmet variant’ and one ‘grits variant’, and, after 10 
experiments, the grits variant was ready, while the gourmet variant still had 
some challenges of binding the fatty acids. The project was claiming to be 




pioneering work, as “there is little knowledge on fish and minced meat of 
fish world wide”, developing core competences on raw materials, 
fermentation, product, process, design, protein and emulsion. The year 2003 
had been used for narrowing the scope (to two specific recipes), by working 
on a set of technological issues. In order to control the raw material, and 
thereby achieve better stabilisation of fatty acids, use of ‘near infrared 
spectroscopy’ (NIR) had been tested with the aim of standardising the 
percentage of fat in the salmon input to 10%74. Furthermore, the use of fresh 
instead of frozen raw material (salami from meat is produced from frozen 
materials) was concluded to give a better texture75. The final choice of using 
only salmon instead of a mix of red and white fish was presented as having 
technological advantages, as the “access to raw material and control is much 
better”. Whereas tests using different parts of the fish had not demonstrated 
significant improvements, and the use of 24 hour old raw material only had 
provided minor improvements on smell and taste, use of 3-6 hour old (pre-
rigor) raw material was considered to provide major improvements in smell 
and taste, without needing to add transglutaminase (an enzyme), and giving 
better shelf life to the product. The remaining R&D challenges for the year 
to come (2004), was said to be a documentation of shelf life, improving fat 
binding in the gourmet variant (by “changing process conditions and 
reducing the percentage of fat in the raw material”), scaling up production at 
Bremnes, expanding the product variation (shapes, spices, etc), and finally, 
packaging. While improving the fat binding in the gourmet variant did not 
present big problems, scaling up production brought some challenges. 
 
Back at the start-up event at Bremnes, which took place at noon on the June 
28, 2004, a meeting with the management and production personnel had 
been scheduled. Eight persons from Bremnes Seashore and five from Tine 
were present. An experienced dairy manager had joined the Tine team from 
their western region. Swensen started out with a brief version of the story. 
Then, the sausage maker, Teigen, took over, and in a narrative style he told 
stories of how meat was traditionally dried and fermented, as way of 
extending the durability of the food. Next, he compared this with the fish 
salami, on levels of salt and fat, the recipe, drying and smoking, and so forth. 
Then he warned the production workers against mould. Calcium sorbate 
might be used as an anti-mould ingredient, as the product might mould 
                                                     
74 In other words: Using only salmon with minimum fat content, as normally the fat 
content in salmon varies from 10% to 30 %. 
75  As mentioned earlier, the effects of the various input factors were contested 
between the different groups involved in the innovation process. This version of the 
story is made by the ’winning team’, with links to Bremnes and the pre-rigor 
salmon. However, everyone I spoke to (on both sides) acknowledged some effect of 
the other group’s input factors, even if their own factors were clearly rated higher. 
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overnight, it would look like snow in the entire room, he warned, and if 
something white is detected, they would need to clean the room 
immediately. Mould might also influence the flavour of the sausage. In 
moving on to bacteria cultures, now being produced industrially and added 
to the recipe, Teigen related how, before the 1970s, this was not something 
that one ‘made’. Starter cultures were just something residing ‘in the house’ 
of production – remaining from the previous production, e.g., in the liquid 
solution, represented by an almost magic understanding of the phenomenon. 
A couple of ‘failure stories’ were then provided to underline the importance 
of the bacteria for a proper fermentation process. Swensen then went through 
the processing work of the raw material: 
 
As fish varies in size from 2-7 kilograms in the same brood, we are 
trying to develop a system for continuously measuring fat content 
online. All brown fat76 has to go, and we will use only back loin, since it 
is leaner. There is a close interaction between raw material, ingredients 
and technology, and quality is extremely important. After five or six 
days, the first acids are produced in the process; this is a critical phase 
where the product has to be watched extra closely. 
 
Some of the production personnel responded a bit anxiously, though also 
jokingly, that they felt this was a big responsibility, whereby Swensen 
calmed them down by arguing that this is “dairy production, which we have 
been doing for 100 years, we will do fine”. In the second session of the 
meeting, Dynda, micro-biologist, took the participants through some basic 
issues of micro-biology, such as shapes and clusters of bacteria, how bacteria 
reproduce, how bacteria tests are done, etc. It was matter-of-fact information 
from her professional knowledge.  
 
The next morning (Tuesday) was used for a course in hygiene, run by the 
dairy manager from Tine Vest. In this way, Swensen and the others had time 
for getting the facilities ready for production and training in the use of the 
machines. Programming and adjustments of the machines still remained, and 
they had discovered that they lacked the right type of cleaning agents for the 
drying and smoking facilities. Production personnel were taught about the 
pasteurisation of milk and how most bacteria thrive at 20-40 degrees, and 
survive cooling, but die from temperatures between 72 and 100 degrees. 
“But then”, he told, “we are not only working against micro-organisms, we 
are working with them too, facilitating the best possible conditions for their 
development”. Bacteria were participants in the project, it was crucial to 
their success that they acted as they were supposed to, and it was challenging 
                                                     
76 ’Brown fat’ is actually a part of the muscle, a small brown area between the belly 
loin and the back loin. When dried, remaining brown fat will show as distinct dark 
spots in the product. 
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to succeed with the recruitment, development, control and good treatment of 
them.  
 
Back on the production premises, they could not get the vacuum pump of the 
blender to work, and instead chose to dismount it, running the first round 
without. A bit resigned, Swensen explained the mess by the cultural 
differences between Tine and Bremnes Seashore: While Tine was thinking 
long-term, Bremnes went for fast changes and adaptations. At 9:50 am, 
Hilsen, the chef, hosed down the facilities, while Swensen gathered together 
the last pieces of equipment before the training session started. The 
production personnel was taken through the basic workings of each machine, 
discussing important things to remember and possible ways of routinising 
this new production practice. Dynda and the dairy manager ran through 
another round on bacteria culture, lab testing and hygiene, before the 
cleaners arrived. Everything was improvised, in the hopes of being able to 
produce something before the Tine team had to leave for the airport the same 
afternoon. Finally, after cleaning, things were ready, and the first test 
production on the new large scale facilities was successfully done. Though it 
was both chaotic and calm at the same time, a lot of people passed through 
the production hall, some just observing and checking on the progress being 
made there, and others being more or less involved in the event, all with 
appropriate sterile white clothing, caps and clogs. The resulting product was 
a pink salmon ‘salami’ in opaque black sausage skin, to be hung in the 
drying and smoking facility to mature during the next few weeks.  
 
The intervention of micro-organisms 
Thus, the transfer and up-scaling of production from the dairy lab to the 
large scale facilities at the fish farm was run during June 2004 and 
everything seemed to work well, but then, in the following batch in July 
2004, problems occurred. Suddenly the whole batch of salami was attacked 
by mould and had to be discarded. Overnight the harmony was gone. This 
was also challenging for the marketing people who had already started 
presenting the product to various international customers. Just a few weeks 
before the first ‘marketing tour’ with Salma, where they planned to visit a 
number of contacts worldwide, the little devil of a micro-organism suddenly 
covered a whole batch of salmon salami in process. A white layer of mould 
had invaded every salami in the drying facility, threatening Salma’s first 
public performance. It was production worker, Magda Sæverud, who 
discovered the mould: 
 
Sæverud: It was mould, and we washed down the sausage four or five 
times, but in the end we had to dispose of it, everything, a whole 
production. 
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Researcher: What was the reason, do you know? 
Sæverud: No, I don’t know. In reality we don’t know, but I have come 
up with some thoughts about it. We used this machine for making, we 
called it b-sausage, not 100%, it contained bones, and the machine that 
takes away the bones, well, and I think that it perhaps was not clean. 
Because the mould started on that sausage, and then it spread from 
there. 
 
This explanation of making inferior quality and testing a machine for taking 
away bones that was not totally clean was supported by Sæverud’s line 
manager, Bjørn Rino Jacobsen:  
 
Some mould came, it started moulding. It produced among other things 
a sausage with raw material that had been through an old grinder we 
have for separating bones, and the moulding of the sausages started on 
these sausages: Mould spores in the belts, or something in that machine 
that could have infected the raw material, and then it developed in the 
maturing process. (Bjørn Rino Jacobsen, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon 
Brands) 
 
Yet their managing director (of Salmon Brands), Jan Ove Morlandstø, had 
another opinion of the problem. In his view, it was not particularly the use of 
the grinder, but rather failed routines that could explain the event: 
 
It was probably a failure in the routines that did it. It is clear that we 
should have nailed our routines better, and we had a plan for 
improvement when this happened. Some of our equipment is old, so if 
the power goes off, the programme resets, and it happened twice with 
that production, so the temperature control went wrong. And, clearly, 
since this is not a regular production, and since this happened during a 
weekend, the routines failed. We have, together with Lars [Swensen], 
gone over the routines for starting the system again, and we have added 
routines having people watching things at night and in week-ends, so, I 
hope that this won’t happen again. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes 
Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
Swensen had to immediately take a flight to the west coast and try to get in 
control, find the reason and make sure that it didn’t happen again. The 
technologist went through several new rounds in teaching and controlling the 
production workers at the fish farm to secure a more stable and predictable 
production. Eventually, they concluded the reason was a lack in the 
maintenance routines of the machine and possibly not being strict enough on 
the routines on hygiene. Even though both issues were described in the work 
manual, they had obviously not yet been established as stable practices by 
the local workers. In addition, Morlandstø – the strongest opponent to 
investing too much in new and expensive equipment – admitted that old 
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equipment might have contributed to the problem. After this event, through 
the reinforcement of new standards and routines, the problem disappeared 
and did not re-appear in later productions. However, this problem had 
troubled Tine R&D previously, for around six months, early in the Umi No 
Kami project. Interestingly, in spite of Teigen’s reminder to the production 
workers about the potential problem of mould, it reappeared when moving 
production from the laboratory to full scale production facilities. To my 
knowledge, the previous problems at Tine R&D were unknown among most 
of the participants when scaling up the production. Yet after the problem had 
occurred, the project management showed the ability to mobilise quickly, 
and succeeded in removing the problem. 
 
The activities of marketing, developing, and producing were intertwined 
throughout the process and particularly during the scaling-up of production 
and the parallel work of conceptualising and presenting the product to 
potential users. Due to economic pressure, Kiland, the commercialisation 
manager, chose to test-launch the product before they had any guarantee that 
the transition from the laboratory to large-scale production worked out well. 
To produce (test-) batches without using the products for commercial 
purposes would rapidly increase the costs beyond what would have been 
viewed as acceptable, and to have production running without customers 
would in any case be perceived as de-motivating, both among production 
workers and management. Many things could have gone wrong, and 
according to the project management, the only way to succeed in stabilising 
all these factors was through trial and error learning. When I challenged the 
commercialisation manager, Øyvind Kiland, on this issue he seemed cool, 
trusting his colleague’s competence in dealing with the issue: 
 
Yes, well, I was very comfortable with this. Because I had great trust in 
Lars Petter, and trust is everything here, feeling that, he had Ommund77 
up in Bergen helping, it was a bit like, it was people I trusted. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
This trust in Swensen and his colleagues’ ability to solve their tasks together 
with Bremnes did not fade during the process, even in the face of more 
technical challenges as the commercialisation process evolved. 
 
Adjusting production practice 
To what extent did this scaling up of production across settings demand 
adjustments and the change of existing technologies, or the learning and 
adaptation of new technologies? There are many possible answers to this, 
                                                     
77 An experienced dairy manager. 
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and by reviewing some of the various responses from the participants to the 
question, we can sense a picture of some problems and their solutions. 
Related to Bremnes’ existing pre-rigor technology, Morlandstø could not see 
the need for much change, except for the problem of scaling up: 
 
No, really, I don’t think so, the motivation for making a good product is 
similar, so to speak, and we have pretty good routines ourselves for 
taking care of, and producing, a good product. But [later], when you 
need the right raw material, the right processing, and have to produce all 
day, it might become a bigger challenge. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes 
Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
Some of the problem with scaling up the pre-rigor production had to do with 
the rest of the processing going on at Bremnes. To rigidly prioritise the raw 
material needed for the salmon salami in large volumes would demand 
Bremnes Seashore to turn the order of pre- and post-rigor production upside 
down. In the beginning, post-rigor was done first in the morning, due to 
significantly higher volumes, and then pre-rigor was done afterwards. Still, 
this was unacceptable for securing the quality and sorting required for 
salmon salami production, hence interfering with the organisation and 
logistics of post-rigor processing. Further, although pre-rigor was of strategic 
priority to both Salmon Brands and Bremnes Seashore, in practice, the 
economic value of the well-established business of post-rigor production had 
its influence. As mentioned in the section about contract negotiations above, 
we saw that the solution to this dilemma was to include all Bremnes’ 
processing activities in the Salmon Brands joint venture, hence increasing 
Bremnes’ owner share to 49%, and giving the Salmon Brands management 
full control on the processing priorities and practices.  
 
One of the differences from the existing pre-rigor production was the 
(aforementioned) need to control for levels of fat, which was sought to be 
solved via developing near-infrared measurement technology on-line in the 
production. Yet this piece of new technology was quite expensive, and the 
question of who should pay for this scanning and measuring technology, 
whether the raw material supplier (Bremnes Seashore) or the industrial 
producer (Salmon Brands), and how much use  would justify such an 
investment remained for quite awhile. Meanwhile, they had to sort the fish 
partly by using a narrower range of fish, sorted by weight, in addition to 
scanning the fish manually: 
 
The raw material for the Salma-sausage, they want the smallest fish, 
right, and this leads to other challenges with the machines and thing like 
that. Our machines are best, most efficient, on three kilogramme fish 
and upwards. Salma should preferably have two to three kilograms, and 
three to four. But if we use three to four, we have to cut off more of the 
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belly, because it contains more fat. (Bjørn Rino Jacobsen, Bremnes 
Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
If successful, the production volumes would have to increase radically 
beyond the initial ‘training levels’. This way of sorting would lead to larger 
problems both with manual scanning, manual processing, getting enough 
fish, and getting a lot of bi-products – cuttings – increasing the raw material 
costs, if not also finding use for these materials: 
 
Until now, we have cut off what we call ‘belly mouldings’, we have a 
product in this. But the largest challenge production-wise is to get the 
job done fast enough. It is a complicated handcraft, as it is pre-rigor 
fish, and you have to get all the bones out, and all the brown fat too, and 
today we have no machines doing this, so it has to be done by hand. The 
question is what to do along the way, right. Should we invest in 
machines and equipment, and do we have the necessary space? (Bjørn 
Rino Jacobsen, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
According to Morlandstø, this was not too much of a problem, as they sold 
“huge amounts” of belly mouldings to the Japanese market, thereby having 
production challenges more in terms of large scale production than in 
product optimisation and commercialising bi-products. The question of scale 
was both about production capacity and sales, and the need to balance these 
in a flexible way. The ambitious production targets could even have made 
problems for ingredients supply and production capacity, but, on the other 
hand these targets were admitted to be unrealistic: 
 
Salma, just on the Norwegian market, was to have volumes somewhere 
between brown cheese and mackerel in tomato sauce. And if you think 
about brown cheese, which I know well, it is about 9000 tonnes, it has 
such a volume that the next big discussion in the group, and we have 
laughed a lot about this, was about whether there was enough whey in 
Norway, because it contained a few percents whey. So, I think we 
managed to get it down to a realistic level, and then if we need to 
expand, we can buy another drying facility, and then another one that 
won’t cost too much. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Nevertheless, achieving a decent production capacity not only meant dealing 
with technology, raw materials and ingredients; it also required lots of 
training of the production personnel, often in combination with technology 
adjustments. I asked Sæverud, production worker, on the combined issue of 
learning and technological adjustments: 
 
Researcher: How much are you capable of producing per day now? 
Sæverud: Well, I think it is around 500 kilograms. If everything goes as 
it should, but we have had problems with that sausage filler every time 
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now. Because the sausage skin breaks, and so the next time I think the 
supplier will be with us. It creates some waste, it does. 
 
Handling fragile raw materials and learning to use new machines took both 
time and effort, and here we saw how the machine supplier had to be brought 
in to participate in solving the problem of breaking sausage skins. Jacobsen, 
line manager in the Salma production, explained more about the hand-craft 
skills needed to handle the process, and the possibility of adding technology: 
 
It is very time consuming work, making the raw material needed for the 
sausage, right. And it is supposed to have this and this content of fat, 
and then we have to do the things I referred to of hand-craft, taking 
away brown fat and all that. And this production process is time 
consuming, it takes time. As I see it, we need new equipment to do the 
job, so that we can do it more effectively than today, everything is hand-
crafted. (Bjørn Rino Jacobsen, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
In this work intensive process, Jacobsen suggested rethinking the 
distribution of labour between machines and humans to increase the 
productivity and simplify the job for his team. Another question was, of 
course, the costs of training; of producing a product that had not yet found its 
commercial users (i.e. a ‘market’). Kiland, the commercialisation manager, 
was particularly concerned about this challenge of production and costs: 
 
So, in terms of costs, there is no risk on the R&D side, because we have 
the sausage. What relates to money now, is if we can’t sell what we 
produce. If we start a production of three to four tonnes, to test the 
capacity, what they in reality can deliver, it will cost us a half million 
NOK if we can’t sell it. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Thus, here they had a problem, the tension between lack of sales and need 
for training the production personnel. Kiland tried to balance the issues, 
although finding that the training on larger quantities was crucial: 
 
Well, it is a challenge, and it is pressing, so first we produced 200 
kilograms, and then we produced 500, and this went reasonably well, 
but we are depending on getting extremely fresh fish within a short 
timeframe, without brown fat and such things, a quality product. And 
then we came to 1000, and I said that ‘you have to practice producing 
more than 1000’, and then they produced 800, and then I said they had 
to double, 2000, and then they managed 1700. So they never manage 
fully, partly due to not getting enough raw material, which is Bremnes’ 
problem becoming our problem. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
According to Kiland, the reason for not being able to deliver the ordered 
volumes during this training period was a combination of production skills 
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and supply of raw materials. And the uncertainty regarding the production 
did not only relate to production capacity (volume), but also the quality of 
the production: 
 
Two tonnes cost us a few hundred thousand NOK, which is a lot of 
money, but we don’t have a choice. As an example, our latest 
production now is also the worst. On a scale from one to five, it is a 
three. The previous production was extremely good, it was a five. I can 
still bring that one to Japan and Singapore for presentation. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
The fact that the outcome of test production had to be used for real customer 
presentations represented a challenge. Thus, both to achieve volume and 
quality, the production team had to practice and tune their practice. To locate 
the cause of the variation in quality, he trusted Swensen’s ability to find and 
solve the problem. The problem, from their point of view, was that the 
production team had been a bit careless with the production procedures: 
 
It was the drying facility, it has a funnel that needs to be filled with 
water once a month, but they have to check on it every other day or 
something. Bremnes had as their routine that the first person arriving 
goes checking this, but then it went dry during a weekend, resulting in 
an extremely dry edge on the product, Bremnes had not followed 
written procedures, so the responsibility is located, but there is no point 
for me to fight that battle. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
This confirmed Kiland’s concern about further training the production 
organisation, and increased the threat for stocking too much. He chose a 
balancing strategy, of doing a minimum of training, while he worked on 
marketing the product: 
 
So then I have a product at level three, what can I do with it? Should I 
enter it as cost of stock, or is it rather just a test production? When it 
ends up as a level three, it is definitely a test production. But if they 
should double the production volume again, then we would soon have a 
stock worth more than a million NOK, and this is what kills projects. 
We couldn’t manage that. Now they produced 500 kilograms. So, they 
have to produce to keep going, with 500 kilogram batches. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
However, Kiland’s main responsibility was to sell the product, not to get 
involve in production. His rationale for interacting with production anyway, 
was related to his view of what a ‘brand’ is about. To build a brand, he 
argued, you have to deliver the exact same quality every time. This 
conception was initially not shared by the Bremnes organisation, which also 
wanted to take the market price for salmon into consideration when deciding 
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on production priorities and type of raw material. Did Kiland go beyond his 
mandate, by interfering with production? If looking at the formal 
organisation structure of Salmon Brands, with Morlandstø as managing 
director, and Kiland representing the sales organisation outsourced to Tine 
Ingredients, he clearly did. Yet, Kiland experienced his mandate as partly 
also representing the major owner of Salmon Brands, to do what it took to 
commercialise the product. 
 
Production competence is both an issue of training and learning for the 
personnel involved, and at the same time an issue of technology, whether to 
use handcrafts or assign and automate the task to a machine. This 
intersection between economy (cost of labour versus cost of technological 
investments) and competence (who solves the task best, humans or 
machines?), was in almost continuous tension, for instance when 
Morlandstø, MD of Salmon Brands, considered the task of taking away 
bones from the pre-rigor fish: 
 
Researcher: In the beginning you took out the bones manually, and now 
you have started using a machine? 
Morlandstø: Yes, that’s right. The machine that we have developed now 
helps us a part of the way, but we have to work more on this machine to 
get it efficient enough. It is also manually driven, we need more camera 
technology positioning the fish and removing the bones in a more 
effective way, at the same speed as the rest of the production lines. 
 
And after the fish had been slaughtered and processed, the product was ready 
for packaging. There were few places where the relation between production 
technologies, costs and marketing more evident. If the product was to be 
sliced, then slicing technology had to be included, as was the case with 
questions about whether the package should be transparent, what size the 
packages should have and what information should be put on the packages 
(e.g. tracing info would require information systems, fat content info would 
require automated infrared measurement, etc). 
 
Unexpectedly from the Tine side, hygiene became the aspect of production 
practice in which Tine had the most to offer Bremnes Seashore. It came to be 
one of the central aspects of knowledge sharing in the joint venture, 
indicating the differences also arguably present on sectoral levels, both in 
different practices of production and marketing, and different competence on 
microbiology and industrial nutritients production. Tine’s expertise on 
nutritional standards and microbiology had been systematically developed 
during decades of quality work on dairy products, while the Norwegian fish 
industry had barely been doing product development on fresh products at all. 
During this process, Tine mobilised some of their production consultants and 
209 
 
researchers to teach the organisation at Bremnes how to improve their 
routines and knowledge. Routines had to be practiced and kept sharp on 
hygiene, regular quality testing and technology maintenance. It should be 
noted that Bremnes always had been safely on the inside of the existing 
regulations (the industry standard in the fish industry is a total bacteria count 
of a maximum 10,000 per gram from factory, while Bremnes normally 
counting around 3,000 to 4,000), but in relation to this new product, they had 
to work to make it significantly better, to secure better durability, and keep 
the product qualities as stable as possible. When early in the project, I talked 
to some production workers at Bremnes, they told me that they never had 
any problems with hygiene; on the contrary, they were very good at this. 
Still, in the subsequent up-scaling and training phase, they managed to 
decrease the bacterial concentration to below 1,000 per gram after the 
salmon was ready processed. This was achieved through systematic 
collaboration over several months, both with the production personnel, the 
cleaning personnel and the management, mainly by improving routines to 
the ‘right’ level, and by implementing systematic control of the results. 
Going closer into the practical work of developing this competence in 
Salmon Brands, Morlandstø mentioned several issues that were dealt with, 
for instance, not only how existing routines had to be improved, but also 
how totally new routines had to be implemented: 
 
First, we had to drill our own people who are cleaning after the day’s 
work and then we had to drill those cleaning to prepare the next day, 
and then we had to start up extraordinary routines to check how clean it 
is. And then, we have taken action if it has not been clean, so here we 
have had to distribute responsibility, and create a new position, that is 
instructed to work out a specification from Tine R&D. And we have 
registered every single production, and followed up with bacteriological 
tests that we have been following closely. In some areas, Tine R&D has 
had to adapt their requirements to realistic levels, while in other areas, 
we have had to admit that this is much more detailed than we have been 
used to doing. We have always viewed below 10,000 in total bacteria 
count78  as being acceptable, we have typically had a level of 3,000 to 
4,000. So we have been very good at this compared to our industrial 
setting, I think. But when we took this down to 300, or below 1,000, 
that was a quantum leap, really. (Jan Ove Morlandstø, Bremnes 
Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
 
In meeting much stricter demands than before, and getting the help to deliver 
on these demands, they were able to establish a remarkably high standard of 
nutritional quality, when compared to the industry practice, from this intense 
                                                     
78 This is said to be the ’industry standard’ in the fish industry; a maximum of 
10,000 bacteria per gram when shipped out of the factory.  
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collaborative relationship with the agricultural cooperative. Parallel to this 
process of scaling up production, as the product materialised and the 
production quality improved, preparations and early attempts at presenting 
the product to potential users were made.  
 
4.6 Looking for users 
Where did all these developments and changes lead the project? Did they 
manage to choose direction related to users and markets, and did they 
succeed in finding and convincing any of the users they had imagined during 
product development? I will take a closer look at the process and practice of 
marketing, i.e., of settling a market concept and going out looking for users 
and markets, and what consequences this had for the project and the product.  
 
Making the concept: Salma 
Parallel to the scaling up the production at Bremnes during the spring of 
2004, plans for international marketing started to materialise, and Hovland 
was indeed aware of where the main challenge was: 
 
The main job is done in the market; that is where the sea battle is. I have 
hired a person to work 100% with development of this as a brand. We 
will have a test launch with our partners in three markets in June, and 
then we let them think for a while, and then we take a round in August 
and September to find out how it is received. (Gunnar Hovland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
Three years after the initial idea, and more than two years after purchasing 
the patent application, the time had finally come for doing the marketing, in 
terms of making the product ‘marketable’, looking for potential users and  
convincing them to actually buying the product. In having succeeded 
technically with making a pure salmon salami, and convincing management 
of the new direction, they earned a degree of freedom in choosing a name 
and concept associated with salmon that the previous project team did not 
have. The use of pre-rigor salmon had also solved some aesthetic problems, 
particularly the fact that the fish salami did not become grey or an artificial 
colour had to be applied; it had a natural and delicate red colour. In addition, 
it became easier to control the raw material, with regard to the content of 
bacteria, and hygiene in general. Once the white fish was taken off the 
project and pre-rigor salmon was chosen as the new ally, the 
conceptualisation took speed. The new commercialisation manager, Kiland, 
started immediately working on the concept, and a couple of months later, he 
had the concept ready. This meant intensive work on naming, categorisation 
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and designing the product. Several names of a branded product concept had 
been discussed earlier, partly with help from external marketing consultancy, 
and names like ‘Deli-Fjord’ and ‘Sea Salami’ had been considered to be the 
best alternatives, because at that time, they were not allowed to consider a 
pure salmon concept. However, now they put all previous work aside, and 
came up with the name and concept of ‘Salma’, stabilising the association to 
salmon even more. Plans for sales activities had been delayed some months, 
as July and August were considered difficult for meeting customers. The 
production capacity of the new facility was 10 tonnes per month, but they 
only needed 3 months to double this volume once, and another 3 months to 
double again – reaching a production capacity of 40 tonnes a month – if 
needed. Kiland expressed the crucial importance of getting sales from 
January 2005, hopefully from market actors in Japan, Hong Kong, US and 
France. 
 
During this transition phase between Umi No Kami and Salma, what was left 
of Umi No Kami’s story? As mentioned previously, much of the work to 
include new actors and resources had pushed much of the story either into 
oblivion or out of the project entirely. What was left was first and foremost 
the initial idea about fermenting fish, and the reference to its inventor – Erik 
Slinde at the Institute of Marine Research. This was the starting point of the 
story, as was presented. At the same time, the story related that many things 
about the product had now become different, thus leading to discussions 
about the patent application and its present value. The new project 
constellation argued that their product not was comparable to the patent 
application anymore. The contract between ForInnova, the 
commercialisation office at University of Bergen and Tine included points 
on economic compensation for each new country in which the product was 
commercialised. Furthermore, for Tine’s part, the more they realised how 
this commercialisation process would progress, the more they realised that 
these parts of the contract were not very beneficial to them. In their view, it 
cost more than it gained; thus, they sought to get out of these parts of the 
contract. They did this mainly by redefining the product, based on the 
material changes and adaptations that had been done to the original recipe. 
With the problems of getting the patent application through the patent 
system, and in having doubts about whether to go further with the 
application procedure, there was a question about whether there was a kind 
of technology that was feasible for patenting at all, or whether it was too 
open, too generic. And, the changes in the recipe made them doubt the 
relevance of the patent. Among other things, they had gone from using 
frozen raw material (fish), as in the salami production of meat, to using fresh 
pre-rigor salmon. They had also gone from a mixed product of white and red 
fish to a pure salmon product. Hence, they argued, they were not responsible 
on the same contract terms towards ForInnova and Erik Slinde anymore. A 
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few other aspects of the history of Umi No Kami were preserved too; the 
story of a rather messy process at Tine R&D. There was a need for change, 
for a shift, so the story went. What was not present, however, was Berit 
Nordvi and her colleagues’ roles in the project, how she met Erik Slinde in 
the beginning, started cooperation with him, and presented the idea within 
the Tine system. The work on milk proteins in the Neptun project, and the 
connections between the Neptun and the Umi No Kami projects, was largely 
absent from the story about what was becoming ‘Salma’, as it was enacted 
into the new project organisation. Another historical issue that also was not 
present, was the cooperation with the Food Research Institute, and the 
systematic testing of various bacteria cultures (lactic acid cultures), to find 
what would make the best product in terms of texture, taste and durability in 
a salami product of fish: How they tested different bacteria cultures from 
their bio-bank, and how one of them proved to be clearly better than all the 
others. When I talked to Kiland, Hovland and Swendsen, they consistently 
explained the product’s quality and identity with the raw material – pre-rigor 
salmon; hyper-fresh salmon of the highest ‘sashimi’ quality. The bacteria 
culture, the inner workings of fermentation technology, was forgotten, 
perhaps simply because it had become stable, working as it should every 
time, or because they did not know the differences, i.e., the results of the 
different cultures on the product, or – as hinted at earlier – they needed to 
create more space for the elements in their new strategy and needed the 
attention to be on pre-rigor rather than on fermentation and fat stabilisation. 
 
In the final report on the Neptun project, Nordvi made a summary of the 
relationship between Neptun and Salma. The report is an account of how 
knowledge produced in the Neptun/Umi No Kami project groups had been 
used in the Salma product, between the initial intentions and interests of 
R&D in engaging with this object, and the product that were to be 
commercialised by Salmon Brands. Seeking to show the project’s results and 
value to its funding and supporting bodies (the Research Council of Norway, 
Tine, The Food Research Institute and more), the report drew some 
interesting lines between the stages of the project, shedding some light on 
what has been a linear development from start to end, and what has been 
discontinuous technical and political reconfigurations. Here, it is appropriate 
to ask, to what extent are we talking about the same innovation between 
Neptun, Umi No Kami and Salma? 
 
While Neptun/Umi No Kami had explored the fermentation of a range of 
different fish species, both white and red, Salma consisted only of salmon. 
Neptun had gathered basic knowledge about the curing of meat and fish, fish 
quality, and studied opportunities for the transfer of knowledge of cured 
meat to curing fish. Stabilisation of fatty acids had been a major challenge 
when curing fish, and in the Neptun project, infra-red analysis (NIR) had 
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been explored to measure the content of fat in the fish, as well as water 
activity, proteins, and colour in different species. Furthermore, the relation 
between protein and fatty acid content had been studied, in finding what is 
possible to stabilise. Salma Cured (the salami), as a pure salmon product, 
was on the limit of fat content, and succeeded by using only the leanest part 
of the salmon. Salmon Brands had tested technology for online NIR 
measurement in their production. While Neptun used only frozen fish, which 
is common in curing meat because the drying process is then easier, Salma 
got better stabilising effects by using fresh pre-rigor raw material. The 
primary aim of Neptun was to study protein applications, which had resulted 
in knowledge of the effects of various proteins on the fermentation process: 
pH, loss of water, texture, fat binding, taste, colour, storage stability, and 
especially, its ability to hinder oxidation (fat fish normally getting harsh 
quickly). On bacteria cultures, Neptun/Umi No Kami tested several bacteria 
cultures from the collection of strains at The Food Research Institute, many 
of which had been isolated from old Norwegian fermented sausages. The 
chosen bacteria gave a characteristic tasting profile when compared to other 
salami bacteria, was robust, and had the ability to restrict listeriosis. The 
bacteria culture was successfully put in production at Tine’s own ‘filter 
fermentor’. In addition, a series of parameters for the production process 
(order of ingredients, temperatures, etc), and methods of analysis for various 
purposes (food safety, sensorics, etc) were developed in the Neptun/Umi No 
Kami projects and then adapted to the Salma production (“Neptun – Salma” 
document, January 2005). Technologically, a huge number of alternatives 
had been explored during the Neptun and Umi No Kami projects. Different 
fish species, bacteria strains and protein variants had been combined and 
recombined many times, and several varying technological parameters had 
been manipulated, such as frozen or fresh raw material, temperature on 
curing process, measurements of biological composition of the raw materials 
(NIR), and the order of blending the ingredients. However, here, in the initial 
period of commercialising the product, of conceptualising a ‘brand’, its 
identity and its characteristics were explained solely from the new raw 
material; pre-rigor processed salmon.  
 
One day, when I came to Kiland’s office (mid June 2004), he was now fully 
engaged in his new job. He proudly presented the new name of the product: 
‘Salma’. It had already been decided, and a design agency, Tangram Design, 
had been assigned to develop a logo and design concept. I got to see a first 
draft. It was a minimalist logo – ‘SALMA’ in clean, white letters on black 
background, with ‘Fresh cured salmon’ as subtext, and with two symbols 
above, guaranteeing for quality and freshness of the product. The first 
package design had a bright red colour, picking up the colour of the product. 
The box, containing a 250 gram whole Salma roll, told a story of the initial 
marketing preferences, seeking to avoid the extensive work often needed to 
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adapt to various retail actors’ demands for sizes and shapes of the product, 
small or large, sliced or whole roll, etc.  
 
The plans for taking the product into large scale production (until then it had 
only been produced in the labs of Food Research Institute and of Tine R&D) 
were on track and test production was scheduled for the end of the month. At 
the same time, the plan for launching the product internationally, through 
food fairs and existing business relations globally, started to materialise. 
Some of the early choices in the Salma conceptualisation had to do with its 
category and customer segment, in very general terms. It was to become 
more of a high-end product, with freshness and quality as sales arguments, 
than a price sensitive ‘everyday’ product. The mundane connotations to 
salami, at least in Scandinavia, were to be downplayed. Catering actors, such 
as airlines, baguette producers and restaurant chains were clearly preferred 
before retail, due to the relative reduction of adaptation and the assumption 
that there was more rapid achievement of stable volumes. Nevertheless, 
retail was still considered to be an option, at least in practice. Last, Salma 
was considered to be an international concept, as the Norwegian market was 
viewed as being probably much too small for such a product. While 
Tangram Design worked with Kiland on shaping some aspects of the visual 
representation of Salma, elite chefs worked on other aspects. For an object 
without a category, like Salma, its audience would probably be uncertain 
about what it was meant to be. When even its inventors were ambiguous 
about its use, most people who heard about a ‘salmon salami’, or a 
‘fermented salmon product’, either smiled overbearingly or stated their 
scepticism right away 79 . Svein Erik Hilsen, chef at Tine R&D, with 
experience from The Culinary Institute of Norway (GI), and some of his 
collaborators let their creativity and craftsmanship loose. The transforming 
result was striking. Salma was no longer a strange and lonely, and hence 
confusing, object (see pictures below). Salma in combination, Salma with 
food associates. Thorough combinations of excellent raw materials had been 
made into dishes fitting different food traditions, hence contextualising the 
product. Pictures showed Salma on display among some of the trendy 
‘hipsters’ of food: Sushi and Asian cuisine, hinting at the absolute high-end 
quality of the product, to be eaten raw, pure and in fine company of other 
sea-food ingredients. Seafood pizza, a healthier alternative within the 
popular Italy-inspired menu. And lefse-roll, a twist on traditional Norwegian 
food, trading the traditional smoked salmon with Salma in combination with 
                                                     
79 Besides following the Salma and its representatives to different venues, I have 
used the case several times as teaching material for Bachelor and Master’s students 
at BI and Oslo University College, in addition to paper presentations at international 
conferences. The pattern never failed: Salma (’salmon salami’) always created 
engagement, both of curious enthusiasm and of outspoken scepticism. 
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the famous ‘lefse’ (potato tortilla). Later, these chefs would also appear at 
various places where Salma needed exclusive introduction to new actors, 
such as food fairs and business meetings.  
 
Next, Salma started to assemble a set of associations presenting itself as a 
viable concept for conscious consumers willing to pay to try a healthy and 
tasty alternative to meat and poultry. In the commercialisation plan for 2005-
2006, by Kiland (June 2004), the vision for Salmon Brands was to “set a 
new standard for Norwegian salmon products, based on quality, uniqueness 
and freshness”, with the goal of creating “the world’s leading brand for 
product solutions based on high quality salmon”. Still, were all the 
‘necessary’ associations in place? Would this do the job of selling Salma? It 
is interesting to note, already here, how the discrepancies between 
interacting practices may create dilemmas and paradoxes. In particular, the 
difference between the brochures and presentations, which summed up all 
the best associations that chefs, scientists and marketers could come up with, 
and the first product version at KaDeWe and Color Line, which were almost 
stripped of all these associations – opaque package whole roll, no use 
situations outlined, no visual representations and no opportunity for sensing 
the product. It is difficult from first impression to tell if the bright red and 
minimalistic package contained a deodorant or a food product. Slicing would 
add costs and time for development, and by displaying the product in more 
transparent packaging, the light could speed up the decay and thus decrease 
the shelf life of the product. 
 
Looking for users: The marketing tour 
In commenting on the early market explorations in Umi No Kami, Kiland 
revealed a very different approach in comparison with the early Umi No 
Kami team, which sought out a robust plan for distinct geographical and 
cultural customer segments. Kiland, on the other hand, refused to a priori 
narrow down the focus for his marketing efforts towards the salmon salami: 
 
In Umi No Kami they had problems deciding on markets, but we are 
thinking that all markets are big enough, more concrete. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
In being pragmatic about where to sell Salma, he was more concerned about 
starting to generate sales in practice. Some of the old Umi No Kami 
participants were critical towards this, viewing it as a lack of focus, while 
Kiland saw this as a trial and error learning process, gradually arriving at a 
firm market strategy related to the response from potential customers. Still, 
could he be sure that they really had something to sell? That the production 
had stabilised with sufficient quality and reliability? During a lunch meeting 
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during the summer of 2004, Swensen told that they were on track regarding 
production: 
 
Now it is all about market activities, the production is on track. There 
have been slight problems with differing understandings of quality, 
mainly small problems regarding hygiene. They are used in sending out 
products of uneven quality, and it is a matter of understanding different 
cultures. (Lars Petter Swensen, Tine R&D) 
 
Thus, at this point, Salma was dependent on only marketing according to the 
team. Having survived ambiguous stages of research and development, and 
now of scaling up production, the remaining question was whether 
marketers, distributors and consumers would be able to find common interest 
in the intersection of economic and use value of the product. Confirmed by 
Kiland, the quality of the salmon salami now had reached a level where 
production, taste and concept had become sufficiently stable. First, the battle 
was now about stabilising the quality of production further, which was not 
too difficult of a problem to solve according to Swensen. However, if we 
read this in relation to the previous chapters, on organising and practicing 
large scale production at Bremnes, we see that they had to work hard on 
improving production routines for a long time after this lunch meeting at 
Tine headquarters in Oslo. Another example of this was how Kiland and 
Swensen demanded that production at Bremnes guarantee they would 
produce Salma within a timeframe of four hours from slaughter to ready 
packaged product: 
 
We have put a four-hour guarantee on the labels now. They [Bremnes] 
made it, it helps to be demanding. You know, the salmon industry is still 
a cowboy industry; it is all about getting stuff out. Bremnes Seashore is 
better than the rest, but still not terribly good. Lars Petter is 
continuously following up. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
In a combined marketing and micro-biological perspective, to be able to 
write ‘4 hour guarantee’ on the labels strengthened quality claims, clarifying 
one of the parameters from which (material) quality and marketing 
arguments were made: Superior raw materials from superior processing 
knowledge and technology. After a bit more excitement over the production 
at Bremnes than expected, where in particular the ’mould episode’ almost 
left the marketers without a product to present at the following marketing 
tour, Salma had come to be ready for meeting customers. Leaving aside the 
questions of when (how early in the innovation process) to involve 
customers, and in what way, I will here go through parts of the tour that 
started in the fall 2004, and continued through the first half of 2005, 
describing both some customers’ responses, and how both the marketing 
strategy, the product and the concept was changed from these interactions. 
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The distribution company in the US, Norseland80, a daughter company of 
Tine, was approached to present Salma in their huge distribution network. 
They set up meetings with people in the big retail actors, via their 
established business relations. Yet, would relations based on cheese work for 
a fish product? Or, in other words, were the same people dealing with both 
cheese and fish in these giant businesses? The answer was, unsurprisingly, 
‘no’. The next question was about the extent to which such indirect relations 
would help. Norseland had little trouble in getting some interesting meetings 
between Kiland and key actors in the food retail industry in US, and had 
some useful feedback from them: 
 
Norseland had invited three of their contacts in relevant industries, top 
managers in their companies. They liked the product, and were 
interested, although only moderately interested. We will be dependent 
on a sliced and processed product, but this will demand a lot of work in 
packaging. And it will be a challenge to maintain the quality after 
slicing. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Again, doubts about selling Salma to retail came up, making a sliced product 
in transparent packages represented more work than Kiland preferred, 
although he still took their moderately positive attitude as a confirmation of 
the product’s potential. The American panel also gave “valuable input” on 
issues like market segment, size and weight preferences, a need for four 
rather three months shelf-life, the prohibition of metal clips, etc. Moreover, 
the response given by the actors from the US on the conceptual side 
pinpointed some problems: 
 
Mainly, the U.S. had two concerns: First, they found the price too high, 
and second, they remarked that the product did not look like what it is, it 
looked processed – of cuttings – not super fresh. But still, they ate more 
than just out of duty. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
This is a good summary of various customer responses, not only in the US. 
High pricing, from the use of very expensive raw materials and an attempt to 
signal exclusivity, was perceived as a problem for market entry. Moreover, 
they presented a product that in many countries “does not look like what it 
is”, to customers who were more closely associated with mundane and low-
price ‘industrial salami’ than with the more exclusive (and often local) 
Mediterranean salami specialties. This seemed to add to the problem of 
                                                     
80 Norseland is Tine’s own distribution company for cheese in the US. They have 
been incredibly successful with Jarlsberg cheese during more than 20 years, and it is 
now the largest import cheese in the US, with distribution covering more than 90% 
of the retail market. 
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price. In a tour going through Moscow before arriving to Hong Kong and 
Singapore, Kiland hoped that they would have learned enough about 
presenting Salma to customers in order to ensure the best possible 
performance in the promising markets of Asia: 
 
Moscow has lots of ‘new-rich’ people, but it is a complicated market, it 
is a ‘wild card’, even though both Jarlsberg and Bremnes have some 
exports there already. We have to practice, you know, learn what 
argumentation works, what responses we get. This is important before 
we go to Hong Kong, by then we have to get rid of all teething 
problems, and I had hoped to bring our best products there. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
Before going to Hong-Kong and Singapore with its considerable aftermaths, 
they went to SIAL food fair in Paris. This time I had the opportunity to 
participate and observe what was going on, in one of the world’s largest food 
fairs, where big actors meet and cultivate their industrial networks.  
 
I arrived at hall five at SIAL, near the Charles de Gaulle International 
Airport in Paris, around noon on the October 17, 2004. This was an 
enormous area divided into six halls, which were partially sorted by 
categories and themes. Eventually, I found Tine’s stand, with “Let Jarlsberg 
Entertain You” on a large banner. They had only cheese on display, not a 
trace of Salma anywhere. Kiland and Hovland were busy sitting in a meeting 
with a potential customer, talking enthusiastically, showing their power-
point presentation, and serving Salma followed by white wine around a café 
table. I soon understood that my opportunity here was to hang around the 
stand, talk to different people, and see what happened. A representative from 
Norseland US was optimistic on behalf of Salma on the US market, but still 
emphasised that this was completely different from the existing portfolio, 
mostly of cheeses: 
 
Everything is about relations, Norseland knows people who know 
people. We can connect them with people who know the fish side, 
because we don’t, it is a completely different market. (Linda Karaffa, 
Norseland US) 
 
In other words, it was unclear how much these existing relations could 
contribute, and probably more indirect than direct. The outcome of such 
meetings was uncertain, as was also evident from Kiland’s previous trip to 
the US (see above). The recent visits to US and Moscow had been 
interesting, but for the most part as a training exercise for the subsequent 
presentations, getting the opportunity to test out the argumentation and the 
presentation materials. Afterwards, the argumentation was adjusted, and new 
brochures were produced, with better quality and less mistakes, before 
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leaving for Paris, and later for Hong Kong to present the concept there. 
Everywhere, the response for Kiland had been similar: “The thing is that 
everyone is positive to the product when they get to taste it”. Initial 
scepticism turned to openness after tasting the product and hearing the story, 
but still – imagining how to sell the product to consumers was a bit harder to 
most actors.  
 
Later at the fair, I spoke to Detlef Martens, Tine’s agent in Germany. He was 
interested in testing Salma on the German market, and reflected on the 
identity of the Salma concept: “Perhaps Salma belongs on the meat shelves? 
It is more similar to those products, where it is common to slice the products, 
and so forth”. He pinpointed one of the central questions of how to market 
and sell Salma Cured how should this new product be categorised? Salma 
Cured was not similar to anything people had seen before, it was a true 
hybrid between meat salami and cured salmon, both having their own 
distinct categories. So, to what category did Salma belong? Or would they 
have to create a new one, without any established shelves in retail stores, and 
no associations for consumers to relate to? And while Martens here argued 
for its similarity to meat products, Kiland often argued that the suggested use 
of Salma corresponded a bit with smoked salmon, used as an appetiser, and 
in various other settings, often on special occasions. In his view, Salma 
could also be used in baguettes, or on pizza, etc., which of course let him go 
in the direction of the assumed easier route to successful commercialisation: 
Catering. Further, at SIAL, he was mainly directing his efforts towards 
catering companies. The prospect of getting large and manageable orders 
from them, less dependent on packaging and similar things, was alluring. 
Still, through the initiative of Martens, Salma Cured was scheduled for test 
sales in the exclusive hyper-market ‘KaDeWe’ in Berlin the same fall, and 
Kiland and Martens continued their conversation on the German market in 
the coming week. 
 
At the end of the first day at SIAL, it was time for a party at the Tine stand. 
The Norwegian Minister of Agriculture, Lars Sponheim, was there, with his 
flock of secretaries, journalists and others. Norwegian National Broadcasting 
(NRK) and a number of Norwegian newspapers and magazines were there, 
all taking pictures of Holmen (CEO at Tine) and the minister in cheerful 
dialogue, tasting different tapas dishes prepared by Tine and the Culinary 
Institute’s chefs. Both of them seemed to thrive in the spotlight, and had 
plenty of time for each other and for the journalists.  
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Pictures 19 and 20: CEO Holmen, Tine, talking to Sponheim, Norwegian Minister of 
Agriculture (above). The Salma banner on the Jarlsberg stand. Kiland preparing for a 
customer meeting, and Holmen (CEO) talking to a journalist in the ‘cafè’-area (below). 
 
Some of Tine’s customers and partners were present, as well as Innovation 
Norway. Generous amounts of wine, aquavit and beer were served, followed 
by a pretty cheerful atmosphere. Salma participated in a glamorous fashion, 
being thoroughly presented as part of several dishes: Salma Cured with dip, 
Salma Cured and Fresh alone, Fresh (as sushi) alone, and with soy and 
ginger, in mustard sauce, on canapés, etc. The Salma banner and the 
brochure had at this time been put up for everyone to see. As with the 
presentation materials, Salma was mostly presented in relations to other 
things, in recipes of different kinds. Often the interplay between Salma and 
various other ingredients were emphasised, such as sushi, pizza, baguettes 
and canapés, and obviously the thinking was that the odds of Salma would 
be better if presented together with potential associates. By ‘teaching’ 
potential customers, using all they had of communication and presentation 
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techniques, they sought to get the message of this salmon product’s 
uniqueness through, as salmon is most often seen as a generic product.  
 
At SIAL, actors from Sweden, Taiwan and Russia, amongst others, were 
exited by this new product, and expressed interest in taking care of 
distribution to their respective countries. Yet none of these really convinced 
Kiland on making a deal (or was it the other way around?), it was difficult to 
establish new relations at such a stressful venue, and several of the Tine 
people, Kiland included, described SIAL as a place where you typically 
scheduled meetings with your most important customers, as they would all 
be there. What did convince him, however, was the meeting with certain 
actors in Singapore a few weeks after. 
 
Catering for Asia 
“I haven’t heard from them in weeks. We delivered good results on the 
adaptations of the product; it works excellent on pizza now. I think they just 
have lost interest”. I had lunch with Øyvind Kiland, commercialisation 
manager of Salma, catching up on the last developments of his project of 
marketing (or rather, making a market for) a brand new cured salmon 
product, a ‘salmon salami’. He was talking about YUM, the multinational 
restaurant corporation, with brands like Pizza Hut and KFC in their portfolio. 
There is lots of irony in this story, often found in the instances in which this 
technology, or product, or concept/product portfolio, seemed stable for some 
time seemed to have found its shape, only to be thrown into new 
uncertainties at the hands of the next actor. After the meeting with YUM, the 
‘gourmet version’ of Salma had to go back to the laboratory. In order to bake 
well in a pizza oven, it needed less drying, probably no smoking, and could 
possibly accept lower quality standards; in other words, it would be a 
product that was easier, faster and thus cheaper to make. The process of 
adjusting and testing a ‘pizza version’ of Salma in the lab went well. 
However, when returning to YUM with good news, nothing happened. They 
had probably lost interest in the product, or they lacked faith in Tine’s ability 
to deliver on their demands, or their contact person had got a new job. Who 
knows?  
 
The Singapore trip had been timed and planned properly. Coinciding with 
the official visit of the Norwegian king and queen, and using Innovation 
Norway for organising meetings and participation in various events, it soon 
gave results. Two potential customers went into further dialogue about the 
opportunities for commercialising Salma: Fairprice, a retail actor and YUM, 
a restaurant actor. The optimal customer to start out with was considered to 
be an actor within the catering or restaurant industries, which meant 
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reducing adaptations of the product to a minimum. While numerous 
adaptations would have to be done in relation to retail, a restaurant actor 
would probably want the product in larger and standardised portions, 
hopefully minimising technological and logistical adaptations, and so it was 
the restaurant actor that was the most interesting to the Salma people. Still, 
they also considered the retail side, together with Fairprice, a relatively 
small-sized retail chain, which led to an initial test campaign: 
 
We got a deal on test sales in Singapore, the ‘Fairprice’ chain, of both 
large and small (250 grams) sausages. Had a campaign the two last 
weekends before Christmas, and we sold some. But it turns out as a 
niche product, with slicing being a prerequisite. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
Slicing turned out to be a clear customer demand, and retail remained on the 
less interesting side of the scale. Nevertheless, slicing opportunities in 
Singapore and Norway were still investigated, obviously intending to go for 
both retail and restaurant if customer orders materialised.  
 
So, then it had forced its way through, so that we end up doing retail. 
And it is like this with new projects, you can’t say no either. And we 
have a package suitable for retail, but it is not sliced. But of course, in 
today’s convenience market, you have to slice it. But then we have 
some challenges, one about bacteriology, shelf-life, if we could vacuum 
it in a tight package, without letting in any light, we would have made 
it. But there are no customers buying something they can’t see. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
And, where would it be best to do the slicing? Hiring production in Norway 
would be expensive, and due to the lack of both the technology and the 
knowledge at Bremnes, it would be as expensive to do it there, and then 
there was the question of how much the slicing process would reduce its 
shelf-life. It could not be delayed much longer, the pressure for making some 
sales soon increased, and Kiland’s manager, Hovland, together with the 
Bremnes people, pushed hard for coming up with a solution on slicing. 
 
I have been pushed hard by Gunnar, and Bremnes, on this thing with 
slicing, so I feel that it is me who is stopping us, that it is me who is not 
showing progress. It is really a bit unpleasant, and Gunnar has been 
bragging a lot about this. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
In spite of the pressures from his boss and partners, Kiland resisted 
implementing a retail strategy, feeling that it was too uncertain to defend the 




The point is shelf-life, without knowing where your market is, if it is the 
Norwegian market it is probably ok, except for high costs because the 
knowledge isn’t there. But if you should slice a product, and then send it 
with a plane overseas, it is really expensive. Or you have to slice it, and 
then send it by boat, which takes long time, which is bad for shelf-life, 
hence you will have to freeze it. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
In addition, the hopes and efforts for making a deal with YUM served to 
influence this resistance. YUM is a multinational restaurant corporation with 
35.000 restaurants around the globe, with brands like KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco 
Bell and Long John Silver’s in their portfolio. One of their main R&D units 
was based in Singapore, and the head of product development showed great 
interest in exploring this product in pizza recipes for Pizza Hut. Kiland and 
Swensen considered this to be an ideal customer, even if having to adapt the 
product and the packaging here too: 
 
And, Pizza Hut does want it, and in pre-sliced form. And perhaps they 
then want a big package, and perhaps they want only 20 slices in each 
package, corresponding to one pizza. But in any case, they are 
extremely preoccupied with price, which means that if I add 2 Euros in 
packaging costs, they will say that ’no, then we’ll rather do it here’. But 
still I don’t know if it is Pizza Hut Singapore or Pizza Hut Japan that 
ends up having Salma on their pizzas. I think it is smart to pre-slice the 
product as close to the end-user as possible. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
If sliced or not, if frozen or not, and the required size of the packages 
mattered in terms of logistics, both on time and economy: 
 
We can send it by plane, but then it is costs again. 12 kroner by plane 
and 2.50 by boat is a big difference. And if frozen, it is easier for those 
slicing it for example in Singapore to manage logistics and storage than 
if it were fresh. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
These were issues that Kiland wanted to settle before investing in slicing 
facilities in Norway, or developing retail packages that were both transparent 
and at the same time protecting the product from light, and so forth. On the 
retail side, no orders did materialise from Fairprice, as the contact person 
was moved to another position just a few weeks later, and therefore Salmon 
Brands was almost put back on scratch with this customer. Without contacts, 
relations, interest, there is not much to do. Geographical and cultural long 
distance, as well as a lack of knowledge of Tine and Salmon Brands by the 
new purchasing manager, made it farfetched to hope for more from 
Fairprice. YUM remained the ultimate customer for Salma at this stage, 
representing everything they hoped for: Restaurants, world-wide distribution 
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and acknowledged brands. It was not strange then, that Kiland became 
enthusiastic when he got such good initial responses from this actor. On their 
second trip to Singapore, Kiland and Swensen got to present and discuss the 
salmon salami with YUM’s head of R&D, who was interested and asked if it 
could be used on warm food, such as pizza:  
 
They were interested in testing Salma on pizza. But we are uncertain if 
it is suitable, and in case, it would need less drying, so we are doing 
tests in our own lab now, on baking, smell, taste and price – as more fat 
and water will influence price and suitability. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
The head of product development at YUM suggested that it could be tested 
in their Japanese Pizza Hut restaurants as their ‘monthly special’ campaign 
in Japan in November or December of the same year (2005), with TV-
commercials and special offers in the restaurants. This would have meant 
massive attention to Salma among some of the most open minded, but also 
demanding, consumers in a huge market. With more than 200 restaurants in 
Japan, and normally such campaigns constituting 50-60% of the sales during 
that period, the potential was huge, even if Salma sold less than normal 
during such a campaign. YUM had not mentioned any volumes in this 
round, but a success there alone would probably have made the whole Salma 
project profitable. Perhaps Salma was now about to find its first large scale 
user? As anticipated regarding catering actors, the level of adaptation on 
packages and logistics turned out to be very sensible: 
 
A deal with YUM would be a great advantage in terms of packaging 
and labour, they wanted Salma ready sliced in packages of 1-2 
kilograms, without any demands on its look, and then vacuum packed 
and frozen. Salma will then have three weeks’ shelf life after defrosting, 
while pepperoni will only have one week. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine 
Ingredients) 
 
However, this customer also had its labour intensive demands, and to be able 
to answer the question of feasibility for warm food properly, Salma had to be 
taken back into Tine’s laboratory. From finally being stable both in shape 
and production, its identity was now questioned again, opened up. Would it 
work as a ‘pepperoni-substitute’ on pizza? A short but intense period of 
experimenting and adapting to YUM’s requirements produced results: 
 
Adaptation of the product has been an important consequence of this 
relation. There is new variant of Salma, less dried, containing more 
water, but besides that using the same technologies and recipes. The 
time in the drying facilities was reduced from 3 to 1 week, hence 
tripling the production capacity. The result is a product well-suited for 
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pizza, because it will not curl from baking, and it will not become as dry 
in the edges as pepperoni. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
The fact that Swensen joined Kiland to this customer, was emphasised as an 
important part of  establishing the good process with them, enabling them to 
answer technical questions on the spot, and giving a more fluent professional 
dialogue on relevant aspects both of product and market, in addition to 
providing Swensen with better understanding of the customer’s needs. 
Moreover, they saw this opportunity to work on developing the product with 
one of the ‘big players’ as a great opportunity that could be exploited in 
relation to other customers: 
 
I think we will use this relation to get access to other places, too, having 
developed a product that is well-suited [for pizza], and that we can refer 
to an interested actor. The frozen pizza market, both in Norway – and 
one in which Tine Ingredients is selling cheese to everyone – and 
internationally – as, for example, when Norseland previously wanted to 
present Salma to a big US actor, but when I luckily said no, as the 
production was not yet good enough, and it is difficult to get a second 
chance in the American market. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
After a process of altering some of the steps of processing, such as salt, 
water content, smoking, testing times of storage and finding the best 
solutions for slicing and distribution, the results were positive, and they 
prepared for negotiating a deal. However, then problems arose: 
  
The pizza version is now ready for use. All YUM’s demands have been 
met, and we will deliver 1 kilogramme packages, frozen and sliced. But 
Pizza Hut is not answering. Lars Petter came with me, talked with their 
researchers and product developers, which was very important, and we 
have developed the perfect substitute for pepperoni. Anyway, I have felt 
since May that YUM was not interested anymore. Our contact was the 
head of product development in Singapore, and I don’t know why they 
have cut the contact. (Øyvind Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
A new variant suitable for warm food had now been created, “the perfect 
substitute for pepperoni”, and even with better properties on storage time 
and behaviour in the oven. Despite these first-class results, this part of the 
Salma story also ended before it reached any users, in this case, restaurant 
guests in Japan, Singapore or Hong Kong. When the good results were sent 
from Tine to the YUM R&D headquarters in Singapore, nothing happened. 
Silence. The process of adjusting and testing a ‘pizza version’ of Salma in 
the lab went well. Notwithstanding, the customer had, for unknown 
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reasons81, lost interest, and the attempt to mobilise the desired customer had 
brought both much work, and failure.  
 
Let’s recap this story from another angle. From excerpts of the email-
correspondence between Tine/Salmon Brands and YUM during 2005, we 
can recall parts of the interaction of this attempt at establishing a customer 
relationship: 
 
2005-01-10, email from head of product development, YUM R&D, to 
Hovland/Tine:  
Further, at the marketing conference in KL [Kuala Lumpur] in Nov.04, 
we have generated a lot of interest in Salma amongst our franchise in 
Asia. Apart from Japan, both Hong Kong and Taiwan would like to 
further explore this product. Can you please send a log of the Salma 
with the bigger diameter to Hong Kong and Taiwan? Sorry for the short 
notice but your help in this matter is highly appreciated. 
 
The first presentation of Salma had obviously made some impression on the 
YUM organisation, who was very interested in exploring this further. They 
had been discussing how Salma could be used in YUM’s context (on pizza), 
how Salma then would need to be modified (less drying, perhaps some 
spices, packaging and slicing, etc), and how to market it (e.g. campaign in 
Pizza Hut in Japan). Now they wanted to test the product, both in their own 
laboratory, and with selected regional managers (Japan, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan). Concurrently, Swensen worked with the required changes at the 
Tine R&D lab to get it adapted to pizza production. After some weeks of 
corresponding, talking and developing, based on the feedback from YUM’s 
representatives, Kiland could come back to YUM with good results on their 
requests: 
 
2005-02-11, email from Kiland/Tine to head of product development in 
YUM R&D: 
Our R&D department has been able to adjust both the production 
method and the recipe in order to make Salma more suitable for pizza. 
In addition we've been able to cut costs with approx.20%. 
 
Results are promising: 
- There is no evaporation of fat at 250 degrees for 8 minutes. 
- Neutral taste. 
- Spice upon request can be added. 
- Unique process (difficult to copy) 
On the other hand, this product needs to be kept frozen during storage.  
                                                     
81 Later, I contacted YUM R&D in Singapore to have their view, but they did not 
want to elaborate on the issue. 
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We have two types of Salma available for you. One with and one 
without spice. 
 
Solving the technical changes and at the same time reaping economic gains 
by reducing costs was clearly an uplifting message to send to Singapore, and 
YUM responded immediately: 
 
2005-02-11, email from YUM R&D to Kiland/Tine: 
Thank for your follow up on this project. As for the samples, I would 
prefer evaluating them first before sending to any Pizza Hut Markets. 
Lastly, is there any update on the slicing of the Salma? Thanks. Please 
feel free to contact me should you need to speak to me further. 
 
In retrospect, things could be seen to start falling apart already at this point. 
Why did YUM want the product only sent to their central R&D unit, when 
their business units had already been involved in the previous test round? 
Had they started doubting in the product? Had the head of product 
development got negative feedback from her marketing colleagues? We do 
not know. Anyway, two weeks later Kiland got impatient, and sent a 
reminder to YUM, using the production schedule as a means for speeding up 
and getting some feedback: 
 
2005-02-25, email from Kiland/Tine to YUM R&D: 
We're anxious to hear your comments regarding our latest production. 
Our R&D department are planning a new production on Tuesday next 
week. In order for us to take your inputs into consideration, we'd very 
much like to hear from you. 
 
A few days later an answer came, still showing their interest and willingness 
to take the development process further: 
 
2005-03-01, email from YUM R&D to Kiland/Tine: 
We tested Salma #4 - Natural. 
Generally, it was a great product but just needs a little fine tuning. 
 
A) Some improvements we would like to have are as follows:  
1) reduce the salt level slightly, 2) increase the moisture 
 
B) In terms of the Pastrami and Pepperoni flavoured samples, how 
different are the costs compared to the natural? 
 
C) Is there any further opportunity to work on reducing the cost? 
 
D) We are also interested to know on the possibility of having the 
product pre-sliced at 1-1.5mm thickness. Any progress on this? 
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Lastly, if you could work on the improvements today, would appreciate 
if you can send us the improved samples soonest possible. 
 
This was enough for Salmon Brands to keep on working for the deal, a new 
production of Salma, adjusted to meet YUM’s suggestions was made, and 
answers to YUM’s questions on recipe, slicing and economy were provided: 
 
2005-03-03, email from Kiland/Tine to YUM R&D(excerpts): 
The production this week went according to plans, and we've managed 
to reduce the salt and increase the moisture. 
Products will be ready next week, and we will of course ship it to you as 
soon as possible. Most likely on Thursday 10th. 
Here is my reply in regards to your questions listed below: 
(...) 
B) Flavour adding does not change the price of the product. (...) 
 
C) By increasing the moisture, the product automatically gets cheaper in 
production. We've reduced cost by approx.20-25%. I'll need to get back 
to you on details as soon as we've done the calculations on the latest 
production. 
 
D) The sliceability of the product is very good.  The question is where 
to slice it, in order to maximise shelf-life, quality and optimising costs. 
(...) 
 
Thus, after sorting out every question, adjusting for every technical demand, 
and another round of estimating the (reduced) costs of Salma, they  just had 
to wait for a decision from YUM if they wanted to take the next step and 
bring Salma to the market test. All requirements regarding the new use 
situation of Salma had been met, and the costs had been reduced – although 
still being a rather expensive ingredient. But, once again, it took quite a 
while without hearing anything more from YUM, and as late as June, 
another reminder was sent over: 
 
2005-07-06, email from Kiland/Tine to YUM R&D: 
After our last visit in Singapore, we've been developing our product 
further and always tried to keep the needs of Pizza Hut in mind. We 
now have the processing plant in place, which includes slicing and 
packaging. Please let me know when and where you'd like us to send 
samples. 
 
No response. If not before, now the hope was definitely fading. YUM had 
for unknown reason lost interest. Another reminder was sent, just to make 
sure: 
 
2005-08-24, email from Kiland/Tine to YUM R&D: 
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I'd like to remind you that our Salma Pizza Roll is now available for 
potential buyers. It has all the way been in our interest to serve Pizza 
Hut first. Hope to hear from you. 
 
The efforts seemed partly wasted, no deal this time either. The prospect of 
the ultimate  
customer had met its end, at least temporarily, and the demands for making 
sales kept growing. This was not, however, Tine’s first experience with 
demanding Asian customers. With regard to both cheese and on biomarine 
ingredients (Maritex) they had encounterd a very different approach to 
business relationships from what they were used to in Norway and Europe, 
especially in relation to the level of resources pulled into the relationship, 
and the intensity of interaction. Hanne Refsholt, CEO at Tine, commented 
on the challenge: 
 
Refsholt: If you go to Japan, you have to be prepared for a type of 
customer processes that is different from what you would meet 
elsewhere. 
Researcher: So, they are more demanding? 
Refsholt: Yes, absolutely. One thing is being thorough and accurate, but 
it is coming up new topics on the agenda all the time, making this into a 
continuously ongoing process. Hence, when you have innovation 
processes that are to be customer driven and involving, for if you have 
Norwegian customers you need to relate to different industries and 
industry practices and knowledge, but when you in addition go abroad, 
then you have both different industries and also many different cultures, 
which add in some additional aspects of uncertainty, and extra needs for 
competence and the ability to drive things forwards and produce results 
fast enough. 
 
Some lessons had been learned in these relations, as when Hovland and 
Kiland brought the R&D competence of Swensen with them to Singapore 
and other places, understanding how the various professions talk with their 
own ‘tribe’ easier than across professions, especially when the cultural 
differences were so big. Yet this time it could not take them far enough, and 
so the ‘industrial track’ of Salma was largely dead. The last hope for the 
salmon salami at this point was its only real end-consumer test, the 
launching of ‘Salma Lax Salami’ in German hypermarkets. 
 
A market test for salmon salami in Germany 
After Tine’s agent for distribution of cheese in Germany, Detlef Martens’, 
caught interest in Salma at the SIAL fair in Paris, plans for distribution to 
retail chains in Germany started emerging. Around the same time, also Color 
Line, a ferry company with a route between Kiel and Oslo, agreed to sell 
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Salma in their on-board shop. Interestingly, it sold well there, in particular to 
German tourists wanting to bring something ‘Norwegian’ back home from 
their Norwegian vacation. Hence, there was some hope that Germans would 
be interested in Salma in their own food stores too: 
 
We have the German market; we will just see how it goes. I am going to 
Germany on Friday to sign the deal with Detlef. He has been Tine’s 
man in Germany for a long time. Dynamic and clever guy, has many 
contacts, and faith in the product, really wants it, so now he will get it. 
Perhaps we will sell 50 tonnes the first year in Germany, in my head I 
think 10, but if he can make 50, he has saved the project. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
In a way, Salma was not ‘sold in’ to Martens and the German market, it was 
Martens asking for it, and hence the responsibility and drive for making this 
happen was on Martens’ German organisation. They soon had the initial, 
unsliced, package for sale in KaDeWe, Berlin’s huge and prestigious 
demonstration store for food products: 
 
It is a new product in the world. I saw it first time at SIAL in Paris, and 
I got interested, I really liked it a lot. And so I talked to Øyvind and 
expressed interest in a contract. The next step was to develop 
packaging, and get it sliced and so forth. And then we had to have 
knowledge for our presentations, about what it is, how it is made, and 
what is in it? So, when taking it to our customers, we had to explain it to 
them. We also had to find a way to lower the price, because 10 Euros 
for a 250 gram package is a very high price. We tested it in KaDeWe in 
Berlin, and we had promotion women to present it and give out tasters, 
and in a few days we sold 10 cartons, 100 salamis. What we saw was 
that without tasting and with very little knowledge among consumers, 
and a high price, it was very difficult. However, when people got to 
taste, most liked it. (Detlef Martens, DM-Nor) 
 
Several lessons were learned in this preliminary market test. First, customers 
needed knowledge about the product – what it was, how to use it, its benefits 
compared to alternatives, etc. This had to be inscribed on the packages and 
presentation materials, as well as having ‘promotion women’ in the stores 
for presenting and giving out tasters of the product. Second, slicing and 
decreasing the size would clearly be beneficial. The package sold in 
KaDeWe was not sliced, it was not transparent, and its size (250 grams) 
made the price too high. It was the second preference, retail, the assumed 
work-consuming alternative, which was once more activated, but with an 
important difference from the Fairprice case. There was already an 
established relationship in place, on cheese, which in this case study turned 
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out to be useful also on fish, getting access to a number of large 
hypermarkets in central regions around Berlin and Hamburg: 
 
It will partly be the same buyers as with cheese, and partly not. There 
are very few brands on salmon. We will not do general marketing, but 
rather build a brand on the German market. Fish is mostly competing on 
raw material. Our relationships with these chains make it possible to 
enter the fish area; I have been in the trade for 20 years. [But we still] 
have a job to do in convincing the buyers. (Detlef Martens, DM-Nor) 
 
A novel thing about Salma was the development of a distinct brand, which 
was very different from the generic marketing of salmon most places, and 
already established relations on cheese would hopefully assist in giving the 
brand access in the marketplace for testing with end-users. In preparing for 
presentation to the relevant retail chains, the design and packaging for the 
German market was developed, and sizes were decided: Small packages (50 
grams) to reduce unit prices, ending up with a price of approximately 2.50 
Euro to end consumers. Armoured with presentation materials, a suitable 
package, and a novel and branded product, Martens could go to the retail 
chains with the product: 
 
We will start out with 90 hypermarkets, to test its sale there to begin 
with. When we presented it to them, they were initially astonished; it 
was brand new, they were positive. Then, they calculated the packages 
and the prices, and responded that it was very expensive. But I argued 
that if considering it as a speciality, something extra for the weekends, 
and that the package was so small, it will be something people are 
willing to test. (Detlef Martens, DM-Nor) 
 
In being presented arguments for why consumers would be willing to pay for 
such a product, launching it as “something extra for the weekend”, 
purchasing managers were convinced and willing to give it a try. Salma was 
ready for test sales in 90 German ‘hypermarkets’. But would consumers be 
convinced to try out a ‘lax salami’? How should it be positioned and 
communicated?  
 
It is very different from meat, but to be able to teach people about it, it 
is best to describe it as a salami, but that it is meatless, lower in fat, very 
healthy. And then people become very positive to it. It is definitely an 
alternative to meat. We will present it in what we call ”fine-cost 
shelves”, which is where we normally sell things like caviar, smoked 
salmon and things like that. (Detlef Martens, DM-Nor) 
 
Both similarities and differences from meat were considered important. Meat 
salami was helpful for finding associations to category and use, but the 
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nutritional value and the supreme raw materials had more associations to fish 
products; hence, there were attempts to make certain associations to both by 
calling it ‘salami’ although placing it among seafood products in the store’s 
shelves. Although not catastrophic, the sales of the ‘Lax Salami’ did not go 
particularly well, not even after adjusting the packaging information and 
trying a second round. With the specific marketing challenges of such a 
category-crossing product – such as having to run demo-stands in the store 
in order to convince people to buy it, not knowing how best to position it, 
and not having budgets for mass-media commercials – and despite making 
adjustments to the package design, it was soon realised that Salma, in this 
form, had little chances of commercial success, even in German 
hypermarkets. Thus, one by one, Salma’s potential partners and associates 
for marketing and distribution either did not connect at all, or failed to fulfil 
the promises of the partnership. The lack of commercial results, of course, 
disappointed the owners at Bremnes Seashore, and the relationship between 
Kiland as commercialisation manager, and the production management at 
Bremnes started to disintegrate: 
 
We imagined this to become a good project, a big project, that would 
give us stable prices on our salmon, and that the volumes would be 
larger. But it hasn’t. It has been a big disappointment, nothing else to 
say about that. (Olav Svendsen Jr., Bremnes Seashore) 
 
Clearly disappointed by the lack of commercial progress, the owners at 
Bremnes gave a rough critique of the marketing and sales efforts of Tine 
Ingredients. A main reason for partnering with Tine had been the hope to get 
better prices on high volumes of their fish, and it took more time than 
expected, even for Tine, to get there. Yet, it turned out, it was not only the 
sales performance that was problematic, it had also to do with disputes on 
technical developments, where Morlandstø and Kiland had both 
communicative problems and differing views on necessary technology: 
 
Between me and Øyvind [Kiland], things broke down after a while. I 
think that when Øyvind came into the first phase in our collaboration, 
he came to think of himself as managing director in Salmon Brands, that 
he in a way bought the services he wanted here at Bremnes. What 
perhaps started the whole thing was this thing with traceability, to 
follow the product from start to end. He wanted us to cooperate with 
two companies, without having been here and seen what we have got. 
We asked, how fast do you need traceability information? Well, at once, 
he said. Yes, but if you have a problem at 10 am, and if you get a report 
at 2 pm the same day, is this fast enough? No, that was irrelevant; he 
wanted to just push a button on his PC. In other words, he only wanted a 
marketing gimmick, rather than just the traceability. (Jan Ove 
Morlandstø, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands) 
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This breakdown of the personal relationship between Morlandstø and 
Kiland, and Svendsen Jr.’s disappointment in Tine not managing to sell the 
product, serves as an illustrative end point for the Salma Cured story. The 
story of salami of fish was fading out, and the involved actors slowly had to 
acknowledge that this would not become a commercial success, at least not 
in the short term. Gradually, focus among the constellation of actors around 
Salma shifted from selling the salami, towards making a fresh loin version of 
Salma. 
 
4.7 Fish salami unmade: Why mince ‘the best beef in the world’? 
This story could have been told from another angle entirely. It could have 
been framed as the invention of new processing technology for farmed 
salmon 82 , what is called ‘live cooling’ and ‘pre-rigor processing’; the 
scientifically documented techniques that provides considerably higher 
quality on fresh salmon filets. This story line started with the small fish farm 
and processing plant, Bremnes Seashore, on the southwest coast of Norway, 
and continued with a set of collaborative research projects between Bremnes 
Seashore and a research group at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. 
Along this story line, the key problem would have appeared when the people 
at Bremnes – in succeeding in making supreme salmon loins – discovered 
that they could not get extra value from this new product in their market, or 
we could say from their distributors. Yet having spent 40 million NOK on 
the matter, Bremnes Seashore was of course very keen, perhaps even 
desperate, on finding ways to get returns on their investments. So, when their 
university researchers, now with jobs in one of the largest food producing 
companies in the country, came back and asked if they were interested in a 
new project – on fish salami – they were not hard to convince. This is the 
point where the pre-rigor story crosses the fish salami story, and where much 
of the present case study is situated. However, what became evident in the 
aftermath of the salmon salami project was that in the end pre-rigor took 
                                                     
82 To show the intertwining of innovation processes, I have included quite a bit of 
the pre-rigor story in this case study. In a post-hoc rationalization of the study, one 
could say that the pre-rigor innovation process is the one that should have been 
studied; that is where the success finally was produced. But I have two objections to 
this, one principled and one empirical: First, from a position of methodological 
agnosticism, one can not anticipate the outcome of a process a priori. Second, my 
point of access to this empirical study was via Tine, thus I started out with field 
studies there, before expanding the field to include Bremnes (and to a lesser extent 
some market actors and settings) as the actors and activities under investigation led 
me there. When I started the field study, the relation between pre-rigor salmon and 
fish salami was just one of several possibilities. 
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over the whole constellation. When Hovland, Kiland, Swensen and the 
others at Tine succeeded in transforming Salma from a product brand for a 
salmon salami to a portfolio brand for fresh salmon products, the road was 
open to selling fresh loins instead of the salami. I have not seen any formal 
decision putting the salami on a sidetrack, but when ‘Salma Fresh’ saw 
daylight, soon after the failures of Salma Cured in Asia and Germany, the 
fresh loins soon got all of the focus of the participants. One of the responses 
from the US retail directors (see above) was illustrative for the emerging 
understanding in the project team that it would be much easier to sell the raw 
material than the salami: 
 
When I did my presentation, first of the pre-rigor salmon, and then of 
the processing of a salmon salami, one of them responded, in broad 
American dialect: ‘Never mind about the sausage, where can I get the 
fish?’ That’s where the volumes are found, I could have signed a deal 
on fresh pre-rigor salmon right away. In a sense, we have the freedom to 
continue as we please, but the sausage is still a precondition. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
If Kiland and Salmon Brands had not been convinced about including pre-
rigor filets as part of the Salma concept before, this crystal clear statement 
from the American certainly provoked some action. In both giving Kiland a 
stronger conviction, and circulating around in Bremnes and Tine for months 
afterwards, the event became a powerful story explaining why Salma needed 
expansion. At that point, they could not cut off the salami, as it was still the 
reason for doing this at all, but contributing to a shift of mind, speeding up 
the inclusion of fresh fish as part of the evolving strategy. This emergent 
idea of including fresh loins also came up in some of my conversations with 
Kiland and others at the SIAL fair in Paris: 
 
I am having a lot of discussions with the Americans. It is fun, they are 
really pushing. We will try to sell in fresh fillets in Costco, a large retail 
chain, that today buy post-rigor fillets from Norway. We have to find 
out who we compete with, as we will have a different pricing. Very few 
actors are inside with Costco, but they sell big volumes. (Øyvind 
Kiland, Tine Ingredients) 
 
When talking to Kiland at the fair, it struck me how he was clearly drifting 
towards a change of strategy, being of the opinion that in many settings it 
would have been easier to sell super-fresh filets first, and then sell the 
sausage. The idea that had been more or less present from the ‘coup’ had 
transferred the project to Tine Ingredients and Salmon Brands, and 
strengthened from the first meeting in the U.S. Also at SIAL, he was 
continuously making sense of the project through meetings with customers, 
colleagues and partners. Sometimes he was almost doubtful about the 
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potential for selling the sausage at all: “But think about it, would the sausage 
have been the product you would have started with?”, and other times 
negotiating and doing sales presentations of the sausage to various actors 
from different countries. He had kept, and strengthened, this emerging 
strategy in his customer presentations (power-points), talking first about the 
superior pre-rigor salmon filets as a prerequisite for the salami, and 
thereafter presenting the salami. He felt that this worked better.  
 
The full story of this transition and the subsequent quite successful 
marketing of Salma Fresh will not be told in this thesis. To be very brief, the 
story – from a Tine perspective – is about an entire turnaround of the market 
strategy (again). The fresh loin, Salma Fresh, was first presented at local 
fishmongers in Oslo, but they were not at all interested in selling vacuum 
packed fish loins83. Then Kiland brought his delicate packages of salmon 
loins to a high-end supermarket, Jakob’s, and their fresh produce manager 
Roar Sjåvåg immediately caught interest. Within a couple of weeks they 
were ready for an introduction campaign in the store, which gave great sales 
at good prices for the new product. Jakob’s was associated with Norway’s 
larges retail chain, Norgesgruppen, which also became very interested. It 
must also be said that Tine, as the dominant supplier of dairy products for 
almost a century, had close relationships to this retail corporation. Soon a 
roll-out plan was launched, first of launching Salma Fresh in another two 
supermarkets, Centra, before getting it out in a larger number of their ‘Ultra’ 
and ‘Meny’ supermarkets. At the same time, several gourmet chefs had 
found this to be a great raw material for their cooking, which ended up not 
only helping Tine with making marketing materials, but also putting Salma 
Fresh on their menus and serving as charismatic ambassadors for Salma. As 
this is being written, Salma is swimming rapidly towards a great commercial 
success story. This is also the public version of the story, as it is told by its 
marketing representatives and by the press. The salami is never mentioned as 
part of the concept anymore, at least not in public. The crooked path towards 
this success story, whether on the Bremnes or on the Tine side is carefully 
deleted.  
 
Finally, this story could also have been told of as a series of discontinuities.84 
First, it is a story of Tine buying the patent and starting Umi No Kami 
                                                     
83 By the way, the packaging design of the Salma concept, with emphasis on the 
Fresh version, got a reward for good design from the Norwegian Design Council. 
84 I have instead tried to describe these processes as the actors in my field study saw 
them; often framing things as continuous development, although now and then 
contributing to more discontinuous moves from one thing to another. In practice, the 
actors involved worked in and with the tension between continuity and 
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instead of supplying another producer of fish salami with whey proteins. 
Second, it is a story of not having the patent application approved, and 
departing quite a bit from the original recipe to manage the product, in the 
end producing from fresh salmon instead of frozen saithe and salmon. Last, 
it is a story of departing from fermentation altogether, instead 
commercialising the raw material as Salma Fresh. In this last transition, the 
Neptun final report was right and wrong (see above). A prototype three was 
indeed developed, Salma Fresh, but it did not use the knowledge or 
technology of whey proteins and bacteria cultures in the recipe. In this sense, 
Bremnes’ pre-rigor salmon became both the saviour and betrayer of the fish 
salami. The project was continued with new vision and energy with the new 
ally, but in the end the raw material took over the project, putting Salma 
Cured on a sidetrack for indefinite time. 
 
  
                                                                                                                            
discontinuity, often going for continuity to mobilize and maintain resources and 
relations in their networks.  
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5 An analytic scheme of innovation processes 
Given that my research questions are how-questions – how do innovation 
processes evolve? – chapter 4 has basically answered the main question. It is 
a relatively detailed description, based partly on real-time and partly on 
historical accounts of an innovation process. It reveals many of the 
uncertainties and contingencies of innovation processes that, in most 
academics’ and practitioners’ accounts of innovation, are black-boxed by 
lack of real-time observation, oblivion and post-hoc rationalisation. 
However, we still need to attempt to clarify what we could learn from this. 
By taking the case study observations and combining them with process-
based analytical and methodological thinking, I will do two things. In this 
chapter, I will outline an analytic scheme for studying and analysing 
(industrial) innovation processes that seem better suited for investigating the 
practice of industrial innovation than can be found in the established 
repertoire of actor-network theory, as well as in some recent contributions to 
innovation management. The framework I suggest here did not come before 
the fieldwork; rather, it is an outcome of the combination of process-based 
theory and my observations in the field, of recording and trying to 
discriminate between what kind of activities and ‘sub-processes’ are 
happening in practice, and pairing that with the logic of a relationalist and 
process view (Latour, 1987; Hernes, 2007). Second, in chapter 6, I will draw 
out the theoretical implications from reconstructing the case study via the 
analytic scheme, suggesting how my study may contribute to, and 
complement, theories of innovation processes.  
 
Based on my fieldwork, and the methodological-analytical basis provided in 
the first chapter, I suggest that innovation processes may fruitfully be 
conceptualised as a dual process: First, as a process of mobilising actor-
networks, or getting the rights, alliances, space, time and resources to 
innovate, and second, of knowledge exploration in formulating and testing 
propositions about reality, which also means interacting because reality 
(people and things) often ‘speaks back’ (see figure 1). Thus, we get a bipolar 
model, in which the particular dynamics between the two poles of a concrete 
innovation process become a central part of explaining that case. This 
explanation, in turn, may have more or less relevance for understanding 
other innovation processes, i.e., for theorising (see chapter 6). This dual 
process happens within a network of interconnected processes, which create 
resistances and constraints, as well as enablers for innovation in certain 
directions rather than others (see figure 2). Moreover, the initiation of 
innovation processes needs some kind of ‘staging’, or bringing attention to 
ideas from boundary spanning actors and putting an innovation process in 
motion. Last, it is clear from the case study that the processes of mobilisation 
and exploration are neither completely separate, nor completely intertwined. 
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How and when these sub-processes interact, and the implication of this, 
seem to be important questions for understanding innovation processes. 
 
 
Figure 1: An interactive process model/analytic scheme of how to study innovation processes 
as interaction between processes of mobilisation and exploration in a 'single' (although 
interconnected and heterogeneous) innovation process. 
 
Still, can a productive distinction be made between these two processes of 
mobilising actor-networks and knowledge exploration? Is not knowledge 
exploration also a matter of negotiating socio-material relations (as in 
mobilisation)? What then is the difference? Several of these activities, 
although analytically separable, are in reality interacting with each other. 
Mobilisation activities may have more or less immediate influence on the 
exploration, and vice versa. However, it takes different tools – skills, 
strategies and resources – to (1) recruit and mobilise elements, and (2) make 
them fit and hold together. The first, or ‘mobilising actor-networks’, 
typically consists of political activities/processes of (re-)presenting, 
convincing, forcing and negotiating. The second, or ‘knowledge 
exploration’, consists of knowledge generation. This involves the exploring 
and stabilising of relations between elements, such as ideas, materials, 
technologies and procedures; formulating propositions and testing them in 
practice. As will be clarified in chapter 6, there are also differences in 
outcomes: Exploration/knowledge generation tends to increase uncertainty, 
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while mobilisation/power tends (if successful) to reduce uncertainty. 
Paradoxically, as the exploration process tends to produce multiplicity, 
ambiguity and thus choice, it demands, at some point, interaction with the 
mobilisation process. Choice under uncertainty needs vision, ideas and/or 
programs to mobilise (power for) settlement of controversy (Latour, 1988).  
 
When studying innovation processes from this perspective, it is not enough 
to just trace these two kinds of processes as if they were separate. A critical 
issue is when and how these processes interact, and what kind of tensions 
and/or opportunities such interaction produces for the innovation to realise 
and find use, as stated by Latour: 
 
In order to follow a technological project, we have to follow 
simultaneously both the narrative program and the degree of 
‘realization’ of each of the actions. (Latour, 1996:81) 
 
The distinction between mobilisation of actor-networks and exploration of 
knowledge has a parallel in Latour’s distinction between the “narrative 
program” and the “degree of realisation of each of the actions” in technical 
innovation, where there is rarely a one-to-one relationship between them, 
and where they are not always very closely connected, but time and again 
have to interact, often causing confrontations, conflicts and needs for 
negotiations and compromises. The tension between the ‘promises’ of the 
narrative program and the ‘realities’ of the realisation process is not settled 
by achieving consistency between them, but by coming up with a reality – in 
one way or another – that serves the interests involved.  
 
Before explaining the analytic scheme in some more detail, I have to make 
certain reservations. When I use the terms ‘process’ and ‘sub-process’, I do 
not mean to say that there is an objective ‘whole’ that may be divided in 
distinctive parts. This is, as with most conceptual models and analytic 
frameworks, rather a matter of delimiting cases, research objects and 
research questions. If required by my research interests, I could have zoomed 
in (e.g. only covering the change in production routines) or out (e.g. looking 
primarily at Tine’s biomarine strategy and portfolio), and hence delimited 
my case and research objectives differently, and still been able to use the 
same analytic scheme.  What I call sub-processes in this case study may well 
have been parts of other processes too, serving other interests, and in fact 
this is part of my argument as explained in the chapters 5.5, 6.1 and 6.4. The 
interconnecting (or embedding) of processes is a crucial challenge during 
innovation processes. There are numerous examples of process oriented 
researchers that pragmatically develop conceptual frameworks that 
emphasises certain parts of the process, such as Law’s (1994) ‘modes of 
ordering’, Callon’s (1986) scheme of translation, Latour’s (1999b:100) 
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model of circulation of scientific facts and Kjellberg and Helgesson’s 
(2007b) translation model of market practices. Not dissimilar to these 
authors, my aim has been to (pragmatically) emphasise parts of the 
innovation process that seem particularly important in my case study. The 
model is depicting aspects of innovation processes. It is not referring to 
entities or actors but rather kinds of activities and processes and their logics. 
The reason why I have developed my own analytic scheme instead of using 
existing models is discussed and demonstrated in chapter 6. 
 
5.1 Staging of innovation processes 
The initiation of innovation processes, is what I call ‘staging’. Something 
happens somewhere; someone asks a question, problematises something or 
incidentally discovers something. In my case study, we saw how new 
techno-scientific ideas emerged from curious experts (technologists, 
scientists, managers, etc) spanning the boundaries of their knowledge, 
facilitating interaction between actors and elements from different epistemic 
and/or industrial fields. An idea comes out of the meeting between different 
perspectives, different realities, different knowledge and experience. In 
industrial settings, we may call these entrepreneurial actors ‘boundary 
spanning experts’, using their curiosity to explore the boundaries between 
different fields of knowledge. Often it is technologists seeking to supplement 
technologies for re-combination or seeking potential use for their inventions. 
Other times, it is marketers or customers that formulate a demand for a 
solution to a problem, or managers that seek to renew their organisation. 
What all such situations have in common for starting a process of realisation, 
is that the idea has to be brought to attention; creating interests and 
mobilising a minimum of time, space and resources. In the case study of 
Umi No Kami/Salma, problematising questions of the future of industries 
(competition in agriculture, lack of industrialisation in aquaculture) together 
with a high level of technical fascination both helped the formulation of the 
idea and the creation of attention and interest during the early stage. 
Moreover, it was fronted by a senior professor with a wide professional 
network who was employed at a research institute, i.e., simply doing what a 
scientist should do: Formulate and investigate new questions. Sometimes it 
is necessary to stick with the initial question for a while before finding an 
opportunity to do something with it, that is, stage a process of exploration 
and mobilise resources (Spinosa et al., 1997). To cultivate the ability to 
formulate questions beyond the present knowledge domain and industrial 




5.2 Mobilising actor-networks 
After formulating the question, putting it on the stage and creating some 
interest in it, the problem immediately arises of how to mobilise the time, 
space, actors and resources needed to start the exploration and realisation of 
the innovation. Slinde partly had to show that there was something to 
explore there, through initial experiments and convincing presentations of 
the premature materialisation of the idea. Further, he had to enrol actors with 
money and expertise to participate in the further development, in this case by 
exploiting established relationships to people within funding bodies, a 
technology transfer office and at his present and previous research institutes. 
However, this was not a one time operation. Throughout the process(es) 
described in this case study, the innovators repeatedly had to mobilise 
renewed support and more resources from their allies, and/or to find new 
partners. We also saw how a number of arguments were used, and how 
several actors were appointed as representatives for the project – or rather 
for the potential of the project. This is a pragmatic process; making the most 
of what you have when using it in convincing and negotiating to expand the 
actor-network and the access to resources. More or less coherent chains of 
arguments have to be constructed to produce mobilising power over 
resources and decisions. In addition, there is the work of enrolling and 
aligning a set of actors and resources into an ‘actor-network’, making them 
represent and support the project, and keeping them interested over time, 
while doing the exploration work. During exploration, the immature object 
has to be taken through several translations; from idea, to prototype, to 
research application, to patent application, to product, to use and exchange, 
etc. This is partly depending on mobilisation; the construction of meaning 
and the mobilisation of chains of arguments: A technical recombination is 
possible – someone might be interested in using it in his/her practice – thus it 
could be exchanged for money.  Exploration, on the other hand, is about 
testing whether these ideas and propositions hold in reality; is (or can we 
make) this technically feasible? – does it (or can we make it) fit within the 
distributor’s product categories? – does it (or can we make it) fit within the 
using practices of consumers? – how much are they willing to (or can we 
make them) pay for it?  
 
5.3 Knowledge exploration 
The other side of the coin is that when you actually have succeeded in 
mobilising some resources and convincing some people to give the idea a 
try, then you have to make it work in practice. This process of knowledge 
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exploration85, of ‘making things work’, involves a process of formulating 
and re-formulating propositions about the (potential) ‘reality’ of the 
innovation, and then testing it out in practice. It is a two step process: First, 
of creatively imagining potential social and technical relations, and then 
testing in practice if – and in what way – such relations are possible. An 
analogy to this process would be that of the scientific method, of formulating 
a research question, or a hypothesis, and doing practical empirical 
experiments to see if the answer to the question can be found, or if the 
hypothesis may stand the test. This is not a one-way street of an actor 
seeking to impose its his/her will on another, but rather an interactive, or, we 
could say negotiated, process. When testing a relationship between elements, 
e.g., between fish and fermentation culture, or between salmon salami and 
users, the innovator enters her own picture, so to speak, and becomes 
involved with – and a part of – the object. Thus, not only is the innovator 
testing a relationship between elements, but the innovator herself 
experiences how the elements ‘speak back’, i.e. accepting some relations 
while rejecting others. Moreover, this testing of – and making of – 
relationships changes the innovation, often in unpredictable ways. Thus, 
although equipping the innovator with some creativity and agency, 
innovation as recombination is not a matter of unlimited agency of the heroic 
entrepreneur. This is not a relativistic ‘anything goes’ perspective, as long as 
the political work of mobilisation of actor-networks succeeds. The proposed 
relationships between technical, social and economic elements have to be 
tested and negotiated, and then reformulated and renegotiated, often several 
times. An unavoidable aspect of exploration is uncertainty. Precisely because 
exploration starts out with imagination, and because the objects being 
explored ‘speak back’ and bring in their own preferences (enabling some 
relations while resisting others), it is not possible to be sure whether – or 
how – the imagined recombination of elements could work. Knowledge 
exploration produces development risk, as there always will be ‘nobody 
knows’-problems present, and in the case of more radical recombinations, 
the number of such uncertainties causes an almost indefinite development 
risk. This part of the ‘translation’-process, of knowledge exploration is about 
developing ‘chains of propositions’ – from testing whether a technology is 
feasible (including all its supporting technologies), to testing whether such a 
product will find (paying) users and hence produce economic value for the 
innovating actor-network.  
 
                                                     
85  This term does not refer to James March’ (1991) conceptual dichotomy of 




5.4 Interaction and confrontation of sub-processes 
However, as mentioned previously, processes of mobilisation of actor-
networks and knowledge exploration are not fully separable. Sometimes (but 
definitely not always) ‘chains of power/arguments’ (mobilisation) and 
‘chains of propositions’ (exploration) interact with each other; borrowing 
elements from each other, or confronting each other’s aims and outcomes. 
This does not continuously happen. After mobilising a set of actors and 
resources, and starting the exploration for shorter or longer periods, there 
may be no or little interaction with the mobilisation process and the original 
idea and intention. Parts of it may be involved in formulating and testing 
various propositions, while other parts are not. Yet, then, when resources run 
out and new resources have to be mobilised, for example, or when allies in 
the actor-network start getting impatient or are disappointed, the exploration 
process may be confronted for its lack of progress, its departure from the 
original vision or its need for reorienting towards enrolling other and 
different actors and resources. Similarly, discoveries and knowledge 
generated in the exploration process may challenge the mobilised actor-
network to rethink and change their ideas, interests and participation, both 
allowing and supporting the project in exploring new directions and 
propositions. Both the ways in which such interactions and confrontations 
come about and what they lead to should be of particular interest, as this 
would reveal some of the generative and limiting dynamics of innovation 
processes; where new meanings are negotiated, choices have to be made and 
new courses of action pointed out.  
 
5.5 A network of interconnected processes 
So far, I have sought to build an analytic scheme for one single innovation 
process. However, we have seen in this case study that an innovation process 
can not be isolated, which also follows logically from a relational 
perspective, and in particular we saw this was emphasised by the industrial 
network approach. The innovation process is evolving within a set of 
interconnected and interacting processes/actor-networks mutually 
influencing each other; sometimes translating the other into one’s own actor-
network, sometimes aligning interests, and sometimes taking over and/or 
betraying the other. The fact that innovation processes are situated in this 
way within a set of interconnected actor-networks, increases the complexity 
and contingency (figure 2) of the innovation process. Furthermore, it 
suggests that we also need to observe innovation processes as they interact, 
(re-)combine and battle with other processes. 
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Within this framework, path dependence becomes the dynamic effect of the 
historical, geographical, cultural and material orderings of multiple actor-
networks. Is the implication of this that history does not matter? Is it the 
present ordering of multiple networks/practices that matters? No, potential 
options are certainly outcomes of history, but also of the 
mobilisation/imagination of potential futures (Hernes, 2007). It is thus a 
negotiation of multiple pasts with multiple futures in the present. In other 
words, history matters as enacted presence. The stabilising factor – and 
problem for change – is that practices are enacted in multiple, 
heterogeneously ordered networks and practices, meaning that both 
voluntarist and determinist views of innovation are impossible. 
 
 
Figure 2: Innovation processes, situated in networks of interconnected processes. 
 
The process model produces complexity when including the interaction 
between several actor-networks seeking to realise different 
programs/projects, and possibly seeking totranslate each other. This is 
illustrated here by a version of the process described in this thesis. It is this 
interconnectedness among multiple networks and practices that produces 
(the experience of) path dependence, or friction (see chapter 6.1 and 6.4). 
 
I will now turn to the discussion of my case study, using this analytical 
scheme for discussing with existing literature and how my study may 
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contribute to the field of innovation studies. After discussing the overarching 
dynamic of ‘contrary forces’ of innovation processes (chapter 6.1), I move 
on to discussing my case study based on the different aspects of the analytic 
scheme. Mobilisation of actor-networks is discussed in chapter 6.2, 
knowledge exploration is discussed in chapter 6.3, and finally the interaction 
between the two sub-processes as well as the confrontation and interaction 
between the innovation processes and the network of interconnected 
processes in which it is situated, are discussed in 6.4. Relevant literature is 








6 The contrary forces of innovation  
This case study is an example of a relatively radical innovation process. The 
analytic framework outlined in the previous chapter positions knowledge – 
or perhaps the lack of knowledge – as the central problem of innovation 
processes. The overall innovation process is characterised by a number of 
uncertainties that, due to their complex and interacted nature, nobody knows 
the answers to. When referring to the ‘nobody knows-problems’ in this 
chapter, I am not arguing for the ignorance of the practitioners who I have 
studied. On the contrary, the actors in this case study – as in many cases of 
industrial innovation – are extremely knowledgeable in their fields. Their 
lack of knowledge pertains to the connection and translation of knowledge 
and technology between settings. In other words, it is through the act of 
crossing boundaries and connecting previously unconnected elements that 
we can say that ‘nobody knows’ what it takes to succeed. However, by 
constructing and amplifying the distinction between mobilisation and 
exploration in a bipolar model, we can explain some of the micro-dynamics 
of innovation processes from an angle that has not yet been sufficiently 
described in the literature. First, during (sub-)processes of mobilisation, 
actor-networks are recruited and committed to things with which they are 
initially unfamiliar: An idea, a prospect or a prototype of something that may 
or may not become feasible and useable. Yet, to enable mobilisation, a 
degree of certainty has to be presumed. Second, during (sub-)processes of 
knowledge exploration, the aim is to create knowledge – to explore the 
object and its potentials – and therefore change is unavoidable. Moreover, 
this process of generating knowledge tends to multiply (alternatives of) the 
object, and hence increase rather than decrease the uncertainty/complexity – 
or development risk – of the project. Finally, the interaction between 
mobilisation and exploration processes on the one hand, and between 
different actor-networks/organising processes on the other, often leads to 
controversies and compromises that may set the project off in new 
directions. This chapter, then, is devoted to a discussion of the theoretical 
implications of the conceptual framework when used to interpret the case 
study. I will contrast and complement the outcomes of my study with 
theories of path creation (Garud & Karnøe, 2001), innovation as punctuated 
learning process (Van de Ven et al., 1999) and relational/interactive 
perspectives of users and markets (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003; Håkansson, 
2007; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007b).  
 
The chapter outline is based on the analytic scheme of chapter 5 in the 
following way: implications of the model as a whole is discussed in chapter 
6.1. In chapter 6.2 I start with a review of Callon’s (1986) model of 
translation and Garud and Karnøe’s (2001) model of path creation/mindful 
deviation, and then go on to discussing the implications of the mobilisation 
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aspect in my analytic scheme. In chapter 6.3 I review Van de Ven et al.’s 
(1999) model of punctuated learning, before I build an argument for 
knowledge exploration as a divergent process. In chapter 6.4 I discuss the 
dynamics of interaction between mobilisation and knowledge exploration, 
moreover, the challenge of interconnecting/embedding the innovation 
process in a web of interconnected processes. ‘Users’ are used to illustrate 
this both in theory and the case study. Each of the chapters 6.2-6.4 are 
divided in two main sections; starting out with critical examinations of 
existing theory, before discussing the theoretical implications of my study. 
 
Knowledge and the lack thereof is in several ways assigned a prominent 
position in this model of innovation processes, and, from the outset, we can 
maintain that innovation processes include multiple ’nobody knows’ 
problems that cause indefinite development risk. This is neither 
controversial, nor main findings of this study, but resembles the one problem 
that all research on innovation seems to agree upon: Uncertainty. The 
presence of a number of ‘nobody knows’ problems frequently produces high 
development risk in innovation projects, making it impossible to conduct 
reliable evaluations or have particularly trustworthy knowledge of them. 
Even behind seemingly simple ideas, a relatively high level of complexity 
will be revealed when the matter is investigated. The Neptun/Umi No 
Kami/Salma projects described in this thesis were not very advanced or 
comprehensive in their origin; the idea of fermenting fish and making a 
salami-like product of fish does not look like something that would 
revolutionise the fish industry. However, as the number of technical and 
economic ‘problems’ to be solved steadily increased, the process grew 
immensely complex. I believe that the description in chapter 4 has produced 
a picture of the contingencies of such a process: The uncertain elements, the 
things that became nothing, the things that were brought together and then 
turned into something, and the great development risk.  
 
The ordering of heterogeneous elements into durable patterns and 
relationships (Law, 1994) seems a sensible way to describe innovation 
activity. However, it is important to remember that these terms do not 
necessarily refer to single actors with clear goals. It may equally be a matter 
of multiple interacting actors with unclear, multiple and conflicting interests 
and goals. Nevertheless, I would argue that a successful innovation process 
can be observed by identifying new and relatively stable socio-material 
patterns. In industrial settings this is made complex by the intertwining of 
several interconnected patterns: First, of technological ordering of materials 
and technologies in the laboratory, and later the reproduction and scaling up 
of these patterns together with production workers in factories. Second, of 
product ordering of tuning the technology with the preferred recipe and 
product features, of designing the visual shape and presentation of the 
248 
product, and of anticipating and adapting the product to how it is going to be 
used. And third, user ordering of getting the product included in distribution 
networks, and of getting the product to become a part of users’ using 
practices (e.g. of cooking and eating in this case study).  
 
Innovation processes are in this thesis analysed as emerging actor-networks. 
Authors of various network perspectives speak of hybrids in various ways,  
including hybrid collectives and hybrid objects, underlining the description 
of any object, practice or organisation as a heterogeneous network ; a result 
of its relationships. However, in some settings these network conceptions 
seem too crude (Hanseth et al., 2004), thus, Law and Mol (2002, in Hanseth 
et al., 2004) talk about how the technical and social are tightly woven 
together, almost like mixing fluids. Latour is similarly speaking of the 
’seamless web’ (1999:204), i.e., in relation to the realisation of extremely 
complex sociotechnical networks, as in Hughes’ study of electrical networks 
(1983, in Latour, 1999). Too often, ’networks’ are described as more or less 
depictable sets of nodes and links, while often actor-networks perform 
unities and entities. While an organisation or an industrial network to some 
extent is separable in terms of humans, departments, firms, technologies, 
money flows, production and distribution, etc, other actor-networks appear 
to be either too complex (even diffuse), as in large information systems, or 
too unitary (compact, blended), as in the salmon salami in this thesis. We are 
talking about a carefully assembled set of elements, which are made to 
perform a unity, or to work according to a certain programme. Sometimes it 
may appear uncertain, ambiguous, in multiple versions or not as an 
assemblage at all. Other times it may succeed in holding together in a certain 
shape, being presentable (and rejectable) to users. This process of 
ontological uncertainty, or we could say ontological flexibility, is due to the 
uncertain nature of an emerging actor-network (or object) in the making. 
Many different (social and material) preferences, interests and ’programmes 
of action’ are to be merged or dissociated in the battle for the actor-
network’s identity and shape. With this clarification of concepts, we can 
move on to discussing the potential theorising from this study. 
 
6.1 Realising and stabilising innovations: a process view 
In this conception, innovation processes consist of two partly distinct and 
partly interacting sub-processes of mobilisation of actor-networks and 
exploration of knowledge. There are often tensions between these sub-
processes to the extent that it makes sense to talk about them as contrary 
forces. Whereas mobilisation is directed towards aligning interests and 
reducing risk, exploration is directed towards formulating and testing 
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propositions about reality. And whereas mobilisation seeks to converge, 
exploration frequently leads to divergence of the innovation. Thus, the 
interaction between these could well be described as controversy, or battles 
over meaning and resources. Those responsible for generating knowledge – 
making the innovation work both technically and economically – will often 
argue for adding more resources, including more time to explore potential 
solutions, more expertise, more equipment and new raw materials. Those 
responsible for mobilising the actor-network and the resources, on the other 
hand, will be more concerned with making the idea communicable (i.e., 
simple and clear), as well as reducing risk through minimising investments, 
ensuring ‘progress’, stripping down much of the complexity and adapting to 
existing practices and networks. Mobilisation requires boundaries, as it will 
always be easier to mobilise resources related to specific and concrete goals. 
This is not to say that mobilisation and exploration are always handled by 
different actors, but rather to clarify how these are based on opposing 
principles and logics, which thereby often conflict and challenge each other. 
Sometimes it appears almost like the innovation process is at war with itself, 
as the internal tensions between these kinds of sub-processes tear and rip at 
each other, with one tearing the other apart. Still, occasionally the bits and 
pieces may start to connect to each other and bring the innovation significant 
steps towards realisation. The framework in chapter 5 will also have to be 
viewed as being circular, in the sense that, in most cases, it will require 
several of such processes, each having different goals and programs, before 
achieving something like a ‘successful’ innovation. Only in very ‘simple’ 
cases or in cases with improbable luck can we think of an innovation process 
having only one mobilisation and one exploration. In addition, to add to the 
mess, this contrapuntal process is always situated within a network of 
interconnected processes, in which some things are made possible while 
others are not. 
 
Putting knowledge, and the lack thereof, at the centre of attention, the 
framework suggests that innovators have to produce two different kinds of 
knowledge: First, a chain of arguments suited for convincing, mobilising, 
maintaining and removing (parts of) actor-networks and their resources. 
Second, testable propositions about reality, e.g. of how to make the 
technology work and what users having interest in such a product. 
Innovation processes are propositional at their core. The original idea is a 
proposition about the potential that stems from a new combination of 
elements. This idea needs some resources to get started, and then the idea 
needs to be explored in practice – testing whether and how the proposition 
may hold. This will normally happen by breaking the original idea into a 
series of new and ‘smaller’ propositions; as the innovation is opened up and 
investigated, it is revealed as a more or less complex set of problems, all 
having many different solutions in potentia. However, to enrol allies, it is 
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necessary to make the idea and concept converge on a number of aspects, 
and this will often create a ‘lock-in’ for the for the remaining process. To an 
extent, the converged version of the concept binds the exploration part of the 
project to what has been prospected, and one will often have to let things run 
for a while before it becomes possible to change things. An example is when 
Tine’s top management locked the project team of Umi No Kami for an 
extended period of time within a certain frame; a blended white and red fish 
recipe, international before domestic marketing, etc. This could not be 
changed before reconfiguring the set of actors, resources and ideas involved, 
both within management and in the team. In addition to the obvious political 
reason of aligning various interests with a certain conceptualisation of the 
innovation, another reason for this ‘lock-in’ is that it is difficult to make 
choices about new things without knowing ‘enough’ about what it is. Thus, 
there is need for exploring and testing the present version before changing it. 
When the direction of the project was finally changed, the inclusion of pre-
rigor raw materials was used both to provide new faith in the sausage, and at 
the same time to expand the ‘horizon of opportunities’ as the involved actors 
saw it could be possible to do other things with this new resource. A third 
reason is the lack of capacity to cope with the level of complexity involved 
in innovation processes; hence, decision makers will need to cut things 
down. In this sense, it seems very hard to take a ‘rational management 
approach’ to innovation, as the uncertainty is too overwhelming. By cutting 
things down and making choices in the face of uncertainty, things frequently 
go wrong. On the other hand, the actors would perhaps not do much better in 
increasing complexity either. 
 
Some of the problems characterising innovation processes are highly 
uncertain; they are ‘nobody knows-problems’. Thus, the innovation has to be 
taken through a number of phases, where some problems may be solved 
simultaneously while other problems require a sequential order, and every 
such ‘nobody knows-problem’ has its own set of phases. In other words, I 
would argue that every ’nobody knows-problem’ of an innovation has to be 
taken through several stages to be resolved, and that the complexity – and 
hence risk – of innovation processes is equal to the number of nobody-
knows problems times the number of stages they have to be taken through. 
In addition, we have to add that these problem-solving processes are 
connected to each other in various ways, they are intertwined and 
interdependent, and changes of one aspect influence other aspects. The 
resources to be connected are themselves complex, and in addition have to 
be connected in complex patterns with a number of other resources within 
the process. Moreover, the innovation has to be adapted to the wider network 
in which the process is situated. The explorative process is expanding, as it 
meets new connections, creates new opportunities or meets friction from 
established practices, always in the space between creative imagination and 
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empirical testing. Hence, we see how unwieldy innovation processes may 
become. Such innovation processes produce a multitude of options. Many 
disappear, others are put on hold, and a few are realised.  
 
When new elements (human or non-human) are enrolled and mobilised in 
the innovation process, they often seem to have more influence than those 
already in place in the process. This happens sometimes to confirm and 
stabilise aspects of the process, as when Nordvi was approached by Slinde 
and proteins were included to stabilise the fatty acids, when the ‘right’ 
bacteria culture’ was included to make the fermentation process work 
optimally, or when Swensen was hired and ‘near-infrared’ scanning 
technology was included to get in control of fat content in the recipe. During 
and after the implementation of these elements, they were described as 
crucial for making the innovation work, and their successful integration in 
the process dominated the description of the innovation process – until a new 
element had to be included and hence take over. Other times the effect was 
more dramatic in terms of altering or disrupting the process, as when 
Skjervold, Swensen and their colleagues were hired by Tine R&D, and their 
introduction of pre-rigor salmon from Bremnes Seashore ended up taking 
over, translating, the entire fish salami project, and made it into a fresh loin 
project instead. From this, I would argue that there is a relationship between 
resource mobilisation and time: Elements enrolled and mobilised in the 
innovation process tend to have more influence on the innovation the later in 
the process they are included. The reason for this effect seems twofold. First, 
the element representing the most recent changes – improvements or 
alterations – have more narrative power in representations of the innovation 
process, such as project reports and presentations, in their symbolic power as 
representatives of ‘progress’ in processes of high uncertainty and unclear 
evaluation criteria. Second, in order to mobilise new actors and resources 
into the process, sometimes the significance of the results already achieved 
has to be downplayed in order to increase the necessity of the new. 
Argumentative power may be produced by increasing the importance of the 
new relative to the old. To establish understanding of the benefits of using 
fresh pre-rigor salmon, the effects of the previously successful testing and 
choice of bacteria cultures were downplayed, as both technical process, 
resulting taste, texture and durability were brought in as central parts of the 
argument for including an exclusive and expensive raw material and its 
owner – a small family owned fish farm.  
 
Another take on this would be to view exploration as a process of expanding 
and generalising the concept. Here, the concept has to be brought towards 
stabilisation, and it must be possible to generalise. This presupposes that the 
concept is tested in practice, that it shows that it holds. Such concept 
generalisations in industrial innovation often involve hypotheses about 
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appropriation and scale. Appropriation refers to the ability to mobilise, 
control and internalise resources and relationships. Scale refers to the idea 
that elements of the concept, such as technologies, products and users are 
possible to generalise, i.e., produce high volumes of the same product, 
standardise technology and translate the products into massive use (by a few 
‘large’ users, or many ‘small’ ones). If, as is often the case, the concept does 
not hold in some aspect, it has to be adjusted to achieve the supposed effect, 
then recombined with other elements, and then again generalised and tested 
in practice. The need for cost absorption and therefore generalisation relates 
both to concept and technology. This happens certainly in standardising 
technology to scale up the production volumes and thereby cut costs per 
item, but also to expand the brand with more product variants, and to use the 
developed technology in several settings. As mentioned previously, the 
exploration process is not a one-way street, as the innovation and its 
elements often ‘speak back’ at the innovator (Latour, 1996). Whether talking 
of ‘material agency’ (Pickering, 1995), or of social and material resistances 
(Law, 1992; 1994), it is clear that not anything goes. The question of success 
in knowledge generation activities is not only a question of ‘objective’ 
experiments by skilled experts, nor simply a question of the political struggle 
over meaning and vision. This case study, and numerous other ethnographic 
and historical studies of science, technology and industry show how this is a 
matter of heterogeneous interaction. The objects under investigation and 
development tend to ‘speak back’, showing different interests in and 
capacities for recombination than anticipated by the innovators. Mould 
would not easily stay away from the production facilities of fish salami, and 
required considerable adaptation of the production, during a six month 
‘negotiation’ process in the laboratory, and then a somewhat shorter period 
in the production facilities at Bremnes. Fisheries supplying white fish would 
not immediately adjust to the requirements of Tine R&D, and the salmon 
supplier (Bremnes Seashore) also had other (economic) interests at play 
when sorting, prioritising and processing raw materials for different 
customers. On the market side, they had to interact closely with consumers 
in the supermarkets, demonstrating the product, to get them to even consider 
buying the salmon salami. Moreover, the proposition of the ‘dream 
customer’ – restaurant and catering actors – was unexpectedly and brutally 
abandoned by the YUM corporation in Asia. This exploration process, of 
knowledge generation through proposing, testing, interacting and adapting 
(aspects of) the innovation, is supposed to move asymptotically towards 
solid knowledge. Further, as can be seen between the lines in most of this 
text, knowledge is here nothing more – or less – than stabilised relations, 
between texts, technologies, raw materials and social actors of various kinds. 
Here, the paradox is that while the aim of exploration processes is to produce 
knowledge, they (almost) always produce complexity; multiplicity, 
ambiguity, choice.  
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If the knowledge sought through exploration processes is defined as 
(temporary) stabilised relations, we can immediately see that the problem of 
complexity – the complexity produced by the exploration process – is of a 
relational matter.  This is where the mobilisation process comes back in. 
Eliminating or reducing development risk means reducing the number of 
associations and relations involved, and simplifying the innovation and its 
actor-network. This happens sometimes by black-boxing the actor-network 
involved, other times by cutting off connections and associations to force the 
process in a certain direction. This strategy of ‘radical simplification’ 
become particularly visible – and crucial – especially when the innovation 
process moves closer to commercialisation; looking for and adapting to 
users. The idea that one should ‘start with the market’ does not hold when 
creating something new. As the case study showed, it is not easy to involve 
just anybody in such a process, the innovation is not stable enough, and will 
not have power to resist pressure from sceptical actors, and only very 
incremental innovation would be possible. If the concept is unstable and 
contains many variable elements, it is likely to generate a high number of 
new concept alternatives, which are difficult to handle in practice. Hence, a 
period of exploration is necessary, to see whether and how the elements 
connects, even though this will in itself produce more complexity before the 
mobilising forces get back in to provide simplification and choice. From this, 
I argue that for the stabilisation of the innovation and its actor-network in 
cases of radical innovation, one needs to achieve a certain degree of stability 
of the innovation before involving users. If not, the concept will not be able 
to resist pressure from sceptical actors. Moreover, with a high number of 
unstable and variable elements in the concept, interaction with users will 
produce a number of new possibilities that are impossible to handle in 
practice. Therefore, when finally going for something, one tends to go for 
the alternative with the fewest (new) elements, the most similar alternative to 
what exists from before. When going to users and markets, the question is 
more a matter of reducing risk, as well eliminating and stabilising elements 
and relations, than it was during earlier stages of the process, and few new 
elements are easier to handle. All of the ‘nobody knows’ problems involved, 
and all the elements to be connected, cannot be isolated; they are not 
independent. Hence, it is difficult enough with the simplest version of the 
innovation. So, when commercialising a ’final’ version of the innovation, 
one goes with the alternative containing fewer elements, and that is most 
similar to the existing, to reduce development risk. Commercialisation of 
radical innovations, therefore, consists of a process of radical simplification.  
 
In addition to interacting with each other, these processes of mobilisation 
and exploration interact with what has long been known as ‘path 
dependence’. In the economic and historical literature, path dependence has 
been used to describe how historical contingencies, often accidental events, 
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may create more or less irreversible ‘lock-ins’ and ‘dominant designs’ that 
limit and determine the subsequent direction of the industry (Garud & 
Karnøe, 2001). However, within the framework suggested in this thesis, path 
dependence simply means that every actor-network is situated within a 
historical, geographical and cultural setting within which everything is not 
possible. Actors are limited by their previous relations, experience, 
investments, etc. Path dependence may be related to local and global 
political regimes, which are different between agro-food and seafood, 
different technical systems, different market networks, different cultures, all 
of which then influence production practices, cooking and eating practices, 
etc. For the most part, path dependence has been described in the literature 
as being barriers to innovation, ‘framing’ innovation processes, and forcing 
companies to act rather conservatively within, or close to, the actors’ 
existing set of relations and practices. For example, Bremnes Seashore was 
not able to economise on their technical innovations within their existing 
marketing practices, their existing distribution network, and due to their 
location within a ‘spot-price’ market for fish as raw material. However, this 
also illustrates some of the structural bias within path dependency literature. 
Dependencies are largely seen as structural and therefore rather static. I 
argue that such dependencies are not at all static and given, but dynamic and 
emergent. In a process view of innovation, we need a dynamic view of path 
dependence that explains how dependencies come about, change and 
disappear. The ‘market system for fish’ was not static. It is true that it 
changed slowly, and it was not possible for Bremnes Seashore, at least not in 
the short term, to change the way fish was marketed and distributed in that 
system. Yet it was certainly changing, albeit gradually, and the successful 
domestication of salmon has led to large consolidations of fish farming 
companies. Increased control of the raw material supply and quality may in 
turn lead to the ability and interest among the companies to change their 
practice to be more in line with the agricultural industry, towards more 
industrial activities like product development and branding. From a process 
perspective, path dependence is better seen as relatively slower processes, 
maintained via carefully and often long-term assembled and intertwined 
networks of heterogeneous elements; creating what Håkansson and 
Waluszewski (2001) have called ‘friction’. The change in one resource 
combination is also likely to lead to change or resistance in other resource 
constellations. ‘Dependence’ thereby becomes a relative measure of one 
actor-network’s stability (in time/durability and space/distribution) in 
relation to a number of other connected actor-networks or processes. Hence, 
instead of serving as an explanation of how innovation is hindered by some 
rigid structure, this view explains some of the slowness and some of the 
unexpected outcomes of innovation processes: (1) why innovation processes 
tend to take significantly more time than expected, and (2) why ‘successful’ 
innovations often are realised as incremental changes or additions to the 
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existing set of relations. Path dependence in this version may also explain 
why and how some kinds of innovations are possible within particular 
settings, e.g., it was possible for Tine to invent and commercialise new food 
products within their setting, due to being a central part of a ‘heavy’ techno-
economic system able to handle technical development, distribution and 
marketing of differentiated food products. However, when crossing sectoral 
boundaries and venturing new business between agri- and aquaculture, it was 
no longer obvious how to innovate, and whether they would succeed or not. 
Path dependence, in this version, includes all developments that take place 
around the actual project, and sometimes such ‘friction’, as noted by 
Håkansson & Waluszewski (2001), may even be an important enabling 
factor for the innovation process. In some fortunate situations, there are 
specific developments and movements in the innovation process’ wider 
network that are compatible with the innovation, and which therefore may 
help the innovation towards its realisation and use. On the research side, the 
development of ‘blue-green’ innovation politics was important for the 
mobilisation of funding from the Research Council, and the emergence of a 
biomarine innovation strategy within the Tine corporation was central in the 
decision to buy the patent application from Professor Slinde. On the market 
side, there were less of such coinciding and compatible movements, both in 
the fish industry and in the agro-food industry, although it is not unlikely 
that such a movement towards industrialisation, product development and 
branding of fresh fish products is on its way.  
  
6.2 Mobilising and committing to uncertain outcomes 
‘Mobilisation’ is located at one of the poles in the framework. Power to 
mobilise resources and decisions for innovation is produced by constructing 
a (more or less coherent) chain of arguments. Ironically, this coherence has 
to perform a degree of certainty; the mobilising actors need to assume that 
they know what cannot be known. In line with the concept of ‘translation’ 
(Callon, 1986; Latour, 1988), this means that parts of the innovation process 
are based on a relational logic of ‘power production’, i.e., carefully building 
(or connecting to) networks of human and non-human elements with 
interests in realising the innovation. It is about developing conceptual and 
material actor-networks that are able to translate other actors, including 
securing their interest and mobilising them. Plans are written, such as project 
applications, business plans, market strategies and progress reports. Rituals 
are activated, such as estimations of ‘total markets’, which involves taking 
the idea through formal bureaucracies of middle managers and committees, 
or advocating the project in front of the board of directors. All of this has 
only one purpose: To mobilise actors and resources. By building a 
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trustworthy and coherent chain, and developing the elements within it, the 
innovation may gain the power to convince others. However, the mobilising 
actors are rarely allowed to build their empires of meaning without 
disturbances. An unexpected outcome of the exploration process, a disloyal 
ally, or the requirements of a new partner, may cause the actor-network to 
shake or collapse and stimulate the intense activity of enrolling and aligning 
actors to save the project. Hence, mobilisation processes happen in several 
rounds, never reaching a final and stable state. I will here discuss how this 
aspect of the mobilisation/exploration framework contributes to the study of 
innovation, complementing previous studies within STS (Callon, 1986) and 
innovation management (Garud & Karnøe, 2001).  
 
Translation, path creation and technical innovation 
According to Callon (1986), the art of building actor-networks, of gathering 
bits and pieces into a unity, is the work of translation, or the work of how 
actors create alignments. The scheme developed in his article for telling 
these stories of alignments divides processes of translation into four 
‘moments’: Problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation 
(Callon, 1986). Problematisation is the work of both formulating questions 
to be investigated, and determining and defining the identity of the social 
and material actors to be involved. The aim is to shape an ‘obligatory point 
of passage’, through which every involved actor must pass to formulate its 
identity and role. This is done by convincingly demonstrating that all actors’ 
interests are served by admitting and joining the proposed project. A 
problematisation describes a system of alliances in the face of a problem, 
thereby defining what these actors ‘want’. After making this ‘crack’ in the 
present reality, the next step in Callon’s model is interessement, or to impose 
and stabilise the identities of the other actors, who can either submit to the 
proposal, or refuse – e.g., by instead accepting the identities offered by 
‘competing’ networks. In this sense, the existence and influence of other 
networks and relationships that may influence the emerging actor-network in 
question is part of the model, but I would argue that there is a need to expand 
on this aspect to cover the complexity of an industrial setting. While 
problematisation is often formulated in and via texts, such as project 
proposals, interessement involves testing whether these proposed identities 
and relationships hold in practice. An infinite number of techniques and 
strategies may be deployed to achieve this, such as bringing in various types 
of evidence, in addition to negotiation, force, seduction, etc. The aim is to 
realise a system of alliances, as described in the problematisation. The 
outcome of interessement is called enrolment, or the successful distribution 
of roles, producing alliances of a more stable kind, via ‘multilateral 
negotiations’ and ‘trials of strength’. However, it is not easy to distinguish 
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enrolment from interessement in the model, and it could probably be viewed 
as being one and the same. The final step in the model is called mobilisation, 
which means “to render entities mobile which were not so beforehand” 
(Callon, 1986:216). The crucial question in order to realise the research 
program is: Who speaks in the name of whom? Who represents whom? A 
few involved actors are made to represent many, from generalisation and 
assumed representation, but will the masses follow their representatives? As 
has been described in studies of many difference scientific disciplines, this is 
mainly done through series of translations. In Callon’s study of 
domestication of scallops, the scallops were translated into larvae, and then 
into numbers, and then tables and curves, thus becoming easily transportable 
to project meetings and scientific conferences. Enrolment is thus 
transformed into active support. This support is then communicated through 
‘spokesmen’ – network members reduced to representatives for its network. 
However, Callon warns us, enrolment is rarely easy, as every process and 
every actor can break down or betray the enroller, and the ability to mobilise 
resources and forces is crucial (e.g. money, threat or just ‘good’ arguments). 
Actor-networks are fragile and temporally limited constructions that may be 
contested. ‘Closure’, a state of relative stability, occurs when the spokesmen 
are deemed to be beyond question, taken for granted, and the controversies 
along the way forgotten, deleted or ‘black-boxed’.  
 
In the case of Umi No Kami/Salma, the ‘problematisation’ happened 
gradually, through many rounds, and was a growing process involving an 
increasing number of actors. thereby leading to a reformulation of the 
proposed problem several times. It appears that industrial innovation 
processes are more complex than typical scientific processes, having to go 
through many episodes of problematisation to take the innovation through its 
many stages before perhaps achieving commercial use in the end. This 
involves both continuity, including gradually adjusting the formulation of 
the problem and the goals of the project, and discontinuity, as sometimes 
dramatic changes may occur in the ‘fundamental’ aims and rationale for the 
project.  
 
When comparing this with my observations, Callon’s scheme seems to imply 
a coherence between program and practice that is not always there. The 
problematisation (the program/text/idea) and the 'realisation’ in practice 
(what is tested and constructed in practice) may be more or less unrelated, 
and may not interact for long periods at a time. Hence, it seems that the 
interaction and confrontation between them is typically triggered by certain 
kinds of events (e.g., when resources, such as time or funding, start running 
out). Callon’s model may also be accused of allocating too much power to 
the innovators. It is certainly true that sometimes competing actors and 
networks are dissociated, as my case study also provides examples of. Still, 
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in industrial settings, innovators usually seem to be forced to adapt to others, 
adjust their program towards the existing set of associations, rather than 
dissociating and outmanoeuvring them (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002; 
2007). Callon does not, in this article, develop any account of how the actors 
are forced to reformulate and transform their own program in their 
interaction with others.  
 
In an industrial setting, the stabilising issues of representation and closure 
need to be challenged on two points. First, representation is rarely located in 
one place. Representation of – or ownership to – the meaning of the project 
seems in general to be more temporally limited, more contestable and more 
distributed in industrial settings than what is implied in Callon’s model. 
Second, ‘taken-for-grantedness’ is not enough in industrial settings for 
bringing about ‘closure’, as the final word in industry is not said by a 
community of professionals (such as researchers, technologists, managers or 
even marketers), but by (commercial) users, actively acknowledging the 
innovation’s (such as a new product) value and using it in their daily practice 
(Pinch, 2001; 2002; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007).  
 
As I have tried to show, the differences between science and business call 
for elaborating on – or changing – Callon’s model, to enable studying 
industrial innovation processes. When scientists approach their ideas, a 
whole apparatus of norms, methods, funding bodies and networks of 
colleagues are orchestrated along the lines of a well-established rationality, 
including writing research proposals, recruiting allies and doing research. 
Ideally, this is done in a rather linear fashion, although most of the time even 
science emerges in non-linear ways, having to alter things along the way, as 
has been solidly documented by STS scholars. On the other hand, when 
business actors seek to realise innovations, research is just one of several 
parts of the process; the main parts of the process involves many other actors 
with other norms, practices and rationalities, such as managers, marketing 
personnel, technologists and designers, distributors, various customers and in 
the end, consumers. Moreover, while ‘success’ in science may be to produce 
‘negative’ knowledge, i.e., discovering that something is not possible, 
‘success’ in business may only be claimed if (1) the innovation actually 
works, and (2) it is being used in a way that is seen to create value of some 
sort. I would claim that this makes industrial innovation processes more 
complex (e.g. through the number of involved actors and elements), more 
uncertain/contingent and more pragmatically related to method than in 
science. Here, rigidity may be more strongly related to commercial goals. 
The connection between ‘problematisation’ (posing and mobilising actors 
for an idea) and ‘interessement’ (actual exploration and testing) often 
becomes looser, but also potentially more dynamic, as more alternative 
futures are possible (due to pragmatism).  In addition, stronger 
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confrontations between interests may occur (increasing risk), and more 
radical reformulations of the problem/aim may be enforced. 
 
A somewhat different way of conceptualising innovation processes, 
particularly related to the mobilisation aspect, has been provided by Garud 
and Karnøe (1997; 2001). This conceptualisation partly builds on later 
ANT/STS research on technological and economic practices, such as 
Callon’s argument of ‘framing’86 of markets (1999), and connects this to 
innovation studies within management and organisation. They oppose the 
concept of ‘path dependence’ in industries (e.g. David, 1985), which 
explains the emergence of novelty from historically contingent processes and 
often accidental events. This may create more or less irreversible ‘lock-ins’ 
and ‘dominant designs’ which limit the potential for action, and hence 
determine the subsequent development direction of the industry. Path 
dependence is accused of granting too much determinacy to history, and 
hence giving little or no room for agency of entrepreneurs participating in 
shaping future history. In this perspective, the emergence of novelty is 
serendipitous (Garud & Karnøe, 2001:7). Instead, Garud and Karnøe argue 
for what they call ‘path creation’, or investigating the role of and space for 
agency in shaping new industrial practice, or, in other words, of shaping new 
paths. The concept of ‘mindful deviation’ is developed in an argument for 
how (collectives of) entrepreneurs work over time to realise and implement 
new ideas in the economy. In sum, entrepreneurship is human agents’ 
“ability to span boundaries of relevance structures, translate objects and 
mobilise time as a resource” (ibid:25), and in this way “disembed from 
existing structures defining relevance”, and “mobilise a collective despite 
resistance” (ibid:2). This is not a unidirectional movement, as “actors 
interact with one another to negotiate the relevance of objects and 
behaviours that constitute the technological field” (ibid:10). Such mindful 
deviation opens up for options, not only in the initiation of the process, but 
the continuous “ability to create and exercise options” (ibid:7) is a crucial 
part of generating momentum, switching to new alternatives along the way 
that may have greater promise than the original idea. Path creation often 
depends on the coevolving of several groups, in processes that both may 
constrain and enable each other.  
 
                                                     
86 The term ’framing’ is borrowed from Goffman, and used by e.g. Callon (1999) as 
a conception of how e.g. economic theory are used to draw boundaries around, and 
providing the performative principles of a certain practice. In this way, the 
practicing of markets and the theory of markets form a mutually constitutive 
relationship. Drawing on Bijker (1987) Garud and Karnøe (2001:10) describes 
frames as “a set of beliefs, standards of evaluation, and behaviours”.  
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Garud and Karnøe identify cognitive limits to the path creation process, as 
actors are deeply embedded in technical fields and economic limits, and 
sometimes they need to exploit what has already been created (2001:11). 
However, less is said about limitations to knowledge, such as the feasibility 
of future technical, economic and social relations. The innovation process 
will succeed, as if only the ‘right’ actors and resources are mobilised and 
(social) resistances overcome. However, this is contingent, first, because 
different actors and resources may be ‘right’, meaning that they generate 
momentum and progress, albeit in different directions, and second, because 
materials (technologies, raw materials, texts, etc) also have ‘agencies’ (i.e. 
characteristics or preferences) and may thereby generate resistances to the 
project. Consequently, in their case study of the 3M Post-it Notes, Garud and 
Karnøe refer to human resistance, while overlooking the potential technical 
(molecular or other) resistance towards the effort to enable particular use 
and/or persuade particular users for the invention. Still, the exploration of 
materials and economies, and the overcoming of material and economic 
resistances also require imagination, manipulation, negotiation and skilful 
combination of social, material and economic elements.   
 
The argument for viewing path dependence and path creation as “two sides 
of the same coin” (Pinch, 2001; Mouritsen & Dechow, 2001) is consistent 
with a process view, in the sense that history always matters, both as a 
constraint and enabler for path creation. As Garud and Karnøe (2001) and 
others have argued, we need to study how social, cognitive, technical and 
institutional matters coevolve and intertwine in the process of creating new 
paths. Consequently, one should endeavour to study the interaction of 
different actors and actor-networks (with different interests) in the making. 
What are, then, the dynamics of industrial innovation processes, and 
stabilising innovations? How are they ‘achieved’, when trying to innovate 
(stabilise new patterns) in the face of uncertainty? Although it is not 
implicated in the model, Garud and Karnøe still seem to emphasise 
continuity over controversy, and hardly demonstrating how competing 
interests may provoke confrontation, and how the mobilisation of time or the 
translation of objects may be contested issues. In their aim to conceptualise 
agency, the model also has a social bias, in comparison with its partial roots 
in actor-network theory. As if everything is possible regarding technical 
matters, and that it is only a matter of social agents’ imagination and 
mobilisation. Moreover, the ability to mobilise “molecules and minds” 
(ibid:18) does not mean that these elements will turn out to be combinable in 
the long-run. It simply means that a space for exploration is made, but there 
is still a long way to go before succeeding in creating and stabilising a new 
path. Hence, I argue that the mobilisation/exploration framework might help 
to better get a grip on the interactions and confrontations between the 
mobilisation and exploration process, including testing whether and how 
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social and technical relations may be possible to realise in practice. This is 
what I will now turn to. 
 
Mobilisation in the face of exploration 
In expanding on ‘mobilisation’ with clear parallels to both Callon (1986) and 
Garud and Karnøe (2001), my study shows how the presence of unlimited 
uncertainty, and the interaction with ‘reality’, i.e., the exploration process of 
formulating and testing propositions of reality, have effects on the 
mobilisation process. Busch (2004; 2007) has recently argued that 
distribution technologies and systems (supply chain management) – and the 
actors in control of these (a few big globalising retail actors) – are taking 
gaining power in the food industry. This underlines the importance of 
including the mobilisation aspect, and the politics of the industry, in order to 
understand commercialisation dynamics within this industry. Here, it 
becomes crucial to ask certain questions, such as: Who sets the rules of the 
trade, who gets access to the market places and what effects does it have? 
My study sheds light on this aspect by describing attempts at entering 
various market places with a ‘frame breaking’ product concept. Actor-
networks such as distribution systems may or may not have influence on 
particular practices and projects. Distribution and market systems within the 
fish industry, the agro-food industry and even within the pharmaceutical 
industry have had direct influence on the outcome of Tine’s blue-green 
projects (both enabling and resisting). At times, they have also had a role in 
‘staging’ such activities, contributed to change and stabilisation of frames 
(Callon, 1999; Garud & Karnøe, 2001) and evaluation principles (Garud & 
Rappa, 1994; Stark, 2006), thus also influencing where opportunities are 
sought out (Beunza & Stark, 2004), and how it would be possible to exploit 
them – whether influencing technoscience (blue-green innovation), labour 
costs (taxation and trade regimes), access to marketplaces (supply 
chains/retail companies/restaurants) or other. 
 
The expert-actor, Slinde, was in position to ‘stage interaction’ between some 
previously unrelated elements from aqua- and agriculture, as he had 
expertise within both. This idea of combination was arguably not random – it 
was deeply based within Slinde’s repertoires and networks of knowledge as 
an expert. It also did not have to be these specific elements, as there would 
have been a number of other possible combinations of elements. We can 
rather say that the idea was contingent, both based on the repertoire of the 
actors coming up with the idea, and on their preferences, assessments and 
access to resources. It was based on a specific repertoire of knowledge, 
enabling a certain degree of creative recombination of elements, a priori 
assessment of these ideas, and access to facilities where they could be tested 
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out in practice. Such a recombination of elements from different fields of 
practice is often explained as coming from boundary spanning individuals 
and groups (Orlikowski, 2002), or via boundary objects, including artefacts 
of various kinds, such as information systems, theoretical models, 
prototypes, etc (Star & Griesmer, 1989). While, in this case study, Professor 
Slinde most certainly acted as a boundary spanner, he did not span random 
boundaries. He spanned boundaries between his own fields of expertise, 
moving between familiar areas, yet nevertheless areas that previously did not 
interact much. His particular interpretation of the message of ‘blue-green 
innovation’ was about translating and transforming fish into a resource for 
industrial production and marketing, similar to that of meat and poultry. This 
version of the blue-green program was not necessarily what the emerging 
blue-green actor-network of institutional actors had in mind. As we saw in 
the early reports from the Research Council on their blue-green research 
programs and projects, Slinde’s interpretation was barely represented in this 
actor-network at all, while several other versions had more momentum 
among the more central participants. However, in the staging-process, Slinde 
still had to rely on – while at the same time subverting – existing frames of 
reference: Fermenting meat/fish the same way as when producing salami. 
We could say that he started the recombination process based on two simple 
hypotheses: (H1) Fish may be fermented the same way as meat into salami, 
and (H2) such a hybrid product should be able to find use/users. Such 
industrialisation had been possible with other materials eaten by humans, 
and both meat from mammals and poultry has been industrialised in large 
scale with great success. Now, with the breakthrough of aquaculture, the turn 
towards industrialisation had come to fish. Slinde associated with the blue-
green program/actor-network, but also deviated from it, via his radical 
interpretation – seeking to transform fish into a industrial resource in line 
with agricultural practices. It is a process of ‘mindful deviation’ (Garud and 
Karnøe, 2001) to explore and shape new frames of reference, and create new 
industrial paths; a creative process, not starting from nothing, but using 
elements from one actor-network to challenge and translate another. 
 
The initial material experiments with the idea could not, however, prove 
certainty – neither of technical feasibility nor of commercial potential. The 
inherent ambiguity/uncertainty of combining raw materials of fish with 
technology for curing of meat was reinforced, leading to discursive 
uncertainty in terms of the interpretation of the object, what it could be used 
for, and by whom, and material uncertainty in terms of how to stabilise the 
object technically. Still, after ’dressing up the bride’, presenting the 
miserable first versions of the object for representatives of business 
(ForInnova) and science (the Research Council), it achieved enough interest 
and economic funding to let the project continue with new experiments. The 
’fish salami’ had passed its 1st trial.  
263 
 
Rather weak signals from various sources had to be ‘read’ together to create 
an overall picture of this being worth pursuing. Actors with resources 
(funding, knowledge, facilities and ingredients) had to be interested and 
mobilised on behalf of the idea. Still, how and if the technology would 
become feasible was uncertain. How a nutritional product could be shaped 
out of the technology was uncertain. Its potential use and the interest of users 
were as uncertain. Finally, it was fundamentally uncertain which actors 
would be interested in industrialising and commercialising something from 
this, while also having the ability to do so. By adding the unpredictability of 
interaction, or of how others respond, studying innovation processes from a 
relational point of view expands the sources of uncertainty, compared with 
seeing opportunity, knowledge and markets as objective entities waiting for 
discovery. Van de Ven et al. (1999:170) make a similar argument, focusing 
on systems or community level factors as a main source of uncertainty, 
hence proposing that “more novel innovations require greater change in all 
system functions and, therefore, greater development time and greater 
chance of failure” (Van de Ven 1999:171). However, interactions during an 
innovation process are likely to happen between all kinds of actors and 
resources, including humans, organisations, materials, technologies and 
other.  
 
When Tine R&D began its cooperation with Slinde, the aim of building up 
competence on protein applications was a goal that was present in the project 
most of the time, not just in the project application to the Research Council. 
In practice it was a genuine interest of the involved project participants and 
in discourse perhaps also as a back-up in case the commercialisation of fish, 
or the fish salami to be more specific, did not work out. What also seems to 
be a common necessity for entrepreneurs is the ability to jump between 
arguments according to what connections to make with whom, who to 
convince, and what resources to mobilise. Van de Ven et al. (1999) 
described how aims and strategies, both in top management, and in the 
operational running of innovation projects, changed over time, according to 
the phase, status and needs of the project. 
 
In the process of selling the invention to Tine, we can see a set of discursive 
strategies used to make the idea interesting and adaptable to the buyer’s 
setting. Since the idea had not yet achieved any degree of stability, Slinde 
and his associates had to work on how to formulate it. First, it was presented 
not as a consumer-ready product, but rather as an opportunity. The buyer 
would secure the rights to exploit a potentially useful technology for 
fermenting fish. Second, the presentation of the invention shifted between 
emphasising what was specific and what was (potentially) general. The 
invention was presented as specific in referring to ‘fish salami’, and how 
such a product could compete either for the consumers who do not normally 
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eat much fish, or for conscious fish eaters wanting a less greasy alternative 
to smoked salmon, or even for highly demanding and innovative Asian 
consumers. The invention was presented as general when emphasising that 
this patent would give the owner the rights to potentially an entire portfolio 
of cured fish products, of which the salami was just the beginning. By 
stabilising a specific representation of the object as a fish salami, it could be 
presented to potential buyers as something concrete, which could be 
developed and commercialised within a reasonable timeframe. At the same 
time, the object was kept open for interpretation87, making adaptation to the 
buyer’s setting easier, and also presenting the object as an opportunity much 
bigger than just a strange combination of fish and salami. Third, the context 
of the idea was framed in a particular way. The (Norwegian) fish industry 
was framed as totally incapable of industrialisation, lacking competence in 
R&D, distribution and marketing, and being embedded in a market system 
that does not reward innovation. The agricultural food industry, on the other 
hand, was framed as very capable, potentially being a serious challenger of 
the fish industry related to product development and finding new ways of 
distributing and marketing (and hence creating economic and use value) 
fresh fish. This rendered only a small handful of large food producers able to 
exploit this opportunity.  
 
As described above, Tine, after some consideration, decided to buy the 
patent application from Slinde and ForInnova, and immediately started the 
product development project Umi No Kami to develop and commercialise a 
fish salami. When it happened that the Tine management wanted to go for 
this opportunity, and to a large extent buy into the ‘frame’ offered by Slinde 
and ForInnova, it was not only because of the sales effort of ForInnova, with 
help from Slinde and Nordvi; rather the fit with Tine’s emerging biomarine 
strategy, and coming in so early in its development, was crucial. At this 
point in time, Tine was willing to take some risks, being conscious about the 
need to learn about the fish industry, and still did not have strict commercial 
pressures on them. Moreover, this project took part in shaping Tine’s 
biomarine strategy by involving many people and resources in the 
organisation.  
 
The Umi No Kami and Salma projects were not without controversies, few 
projects are. There have been conflicts between researchers and business 
management, between inventor and buyer, and between developer and 
producer. One way to ‘read’ the processes that may illustrate the relation 
between mobilisation and politics on the one hand and knowledge 
exploration and generation on the other is via the concept of ‘evaluation 
                                                     




principles’ (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Stark, 2006). Different actors evaluate – 
assign value to the object – by means of different criteria, or principles. 
When exploring the innovation, researchers might value an object (or 
technology) in terms of quality standards, functionality and problem solving. 
Marketing people might evaluate in terms of (anticipated) customer needs 
and preferences. Business managers might evaluate the innovation in terms 
of revenue and margins, economic criteria and fit with the overall strategy. 
And the supplier/producer (Bremnes Seashore) probably evaluated the fish 
salami in relation to the prices for their raw materials, people employed in 
their local community and opportunities for entering new market systems. 
These different evaluation principles are not (always) complementary, as 
they are often rooted in – or co-producing – various actors’ interests. 
Sometimes they overlap, sometimes they are in conflict and often they 
emphasise completely different qualities and characteristics of the project. 
Yet this plurality of evaluation principles, which creates ambiguity with 
regard to the innovation, is necessary for innovation to happen. At the same 
time, it demands processes of mobilisation, including negotiating, deleting 
and combining evaluation criteria and interests. In to this perspective, 
politics are a way of naming an aspect of what inevitably happens in every 
innovation project. Some views are bridged and combined, some are 
‘winning’ battles and others are left out. While other ANT-influenced 
perspectives on mobilisation (see above) have explained this negotiation 
with existing (and often competing) actor-networks via concepts of ‘mindful 
deviation’, ‘problematisation’ and ‘interessement’, there is another dynamic 
that also deserves some attention during mobilisation processes: The 
exploitation of uncertainty in interaction between (potential) allies in efforts 
to stage and mobilise resources for innovation. 
 
The existence of knowledge ‘fields’ and ‘practices’, as well as ‘frames of 
reference’, means that different actors have different experiences and 
expertise related to the characteristics (and potential) of the elements 
recombined into a new idea. Moreover, different actors are situated within 
different sets of relationships, e.g., with (potential) users, thus having 
different knowledge of what it takes to mobilise a network strong enough to 
take the innovation through technical and economic trials on its way to 
feasibility and usability. However, few – if any – know what it takes to relate 
previously unrelated elements to each other. Simply, nobody knows, but 
some know more than others, and this may be used by innovators in the 
process of mobilising actors and resources. I argue that there are three 
aspects of the relationship between lack of knowledge and the mobilisation 
of actors and resources for realising innovative ideas (the building of actor-
networks) that need to be explicated. First, asymmetrical knowledge and 
experience may be used during interaction to exploit the other. In the process 
of building arguments to convince others on behalf of an innovation, 
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presumptive competent actors are mobilised to represent the innovation as 
something worth pursuing, whether they possess technical expertise, or are 
market actors, users or something else. Second, manipulation based on 
asymmetrical knowledge consists of mobilising apparent authority. Hence, if 
more ‘radical’ ideas will be impossible to evaluate in objective terms, those 
with more (or different) experience with (some of) the elements involved 
might be able to exploit actors with less or other types of experience. This is 
the case with all parties involved, both with actors buying the idea, investing 
partners and customers of various kinds. Third, asymmetrical knowledge and 
mobilised authority may therefore contribute to the construction of a ‘market 
for ideas’ by those who have ‘knowledge advantages’, i.e., a trigger for 
economic exchange of ideas. Choices regarding innovative ideas always 
have to be made with having too little knowledge. 
 
In order to illustrate this argument, let me recall two significant events from 
the case study. First, Professor Slinde had longstanding experience with 
research from both agriculture and aquaculture. He also had experience with 
patenting and commercialising new technology within aquaculture. Based on 
his unique combination of academic and business knowledge from different 
sectors, he came up with the idea of fermenting fish in the first place. This 
experience was also embedded in relationships to various actors, like 
research institutes, funding bodies and industrial firms. In these 
relationships, he could relatively easily mobilise some ‘expert’ authority to 
rally economic support and technical cooperation in order to start the process 
of exploring whether and how this idea could be feasible, first in a pre-study, 
and then in a full blown research project. In the next round, Slinde 
understood that it would be too difficult for him to be in charge of the 
industrialisation and commercialisation processes, so he instead sought to 
sell idea to an industrial actor. He did not have the industrial organisation 
and resources that were needed to scale up, market and distribute such a 
product. He also did not know anything about the challenges of industrial 
competence in the fish industry, related to establishing a high quality supply 
of raw materials and high quality production routines. However, his 
professorial knowledge and authority did not suffice in selling the idea to a 
commercial actor. The technology transfer office, ForInnova, was enrolled 
for this purpose, and took responsibility for co-representing the idea with 
Slinde. Furthermore, the idea was dressed in the formal authority of the 
stamp from the patent office. A recipe/description of the technology became 
associated with the patent institution, which was registered for the 
public/official quality control of new ideas. However, this did not mean that 
the idea became stable, as they could not know if there would be objections 
from other inventors, or if the patent office would approve the application as 
innovative enough, etc. In addition, it is likely that the less one knows about 
patenting, the more it becomes possible to overestimate the stability of this 
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element. Tine, which was already involved with R&D people and resources, 
was interested but hesitant towards buying the patent application. At this 
point in time, Tine had modest knowledge about the fish industry, fish as 
raw material and about patenting. They had just started their involvement in 
a few projects related to biomarine resources, and were in a learning process 
on the matter. Further, due to their dominant position within a protected 
national market, they had done very little much to build competence on 
patenting. This increased their feeing of uncertainty, in addition to the 
inherent uncertainty regarding both the technology and use of the innovation. 
It was only when another commercial actor was mobilised by 
Slinde/ForInnova to represent the idea as commercially interesting (the 
Japanese actor that was to consider buying the patent application), did Tine’s 
management decide to go for it.  
 
Second, when the increasing impatience and the re-organising of Tine’s 
biomarine portfolio enforced and enabled a reorientation of the Umi No 
Kami project, new knowledge and authority were mobilised to gather 
support for a new direction. The recently hired group of researchers from the 
University of Life Sciences brought with them expertise and established 
relations to another innovation; pre-rigor processing of salmon. The 
combination of these ideas – about fish salami and pre-rigor salmon – 
produced new enthusiasm for the Umi No Kami project in Tine Ingredients; 
it represented new opportunities both for technology and for expanding the 
product concept. This new constellation of the business unit management 
(Hovland), R&D people (Skjervold, Swensen, etc) and the fish farm 
(Bremnes Seashore) together built a renewed program for the fish salami 
project: An exclusive brand based on a pure pre-rigor salmon product. In 
addition, a large French catering actor was recruited to represent the project 
from the market side. With new expertise, new resources and new relations, 
Hovland succeeded in mobilising Tine’s owners to once again provide their 
full support through approving and investing in the new program. While the 
uncertainty of the technology and the product had been reduced, the 
uncertainty regarding users and markets was still huge. Soon after the Tine 
board of directors approved the product, the French actor was off the hook, 
but they had already served a part of their function in contributing to a 
convincing argument for the new direction of the project. The recruitment of 
Bremnes Seashore into this ‘new program’ was also clearly based on 
differences (asymmetries) in knowledge. In being quite desperate for finding 
ways to get returns on their R&D investments, the people at Bremnes had 
great hopes for Tine’s vision of selling huge amounts of salmon salami 
world wide. They showed great faith in Tine’s ability to transform their 
commercial knowledge/expertise from agro-foods to fish products, not 
realising that most of Tine’s commercial practices were deeply embedded in 
relationships with other actors and networks that could not necessarily be 
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transformed to serve a new kind/category of products. Hence, Tine could 
translate Bremnes Seashore and their supreme processing technology and 
raw material into their ‘fish salami’ actor-network. On the other hand, as the 
last part of the story showed, the pre-rigor salmon ended up translating the 
Tine project into serving Bremnes’ agenda, betraying the salami while 
maintaining its actor-network, transforming the project into a fresh salmon 
loin project.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘coup’ of the project by means of a new constellation of 
raw materials, researchers and arguments, did not only mean that resistance 
within the project had been eliminated. In the same move, potential 
resistance from top management had been avoided too, backed up by a 
‘promising’ relationship with a prominent French actor. Armoured with 
these new arguments, or we could say this new vision, the director of Tine 
Ingredients had a seemingly easy task of convincing Tine’s top management 
of the new direction of the project. Yet, this is also an important competence 
– knowing how to convince, how to enrol those in power, secure control on 
the main direction of the project, ensuring better access to necessary 
resources in the future. In such situations, it seems out of the question to 
reveal doubts and ‘too much’ of the apparent uncertainty of the proposal. 
This competence of the director was mentioned by several of the project 
participants. This may be insignificant to my argument in itself, but when 
contrasted with top management’s lack of approval of suggestions proposed 
by the previous project group,  particularly with regard to the white/red fish 
mix and technological investments, it shows how important every link in this 
complex emerging web may be for the outcome of the project. The search 
for industrial partners had been going on, both on the fish and the meat side, 
for a long time, but as soon as new evaluation principles, or ‘frames of 
reference’, had been approved, all alternatives were deleted in favour of the 
supplier of the pre-rigor salmon – a small fish farm. The argument was that 
they needed just this kind of raw material, and that production facilities 
should be built as close as possible to the raw material, i.e., by the sea, 
ensuring freshness and quality of the fish. Hence, this became more 
important than collaboration with actors that had competence for industrial 
food production and/or an established distribution network for similar 
products. 
 
What are the consequences of this? What can be done in the face of 
unlimited development risk? It seems that the kind of uncertainty involved in 
such processes enforces learning. Most of the lacking knowledge cannot be 
purchased; it is not available, since no one has done this before. The 
necessary knowledge has to be generated through active learning, and to 
enable this one has to mobilise actors, resources and time in the face of 
uncertainty. This is one answer for why innovation is difficult and the more 
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radical the worse. In retrospect we can see that Tine bought something – an 
idea and a patent application – that turned into nothing, at least within the 
time frame of this study. The idea of fermenting fish/making fish salami 
never stabilised conceptually. The technology was taken through many trials 
and finally stabilised, but it did not find commercial users. The meeting with 
unlimited development risk created far more problems than was (or could 
be) foreseen, both technically and commercially.  
 
Constructing an actor-network around a new idea is an exercise in creative 
connecting of actors, networks, resources and ideas. In this sense, this part of 
the process is more or less ignorant towards ‘truth’; rather, it is about 
producing power effects, i.e., mobilising actors and resources on behalf of 
the innovation, and translating their interests into a common project. Still, if 
and when an actor-network is mobilised, the elements employed in the chain 
of arguments may produce frames and evaluation principles that define the 
room for action in the project, hence enforcing temporal lock-ins that can not 
easily be broken out of in the subsequent parts of the innovation process. 
Therefore, the way in which this process is handled is not indifferent. 
Elements from the exploration process, such as hypotheses and propositions 
about the outcome products and markets, and relationships to partners with 
valuable resources are ‘borrowed’ in the building of a coherent chain of 
arguments and a powerful actor-network. On the other hand, the case study 
also showed that after a while it became possible (and necessary) to 
renegotiate the framework conditions, and that the actors could re-sell the 
project with brand new conditions to the top management, by bringing in 
new elements and actors, partly from the proposition/knowledge 
generating/exploration process and partly from loose connections to 
potential users.  
 
The mobilisation and the exploration (sub-) processes are different in the 
sense that they only partly connect and interact. Sometimes they operate on 
their own and according to their own logics, but then one for various reasons 
may be confronted by the other, e.g., due to impatience from the mobilised 
actor-network towards the (lack of) progress in the exploration process, or 
because there is a need to add resources to the exploration process, which 
forces the actors into new rounds of mobilisation. Thus, the sub-processes 
draw on, but also challenge each other during their execution.  
 
6.3 Exploration: Producing knowledge and generating complexity 
‘Exploration’ is the process of actually testing and developing the 
innovation. Such exploration processes are typically about imagining and 
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formulating testable solutions, e.g., in the form of theories or propositions 
for problems of a technical, social and/or economic character, and then 
testing these solutions in practice. Viable, or stable, propositions are thus the 
outcome of analytical conceptions and empirical interactions. Loose ends 
have to be tied into a concept that is testable in practice, in an interactive 
process of tuning the concept with its social, technical and economic 
relations. Is it possible to combine fish and fermentation technologies? Can a 
mix of white and red fish produce a high quality product? Can whey proteins 
stabilise biomarine fatty acids? Will Asian and European customers be 
interested in using the product in their cooking and eating practices? How 
should it look, taste and smell? Would industrial users and/or consumers use 
it, and would they be willing to buy it as a ‘high-end’ product? Can the 
production be scaled up at Lofotprodukt, at an abandoned meat facility or at 
Bremnes Seashore? The list goes on. This is a kind of process that is similar 
to the scientific method, that is, the interaction between intellectual 
imagination (Weick, 1989) to formulate ‘propositions’ about reality, and 
then test them out. Loose ends have to by tied, creating concepts that are 
testable on technical combinations, calculations and users. It may also be 
likened to engineering methods of carefully assembling various elements 
into entities and relationships that work, of making the innovation 
technically and economically feasible.  
 
Exploration and mobilisation are partly separate sub-processes, and the case 
study shows how these processes often followed completely different logics, 
and further, that they often did not even deal with the same object. Examples 
of this are when the mandate was to make a mixed white/red fish product, 
while parts of the project organisation succeeded in proposing and testing a 
pure salmon version. Another is when research funding was mobilised for 
investigating and designing milk proteins for various applications, while the 
Neptun project largely worked in preparation for producing a very specific 
product: A fish salami. Further, there is the instance when the 
commercialisation manager gradually moved from marketing the fish salami 
– the product he was hired to commercialise – to marketing the raw material 
instead. The innovation (and its (potential) relations to use and users), as it 
was described during the activities of mobilising resources, decisions and 
allies, was often different from how  it was sought to be realised during 
technical and market development activities. Much of the time, the R&D 
projects and later the marketing activities went on doing their exploration 
activities of fermentation and protein research, market research and 
conceptualisation, etc. At the same time, the project’s representatives in 
Tine’s management went on doing their mobilisation work to maintain 
goodwill and commitment to the project, by presenting reports, emphasising 
progress and downplaying or explaining reasons for delays, and giving a 
general impression of economic potential. I will here go further into the 
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dynamics of exploration/knowledge generation and its interaction with 
mobilisation, suggesting that my study complements Van de Ven et al.’s 
(1999) cyclical model of innovation. 
 
Punctuated learning/nonlinear cycle of divergence and convergence 
‘The Minnesota Innovation Research Project’ (MIRP) (Van de Ven et al., 
1999) conducted a seminal study that had a great impact on our 
understanding of innovation processes. Analysing their comprehensive data 
materials Van de Ven and colleagues drew on Anderson and Tushman’s 
(1990) “punctuated equilibrium model of cyclical change” that described 
how industry-changing technological breakthroughs were followed by 
convergent and incremental movements towards a ‘dominant design’ 
(Hargraves & Van de Ven, 2006). From this, Van de Ven et al. (1999) could 
recognise and conceptualise a pattern of the innovation process as “a 
nonlinear cycle of divergent and convergent behaviours that may repeat 
itself over time and reflect itself at different organisational levels” (Van de 
Ven et al., 1999:213). They found this to be the case independent of the great 
diversity in paths and outcomes in the processes studied. Linear stage 
models as well as random models are opposed; instead, they argue for 
innovation as ‘emergent process’ based on nonlinear dynamics, in which 
sensitivity to initial conditions and the ability to manage complexity 
(metaphorically described as navigating in the river rather than controlling 
it) were viewed as being crucial to success. Hence, innovation is viewed as a 
learning process, with ‘learning by discovery’ being “an expanding and 
diverging process”, and ‘learning by testing’ being “a narrowing and 
converging process” (ibid:203). Thus, these two processes are viewed as 
being dependent on each other in a continuous cycle. However, less is said 
about the mechanisms, or micro-dynamics, that initiate and fuel the different 
processes of divergence and convergence. 
 
Similar to the observations of my study, Van de Ven et al. (1999) 
underscores the fundamental uncertainty of innovation processes, as “the 
usefulness of an idea can only be determined after the innovation process is 
completed and implemented”, and such summative evaluations “are not 
available to the managers and entrepreneurs who are undertaking the 
innovation journey” (ibid:11). In addition, they found that the evaluation 
criteria – the principles for assigning value to the innovation – used by 
innovation managers and resource controllers shifted over time (ibid:42), in 
line with the changing needs of the innovation process and the unexpected 
events that occurred, both related to outcomes, process and input. Such 
changes “triggered innovation managers and entrepreneurs to search and 
redefine their innovation ideas and strategies” (ibid:42). Stark and Beunza’s 
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(2004) concept of ‘evaluation principles’ in identifying innovative 
opportunities from boundary crossing activities, and Howard-Grenville and 
Carlile’s (2006) concept of institutionalised rules in cross-domain innovation 
have provided similar insights, but from a more political point of view. They 
all show how the negotiation of evaluation criteria is fundamentally a 
political process through which power relations are (re-) constituted, and that 
‘borrowing’ evaluation criteria across boundaries is one of the keys to 
identifying and realising novel and valuable opportunities.  
 
A central problem from this intersection of the fundamental uncertainty of 
innovation processes on the one hand, and shifting evaluation criteria on the 
other is what Van de Ven et al. (1999:12) call the “management of paradox”, 
which means that highly effective organisations are able to perform “in 
contradictory ways to satisfy contradictory expectations” and “ambiguity in 
goals”. One such paradox, which is incorporated in my process framework, 
is found between mobilisation and exploration, hence offering insights into 
some of the micro-dynamics of how and why divergence and convergence 
come about during innovation processes. When discussing the handling of – 
the managing of – innovation processes, Van de Ven et al. (1999:124) argue 
that, in uncertain situations, there is a need for “a pluralistic power structure 
of leadership”, increasing the chances for technological foresight, while, 
however, also decreasing the chance of oversight. The diversity in views and 
conflicts is viewed as constructive in ensuring good process during 
divergence, serving as “checks and balances with each other”, while unitary, 
single-vision and hierarchical leadership tends to restrict creativity and 
deviant behaviour. From this, innovation processes are described as steadily 
producing new ‘spin-offs’ – new ideas and projects – taking the process in 
new and often multiple directions, where it is difficult to predict what will 
succeed. Nevertheless, as I have argued above (6.1), convergence, in the 
shape of ‘radical simplification’, e.g. through vision or force, is necessary to 
mobilise (and sometimes to maintain) actor-networks and resources. Van de 
Ven et al. (1999:50) further describe how, over time, “more and more 
players are brought into the game”, resulting in a complex network, 
“engaging in a series of transactions necessary to move the innovation 
forwards”. However, I would argue that including more players is likely to 
bring about divergence instead of clear and converging solutions, hence 
enforcing political processes of mobilisation when ‘progress’ is needed. 
Sometimes this might be done through aligning the interests of multiple 
participants, while other times it is necessary to cut off relations to 
‘troublesome’ actors and resources, hence reducing rather than expanding 
the actor-network. 
 
Lastly, Van de Ven et al. (1999) found that “innovation uncertainty 
decreases over time as system functions that define key technical and 
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institutional parameters for the innovation emerge” (Van de Ven et al., 
1999:172). However, in my case study, the reduction of uncertainty was not 
only about getting system functions or institutional arrangements in place, 
nor was it about technical and social relations stabilising ‘by themselves’. 
Rather, it was about processes of mobilisation, negotiating interests, 
involving strategic partners and especially radical simplification – of 
stripping down the innovation itself in order to get adaptability, and thus 
momentum – towards relations and patterns of distribution and use. 
Sometimes the innovation and its actor-network were simplified to an extent 
that in reality transformed the innovation. This is a key problematisation of 
the outcome of the Minnesota Innovation Research Project; what are the 
conditions for, and the dynamics of reducing uncertainty in innovation 
processes? Moreover, how are the divergent process fuelled to the extent that 
convergent processes are so desperately needed to bring the process further? 
 
My study of innovation processes between agri- and aquaculture was not 
designed to test or compare with Van de Ven et al.’s (1999) model. 
Nevertheless, it is an in-depth study, more ethnographically oriented, and 
with similar points of departure – to develop an empirically grounded 
understanding of innovation processes. In some sense, my study confirms 
and aligns well with their Innovation Journey, but perhaps more importantly, 
I identify, elaborate on, and provide rich descriptions of some of these 
mechanisms through which innovation processes are organised.  
 
Exploration as divergent process 
What seems to be less covered in Van de Ven et al.’s (1999) model, as well 
as within the dichotomy of path dependence and path creation, is the process 
of exploring and constructing new knowledge – of formulating, building and 
testing knowledge in practice. When actors and resources have been 
mobilised into a new innovation project, a process of making things work, or 
testing propositions in practice, starts. While these aspects have been studied 
more or less as one and the same within actor-network theory, I have 
observed in my fieldwork how these kinds of processes do not always 
interact. Sometimes they are not coupled at all, and when they do interact, 
tensions, confrontations and conflicts are often produced. They tend to 
challenge each other, because it is extremely hard, in innovation processes, 
to make the ideas and meaning produced when mobilising actor-networks 
and the actual results of development activities come together. As mentioned 
previously, these seems to be two relatively distinct kinds of processes – or 
activities – and therefore deserve more attention than they received in the 
path creation model, and they are not as tightly coupled in practice as is 
suggested in Callon’s model (in the assumed coherence between 
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problematisation and interessement/enrolment). In practice, this tends to 
produce several parallel paths, as also demonstrated by Van de Ven et al. 
(1999), which sometimes interact and confront each other. I suggest that the 
reason for this is that the exploration process, of generating knowledge, 
challenges the mobilisation process that is already established, and creates a 
dynamic that either may strengthen the emerging path, or undermine and 
destroy it, or even lead to the establishment of new path creation processes 
entirely. While they are certainly more or less intertwined in practice, these 
processes are distinguishable analytically: Mobilisation is a process of 
getting and maintaining the rights, alliances and resources to go on with the 
innovation process, while exploration is a knowledge generating process of 
proposing and testing out relations in practice.  
 
As described in the research application to the Research Council, the Neptun 
project had a research design common to many technology development 
projects, a process of modelling. The building of a ‘quantitative model’ 
(model 1), i.e., a theoretical representation of the invention, enabled 
scientific testing of a physical model (model 2), a prototype, and having the 
results of various versions of the prototype analysed in scientific terms, 
providing results that again could be fed back to – and adjust – the 
quantitative model. This was an interactive and mutually constituting 
process of developing a technology and scientific knowledge about that 
technology. The technical problems the project sought to resolve were about 
stabilisation of microbiology: Getting a firmer texture without fat slipping 
out of the product, and improving durability (slowing down the process of 
oxidation of biological materials/fat). In addition, on the side of the main 
research problems, issues related to fermentation (testing bacteria cultures), 
colour, hygiene and raw material quality had considerable focus from the 
project team. It is interesting to note here, how the aesthetic ideals for the 
modelling of a prototype (model 2) had strong associations to salmon, while 
the use of salmon at the same time increased one of the main technical 
challenges in the project: Stabilisation of fatty acids. The resulting colour of 
the model recipe was somewhere between grey and red, according to the 
amount of saithe (or other white fish species) and salmon, but the ideal was 
seen to be a clear salmon red colour. Various ways of achieving this, from 
adding artificial colours, to increasing the content of salmon were tested. 
When the project failed to finalise the stabilisation of a fish salami (although 
coming several steps in the ‘right’ direction), it was to a large extent seen to 
be due to problems with the white fish; of getting fish with good enough 
microbiological quality – or in other words of getting fishermen and fisheries 
to handle the fish with the necessary hygienic standards.  
 
Similar practices of natural sciences have been described by several STS 
researchers (Latour, 1999b; Knorr Cetina, 1999), showing how relations 
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between the theoretical modelling of scientific knowledge, and practical 
interaction with ‘phenomena in the world’ (nature, technology, etc) are made 
possible through systematic ‘chains of translation’ (Latour, 1988). However, 
what seems different in an industrial setting like this, is how this ‘chain’ 
goes a few steps further; the result of such techno-scientific exercises has to 
be taken far beyond scientific journals, and through industrial production and 
out to supermarket shelves and consumers’ situations of use (kitchens and 
food plates). In order to be deemed as valuable, the Neptun and Umi No 
Kami projects would have to prove useful in enhancing or creating economic 
value somewhere in the value chain. Therefore, this temporal stabilisation of 
the innovation, which was useful for scientific procedures, could later turn 
against the project, ultimately hindering or even betraying it, due to the 
rigidity that such (mental and physical) reifications of the emerging object 
might imply. One out of many possible versions was chosen at a certain 
stage of the process, without anyone knowing whether this version had the 
properties needed to survive later trials of different kinds – 
conceptualisation, market research, customer adaptations and use, and so 
forth. 
 
Knowledge is situated, and hence difficult to transfer across settings 
(Orlikowski, 2002). Yet, it is still not indifferent who is trying to move and 
translate knowledge. It seems that some actors are more likely to succeed 
than others, depending on the – sometimes unexplored – compatibilities 
between the specific knowledge regimes represented. In this case study, we 
observed how the actors started exploring and developing new cross-domain 
practices in buying a patent application and then seeking to develop the 
invention based purely on their own practice. New resources and new 
technologies were brought into an existing knowledge regime, and sought to 
be developed within an existing system of interconnected practices. 
Evaluation principles (Beunza & Stark, 2004), or conventions (Howard-
Grenville & Carlile, 2006), from their existing socio-material practice of 
processing milk, related both to micro-biology and to categories of users, 
were applied to find feasible and valuable solutions. Tine took for granted 
that they could get what they lacked in knowledge by interacting with others. 
However they had not foreseen that they could not utilise or connect with the 
other field of practice without first learning more about that practice 
themselves. Ironically, the act of protecting knowledge by organising the 
project in-house had the unintended consequence of losing important 
knowledge embedded in the relations of academic technoscience. The 
technical problems that arose after moving the experiments from the Food 
Research Institute to Tine, illustrates the embodied nature of knowing in 
practice. On the other hand, we can not be certain that the presence of 
someone used to working with meat would have helped the translating of the 
practice to fish. Anyway, this independent strategy of innovation did not 
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work out when working on materials from another industry. For their own 
knowledge to become translatable, they needed more knowledge about the 
practice of ‘the others’, and therefore they started recruiting allies on the fish 
side. 
 
Actor-network theory does not say much on a principled basis about what 
the (material) practices of actually doing expert work consists of. It is wisely 
left as an empirical question. The surgeon performing a skilled procedure, 
the biologist getting bacteria cultures aligned in a fermentation recipe, the 
production worker keeping nasty micro-organisms away via hygiene 
routines, and even the marketer, surveying consumers, interacting with – and 
selling to – customers. In such empirical accounts from actor-network theory 
authors there are many descriptions of professional practices, but there 
seems to be a lack in distinguishing between attaining the right, the position 
or the resources, to do a practice, on the one hand, and actually doing a 
practice on the other. To me, these seem to be distinctly different kinds of 
activities, even if they sometimes interact during the overall process. In this 
particular case study of an innovation process, attaining the right and the 
resources is what I call ‘mobilisation’, and the doing of the practice I call 
‘exploration’; that is, knowledge generated by ordering elements in durable 
patterns. Mobilisation activities may for example be expressed via 
problematisations, suggestions and promises like: “Let’s check it out”, “this 
is a problem (or an opportunity), and I have the ability to solve it”, “let’s do 
this together, and you will be rewarded”, “give some more time, money, and 
resources, and I will show you that it will work” and “there must be users, 
somewhere, for this product”. It seems for the most part to be a convergent 
activity, in the sense that a number of discursive techniques, like 
argumentation, vision, simplification, promise and visualisation are 
employed to achieve support for initiating and maintaining the process, until 
it is realised something that may become durable ‘on its own’ (i.e. by 
maintaining its own relations, or by being maintained by others – users of 
the innovation).  
 
Exploration activities, on the other hand, may be expressed more via 
propositions and statements about potential sociotechnical relations, that in 
turn are tested, re-designed and tested again, in attempts at ordering social 
and technical elements into relatively durable patterns. Examples of such 
propositions from this case study may be the following (in my wording): “It 
is beneficial both from an economic and a technical point of view to mix 
white and red fish in the salami recipe”, “if we make a salami of salmon, 
then these particular kinds of users will buy it”, “if proteins are added to the 
recipe, then the fat will stabilise better”, “if we improve the hygiene routines, 
then the mould will go away”, “if we can identify the best bacteria tribe, the 
product will stabilise and taste better” and “if we sell fresh loins under the 
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same Salma brand, it will be embraced by high-end customers”. However, 
exploration is not only about making and testing propositions, as the object 
(and other involved elements) frequently ‘speaks back’, interacts with the 
other involved participants, and may thus cause change of direction, 
resistance to certain ways of going about it or triggering new ideas. This is 
why exploration processes, or knowledge generation, somewhat counter-
intuitively tend to be divergent, and produce a multiplicity of opportunities 
and potential futures. In their passionate engagement with objects, experts 
tend to find a number of interesting problems, opportunities and potentials. 
This is, according to Knorr Cetina (2001), a fundamental characteristic of 
‘epistemic objects’, i.e., objects under investigation by experts. They are 
objects “characterised by a lack of completeness of being”, and therefore 
tend to expand and multiply.  
 
The learning outcomes of the exploration processes, as well as the 
confrontations between mobilisation, exploration and other actor-networks 
often create disruptions and divergence. This illustrates and elaborates upon 
Van de Ven et al.’s (1999) description of ‘punctuated’ learning during 
innovation processes. Sometimes positive or negative discoveries from the 
exploration of technical and economic aspects of the innovation lead to 
smaller adjustments and improvements to technology and concept, while 
other times the implications of the knowledge produced fundamentally 
undermine or alter the project. More often than not, the exploration process 
seems to produce choice, including choices between solutions, 
conceptualisations, users, partners, etc. Sometimes learning happens 
incrementally, as small adjustments to the concept, a simple reassurance to 
the management or minor increases in economic and time frames, typically 
ensuring continued effort to realise the innovation. Other times learning 
means departing from the original idea, creating a mismatch to the extent 
that a battle for the future direction of the project becomes inevitable. What 
may have seemed to be a stable and consensual actor-network thus dissolves 
into smaller constellations with different interests, in a battle of strength for 
achieving the right to further define and participate in shaping the project. In 
order to understand the development of new knowledge and new practices, 
we need to relate the process to its frame of reference. When such frames 
change, what counts as knowledge changes too. In other words, we talk not 
only about change within the existing discourse, but also changing the 
discourse itself. This, however, will not always happen. Sometimes things 
are developed or exploited that are already part of present practice, and 
change in such cases would take place on the premises of the existing 
discourse or practice, and hence change reality (knowledge/practice) to a 
very modest degree. 
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When every new solution brings with it a set of new challenges, it is not easy 
to simplify and converge. One example is the efforts to minimise the 
problem of the high and variable fat content in salmon, where they proposed 
that a mix of salmon and white fish would do the job. However, white fish 
brought with it problems of microbiological quality and fishermen and 
fisheries’ practices and routines, in addition to unsatisfying colour.  Solving 
the colour issue by adding colouring substances would bring challenges of 
nutrition and regulation. Solving the quality issue of supply proved hard in 
the face of an old historically and industrially embedded practice. In 
addition, a number of different white fish species were tested to find the one 
best suited in combination with salmon. Another example is the continuous 
interaction and paradoxification between technical development and 
commercial conceptualisation. The choice of raw materials for the recipe 
was not only a matter of technical feasibility, but also a question of 
anticipated users. On the one hand, a mass product would need low cost raw 
materials and could possibly do with a lower experienced quality of the 
product, which matched the original idea of a mixed product. On the other 
hand, a product for high-end segments would require absolute top quality in 
the user experience of colour, texture, taste, packaging and concept, which 
seemed to go more in the direction of a pure salmon product. However, the 
exclusive use of salmon in the recipe was regarded impossible technically, as 
in addition to considerably increasing the costs, it was outside the framework 
conditions in their mandate from the Tine management to make such an 
alternative at that point in time. 
 
In section 6.2, I discussed the political (mobilisation) aspects of uncertainty. 
Yet the lack of knowledge is more directly a problem calling for exploration, 
as active learning processes to generate knowledge. The exploration process 
is driven towards divergence, and thereby produces more rather than less 
complexity. To sum up the exploration process, we see that the number of 
technical and economic issues that need solving increase as experts dig into 
the innovation (epistemic) object, and therefore, the number of 
possible/potential concepts, products and users are kept high. We also saw in 
the case study that after a successful mobilisation, the resulting framework is 
kept tight until new confrontations and reconfigurations enforce or enable 
renegotiation either of the framework conditions or of the actual innovation. 
When trying to cope with the increasing complexity of exploration 
processes, we saw that participants in the Umi No Kami project repeatedly 
avoided involving experts from other organisations, such as Matforsk and 
the University of Life Sciences, despite needing their competence (as in the 
problem with mould in the Tine R&D laboratory). We also saw how, after 
the ‘coup’, the new constellation dramatically downsized the project 
organisation in the process of shaping the Salma concept, despite losing 
knowledge both on the technology and of potential markets. Finally, we saw 
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that Tine avoided involving industrial users (i.e. distribution actors) for long 
periods of the innovation process. On the other hand, if they had chosen to 
include more knowledgeable people and more resources in the process, this 
would likely have influenced the process, perhaps in ways that were 
incompatible with the interests and ideas of the participants. Such interaction 
avoidance may have a variety of reasons, such as fear of loosing control and 
strategic positions in the project, unwillingness to compromise on some 
professional principle or lack of knowledge on how to facilitate the 
interaction process.  
 
In any case, interaction avoidance seems to be a common challenge of 
innovation processes, basically stemming from the need to handle and 
reduce the divergent and expanding aspect of exploration. I would therefore 
argue that innovating actors tend to avoid interacting with others during 
exploration processes because of the risk of being influenced – or even taken 
over by – the others. Furthermore, when interaction happens, it may lead to 
more or less radical shifts in the innovation process, like the multiple ‘spin-
outs’ in Van de Ven et al.’s (1999) model. New connections, new elements 
interacting with and confronting the project create new conceptions and 
solutions, that in turn require new processes of mobilisation and exploration. 
Thus, I suggest that interaction during exploration tends to produce 
divergence, sometimes leading to shifts in the process; new connections, 
new confrontations and new elements may trigger new directions in, and 
spin-offs from the emerging path. To make it even worse, as mentioned in 
6.1, the value of elements that later enter into the process (which turn out to 
be combinable) seem to have more influence than elements connected 
earlier. Hence, later relations may become decisive for what happens next 
and for getting support. More is at stake, and therefore more of the previous 
elements have to be downplayed in order to strengthen the mobilisation 
power on behalf of the new elements to be recruited. The original actor-
network may thereby become victim of others’ interests. At the same time, 
such interactions and adding of elements may be crucial for the fate of the 
project. 
 
This interaction dilemma is positioned in the tension between control and 
involvement. From the project participants’ point of view, it is not always 
easy to make judgements about the balance between the risk of being 
influenced by others and the benefits of making use of their knowledge and 
resources. They do not know beforehand whether the project – including 
their own interests – will be strengthened, or whether they will end up being 
enrolled and translated into the others’ actor-network. Clearly, this fear of 
being influenced – or even betrayed – by partners was one of the reasons for 
isolating the Umi No Kami project when the patent application was bought 
by Tine, cutting off relations to partners that had been contributing to the 
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Neptun project, and that could have helped out, e.g., with the mould-problem 
that occurred soon after. There were also numerous references to turf battles 
and conflicts of interests internally in Tine and in the project group that 
related to what knowledge to generate, how, and based on whose expertise. 
In the later evaluation of potential partners for scaling up production, they 
clearly preferred partners that were interested in sharing ownership of the 
project rather than those only willing (or able) to do the job on an 
outsourcing basis. They wanted partners that were committed to the project 
as defined by Tine. Throughout the innovation process, from Neptun, via 
Umi No Kami, to Salma, there was an escalating battle between the 
representatives of the different ingredients in the recipe regarding 
explanations of – and solutions to – various technical issues. This climaxed 
in the battle between pre-rigor salmon and fish salami, with both sides 
seeking to translate the other into its project; one of commercialising a 
fermented fish product and the other commercialising pre-rigor salmon. 
While this battle was to an extent fought on ‘mobilisation arenas’ (see 6.2), 
there was also a crucial competition regarding the formulation, testing and 
adjusting of propositions about technical and economic relations in practice. 
The inclusion of pre-rigor salmon in the project turned out to represent a 
major shift in the project, with consequences exceeding the calculations of 
the involved actors. Through a process of testing pre-rigor salmon in the 
recipe, and adding supporting technologies (such as near-infrared scanning), 
explanations of the fermentation process were generated that strengthened 
the power of the new constellation relative to the original project team. Still, 
the pre-rigor salmon could not take over the project completely before the 
fish salami had been tested and refused by a set of retail, restaurant and 
consumer users. 
 
Even if sometimes the knowledge generating process succeeds in providing 
clear and singular answers, like in the testing of bacteria cultures for 
fermenting the fish salami, and the use of whey proteins to stabilise fatty 
acids from fish, most of the time the object and its complex of (potential) 
relations in this case study expanded during exploration. In fact, the ‘lack of 
progress’ in the Umi No Kami project, which was explained by Hovland and 
Kiland as mis-management and poor communication, probably had more to 
do with being in a phase dominated by exploration activities. Hence, they 
had the dilemma of when to intervene from a mobilisation point of view: 
When has enough knowledge been generated and stabilised to make choices 
about how to commercialise the innovation? This was even more 
complicated by the innovation being unstable within several dimensions at 
the same time. Hence, the innovation consisted of many sub-processes (both 
of exploration and mobilisation) that needed stabilisation on their own terms 
while at the same time having to be combinable with the other elements and 
sub-processes. New solutions and strategies may appear in many places, 
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sometimes gradually undermining the whole process, while other times 
suddenly connecting and binding things together. In this particular 
innovation process, commercial users of various kinds were not involved 
before this major shift took place, contrary to the mantra of ‘customer driven 
innovation’, which was also popular in Tine at the time. For this reason, the 
involvement of commercial users – the testing of the concept on potential 
customers – may serve as a main issue when discussing the innovation 
process and its interaction with other actor-networks/processes in its 
environment in the next section.  
 
6.4 Interacting and mutual translation of interests 
The processes of mobilisation and exploration, as well as the interaction 
between them, are making this complex enough. Still the innovation process 
is not evolving in isolation. It is situated in a network of more or less 
intertwined processes, each with different interests, aims and problems to 
solve. In this network of processes, the innovation either has to be adapted to 
the established patterns and practices of production, distribution and 
consumption, or the network has to be adapted to the innovation88. Research 
on industrial networks (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2001) shows how the 
former is clearly preferred, but on the other hand, some kind of network 
reconfiguration and redefinition seems necessary for anything new to be 
included. It is this interaction between actor-networks that I will now turn to. 
Van de Ven et al. (1999:148) reported that development patterns of inter-
organisational relationships followed “a multiple, parallel progression of 
numerous bargaining, commitment, and execution events throughout the 
temporal duration” of the relationship. Moreover, interaction in networks 
was often more influenced “by activities occurring in other dyads than by the 
internal logic of the dyad itself” (Van de Ven et al., 1999:148). While not 
limiting the discussion to the interaction between (formal) organisations, I 
maintain that stabilisation of innovation processes largely happens by 
embedding them into heterogeneous networks across organisational and 
other boundaries. 
 
A common limitation of organisational ethnographies, also within the STS 
literature, is that they receive a too narrow focus. It is hard to observe things 
happening outside the local interaction, or rather, the interaction that takes 
place in a very limited set of locales 89 . This is also to some extent a 
                                                     
88 See Hoholm & Mørk (2009) for a discussion of knowing, learning, and innovating 
from a ‘practice-based’ and networked perspective. 
89 With a ’flat ontology’ as in actor-network theory, all action is considered local. It 
is the linking of locales, of making networks hold together across time and space 
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limitation of this study, as it is a study of a particular set of related projects. 
Things happened elsewhere that were difficult to observe from my 
viewpoint, and still I argue that one can not understand this particular set of 
processes without also taking a broader look at the situation. Hence, I have 
tried to include at least some of the actors that were in direct interaction with 
these projects, such as the management in Tine and in Bremnes Seashore, 
the Norwegian Research Council, the government and a set of potential 
customers.  
 
In the framework (chapter 5), this is conceptualised as a ‘process situated in 
a network of intertwined processes’, thereby providing an angle on path 
dependence as being emergent and relational. If in following the framework, 
we then assume that the innovation process under investigation evolves in 
interaction with other processes seeking stabilisation (and expansion) 
through mobilisation and exploration, what can we learn about the 
interaction between the innovation process and its environment? First, it 
adds to the already massive complexity and uncertainty of such processes. 
Not only are the elements of the process to be mobilised and adapted to each 
other, the innovation process also has to mobilise and adapt to a number of 
other processes going on. This strengthens the need for partial stabilisations 
and simplifications (as discussed in chapter 6.1) before and during 
interactions with present and (in particular) new relations. Second, it bears 
some implications for the handling of established and new relationships in 
industrial networks. I will here discuss the dynamics between innovation 
processes and the network in which they are situated, suggesting that this 
may add to our understanding of the realisation and commercialisation of 
innovations. In particular, conceptions of ‘users’ and ‘markets’ for 
innovations are problematised, and it is argued that there are more kinds of 
‘users’ involved than normally included in the literature. Furthermore, I 
pinpoint some problems both with reconfiguring established relations and 
with recruiting new ones in economic/industrial settings. Below I present 
some recent research on how users and markets are (re-)configured, before I 
outline some theoretical implications of my study. 
 
Interacting with users 
In STS studies there has been a growing concern for the user of technology, 
realising that it is difficult to understand technology development fully 
without including the receiving end. The findings of these studies have been 
that users are not only receivers; they are also participants – in more or less 
direct ways – in shaping the technology. The recent emphasis on use and 
                                                                                                                            
that make up the ’macro-actors’ that in other theories are stratified into different 
‘levels’. See also the methodology chapter (ch.2).  
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users has led to insightful studies of technology, both in relation to economy, 
industry, social practice, individual users, politics and the technology itself 
(Pinch & Oudshoorn, 2003; 2008). Von Hippel (1998; 2005) has showed 
how some innovations come about from users identifying their own needs 
and trying to develop their own solutions. In developing the influential term 
‘lead users’, he has subsequently researched and experimented with ways of 
systematically including users in the innovation process e.g. via ‘tool kits’, 
workshops and joint research projects. However, Hoogma and Schot (2001, 
in Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2008) remind us that not all users are innovative, 
and hence that one needs to think through how to foster a “sensitive 
interactive environment for the adaptation of some radical new technologies” 
(ibid:543). They also problematised the concept of users, as many (end-) 
users remain silent under the self-interested representation of companies, 
institutions and individuals (e.g. children being represented by parents, 
government institutions and pharmaceutical companies in medical 
questions). In addition, I suggest that more kinds of users than just end-users 
should be included in the analysis of innovation processes. 
 
The social construction of technology approaches have positioned users as 
participants in technology development, in terms of how they interpret and 
therefore use the technology. The boundaries between users and designers, 
production and consumption, are thus blurred. Closure of the ‘interpretative 
flexibility’ of objects can be reached through several ‘closure mechanisms’, 
stabilising the technology in a pattern of predominant meaning and use 
(ibid:544). Designers, users and intermediaries do, however, interact within a 
‘technological frame’, providing institutionalised rules on how to interact 
with the technology. Users (social groups) and technologies are seen to be 
co-constructed, but the literature so far “has not paid as much attention to the 
diversity of users, the exclusion of users, and the politics of non-use or 
restricted use” (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2008:544). Feminist studies of 
technology have further emphasised the diversity of users, and encouraged 
investigations of the relative power relations between designers and various 
user groups. In this there is an explicit critique of the actor-network approach 
for putting too much focus on producers and experts, and hence failing to 
understand non-standard positions.  
 
Within actor-network theory, the concepts of ‘configuring the user’ and 
‘scripts’ are central, framing users as ‘readers’ of technology. Interpretative 
flexibility is seen as constrained “because the design and the production of 
machines entail a process of configuring the user” (Woolgar, 1991 in 
Oudhorn and Pinch, 2008:548), in short – the technology cannot be used in 
any way the users want because of the limitations built into the technology 
by designers. The representation of (certain kinds of) users (real or 
imagined) in designing and testing technology is crucial in the process of co-
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constructing ‘not-yet-settled’ technology and ‘not-yet-settled’ users. ‘Script’ 
(Latour, 1992) denotes how designers anticipate user patterns and 
behaviours, and build it into the technologies, hence enabling and 
constraining sociotechnical relationships. Scripts are sometimes opposed by 
users refusing to submit to the anticipated use. Later studies have 
emphasised how designers are also configured by users and their 
organisations, making the process of configuration a mutual matter (Mackay 
et al., 2000, in Oudshorn & Pinch, 2008:549).  This view challenges social 
constructivist approaches by giving more agency to non-humans, 
destabilising both users and products and viewing them both as relational 
effects. Actor-network approaches are criticised, however, for ending up 
putting “more weight to the world of designers and technological objects” 
(ibid:551). This limited understanding of user relations, particularly 
economic relationships, within STS has recently led to studies of markets 
and marketing, where, e.g., institutionalisation of market forms, shaping of 
distribution networks and ‘branding’ have been analysed as attempts to 
shape and control the relations between products and users. 
 
In outlining a ‘performative’ view of markets, Kjellberg and Helgesson have 
created a conceptual model of “markets as constituted by practice”. They 
suggest that markets are made of normalising practices (“to establish 
normative objectives”), representational practices (to depict markets), 
exchange practices (“to realize individual economic exchanges”) 
(2007b:137) and the continuous translations between them. Segmentation, 
for instance, is thereby viewed as an ontological act, not only of discovering 
and representing segments of customers, but also of participating in shaping 
and maintaining these groups in practice. The example of segmentation also 
“illustrates how a chain of translations may allow one setting, in this case 
often a marketing department, to assume (or be given) the right to speak on 
behalf of others, in this case a number of customer groups” (Kjellberg & 
Helgesson, 2007b:145). Food retailing is then used as an example of a 
market where “exchange, normalization, and representational practices [are] 
linked through highly stabilized chains of translations”, and with a clear 
‘division of labour’ between different actors, such as food regulation 
authorities (normalisation), marketing agencies (representation) and retail 
(exchange). This makes it harder to introduce new products that cross the 
established boundaries between product categories and user practices, as 
they may require modifications in all the three kinds of market practices. My 
study illustrates this view of markets as ongoing and performative, showing 
how difficult it is to produce representations of non-existing markets, to 
negotiate exchange when there are few associations to the new product, and 
to actually produce a material product based on anticipated quality demands 
not supported by existing regulations (of micro-biological standards in the 
fish industry).  
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Araujo (2007) outlines marketing activities as both performing calculations 
in institutionally stable market structures and ‘qualculations’ (qualitative 
judgement) in the shaping and re-shaping of market ‘frames’. He defines the 
qualitative side in the following way, “the work of qualifying goods, of 
imbuing them with specific qualities, is a distributed effort involving both 
market professionals and the final user” (Araujo, 2007:214). Thus, he 
expands on Callon and associates (e.g. 1999; 2002; 2005), who are viewed 
as over-emphasising the calculation side, and leaving little room for 
interaction between market participants. Within this tension “between 
markets as institutions and markets as dynamic, learning spaces” (Araujo, 
2007:215) the challenge of innovation can be found: Qualifying new 
products for established market practices by adapting them to existing 
categories and practices and/or establish new ones altogether, as “there is no 
calculation without qualculation and new forms of qualculation, if 
successful, can destabilise existing forms of calculation and usher in new 
ones” (ibid:222). Studies in this field, however, are more concerned with the 
institutionalisation of markets and market practices, than with (commercial) 
users. Cochoy (2005) has studied how big business (food retail) has 
produced ‘customers’ as collective and segmented actors in order to gain 
control of globalising markets. Then he describes how lawmakers created 
‘consumers’ endowed with legal rights, thereby ending up with the present 
hybridisation of business and law that was followed by standardisation. He 
argues that this has subordinated the industrial customer to the consumer 
customer. Araujo (2007) suggests, on the other hand, that in mass retail, the 
power is on the supply side, choreographing the buying process for the 
individual consumer, while in business markets there is a more equal 
distribution of power between the supply and the demand side. My case 
study shows how industrial interaction between suppliers and retail still 
seems to be more central to the shaping of food markets than the influence of 
consumers. Before the consumer has an option at all, the question is: Will 
the distribution actor (retail or restaurant) offer it to their customers? 
Resembling Woolgar’s (1991) ‘configuring the user’, Cochoy sees the need 
for educating the consumer, “selling her not only the product, for example, 
but the ‘use that goes with it’” (2005:S38), but again, the user is not granted 
an active role in co-producing the ‘market’. 
 
Lury (2004) has analysed brands and how they take part in shaping the 
economy. She argues that the “object-ivity of the brand emerges out of 
relations between its parts, or rather its products (or services), and in the 
organisation of a controlled relation to its environment” (Lury, 2004:2). The 
brand thereby comes to serve as an alternative coordination mechanism to 
price, with more ‘qualitative intensity’. The case study of my thesis shows 
this difference between price and brand as coordinating mechanisms in an 
interesting way: It is the story of movement, or translation, of a set of raw 
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materials and products to escape the domination of price as coordination 
mechanism by replacing it with the brand instead. This provides the supplier 
with a larger repertoire of product attributes to manipulate and stabilise the 
relation to users. Producing a brand, then, is “the management of relations 
between [product] attributes”, such as price, packaging, place and promotion 
(ibid:5). Brands are in this way both used to produce difference, e.g., related 
to fast changing fashions and collections of products, and sameness, by the 
brand acting “as a guarantor of the consistency of quality” (ibid:9). This is 
also the case with the Salma brand embracing a high-quality strategy in a 
market segment dominated by anonymous (non-branded and with invisible 
origin) products with high variation in a number of qualitative aspects. Still, 
it seems to be a bit problematic how Lury positions the customer-user 
outside the set of relationships comprising the brand, making an asymmetric 
distinction between human and non-human actants. The interaction between 
users and brand simultaneously takes part in shaping (changing and/or 
maintaining) the brand itself, hence users cannot be analysed as ’outside’ the 
’brand actor-network’. For a brand to exist at all, at least as a mechanism of 
coordination in the economy, it has to be continuously related not only to 
products and marketing techniques, but also to users. In this sense, branding 
too is a matter of co-creation, of mutual construction of producers, products, 
markets and users. 
 
While insisting on the heterogeneous (social, material and economical, that 
is) character of market practices, both products (material resources) and 
users seem under-studied in this stream of research. First, there is the 
representation of the actual (social and material) properties of the products 
(or services) in question. When talking about fresh food products, it becomes 
clear that the products in themselves – and not only their representations as 
part of socially constructed ‘structures’ of market practices – have a great 
impact on the shaping of their markets and market practices. The material 
relations within fresh foods are fragile to the extent that they require high 
degrees of caution during production, packaging, transport and presentation. 
Everything, from micro-biological organisms through humans, to sunlight 
and temperatures may serve either to protect and even improve quality, or 
weaken and damage it. This has led, for example, to distribution innovations 
like cold-chain technology and supply chain management having huge 
success and giving great powers to the ones controlling them. Second, users 
suffer, either from being positioned on the ‘outside’ of market practice, or 
from being only present via (indirect) representations; anticipated and 
categorised into the ‘scripts’ of various marketing tools, such as 
segmentation and branding. I will now turn to recent research on industrial 
networks (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2001; 2008), and in particular to 
how they treat these two factors of resources and users. 
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As mentioned previously, Håkansson and Waluszewski (2001) observed 
how resources often seemed to be ‘cemented’ upon each other, thus being 
hard to change or replace, and yet apparent stable resource combinations 
could sometimes suddenly disintegrate. In addition, intentions, whether weak 
or strong, could both stabilise and de-stabilise resource-combinations 
(ibid:1). In order to describe and understand these forces, the concept of 
friction90 was introduced. From this perspective, innovation is a challenging 
task, first for creating movement at all (de-stabilisation), and second, for 
coping with what is new without destroying what is current. It does not make 
it easier that change often has a number of unintended (and often 
unpredictable) consequences in related interfaces. Still, it is also a clear 
limitation of human agency, as the use and value of any resource is 
determined by the relationships and interaction processes in which it is 
embedded (Håkansson & Waluszewski 2001:4). Hence, effects are never just 
local; they become distributed through friction with other interfaces with 
other resources, transforming them too. This is a process of bringing two or 
more histories together, with an uncertain outcome and no ‘best’ solutions, 
and with a challenge of integrating the new interface with related existing 
interfaces (ibid:15).  
 
A reason for why friction also produces de-stabilisation effects is because 
simultaneous processes are connected through friction, which allows the 
same interface to be activated in several change processes. In this way, 
friction can also strengthen change (ibid:17). The more the focal resources 
are embedded in other interfaces, the more friction there is; the more 
resources will be affected, and the more power needed to initiate change 
(ibid:18). In other words, this is an argument for embedding resources, a 
parallel to Law’s (1994) argument of heterogeneous engineering to stabilise 
actor-networks. What then influences the degree of friction? Håkansson and 
Waluszewski (2001) found ‘economic heaviness’, meaning investments in 
material and immaterial resources, and the combination of these in complex 
webs of relationships to be a conservative force. They argue that attempts to 
change are forced to be ‘economical’, from the established structure’s point 
of view (ibid:23), a conservative factor in innovation. On the other hand, this 
seems to be challenged by Akrich et al. (2002), in their empirical example of 
process innovation where solutions were implemented in spite of no real 
cutting in costs, and no real increase in effectiveness. This is then made into 
an argument for how interests and intentions of different actors are 
                                                     
90 Håkansson and Waluszewski (2001) argue that the more common concept of 
‘inertia’ is of little help understanding the dynamic aspect of such networks, due to 
its fundamentally static meaning (inertia originally describes a situation where the 
object is not under pressure from any source, thus either standing still or moving 
with constant speed). 
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constantly negotiated, and the outcome – whose ‘forces’ succeed – is left an 
empirical question. Friction distributes the tension of innovation to other 
related interfaces; combinations will be questioned and thus put under 
pressure to develop.  
 
According to Håkansson and Waluszewski (2007), knowledge of use resides 
in the relations between suppliers and users, as well as between resources 
and users. They argue that academic knowledge has a long way before being 
usable by business. While Woolgar (1991) emphasised the ‘configuration of 
users’, and hence privileging designers of technology, Håkansson and 
Waluszewski argue that it is users which determine the value and use of 
innovations, and further they point to the dilemma of specialised versus 
generalised knowledge. Although the industrial logic of ‘economies of scale’ 
requires comprehensive generalisation of knowledge (assuming that many 
users need similar products, and will use the products in similar ways), it is 
often necessary to embed the innovation into specialised user practices in 
order to succeed with creating use. Håkansson and Waluszewski’s argument 
for the need to embed innovations into existing economic and technical 
relations in order to get used implies trial and error learning process in 
interaction with users, and thus that users should be involved at an early 
stage in the process.  
 
I have three questions about this that are of relevance to the discussion in 
this chapter. First, how can an actor involve others in something that s/he is 
unfamiliar with, as well as not knowing whether that something is feasible at 
all? We saw how the experienced company did not want or dare to contact 
new or established retail customers with the innovation before it had 
materialised to a certain extent. They needed ‘something to present’. Second, 
Håkansson and Waluszewski (2001; 2007) speaks almost entirely of the 
‘economic world’, as if this part of our reality is not also simultaneously 
social, professional, material, cultural and political. All these realities affect 
the network at the same time. Thus, I wonder if the available range of actors 
(and therefore users) available in the analysis is too limited? However, this is 
much more problematic in the ‘user-driven’ innovation literature, where 
‘users’ for the most part are synonymous with customers (more often 
consumers than industrial customers). Third, the argument of the 
conservatism inherent in industrial networks (resource combinations) and the 
following requirement to adapt innovations closely to established practice is 
a powerful argument pointing towards incremental innovation. However, it 
also seems to hide the need and ability of actor-networks to redefine (i.e., 
translate) existing networks into representing and realising a new set of goals 
and interests. Nevertheless, the mechanism is still basically the same: An 
innovation needs to, at all stages of its development, find allies, or users, 
who find they can use it for something, in other words, having interest in it. 
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In sum, while industrial customers are increasingly included in the analytical 
framework, consumer users are kept ‘on the outside’ of the set of relations 
‘internal’ to the analysis in these streams of research. In addition, none of the 
above included ‘non-customer users’ as part of their framework, or to be 
more precise, were given status as ‘users’. Not that all such users are left out 
of sight, but still I will argue that to analyze a wider array of participants in 
the process in terms of their use of the innovation will add a powerful 
dimension to how the innovation is connected (or not) to other 
processes/actor-networks during its journey towards realisation and 
commercialisation. It is also notable that in these contributions, products are 
for the most part treated indirectly, via their representations of e.g. marketing 
practice, hence losing some of their real/material impacts on use, users and 
markets. When I argue that more kinds of users should be included, my point 
is that innovations will, along the way, be used for a number of different 
purposes in a number of different practices, e.g., research groups that use the 
fish salami and the pre-rigor salmon for producing academic knowledge, 
political actors using these projects to boost their vision of ‘blue-green’ 
innovation, and raw material suppliers using the project as vehicle out of raw 
material markets. In this respect, the focus on configuring users and building 
user anticipations (privileging some kinds of use/users while restricting 
others) into the technology, marketing and distribution calls for a better 
understanding of the user-side, including their ‘real’ needs and their response 
and participation in shaping markets for innovation. 
 
Mutual translation of interests 
Based on this case study and critical reviews of the literature, the fact that 
innovation processes are situated in networks of intertwined processes was 
built into the conceptual model in chapter 5. What implications does this 
have? First, it adds to the complexity of innovation processes, including 
increasing the number of ‘nobody knows’ problems, and the number of 
elements to relate to each other to stabilise the network. Second, it means 
that we need to widen the analytic scope of innovation ethnographies to 
include more kinds of users. The literature is clear that innovations need to 
be embedded into heterogeneous networks to find use, by mobilising and 
adapting to other processes with other interests and aims. However, the 
relevant constellations in which to embed an innovation may change over 
time, as the innovation process move through different phases and 
challenges. Innovation is a kind of ‘stabilisation process’, in which the 
stability of networks is the result of embeddedness of elements; resources, 
actors and practices. Movement in such embedded networks create friction, 
which is a creative and destructive force, although due to the ‘economic 
heaviness’ of prior investments friction tends to work in a conservative 
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manner, similar to path dependence, privileging continuations and 
incremental changes of the existing practice. It is hard to de-stabilise 
established constellations, and it is hard to create something new without 
destroying some of what is current. However, innovation does not always 
work towards ‘economising’, it is also a matter of a struggle for (the right to) 
re-define networks, by negotiation, force and alliances. Friction in embedded 
networks also means that effects of movement are distributed throughout 
networks, making such processes highly uncertain. Potential constellations 
of actors and resources are explored via trial and error learning 
 
In the food industry, power increasingly seems to move to the big retail 
chains (see also chapter 6.2), hence making it harder for producers to 
translate new products to use and users on their own. A few huge 
corporations and their portfolios of retail chains are becoming ‘centres of 
calculation’ in the food industry, with increasing ability to control both what 
is produced by farmers and industrial producers, and what is granted access 
to supermarket shelves across the globe. Globally, Busch (2004; 2007) has 
documented how corporations like Walmart, Royal Ahold and Carrefour are 
developing a rigid design of distribution based on cold chain technology and 
economy of scale in their supply chain management systems. This leads to 
high demands for adaptation by suppliers of all kinds. Retail are moving 
towards distributed and centralised actor-networks with immense power: 
Ability to act in coordination, and ability to coordinate and direct the action 
of others – acting at a distance, and be loyally represented by a huge 
distribution network (Cochoy, 2005; Busch, 2007). The same kind of 
development started during the 1980s on a national level in Norway, with 
Norgesgruppen, ICA (now owned by Royal Ahold), Coop and 
Reitangruppen. Together they had by 1999 reached a 99% market share, 
from 46% in 1990 (Knutsen, 2007). In this new situation, food producers 
have to turn from focusing on their own raw material suppliers to focusing 
on the distributors. Unless they associate and align themselves with these 
powerful retail actors, it is impossible to succeed with new products on an 
industrial scale. It was in this setting, both globally and nationally, that 
Salmon Brands sought to commercialise their salmon salami. After failing to 
get access to the ‘ideal customer’, i.e., restaurant actors, they had to go to the 
retail sector. The relative stability of industrial networks, so often observed 
by industrial network researchers, was not easily mobilised on behalf of the 
salmon salami. Still, stability is relative, an element may resist, break down 
or disappear (recombine with another network), hence possibly shaking the 
whole network. Existing constellations were not easily altered to include 
salmon salami. This would perhaps have demanded too much by way of 
restructuring supermarket shelves, restaurant recipes and consumption 




When it comes to marketing practices, as well as the tools and strategies 
producers and distributors use to create and maintain markets for their 
products, Callon and fellows distinguish between calculation and 
qualculation. From an innovation point of view, the issue is to succeed in 
qualifying the product for calculation, or in other words hard work on 
qualculation. This is because qualculation may de-stabilise the present state 
and allow for innovations by adapting to or changing existing categories, or 
developing new ones. The Umi No Kami/Salma case provides an example of 
the challenges of qualculation, or of qualifying a new product for established 
market and distribution practices. The distribution of power is shifting in 
various industries, towards the consumers according to Cochoy (2005), and 
towards retailers according to Araujo (2007). Anyhow, power in these 
settings depends on the number of allies of the various constellations (actor-
networks), and presently in the food industry there seems to me to be a shift 
from producers to distributors, while keeping some power with the 
consumers as far as they have choice, and are represented by market research 
and law.  
 
The interconnecting of the innovation and its development process to other 
processes in the framework clearly shows a distinction between creating new 
relationships on the one hand, and utilising and redefining established 
relationships on the other. I have previously argued that the innovations that 
are most similar to and/or most adapted to existing practices, due to the 
inherent development risk in any innovation process. In commercial 
innovation, businesses are forced to minimise development costs via radical 
simplification and adaptation to what already exists. Historically, businesses 
have not been the proponents of radical innovation. Instead, publicly 
financed projects, programmes and regulations have often driven such 
processes. In strictly commercial innovation processes, therefore, one would 
expect as little market development as possible. This conservatism, 
advocated by industrial network researchers (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 
2001; 2007) carries a critique of the actor-perspective in business studies, as 
well as a bias towards ‘designers’ of innovation in STS-perspectives such as 
actor-network theory. By this logic, Tine should probably never have gotten 
involved in a project as radical as the fish salami project, due to the degree 
of uncertainty, the development risk, the lack of commercial users, etc. So 
why did they still do it? In this case study, there are some specific reasons, in 
addition to commerce, for Tine to go for this project, as well as the other 
biomarine projects. It was used as part of the strategic process towards 
repositioning the corporation from dairy/agro-food to ‘food corporation’. In 
addition, it was used in national discourses of food/industrial politics and 
rural politics, showing that Tine ‘took responsibility’ within biomarine 
activities, possibly strengthening their position and goodwill with 
governmental ministries. Lastly, there was a clear aspect of epistemic, or 
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professional, interest in the project, fuelling it with enthusiasm, as well as 
providing the basis for external financing from the Research Council. 
 
However, the challenge goes the other way too. The conservatism of 
industrial networks (‘economic heaviness’ and friction) is challenged by 
actor-network theory’s conception of ‘translation’ (mobilise and re-define). 
In order to create use for innovations, other actor-networks have to be 
mobilised and redefined. It is clear that networks are never created from 
scratch, but there is (sometimes) room for renegotiating the interests, 
programs and constellations of networks. Further, in order to succeed with 
innovation processes, it is often a battle of either translating others or being 
translated, hence there is the idea that innovation requires negotiating and 
compromising in complex networks, and not leaving any of the involved 
parties unmarked. It is still clear from this that to utilise and redefine 
established relationships; it may be easier than to establish new ones. This 
was also observed in the case study; Salmon Brands had problems 
establishing new relationships on distribution, both in retail and restaurant 
industries. When they did get access, it was by redefining well- established 
relationships to retailers, first in Germany, and then (with Salma Fresh) in 
Norway. On the supply and production side, the new relationship between 
Tine and Bremnes Seashore came about by the active brokering of 
individuals with close relationships to both companies. Moreover, it 
happened after Bremnes had tried to redefine their relationships to their own 
distribution partners without success, and thus they had a strong motivation 
to find new paths to get return on their innovation investments. It is a 
challenge to establish relationships, and to recruit allies, these potential allies 
have to be able to use it for their own purposes. I argue that new user-
producer relationships are hard to establish during innovation, and they will 
be fragile due to a lack of tangled interests and resources, providing little 
commitment from the (new) user. Therefore, the lack of ‘first connections’ 
in many innovation processes may prove to be critical to the outcome, 
thereby demonstrating a clear advantage of mobilising established relations, 
if they are available. YUM and Fairprice in Singapore, as well as Nutrimer 
in France, could just drop the salmon salami project without warning and 
without giving any reason without risking much.  
 
Furthermore, in the ‘outwards’ organising of the project, Tine and Salmon 
Brands were very conscious in including the consumer in their product 
development; researching various consumers’ environments, and asking 
samples of consumers about their responses and potential use of a fish 
salami. But from their reluctance to involve distributors early in the process, 
they failed to get answers to the crucial question: Within whose product 
range would the innovation be a good fit? This is also a challenge to the end-
user/consumer bias within the literature on user-driven innovation. Who are 
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the industrial users of such a product, what would they be interested in using 
it for, and what shape should it therefore have? Before the consumers have a 
choice at all, the product will need to be strongly aligned with committed 
distribution partners (in this case retail or restaurants). Tine knew about this 
challenge, but did not want to risk making fools of themselves by presenting 
the idea before they ‘had something to present’, i.e., having a clearer 
conception of the product and a stable prototype. Further, when they started 
the recruitment of customers, the target users were hardly specified, it was a 
trial and error learning process that in this case led nowhere. This is a 
relevant dilemma: When should (commercial) partners be involved, how far 
should the innovation be developed before exposing it to the risk of a bad 
response from potential allies, and how much simplification (removing 
ambiguity/multiplicity) is needed to get the message across? On the other 
hand, the innovation should not be too stable, in order to provide the 
necessary ‘interpretative flexibility’ so that the innovation may be adapted to 
the interests and use of potential partners. This leads to another important 
aspect of users and innovation, namely that attempts at building the 
innovation into commercial relations are likely to de-stabilise it and produce 
new phases of development, of mobilisation and exploration. In the Umi No 
Kami/Salma case, we saw how conceptions of users and markets were built 
into the product and its network, and how a range of potential versions and 
directions was maintained simultaneously. These propositions about users 
will rarely fully match, because finding or creating use for the innovation in 
other actor-networks means that the innovation needs renegotiation and 
therefore that it often will be thrown back into new rounds of development 
(mobilisation and exploration). With regard to the ‘internal’ organising of 
development (here, in organising relations to users), confrontations between 
mobilisation and exploration are often destructive, thus actors seek to avoid 
involving themselves in more relations than necessary. Simplifications of 
networks might be necessary, and the confrontations that the actor-network 
goes for are those they think they can win. And, while sometimes necessary, 
this reluctance to interact may again lead to sub-optimal mobilisation or 
exploration. Hence, I argue that when partially stabilised innovations (and 
their internal propositions about users) are tested with potential users, new 
propositions and adaptations of the established will arise, and thus lead to 
new development phases and new selection processes.   
 
A basic logic of this innovation process can be seen as ‘connect and 
stabilise’, whether material combinations or social relations. The interaction 
and adaptation of each human and non-human element to be included was, 
however, not straightforward. The mutuality of technology and use 
continued and perhaps even intensified during the process of interacting with 
potential users. If the process of connecting and stabilising technical and 
conceptual relations was hard work with uncertain outcomes, the process of 
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connecting and stabilising relations between Salma and users was no less 
demanding. Partly stable aspects of Salma had to be destabilised and 
changed several times in relation to responses and demands from several 
sceptical and demanding users.  
 
As previously mentioned, this case study exemplifies the connection of past 
and present through friction, although it does not entirely work in the 
conservative way suggested by Håkansson and Waluszewski (2001). 
Compared to Tine’s core business, this project was of a relatively small size, 
and its failure would not threaten Tine’s resources in any significant way. 
Thus, friction here had a less conservative effect, because the risk related to 
already established activities was low, and current investments and 
technological systems would continue independent of the biomarine projects. 
As for the other party, the fish farm, it might have been different. Relative to 
its size, its investments into this joint venture made it more dependent on the 
outcome of this project.  
 
The ideal of marketing practice is increasingly moving towards interacting 
and relating with users (whether industrial customers or end consumers), and 
is also becoming the norm for innovation practice (e.g. Von Hippel, 2005). 
However, when dealing with radical innovation (with radical meaning 
unfamiliar, boundary crossing and discontinuous), user-involvement brings 
with it some challenges regarding methods, timing and strategy. In this case 
study, when Tine R&D thought they were almost finished with a product, 
and eventually presented it to potential customers, the product had typically 
to be sent back to the lab again for further development, improvement or 
changes. The question, then, is whether this extra work could have been 
avoided if involving users earlier in the process, or if it would only distract 
the fragile process of technology development. Integration of development 
and marketing is thus depicted as both necessary for understanding and 
meeting the user demands, and difficult for the lack of methods for involving 
users before having produced ‘something concrete’ to represent the project.  
 
The users who were ‘at hand’, however, were chefs. They were very much 
involved in the project, at different stages of the development. With 
creativity and skill way above that of the average consumer, they took on the 
task of situating the product within familiar eating practices, demonstrating 
possible dishes and use situations, associating the fish salami (and later the 
fresh loins) with other ingredients within a set of popular and exclusive food 
traditions. Thus, the emergent object, neither technologically nor 
conceptually stable, got some help from a few ‘lead-users’, and a dedicated 
and enthusiastic project team of researchers, product developers and 
marketers. Even if this resulted in wonderful presentations and 
representations of the product, and thus contributed to shaping the brand 
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image of gourmet quality and use, it is interesting to question if top-class 
chefs were the right lead-users to align with. They were, no doubt, of high 
competence and creativity, and added a portion of gourmet credibility to the 
Salma brand. Yet, on the other hand, chefs and private consumers are 
different kinds of users. The use of the product is likely to be different 
between a chef in a restaurant and a consumer buying something for his/her 
family meals. Their competences are different, as are their preferences of 
taste and use situations. This may, however, have been more problematic 
with the Cured version than with Salma Fresh. While Fresh may be used in 
some of the suggested recipes, it may also be used in the same way people 
have traditionally prepared their salmon, with the added benefits of having 
removed skin and bones.  
 
Yet, were all necessary associations in place? Would it have been possible to 
work together with industrial users from the start of the salami project 
(UNK)? Would Tine have found actors interested in exploring opportunities 
from fermenting fish together with them? Finally, would this have led to a 
successful commercialisation of the fish salami? No one knows. Although it 
did not involve industrial users early in the product development process on 
Salma Fresh, the finished product and concept turned out to be of great 
interest to both retail chains and (individual) restaurants. Established 
relationships between Tine and Norwegian retail chains could also be used 
for selling fish. 
 
An aspect that brought the pragmatics of the commercialisation process to 
test was the difference between the anticipated user – as s/he was built into 
the product and the brand concept – and the actual (and potential) users that 
the Salma team interacted with in practice. The (first) anticipated users were 
curious, creative and high-paying users of novel and healthy products, either 
in private households or in restaurant kitchens, able to translate a salmon 
salami into their patterns of cooking. The (potential and actual) users 
interacting with Kiland and Swendsen on Salma Cured in practice were 
curious indeed, but also sceptical and seriously concerned with problematic 
issues like the associations of salami with meat, price and packaging. YUM 
even demanded a larger change of both the use and hence on the technical 
characteristics. Tensions appeared between the anticipated and actual 
(potential) users that could not necessarily be easily resolved. The shift 
towards Salma Fresh, or selling fresh loins under the same brand, was 
consistent with this pragmatic drive towards selling something to someone, 
hence going for the easiest alternative.  
 
Tine’s user relations and marketing expertise could not be used to bring 
Salma Cured all the way to supermarket shelves, or in any other way 
towards the shopping baskets and food plates of consumers. For this, they 
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had to simplify the product (paradoxically coming up with a product 
perceived as being more exclusive), and associate it closer with established 







I am ambivalent towards writing conclusions. To wrap up years of research 
and rich descriptions of complex processes in just a few pages provokes a 
fear of reductionism and of restricting the thesis too much. The fact that 
many readers will confine themselves with reading just the conclusion does 
not make it better. Nevertheless, I will in this short chapter compress the 
content from the previous chapters to provide a summary of the 
contributions to innovation process research, and point out a few areas of 
further research. 
 
This thesis contributes by unpacking the black-box of innovation processes, 
through its investigation of innovation processes and practices in one small 
sector of the business world: A Norwegian agricultural cooperative, Tine, 
and its counterparts in the agricultural and biomarine industries. It is an 
ethnographic case study of the organising of innovation processes, meaning 
the development and commercialisation of hybrid technologies and products 
between aquaculture and agriculture. What I have described is the 
emergence of a possibility: The possibility of industrialising fish, and some 
early attempts at doing so. The ongoing micro-practices of realising the 
concept that came to be called Salma should be viewed as a mutually 
constitutive part of what might become new industrial practices between 
agro- and aquaculture. It illustrates how a changing ‘macro-structure’ creates 
new opportunities, but also a bottom-up perspective of how new industrial 
and market practices are made. 
 
From the overall interest of how innovation processes evolve over time, I 
formulated my research purpose as follows: First, I want to describe the 
organising of innovation processes crossing technological, organisational 
and industrial boundaries in time. Second, I seek to increase our 
understanding of efforts to realise and stabilise new knowledge and 
technology in innovative ventures, with particular emphasis on how 
controversy is overcome as part of the process of stabilising relations. In 
turn, this led me to ask the following research questions: 
 
- How do innovation processes evolve over time?  
- How is knowledge translated, transformed and combined in 
processes of innovation?  
- What are the contrary forces of innovation processes?  
 
My hope was that this could contribute to innovation studies by shedding 
some light on the question of how knowledge, which is developed in certain 
contexts and embodied in certain objects and practices, is rendered mobile, 
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translated, combined and made stable in new settings, objects and practices 
underpinning innovative ventures. 
 
Innovation in the setting of my case study implied the development and 
commercialisation of knowledge and technology. This was manifested in 
new products and ingredients, and in new practices that crossed, or re-
organised, the traditional boundaries between agri- and aqua-culture. A dual 
dynamic came to the fore in the analysis of the case, namely between 
mobilising actor-networks on the one hand and exploring knowledge on the 
other. These ‘sub-processes’ of the larger innovation process sometimes 
drew on each other, other times they did not interact at all, and sometimes 
they came to confront each other – with potentially serious implications for 
the future of the innovation. This dual dynamic became an ‘interpretative 
scheme’ from which I have structured a theorising discussion on innovation 
processes. 
 
7.1 Positioning: Summing up the critique of existing theory 
In the review of the literature, knowledge (or the lack thereof) was posited as 
the most central challenge to innovation. Innovation consists of contingent 
processes, stemming from interaction between science, technology and 
markets, thereby producing high levels of uncertainty. Hence the 
‘management of uncertainty’ is one of the crucial tasks for participants in 
such processes. Pavitt (2005) found that coordination of knowledge and 
learning were the two generic aspects of innovation processes. However, he 
notes that more research is needed for improving our understanding of these 
dynamics. 
 
Related to Van de Ven et al.’s (1999) research on innovation processes, 
some questions were identified that still remain to be answered, in particular 
on the issue of the mechanisms, or micro-dynamics, that initiate and fuel the 
different processes of divergence and convergence: What are the dynamics 
driving the divergence, convergence and interaction between them? What in 
innovation processes is manageable and how? In the face of the complexity 
of networked interaction, how is it that such processes (sometimes) stabilise? 
What are the conditions for, and the dynamics of reducing uncertainty in 
innovation processes? And, how do system functions and institutional 
arrangements come into place? Van de Ven et al. (1999:12) found that 
highly effective organisations are able to perform “in contradictory ways to 
satisfy contradictory expectations” and “ambiguity in goals”. One such 
paradox was incorporated in my process framework, between mobilisation 
and exploration, hence offering insights into some of the micro-dynamics of 
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how and why divergence and convergence come about during innovation 
processes.  
 
While revealing a lot about mobilisation and translation processes, Callon’s 
(1986) scheme of translation seems to imply coherence between program 
and practice that is not always there. Callon’s model, as well as actor-
network theory in general, has also been accused of allocating too much 
power to the innovators. In industrial settings, innovators usually seem to be 
forced to adapt to others. Another critique of actor-network theory (ANT) is 
that it (unnecessarily) tends to lose sight of some of the connections to other 
networks in other realms. In this sense, there is a need to ‘stretch out’ the 
actor-networks of actor-network theory; ambitiously seeking to follow the 
action (Czarniawska, 1999) a bit farther in time and space.  
 
ANT stems from laboratory studies, where the major product is texts. The 
major product of industrial companies, however, are (physical) objects – 
products – often mass produced and distributed for use by multitudes of 
people. Material realities and potentialities are translated to text, but even 
more so, texts (ideas, strategies, patents, recipes, etc) are translated to 
material products, and then to economic value. The creation of use, 
exchange and economic value is what counts (and is counted), and texts are 
little more than pragmatic tools on the way. This has been acknowledged 
within the field, and finance has proven to be a fruitful object for 
investigation. However, large sections of economic practice are performed in 
a much more impure and messy mix of matters and materials than in finance. 
When business actors seek to realise innovations, research is just one of 
several parts of the process; the main parts of the process involve many other 
actors with other norms, practices and rationalities. I claimed that this makes 
industrial innovation processes more complex (e.g. through the number of 
involved actors and elements), more uncertain/contingent and more 
pragmatically related to method than in science. I also suggest that new 
empirical settings demand new analytic tools. 
 
In Garud and Karnøe’s (2001) model of path creation, the mechanism 
through which entrepreneurs deviate from existing practices in order to 
realise novelty is well explained. Less is said about limitations to knowledge, 
such as the feasibility of future technical, economic and social relations. The 
innovation process will succeed, if only the ‘right’ actors and resources are 
mobilised and (social) resistances overcome. Garud and Karnøe also seem to 
emphasise continuity over controversy, and have a social bias, in comparison 
with its partial roots in actor-network theory. Moreover, I argue that the 
ability to mobilise “molecules and minds” (ibid:18) does not mean that these 
elements will turn out to be combinable in the long-run. Research on users 
(e.g. Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008) and market-making (e.g. Kjellberg & 
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Helgesson, 2007a,b) were found be more concerned with the 
institutionalisation of markets and market practices, than with (commercial) 
users. Furthermore, in these streams of research end-users suffer, either from 
being positioned on the ‘outside’ of market practice, or from being only 
present via (indirect) representations. 
 
Last, I had three questions about Håkansson and Waluszewski’s (2001; 
2007) research on industrial networks. First, how can an actor involve others 
in something that s/he is unfamiliar with, as well as not knowing whether 
that something is feasible at all? Second, is the available range of actors (and 
therefore users) available in the analysis is too limited? Third, the argument 
of the conservatism inherent in industrial networks and the following 
requirement to adapt innovations closely to established practice, seems to 
hide the need and ability of actor-networks to redefine (i.e., translate) 
existing networks into representing and realising a new set of goals and 
interests. 
 
Clearly drawing on these perspectives, I amplified some of the tendencies in 
my case study to draw a bipolar analytic scheme that could help explain 
some of the dynamics of innovation processes, particularly related to the 
identified shortcomings of existing theory. This scheme emphasised the 
contrary forces of mobilising actor-networks and exploring knowledge, the 
interaction between the two, and the interaction between the innovation 
process and its network of interconnected processes.  
 
7.2 Contributions from the study 
Empirically, this thesis has provided rich insights on a complex 
phenomenon: industrial innovation crossing multiple boundaries. It has also 
given a relatively detailed description of a project that may or may not come 
to be representative of convergence between aquaculture and agriculture. In 
the contrasting of these two industries some of the distinctive characteristics 
of their practices have been revealed. The international and raw-material 
oriented fish industry, and the national and industrialised dairy industry. The 
case study shows that industrial interaction between suppliers and retailers 
still seems to be more central to the shaping of (Norwegian) food markets 
than the influence of consumers. However, in this new situation of shifting 
power from producers to distributors, food producers have to turn from 
focusing on their own raw material suppliers to focusing on the distributors. 
In this situation, the ‘next’ users in the value chain need to be included in the 
innovation process, and the crucial question to ask is: Within whose product 
range would the innovation be a good fit? 
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The case study, written as a ‘thick description’, may be read from different 
theoretical perspectives; as a story of learning, industrial change, strategising 
or innovation, to mention a few. By constructing and amplifying the 
distinction between mobilisation and exploration in a bipolar model, I 
explain some of the micro-dynamics of innovation processes from an angle 
that, to the best of my knowledge, has not yet been sufficiently described in 
the literature. First, during (sub-) processes of mobilisation, actor-networks 
are recruited and committed to things with which they are initially 
unfamiliar: An idea, a prospect or a prototype of something that may or may 
not become feasible and useable. Yet, to enable mobilisation, a degree of 
certainty has to be presumed. Second, during (sub-)processes of knowledge 
exploration, the aim is to create knowledge – to explore the object and its 
potentials – and therefore change is unavoidable. Moreover, this process of 
generating knowledge tends to multiply (alternatives of) the object, and 
hence increase rather than decrease the uncertainty/complexity – or 
development risk – of the project. Mobilisation and exploration are contrary 
forces in this model, and sometimes it appears almost like the innovation 
process is at war with itself. Whereas mobilisation is directed towards 
aligning interests and reducing risk, exploration is directed towards 
formulating and testing propositions about reality. While mobilisation seeks 
to converge, exploration frequently leads to divergence of the innovation. 
Finally, the interaction between mobilisation and exploration processes on 
the one hand, and between different actor-networks/organising processes on 
the other, often leads to controversies and compromises that may set the 
project off in new directions.  
 
In relation to ANT/STS, the study shows how the pragmatics of business 
(which may be understood as a set of practices connected to economic 
theory, consumer practices, industrial networks, marketing/branding 
practices, etc) may compromise the technological passions and interests 
driving technical innovation, making science less ‘pure’, less hegemonic, 
and less seducing. In the meeting between inventions of technoscience and 
the tough ‘realities’ of business, it is an open question what remains of the 
initial innovation, how it is combined with existing business practices in 
order to find use(-rs), and how it takes part in reconfiguring and 
reconstituting those practices. In relation to innovation management and 
industrial networks, the study shows how technoscience, and its creative 
chaos (of ideas and direction) and rigidity (of method) sometimes serves as 
precondition, one of a number of resources, for creating new commercial 
practices. 
 
The presence of a number of uncertainties – ‘nobody knows’ problems – 
frequently produces high development risk in innovation projects. Although 
being experts in their respective fields, I argue that innovators’ lack of 
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knowledge pertains to the connection and translation of knowledge and 
technology between settings. Putting knowledge, and the lack thereof, at the 
centre of attention, the framework suggests that innovators have to produce 
two different kinds of knowledge: First, a chain of arguments suited for 
convincing, mobilising, maintaining and removing (parts of) actor-networks 
and their resources. Second, they need to produce testable propositions about 
reality, e.g. of how to make the technology work and what users having 
interest in such a product. Innovation processes are propositional at their 
core. The original idea is a proposition about the potential that stems from a 
new combination of elements. This idea needs some resources to get started, 
and then the idea needs to be explored in practice – testing whether and how 
the proposition may hold. This will normally happen by breaking the 
original idea into a series of new and ‘smaller’ propositions; as the 
innovation is opened up and investigated, it is revealed as a more or less 
complex set of problems, all having many different solutions in potentia. 
However, in order to enrol allies, it is necessary to make the idea and 
concept converge on a number of aspects, and this will often create a ‘lock-
in’ for the for the subsequent process – at least for a period of time. I further 
argue that every ’nobody knows-problem’ of an innovation has to be taken 
through several stages to be resolved. Further, the complexity – and hence 
risk – of innovation processes is equal to the number of nobody-knows 
problems times the number of stages they have to be taken through. 
 
Mobilising actor-networks 
In this thesis I argue that power to mobilise elements and decisions for 
innovation is produced by constructing a (more or less coherent) chain of 
arguments. In other words, mobilisation of actor-networks is based on a 
relational logic of ‘power production’, i.e., of carefully building (or 
connecting to) networks of human and non-human elements with interests in 
realising the innovation. Hence, constructing an actor-network around a new 
idea is an exercise in creative connecting of actors, networks, resources and 
ideas. In this sense, this part of the process is more or less ignorant towards 
‘truth’; rather, it is about producing power effects, i.e., mobilising actors and 
resources on behalf of the innovation, and translating their interests into a 
common project. Still, if and when an actor-network is mobilised, the 
elements employed in the chain of arguments may produce frames and 
evaluation principles that define the room for action in the project. Hence, 
temporal lock-ins may be enforced that can not easily be broken out of in the 
subsequent parts of the innovation process. In chapter 6 I have derived some 
more specific suggestions for theorising the mobilisation aspect of 
innovation processes.  
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I argue that there is a relationship between mobilisation and time: In the case 
study, elements enrolled and mobilised in the innovation process tended to 
have more influence on the innovation the later in the process they were 
included. The reason for this effect seems twofold: First, the element 
representing the most recent changes – improvements or alterations – have 
more narrative power in representations of the innovation process, such as 
project reports and presentations, in their symbolic power as representatives 
of ‘progress’ in processes of high uncertainty and unclear evaluation criteria. 
Second, in order to mobilise new actors and resources into the process, 
sometimes the significance of the results already achieved has to be 
downplayed in order to increase the necessity of the new. Argumentative 
power may be produced by increasing the importance of the new relative to 
the old. 
 
I also argue for the exploitation of uncertainty in interaction between 
(potential) allies in efforts to stage and mobilise resources for innovation. 
The existence of knowledge ‘fields’ and ‘practices’, as well as ‘frames of 
reference’, means that different actors have different experiences and 
expertise related to the characteristics (and potential) of the elements 
recombined into a new idea. Moreover, different actors are situated within 
different sets of relationships. However, few – if any – know what it takes to 
relate previously unrelated elements to each other. I argue that there are three 
aspects of the relationship between lack of knowledge and the mobilisation 
of actors and resources for realising innovative ideas (the building of actor-
networks) that need to be explicated: First, asymmetrical knowledge and 
experience may be used during interaction to exploit the other. In the process 
of building arguments to convince others on behalf of an innovation, 
presumptive competent actors are mobilised to represent the innovation as 
something worth pursuing. Second, manipulation based on asymmetrical 
knowledge consists of mobilising apparent authority. Hence, if more 
‘radical’ ideas will be impossible to evaluate in objective terms, those with 
more experience with (some of) the elements involved might be able to 
exploit actors with less or other types of experience. Third, asymmetrical 
knowledge and mobilised authority may therefore contribute to the 
construction of a ‘market for ideas’ by those who have ‘knowledge 
advantages’, i.e., a trigger for economic exchange of ideas. In any case, 




Uncertainty, or the lack of knowledge, in innovation is a problem calling for 
‘exploration’; an active learning process. Exploration is the process of 
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actually testing and developing the innovation. Such exploration processes 
are typically about imagining and formulating testable solutions, e.g., in the 
form of theories or propositions for problems of a technical, social and/or 
economic character, and then testing these solutions in practice. The 
exploration process, of knowledge generation through proposing, testing, 
interacting and adapting (aspects of) the innovation, is supposed to move 
asymptotically towards solid knowledge. The paradox is that while the aim 
of exploration processes is to produce knowledge, they (almost) always 
produce complexity; multiplicity, ambiguity, choice. Even if sometimes the 
knowledge generating process succeeds in providing clear and singular 
answers, most of the time the object and its complex of (potential) relations 
in this case study expanded during exploration. I argue that this partly has to 
do with the innovation, at least in its early phases, being unstable within 
several dimensions, and that its stabilisation requires exploration of a 
number of interconnected issues. In addition, when experts start 
investigating an idea, making it into an ‘epistemic object’ (Knorr Cetina, 
2001), it opens up and becomes a complex of interesting problems and 
opportunities. Paradoxically, in industrial settings exploration is a process 
aiming for expanding and generalising the concept, often involving 
hypotheses about appropriation and economies of scale. The innovation has 
to be brought towards stabilisation as a general concept and thus possible to 
scale up. This presupposes that the concept is tested in practice, that it shows 
that it holds. From this I suggest some theoretical implications of the 
knowledge exploration (sub-)process. 
 
A main point in my analytic scheme is that processes of mobilisation and 
exploration not always interact. Sometimes they are not coupled at all, and 
when they do interact, tensions, confrontations and conflicts are often 
produced. I suggest that the reason for this is that the exploration process, of 
generating knowledge, challenges the mobilisation process that is already 
established, and creates a dynamic that may either strengthen the emerging 
path, or undermine and destroy it, or even lead to the establishment of new 
path creation processes entirely. Often, learning leads to departing from the 
original idea, which may create a mismatch to the extent that a battle for the 
future direction is unavoidable. Therefore, interaction avoidance seems to be 
a common challenge of innovation processes, basically stemming from the 
need to handle and reduce the divergent and expanding aspect of 
exploration. I argue that actors tend to avoid interacting with others during 
exploration processes because of the risk of being influenced, moreover, that 
the battles that innovators take are only the ones they think they can win. We 
also saw in the case study that after a successful mobilisation, the resulting 
framework is kept tight until new confrontations and reconfigurations 




While acknowledging that knowledge is situated, and hence difficult to 
transfer across settings (Orlikowski, 2002), I argue that it is still not 
indifferent who is trying to move and translate knowledge. It seems that 
some actors are more likely to succeed than others, depending on the – 
sometimes unexplored – compatibilities between the specific knowledge 
regimes represented. In the case study, for their own knowledge to become 
translatable, Tine needed more knowledge about the practice of ‘the others’, 
and therefore they started recruiting allies on the fish side. 
 
Network of interconnected processes 
Not only are (sub-)processes of innovation (sometimes) interacting, the 
innovation process is also interacting with a number of other actor-networks 
in a network of interconnected processes, thereby considerably increasing 
the complexity and uncertainty. The industrial network approach (IMP) was 
brought in to complement actor-network theory on this part. I suggest that, 
from a process perspective, path dependence is better seen as relatively 
slower processes, maintained via carefully and often long-term assembled 
and intertwined networks of heterogeneous elements. Movement in such 
embedded networks create friction, which is a creative and destructive force, 
privileging continuations and incremental changes of the existing practice. 
This view of path dependence explains some of the slowness and some of 
the unexpected outcomes of innovation processes: (1) why innovation 
processes tend to take significantly more time than expected, and (2) why 
‘successful’ innovations often are realised as incremental changes or 
additions to the existing set of relations. However, the conservatism of 
industrial networks is challenged by actor-network theory’s conception of 
‘translation’ (mobilise and re-define). In order to create use for innovations, 
other actor-networks have to be mobilised and redefined. It is clear that 
networks are never created from scratch, but there is (sometimes) room for 
renegotiating the interests, programs and constellations of networks. 
Anyway, there is a distinction between creating new relationships on the one 
hand, and utilising and redefining established relationships on the other, and 
I argue that new user-producer relationships are hard to establish during 
innovation, and that they will be fragile due to a lack of tangled interests and 
resources, providing little commitment from the (new) user. 
 
In particular I problematise conceptions of ‘users’ and ‘markets’ for 
innovations, and argue that more kinds of users than just end-users should be 
included in the analysis of innovation processes, because innovations will, 
along the way towards realisation and commercialisation, be used for a 
number of different purposes in a number of different practices. In fact, for 
the stabilisation of the innovation and its actor-network in cases of radical 
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innovation, one needs to achieve a certain degree of stability of the 
innovation before involving users. Otherwise, the concept will not be able to 
resist pressure from sceptical actors. Moreover, with a high number of 
unstable and variable elements in the concept, interaction with users will 
produce a number of new possibilities that are impossible to handle in 
practice. Therefore, when finally going for something, one tends to go for 
the alternative with the fewest (new) elements, the most similar alternative to 
what exists from before. 
 
Further, building the innovation into commercial relations is likely to de-
stabilise it and produce new phases of development, of mobilisation and 
exploration. Hence, finding or creating use for the innovation in other actor-
networks means that the innovation needs renegotiation. As mentioned 
previously, confrontations between mobilisation and exploration are often 
destructive, thus actors seek to avoid involving themselves in more relations 
than necessary, and simplifications of networks might be necessary. And, 
while sometimes necessary, this reluctance to interact may again lead to sub-
optimal mobilisation or exploration. I argue that when partially stabilised 
innovations (and their internal propositions about users) are tested with 
potential users, new propositions and adaptations of the established will 
arise, and thus lead to new development phases and new selection processes. 
In order to minimise such challenges, and thereby reducing development 
costs, businesses are forced into radical simplification of the innovation and 
its network, and adaptation to what already exists. 
 
In sum, I maintain that my study have contributed to our understanding of 
industrial innovation processes by challenging and complementing 
perspectives of punctuated learning (Van de Ven et al., 1999), path creation 
(Garud & Karnøe, 2001), market making (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2007 a,b; 
Araujo, 2007) and user-producer interaction (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 
2007; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008). My analytic scheme and subsequent 
theorising is consistent with the methodology of actor-network theory, while 
also drawing on the insights of the mentioned perspectives. However, it 
differs from many actor-network theory accounts and conceptions in its 
attempt at handling industrial innovation, rather than science and technology 
development. It also differs from the related emerging sociology of finance 
(Callon, 1999; Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2004) in dealing with ‘less pure’ 
settings. I have emphasised the controversies of innovation; both within the 
process itself, and between the innovation process and its related network of 




7.3 Methodological contributions 
While working from a relational and process perspective as found 
particularly in actor-network theory, the movement (translation) of ANT 
from science and technology studies to studies of industrial innovation 
demands developing new tools and concepts. I have contributed to the 
emerging conceptualisation of industrial innovation processes by developing 
and using an analytic scheme, including a set of process based concepts, 
which I claim to be more in line with the empirical setting of industry than 
what was available in ANT. This was partly derived from the dynamics of 
the case study, and partly developed from drawing on insights and concepts 
from innovation management and the industrial network approach (IMP).  
 
The connecting of ANT and IMP was suggested by Mattsson (2003), and on 
the issue of market making/marketing, this has already produced interesting 
insights (e.g. Araujo, 1998; 2007; Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006). My thesis 
contributes by following an innovation process from idea, through 
technology development and conceptualisation, to commercialisation. 
Starting out from an ANT perspective, in my view, it is possible – and 
rewarding – to combine some aspects of IMP with ANT. In particular, the 
‘resource perspective’ in IMP has some clear similarities with the basic 
thinking of ANT. Resources in IMP are heterogeneous, relational and are 
seen to interact, meaning that resources only get their value and identity 
from their relations. If including humans, groups and organisations, this is 
very similar to ANT’s view of actors and actor-networks. Therefore, I could 
import in particular two aspects from IMP to my analysis. First, the concept 
of friction helps me explain the problems of associating something new 
within, or changing, established practices. Second, the stringent focus on 
(relatively stable) relationships in industrial networks, giving an ‘outsider’ 
view on innovation processes, has provoked a stronger interpretation of 
emerging actor-networks’ interconnectedness to other processes and other 
actor-networks. As far as I can understand, however, it seems more difficult 
to combine the activity and the actor perspectives of IMP with ANT. While 
perhaps not being necessary, activities and actors in IMP tend to be depicted 
in more structural – and thus less interactive/process based – terms.  
 
It is also of value that I have demonstrated the possibilities and the 
challenges of doing ethnographic case studies of innovation processes. On 
the one hand, it demands open access to relevant organisational settings, and 
brings with it challenges of observing in multiple places and of not knowing 
when and where the important events happen. On the other hand, it provides 
opportunities to produce a more fine-grained understanding of innovation 
processes than what has been produced by much of the innovation process 
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literature, as demonstrated for example in the identification of some of the 
drivers for divergence and convergence during innovation. 
 
7.4 Limitations to the study 
There are some limitations to this study. The methodological limitations of 
doing ethnographic research were also mentioned in chapter 2: Observing at 
multiple sites, not knowing where (influential) decisions are made and 
having limited access to the field have been the most pressing issues during 
this research. In addition, I had to use historical materials in order to trace 
parts of the process that happened before I started the field study. Related to 
theory, this study is limited to just one case study, hence limiting the 
discussion of generalisability of my findings. This is partly compensated for 
by comparing with previous literature, but the relevance of the analytic 
scheme in chapter 5 and the theorising in chapter 6 for other cases of 
industrial innovation remains unexplored: In what settings and under what 
conditions will the model be useful? How should it be tuned for (1) handling 
a wider set of innovation processes, or (2) giving a more precise and 
comprehensive understanding of particular innovation processes? 
 
In addition, I cannot exclude the influence of the specific setting of the case 
study for developing the analytic scheme and the subsequent theorising. 
Norwegian agriculture is different from many other industries in that it is 
protected by national trade barriers and almost without competition. 
Norwegian fish industry, on the other hand, is in a very early stage of 
industrialisation, having gotten control of their raw materials very recently, 
hence being in a process of transition from a catch-based logic towards an 
industrial logic. Nevertheless, I presume that the insights of this study have 
at least some relevance to other industrial settings, as many similar elements 
will be present.  
 
7.5 Further research 
There has been a call for studies of innovation processes in organisation and 
management research for the last 25 years, and yet our understanding of 
innovation processes is still limited. Although researchers like Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986) and Van de Ven et al. (1999) have pioneered the field 
through empirically and analytically rigorous studies, the topic is still far 
from illuminated in all its complexity. Similarly there has been recent calls 
for process studies of organisation (e.g. Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; Van de Ven 
& Poole, 2005), even though researchers like Weick (1979) radically 
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challenged the field with his process based view 30 years ago. I suggest that 
ethnographic and comparative ethnographic case studies represent a great 
potential for contributing to these fields of research. 
 
First, I suggest that there is a need for testing and tuning process based 
models, like the one presented in this thesis, in more settings. It could be 
tested in studies of innovation processes on more ‘strategic levels’ of 
organisations, such as the overall development of innovation strategy in the 
Tine corporation. Another route would be to use the model for research 
within various other industries, enabling testing the relevance of the model 
as well as comparison of innovation processes across industries. 
Furthermore, the relevance of the model in settings of (1) service innovation, 
and (2) entrepreneurship has not been discussed in this thesis, and I would be 
curious about the differences that would appear if this was done.  
 
Second, I think that the insights produced from the analysis of the case study 
in this thesis are not exhaustive. At this level of detail in the empirical 
descriptions, more could be gained than I have been able to do in this 
project. In particular, I suggest that it would be interesting to identify more 
of the various strategies used for coping with the controversy and interaction 
(1) between the mobilising of actor-networks and the exploration of 
knowledge, and (2) between the innovation process and the network of 
interconnected processes in which it is situated. 
 
Third, I suggest that much could be gained from doing more systematic and 
comparative ethnography. Hess (1992:16) lists how comparative 
ethnography have been used to study “implicit values and meanings” within 
science and technology studies, particularly to reveal differences between 
geographical/cultural settings, discursive domains, researchers’ practices, 
and different categories of users of technologies. Various contextual and 
structural variables have in this way been employed to contrast different 
‘cultures’, highlighting their difference and uniqueness in line with 
traditional anthropology. While many of the studies he refers to are studies 
of innovation, the focus has been more on the cultures and practices of 
scientists and technologists, than on the characteristics of the innovation 
process itself. Moreover, Hess refers to ethnography of science and 
technology rather than ethnography of industry. From ethnographic research 
understanding can be built bottom-up; from micro-events to a web of 
interacting actors and processes. From the particularly challenging task of 
selecting and delimiting ongoing/real-time cases in the face of the vast 
uncertainty of innovation processes, it is not easy to do in practice. To date, 
most comparative case studies within the field seem to use interviews and 
archival data to investigate their cases retrospectively. However, as I hope to 
have demonstrated in this thesis, the continuing effort towards conducting 
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rigorous ethnographic research on innovation processes might produce new 
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Appendix A: List of participating persons and organisations 
 
Person Role Organisation 
Erik Slinde Research Inst.of Marine Research 
Berit Nordvi Research Tine R&D 
Dorotha Dynda Research Tine R&D 
Even Manseth Research Tine R&D 
Hilde Torvanger Marketing Tine R&D 
Janne Haugdal Product development Tine R&D 
Johanne Brendehaug Research Tine R&D 
Karl Inge Rekdal Project manager Tine R&D 
Lars Petter Swensen Product development Tine R&D 
Ove Johansen Product development Tine R&D 
Per Olav Skjervold Research Tine R&D 
Svein Erik Hilsen Product development (Chef) Tine R&D 
Hanne Refsholt Corporate mgmt (later CEO) Tine BA 
Jan Ove Holmen Corporate management (CEO) Tine BA 
Jan Ove Tryggestad Board of Directors Tine BA 
Per Magnus Mæhle Corporate management Tine BA 
Bente Mogård Internationalisation, IPR Tine Ingredients/R&D 
Gunnar Hovland Management Tine Ingredients 
Øyvind Kiland Marketing Tine Ingredients 
Jan Ove Morlandstø Management Bremnes Seashore/SB 
Bjørn Rino Jacobsen Production Bremnes Seashore 
Magda Sæverud Production Bremnes Seashore 
Olav Svensen Jr. Board of Directors Bremnes Seashore 
Anonymous Product development YUM R&D (Singapore) 
Detlef Martens Marketing DM-Nor (Germany) 
Linda Karaffa Marketing Norseland (US) 
Roar Sjåvåg Fresh Produce Manager Jakob’s 







Bremnes Seashore  
The Culinary Institute 
DM-Nor (marketing agency, Germany) 




Norgesgruppen (retail chain) 
Norwegian Food Research Institute 
(Matforsk) 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences 
NutriMarine Life Science 
Research Council of Norway (RCN) 































Appendix B: Field-sources 
Fieldstudies/participant observations 
Fieldnotes from my participant observations at Tine’s corporate headquarters 
(Oslo), Tine R&D (Oslo and Voll), Bremnes Seashore (Bømlo), Maritex 
(Sortland), and SIAL food fair (Paris). See methodology chapter for an 
account of the fieldwork done for this study.  
 
During my fieldstudies, I have benefitted immensely from open discussions 
of people’s work practices and experience, in particular: 
- Tine Ingredients: Bente Mogård, Gunnar Hovland, Øyvind Kiland, 
Erik Lie, Elisabeth Lie, Roger Hem 
- Tine R&D: Lars Petter Swensen, Eirik Selmer-Olsen, Even 
Manseth, Per Olav Skjervold, Dorotha Dynda, Svein Erik Hilsen, 
and the members of “Jarl S. Berg’s experimental factories” (JSB) 
- Tine BA: Per Magnus Mæhle, Asbjørn Tandberg, Tor Guttormsen, 
Unni Sjøflot, Jan Ove Tryggestad 
- Bremnes Seashore: Jan Ove Morlandstø (MD, Salmon Brands), 
Bjørn Willy Sæverud (MD, Bremnes Seashore), Olav Svendsen Jr. 
(chairman of the BS board), and Olav Svendsen Sr. (founder of BS) 
- Maritex: Victor Johnsen (MD), Fred Frivåg, and Frank Hansen 
- Jakob’s (supermarket): Roar Sjåvåg (fresh produce manager) 
- Gilde (Norwegian Meat Cooperative): Egil Olsvik corporate director 
- Fjordland: Knut Søyland (in charge of product development) 
- Others: Tore Teigen (consultant), Thomas B. Nilsen (the Culinary 
Institute), Linda Karaffa (Norseland US) 
 
Fieldnotes and interviews from Margrethe Schønning and Morten Huse’s 
study of Tine’s corporate board, 2004. 
 
Documentation (project and individual archives) 
- Project documentation of the Umi No Kami and Salma projects from 
Øyvind Kiland (Tine Ingredients/Salmon Brands) and Bente Mogård 
(Tine Ingredients), including board meetings, correspondence, 
market research, etc. 
- Project documentation of Neptun by Berit Nordvi, project manager, 
Tine R&D 
- Project documentation of the Maritex project from Bente Mogård, 
Tine Ingredients 
- Electronic project folders: Umi No Kami and Salma 
- Excerpts from e-mail correspondence between Tine, Bremnes 
Seashore, and customers 
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- Excerpts from e-mail correspondence between Tine, Maritex, and 
customers 
- Evaluations and summaries of Tine’s bluegreen activities by Per 
Magnus Mæhle, corporate director 
- Presentations of the Salma project by Lars Petter Swensen, project 
manager, Tine R&D 
 
Interviews  
- Bente Mogård, internationalisation and IPR, Tine Ingredients/R&D 
- Berit Nordvi, researcher and project manager, Neptun, Tine R&D 
- Eirik Selmer-Olsen, research manager, Tine R&D 
- Even Manseth, researcher/project manager, Tine R&D 
- Gunnar Hovland, MD, Tine Ingredients 
- Hanne Refsholt, CEO, Tine BA 
- Hilde Torvanger, marketing, Tine R&D 
- Ingeborg Flornes, project manager, Tine R&D 
- Janne Haugdal, product developer, Tine Ingredients/R&D 
- Johanne Brendehaug, research director, Tine R&D 
- Karl Inge Rekdal, project manager, Umi No Kami, Tine R&D 
- Lars Petter Swensen, project manager, Salma, Tine R&D 
- Ove Johansen, product development director, Tine R&D 
- Per Magnus Mæhle, corporate director, Tine 
- Per Olav Skjervold, innovation manager, Tine R&D 
- Roger Hem, Tine Ingredients 
- Willy Finkelsen, Tine R&D 
- Øyvind Kiland, commercialization manager, Tine Ingredients 
 
- Bjørn Rino Jacobsen, production manager, Bremnes Seashore 
- Jan Ove Morlandstø, MD, Bremnes Seashore/Salmon Brands 
- Magda Sæverud, production worker, Bremnes Seashore 
- Olav Svendsen Jr, owner/chairman of the board, Bremnes Seashore 
 
- Detlef Martens, agent for Tine in Germany 
- Erik Slinde, Senior Researcher, the Marine Research Institute 
 
 
 
